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ABSTRACT
This is a study of the significance of the myth of the 
Anglo-Saxon constitution as part of the 18th century artisan mind. 
The study is undertaken by applying social science concepts such 
as structure, paradigm and myth to examine the logic of popular 
ideas.
The myth of the Anglo-Saxon constitution is first related 
to the general level of rationality or mentality. This is followed 
by two case study chapters which examine particular expressions of 
'Anglo-Saxon' or gothic thought in detail. This involves a 
reassessment of the writing of Major John Cartwright, Thomas Bewick, 
William Cobbett, Sir William Jones, John Baxter, Thomas Evans,
Thomas Spence and Grovenor Henson. The last chapter draws together 
the common elements in all these writers and supports the existence 
of 'gothic paradigm' by examples from other writers of the time.
It is argued that virtue, custom and natural law form part 
of a single paradigm of thought. It is further argued that these 
secular political concepts are embedded in a (Protestant) religious 
framework. A deeper substructure is also discovered and is 
formalised using social anthropological conceptions of myth. 
Consequently, while not a primitive or pre-literate society, 
the study of certain aspects of its political ideology suggests 
18th century society is pre-Enlightened, pre or semi-industrial 
and pre (modern) capitalist in many of its habits of mind.
PREFACE
The requirements as to the scope and content of Ph.D. theses 
have been taken seriously.
Some new sources have been used. A new gloss has often been 
put on familiar material. Old arguments have been recast.
The discipline of history is undergoing the broadening of its 
framework. An attempt has been made to associate myself with this 
movement. In particular, I have tried to relate my topic to, and 
illuminate it by, methods and concepts used in the other social 
sciences.
Perhaps it is worth mentioning, since the marks are still 
evident, that the thesis began life as a topic in the history of 
political thought.
1INTRODUCTION
Basically this thesis is concerned with the problem of rationality 
*1and rationalisation. In the 18th century context, it is not possible
to think and write about these two historical processes without also
giving some consideration to the 18th century movement of ideas known as * * *
Rationalism. From this movement, its propagandists and interpreters, 
the idea of the 18th century as the Age of Reason took root and spread 
to become the common image of the period in 20th Century 
historiography and societyAlthough there are now signs of a re­
assessment since I first put pen to paper on the topic, this image 
of reason and secularisation has helped to fashion the writings of 
numerous modern historians, regardless of political complexion. For 
example, it is found in the Marxist writings of Christopher Hill and 
the early writing of E.P. Thompson, no less than in John Osborne and
other authors generally 'conservative' account of the ideas of Major *John Cartwright . Whatever their ideological differences, both 
Osborne and Thompson praise Cartwright's efforts in prefiguring modern 
political organisation while dismissing that part of his ideology, and 
the Anglo-Saxon myth in particular, as belonging to a pre-industrial 
outmoded form of thinking.
* More sense can be made of the thesis if I say something about its 
unfortunate history. It is part of what originally was a much 
bigger piece of work. The total work was submitted some time ago 
but was eventually not allowed to be examined because its length 
was well above the requirements for ANU theses. In this connection 
I would like to acknowledge my gratitude and debt to Campbell 
MacKnight who very kindly consented to read the full manuscript.
The inordinate amount of time involved in the total process, 
explains why there is little reference to the most recent 
secondary and theoretical literature. While some of this 
literature may weaken the originality of the thesis, none of it 
makes me want to revise my opinions or methods.
1. On rationality and rationalisation, see Max Weber, The Theory of 
Economic and Social Organisation, (London 1964) esp. Part II, and 
H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) From Max Weber (London 1948) 
esp. Part VIII. There is a neat summary of Weber's ideas in 
Graeme Salaman Class and the Corporation (Glasgow 1981) 51-54.
** There is a brief definition of Rationalism below, Chapter One, p. 29
* A more detailed criticism, together with citations, is given in 
the text of the thesis.
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Like Thompson, Christopher Hill is sensitive to the significance
of this type of thought, although moreso post-Keith Thomas than before.
It was through Hill's essay on "The Norman Yoke" that I first became
aware of the myth of the Anglo-Saxon Constitution. In an impressive
survey he traces the rhythms of the Anglo-Saxon myth from its obscure
beginnings to its end as a rhetorical literary device in the 19th
and 20th centuries. He interprets the myth in terms of an underlying
property theme. The form the myth takes is explained by way of a
"backward look" mentality that is characteristic of a pre-industrial
society. Despite this, Hill's account, in common with other writers
on the topic, reads as if he were dealing with people who had the same
*
kind of mentality as himself.
Yet at first I found Hill's explanation very convincing. Only 
later, when I came across the writings of J.G.A. Pocock, did my doubts 
start to crystallise. Although I still found Hill's property theme 
and his association of the backward look with a pre-industrial or 
agrarian society very interesting, it soon became clear an explanation 
of the myth in these terms was not sufficient. Even in the 17th 
century, and more so in the 18th, the Saxons were long since past 
and seemed to belong to a different kind of society. Given that the 
backward look was, perhaps, inevitable, why was it felt necessary to 
reach right back to the Saxons? Why not some alternative, closer, device 
or model?
Hill's analysis is much stronger on the 17th century and leaves 
room for a fuller account of the 18th century version of the myth. 
Acquaintance with J.G.A. Pocock's notion of a political language and 
his analysis of 17th century political ideas in terms of paradigms 
raised questions about writing the history of ideas in a different 
manner from that normally adopted by social historians and by historians 
of ideas in the American style. My background in political philosophy 
and ideas led me to be sympathetic to this more 'conceptual' approach; 
my background in social anthropology, besides leading me in the same 
direction also suggested certain paths to take regarding 'pre-industrial' 
societies and 'archaic' systems of belief. Yet as my studies lengthened 
I also began to appreciate the concerns of the historian.
* For the particular books I delved into, see the Bibliography p.xxxviii.
3Formerly, questions of method and theory were discussed in some 
detail. But there is a brief summary in what shortly follows, and there 
is within the text a shift backwards and forwards between ideas and 
concepts taken from political theory, social anthropology and history.
I have tried to apply a method but at the same time have paid close 
attention to historical particulars and individuals. Probably, in 
this truncated form, there is an over-indulgence in the thesis in 
discussing the variety of individual ideas. Explanation is, to a large 
extent, 'embedded' in the two 'case study' chapters rather than spelled 
out.
So the thesis is an attempt to bridge some gaps, or to use Gramsci's 
term to tighten a "suture" or rough stitching. And not merely between 
disciplines or areas but also between objects of study. Pocock, Goldmann 
and Foucault tend to play down the possibilities of popular ideas or 
ideology being amenable to conceptual analysis. But as Gramsci says,
studying the history and the logic of the various 
philosophers' philosophies is not enough ... 
attention should be drawn to the other parts of the 
history of philosophy; to the conceptions of the world 
held by the great masses to those of the most restricted 
ruling (or intellectual) groups, and finally to the 
links between these various cultural complexes and the 
philosophy of the philosophers. The philosophy of an 
age is not the philosophy of this or that philosopher, 
of this or that group of intellectuals, of this or that 
broad sections of popular masses. It is a ... 
combination of all these elements .
As I immersed myself in the literature produced by artisans and honorary 
artisans in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, it became clear that 
the myth of the Anglo-Saxon constitution contained a 'philosophy' of this 
sort and that it was connected to the more formal philosophy of, say,
Locke or Machiavelli. The Anglo-Saxon myth is, I began to realise, 
a "conception of the world" in Gramsci's sense. As research progressed, 
what started out as an investigation and an analysis of a particular 
idea was eventually written up as a contribution to the history of a more 
general mentality or consciousness. This is done from a loosely 
structural point of view rather than from the event or situation that
2. Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, (London 1971); 344-45.
4is normally preferred by historians.
When writing a history of "conceptions of the world", the problem 
soon arises of how to give a satisfactory account of a particular conception? 
What method should be adopted? Above all, a mentality is expressed in words, 
in language. My sensitivity to this problem became heightened through 
reading J.G.A. Pocock on the "ancient constitution" and on other 
commonwealth ideas. From there, I began to examine the question of method 
and language more generally through an examination of the ideas of Foucault, 
Althusser, George Boas, Harold Lasswell, Quentin Skinner, phenomenology,
Kuhn, Lucien Goldmann and others, in order to aid the reader's understanding 
it may be useful to give a brief account of my conclusions. What I accepted, 
and what I rejected. It is also pertinent to add that I am aware that many 
of these theorists work within different epistemological frameworks, so I 
plead guilty to a certain amount of eclecticism. Having said this, I should 
perhaps add that I was and am still sufficiently influenced by Marx and 
other Marxists, particularly Gramsci and Lucien Goldman to attempt to 
relate ideas to their social and economic foundations.
First, I accept most of the criticisms made by Foucault, Althusser 
and Skinner against the traditional method in writing about ideas or
4ideologies. This is not the place to go through those arguments in detail. 
But their arguments involve the rejection of certain assumptions, or 
'strategies' as Foucault calls them, that were and still are common in 
historiography and the history of ideas. Basically, the new method is 
founded in a metaphysic of difference while the old approach is rooted in 
the idea of sameness. Acceptance that ideas should be written about with 
the concept of difference in mind, involves the rejection of certain 
assumptions based on the 'sameness' principle. It rejects the notion of 
a tradition as a principle of investigation, since by definition ideas 
which are said to belong to a single tradition are of the same kind or 
type. Once ideas, or the writings of particular writers over a long period 
of time, are seen as part of a tradition, one way of validating that 
tradition is to trace them back to a common origin. Traditions have origins.
A fairly recent example is John Rule's The Experience of Labour in the 
Eighteenth Century (London 1981) where he argues against the sort of 
approach adopted here.
See again the Bibliography. In particular, see the arguments put forward 
by Louis Althusser, For Marx (Penguin edn. London 1969), Michel Foucault, 
The Archaeology of Knowledge (London 1972) and The Order of Things 
(London 1970), and Quentin Skinner "Meaning and Understanding in the 
History of Ideas" in History and Theory, VIII, 1, 1969.
3.
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5Consequently, too often disregarding differences in historical content, 
the history of ideas becomes the quest for a common origin. The notion 
of democracy in Paine is traced back to the idea of democracy in 
classical Greece. Often this exercise also involves a process known as 
'essentialism'. The meaning of democracy in Paine is essentially the 
same as the meaning of democracy in the writings of Plato.Or,  there 
is a socialist tradition where the seeds of socialism are found in Plato 
or, later, in the English Civil War. A genealogy or lineage is often 
constructed in the process. I have used the term 'seeds', since the 
metaphor which is used as a vehicle for carrying the 'traditions ' 
intellectual baggage is organic or botanical. Ideas are planted, grow, 
ferment, spread, germinate and so forth. They have the same root. They 
are also said to pass from one writer to another, whereby one writer or 
author is said to 'influence' another. This lends itself to an author- 
centred approach when writing about ideas. Elements of the sameness 
metaphysic are found in the writings of Marxian historians such as 
Thompson and Hill as well as more 'bourgeois' historians.
The rejection of a writing strategy or approach based on sameness, 
tradition, origins, essentialism, influence, a botanical metaphor and 
authors involves its replacement by a new kind of method. In place of 
these concepts are put epistemological or ideological limits and 
silence, transformation, language or code instead of author, structure 
or paradigm, and some sense of the unconscious or 'sub-text', or as 
Foucault puts it "what was being said in what was said".
In order to establish difference, differences between set of ideas, 
it is necessary to break up a tradition of thought or even the writings 
of a particular writer. In Althusser's now well-known and controversial 
example, which is also used by Skinner, Marx's earlier writings are 
epistemologically distinct from his later writings. There is a break or 
a rupture in thought. A break or rupture is signalled by the absence of 
a term used in an earlier piece of writing. In Marx, it is the supposed 
absence in Capital of the concept of alienation found in his earlier 
writings. Or, it may be the transformation in meaning of a word used
Examples are in the writings previously cited. But see also 
Alexander Gray's The Socialist Tradition (London 1946) and 
E. Tuveson Millenium and Utopia (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1949). More recent examples could be given.
6in both earlier or later texts. The term 'revolution' may not have the 
same meaning in, say, Locke's Second Treatise as it does in Paine's 
Rights of Man, although Locke is supposed to have 'influenced' Paine.
The 'limits' of thought or mentality of a text or 'language' is 
provided by its conceptual structure. The 'limits' or structure are 
indicated by 'silences'. For example, the notion of 'silence' helps 
to place the agrarian 'socialism' of Thomas Spence by making us aware 
of what was not in his mind in relation to the kind of ideology that 
was to come later. In Spence's writings, there is no critique of 
profit in the capitalist sense; there is also the absence of proposals 
for the nationalisation of industry. The method also includes studying 
political literature with an attempt at unravelling its language or code 
rather than examining the intentions of a particular author or text, or 
even tracing a single concept such as natural law or 'the people' across 
a number of texts or authors. In the words of one reviewer it is a form 
of analysis which "without obfuscating the divergent aims of different 
political writers, tries to establish the linguistic and conceptual 
system common to them."^ Probably, the earlier part of this quotation 
could not be applied to writers such as Foucault and Althusser who take 
linguistics as their starting point.
A more empirical approach is taken up by J.G.A. Pocock, who, I feel, 
has a greater sensitivity to social context and historical meaning than 
the two French writers.7 Rather than a statement's logical structure, 
Pocock is concerned with a statement's "concrete character as an 
historical phenomenon". Pocock acknowledges his debt to Thomas Kuhn 
who, as he says, "has accustomed readers to think of the history ofQ
science as essentially a history of discourse and of language."
6‘ Felix Gilbert "Corruption and Renewal" in The Times Literary 
Supplement, 19.3.1976; 306-8.
7’ See also B.N. Colby "Ethnographic Semantics: a preliminary survey" 
in Current Anthropology, 7, February 1966, 3-32. Harold Lasswell, 
Nathan Leites and others, Language of Politics (Cambridge, Mass., 
1949) for discussions which concentrate on meaning in language rather 
than its 'grammatical' structure. Gramsci, Notebooks, 428, 450 also 
argues that Marxism ought to include a 'philology', a "method of 
scholarship which would ascertain the individuality of particular 
cultural expressions" linked with Marxian "laws of tendency". On 
the importance of philology see also John Allegro The Sacred 
Mushroom and the Cross (Abacus edn. 1973), 17, 19, 21. Allegro, 
however, associates philology with origins rather than structure.
g
J.G.A. Pocock "Languages and their Implications"and Thomas Kuhn, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago 1970, 2nd edn.) passim.
7Kuhn's explanation of scientific discovery can be transferred without much
difficulty to the history of political thought. For Kuhn, progress in
scientific thought is a question of paradigm shifts or breaks or ruptures.
Both Pocock and Kuhn see paradigms as "linguistic structures", as clusters
or webs of words and concepts. But scholars should "look empirically at
language rather than immediately at theory", according to Pocock. In
some respects in the thesis I have followed the structuralism of the
Namier method in "minutely dissecting and 'disintegrating' material
prior to reconstruction", although I have not taken over underlying
assumptions about the primacy of politics and psychology. The earlier
chapters are exercises in criticism and dissection, while the last
chapter attempts reconstruction. Unfortunately this involves, in
Felix Gilbert's words, "careful reading of a text from sentence to sentence,
almost word to word" so that "the connections become evident to the reader
... by making him a participant in a detailed textbook study". This
is necessary given the historical depth in language. Words like 'progress'
and 'revolution' are problematical in this sense. Volney writes in a
seemingly modern fashion about the "constant progress of societies" but
then relates it to "an eternal circle of passions" whereby "experience is
9useless since salutary examples are often forgotten." This sort of thing 
is, as it were, an historical sub-text that is often at least half-hidden 
from the consciousness of the modern reader. The paradigm or structuralist 
method is also a method for revealing other sub-texts which are at least 
often only half-conscious in the minds of the historical participants 
themselves.
* * * *
Besides the term paradigm, I have used a number of fairly specialised 
words, the use of which is often ambiguous or a matter of controversy and 
are probably unfamiliar to many historians. Consequently, it will no doubt 
be of help to the reader if I briefly define my understanding of these 
terms. Some indication has already been given of how I understand and 
use the notion of a paradigm. But it is important to point out, given 
the concerns of 'orthodox' historians, that paradigms, besides being 
linguistic structures restrict or limit what Kuhn calls "the phenomenological 
field". The construction of a paradigm is not an attempt to explain the
C.F. Volney, The Ruins or a Survey of the Revolutions of Empires,
(London, 1795), 77-8. Similarly, when John Cartwright says that he 
knows the "secret of revolutions", he is not referring to progress through 
revolutions but to the interminable "rise and fall of kingdoms".
9.
8complete thought or works of an author or even a complete text, since 
neither author nor text is the object of study. Although he employs 
the term "discursive formations", the paradigm method, to use the 
words of Foucault, takes the statement as "the atom of discourse... 
the elementary unit". Discursive formations or linguistic paradigms 
are in fact "groups of statements."10 They are uncovered by looking for,
Relations between statements, (even if the author is 
unaware of them; even if the statements do not have 
the same author; even if the authors were unaware of 
each others existence), relations between groups of 
statements...
By looking at relations the student ends up with a linguistic or
conceptual framework or structure, or as Pocock says, "an inherited and
transmitted linguistic structure". According to Pocock the history of
political thought, which I interpret in the widest sense of the term,
can be written up as "the production, modification and transformation
of paradigms". The writings of an author or an organisation, like political
language itself, contain "a highly complex language, in which many
paradigmatic structures exist simultaneously". In 18th century political
thought, Pocock finds paradigms based on natural law, on virtue,
on custom and tradition and so on. Lastly, paradigm is defined in the
two senses used here. It is both a method, "a matrix for the history of
political ideas", and "a theory of ... political language", a presentation
12of particular forms of political speech or expression.
A closely linked concept is the term 'moment' which is employed generally 
in the thesis. A 'moment' is defined as "a constituent or active 
principle in thought", or, as "one of the elements of a complex conceptual 
entity". The structure that I have constructed in the last chapter is such 
a moment in the general 'ideology' of the artisan mind.
A moment in thought implies that the writer adopts certain ideas or 
ways of thinking and rejects others. The 'Gothic moment' in the artisan 
mind involves certain assumptions about natural rights, custom, virtue and 
liberty and constitutionalism and about the development of society in 
general. Adopting a purely natural rights approach instead, involved a different
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology 0f Knowledge, (London, 1976) 6-7. 
Foucault, Archaeology, 119.
Pocock, Politics, 21-22, 25, 28; see also his Machiavellian Moment, 
(Princeton 1975), 84.
12.
9writing strategy, which is more deductive and rationalist. But the 
constitutionalist argument involved talking about historical cycles, 
about virtuous example and behaviour and other things. A moment, and 
to some extent Pocock has here made it interchangeable with paradigm, 
involves selection from the thoughts of a particular writer or set of 
authors. His "Machiavellian Moment", he says, is a selective enterprise,
in the sense that it does not commit us to interpreting 
the totality of his thought ... 'the Machiavellian 
moment' entails less a history of Machiavelli than a 
historical presentation of Machiavelli ...The test 
of this method is its ability to narrate a process 
actually taking place in the history of ideas...^
It is this sort of "historical presentation", or something like it, 
that I have adopted in my analysis of the ideas of John Baxter, John 
Cartwright and other 18th century Radicals. But the point of entry, so 
to speak, is the popular political idea in which the 'moment' is embedded. 
This idea is the myth of the Anglo-Saxon constitution, a political model, 
similar in function but not structure to, say, the position that the Cuban 
Revolution occupied a few years ago, or the Russian Revolution some years 
before. These models are sometimes referred to as 'tropes', another term 
that needs comment. Ideologies and myths, besides being statements about 
the social structure or system, are also addressed to social problems, or 
to use an 18th century turn of phrase, to "times that try men's souls". 
Political models or tropes have been described as "maps of problematic 
social reality." Attracting troubled minds, tropes "transform sentiments 
into significance" and give mental satisfaction or comfort. They "size 
up situations" or problems "name their structure and outstanding 
ingredients, and name them in such a way that contains an attitude 
towards them". Figures or tropes are "strategic answers or stylised 
answers" to social problems or situations. The myth the Anglo-Saxon 
constitution is a kind of symbolic yet concrete model of the experiences 
and sentiments thrown up by social life: "a matching of ... symbolic
14models against the states and processes of the wider world". If you
13. Pocock, Moment, 183.
14. On all this, see Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System" in 
Ideology and Discontent, (New York 1964) (ed.) David Apter; 61,71.
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were a Radical and believed in the Anglo-Saxon myth you had the answer 
to certain current questions. Why was the Constitution corrupt? How 
did it become corrupt? It involved thinking about history as the history 
of liberty and corruption. It meant giving shape to certain sentiments, 
and adopting certain 'strategies' in political argument and writings.
It meant writing about the present in terms of the past, and seeing the 
Constitution as a bundle of historical rights and as the creation of 
English history in particular - "the stylised answer".
These, then, are my more 'theoretical' concepts. The analysis also 
incorporates certain 'working' concepts taken from social anthropology and 
political philosophy. 'Form' and 'content' are used throughout as 
conceptual tools and they are used as they are in logic.^ Apart from 
these I use two groups of concepts which are, as it were, abstractions 
from the historical process. On the pre or 'proto' industrial side of 
things ideas are analysed in terms of the concepts of myth, millenarianism 
and 'return'. But the prevalent mode of modern thinking is analysed in 
terms of ideology, progress and utopia. The distinction between myth and 
ideology is crucial, although in the following chapters I have sometimes 
used the two terms interchangeably as often happens in common usage. Both 
terms are very ambiguous, and have been used in a variety of intellectual 
contexts.
Despite this, I have preferred to use the Marxian term ideology in
preference to the Annales conception of mentalities since the latter is 
16too vague. Ideology as a cognitive concept also needs to be distinguished 
from its use in political rhetoric. In the light of the earlier Althusser
See David Mitchell, An Introduction to Logic (2nd edn. London 1964), 
12-16 and see also G.V. Plekhanov, The Materialist Conception of 
History, (London 1949 edn.), 45 for the importance of these concepts 
in studying the history of ideas/ideology. For a practical 
application see Joseph Levenson Confucian China and Its Modern Fate 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles 1959), 3 vols.
* Traian Stoianovich, French Historical Method, (New York, 1976), 216. 
Stoianovich attempts to establish what he calls "the Annales paradigm". 
He is, I think, unsuccessful. At one point he writes of "the 
Annales School's horror of system and ... the journal's pragmatic 
and unphilosophical quality".
11
and other previous writers in political philosophy, ideology needs to be 
taken seriously as a subject for scientific or scholarly investigation, 
although since I first put pen to paper there are signs of a less dismissive 
attitude.'*'7 The often put question of political philosophy concerning the 
truth or falseness of ideology is overlooked in favour of a question about 
levels of rationality and historical development. Ideology is a type of 
thought distinct from other types of thinking such as science and myth.
But it is important to stress, given the literature pointing in the 
opposite direction, and what I want to say about the Anglo-Saxon myth and 
18th century mentality in general, that there is a certain structural 
affinity between ideology and science. Previously writers have emphasised 
the functional affinity between myth and ideology, based on their value­
laden nature. But as Foucault says, science is "localised within" ideology; 
while myth is 'localised' within magic, or perhaps it is the other way 
around.
In a different way, Gramsci perceived the connection between science 
and ideology when he argued "that every philosophy is a politics", and, 
to some extent vice versa. Put succinctly, pace de Quincey, the 
literature of knowledge becomes the literature of power. So, despite the 
useful distinctions between science, philosophy and ideology, ideology as 
cognition implies that it, too, is a form of knowledge and contains social 
'theory' or 'epistemology'. Because of this, it is at least partially 
systematic, even if ideology is also part of "the history of common sense" 
and can assume "heterogeneous and bizarre combinations". Often, ideology 
is made more systematic through what Lucien Goldmann calls "representative 
figures" who produce "not merely the reflection of social reality but 
the particularly coherent expression of aspirations". It must be stressed 
that this form of ideology is especially not reducible to immediate social 
situations or interest and can contain half hidden understandings of how 
society works, of the political economy and so on. Ideology and myth both 
contain these systematic elements. In the debate over the systematic nature
One of the best attempts to correct this dismissive view is D.J. 
Manning (ed.) The Form of Ideology, (London, 1980). In the "preface" 
Oakshott now calls ideology "a specific form of discourse". And, as 
the editor concludes, ideology "is not an intellectual aberration.
Man does not live by knowledge alone. Ideology is an autonomous 
display of the intellect no less capable of masterly exposition than 
any other man's creative powers. Philosophers would do well to give 
it serious consideration", 130. Earlier writers who have taken 
ideology seriously, apart from Marxists, are Clifford Geertz and 
Plamenatz (see Bibliography).
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of popular (magical) ideas I have sided with E.P. Thompson and Hildred
Geertz against Keith Thomas.18 But in popular ideas, systematic meanings
tend to be immanent or embedded rather than explicit. There is an
"ascending order of comprehensiveness" in ideologies and myths. This
means that the student of ideas needs to explicate this comprehensiveness
at the 'higher' levels, and this is what I try to do in the following
chapters. There is, as Plamenatz says, an interaction "between 'political'
and 'popular' ideology" and he stated at the time that it had "never been 
19studied", To unravel and elicit this kind of interaction is the aim
of this thesis. In both pragmatic and systematic ideology, "the two planes 
complement and mutually support each other". If Burke and Paine, or even 
John Baxter and Cobbett or Gravenor Henson, are seen as representative 
figures, their books need to be complemented by the pamphlets and memoirs 
of more obscure or even anonymous writers. So I interpret systematic and 
popular ideology as, say, the relationship between a pamphlet produced 
by the London Corresponding Society and Paine's Rights of Man. I also 
interpret it as the relationship between 'political' ideas and popular 
magical and religious belief.
Ideology is found in a more systematic form in the writings of what 
Lucien Goldmann calls "representative figures" and Antonio Gramsci, "organic 
intellectuals". Representative figures, according to Goldmann can create 
"a potential consciousness" out of "real consciousness". In other words 
the writings of Radical ideologues or representative figures such as Tom 
Paine, John Baxter and Gravenor Henson are meditations upon popular ideas; 
they think them through and state them perhaps more coherently or 
systematically than is usually found in political speeches or the records 
of meetings of political societies. "We have been accused", Leon Trotsky 
once said, "of creating the opinion of the masses. This is untrue, we 
only formulate it". "Organic intellectuals", although used by Gramsci 
to refer to intellectuals as such who often come from the middle classes,
Hildred Geertz, "An Anthropology of Religion and Magic I" in Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History, 6, 1975, 71-89, esp. 85, 88; Keith 
Thomas, "An Anthropology of Religion and Magic, II, in Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, 6, 1975, 96, 98, 102, 104-5; E.P. Thompson, 
"Anthropology and the Discipline of Historical Context", in Midland 
History, I, 1972, 53.
19.
John Plamenatz, Ideology (London 1970), 123.
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has been used here, interchangeably, with the term representative figures.
Gramsci's conception is not all that different from Goldmann's although
20it is less formalised.
Another Gramscian term used in the thesis that is connected with the
notion of ideology is hegemony. Hegemony, according to Gramsci, occurs
when a group or class, "has for reasons of submission and intellectual
subordination, adopted a conception which is not its own but is borrowed
21from another group". A dominant group or class is able to ensure that
"one concept of reality is diffused throughout society" affecting "all
social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral 
22connotations". But, "the version of the orthodoxy held by different
social groups, will be different incorporating each group's specific 
23perspective". The notions of political power, dominance and cultural
diffusion are, then central to Gramsci's concept of hegemony. But the
question is whether or not political and cultural dominance is ever complete.
It is a question of working class independence. "The Country tradition of
Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke was in no sense hostile to the peerage; it saw
24hereditary status as a reinforcement of propertied independence".
Although they did not want to abolish the peerage entirely, this was certainly 
not the view of many Radicals, even though it is possible to interpret their 
ideas as belonging to the Country or neo-Harringtonian tradition of political 
thought. At the bottom of this opposing version of Country ideology lies the 
social and economic experience, more,the whole cultural experience of the 
artisans and "the middling sort of people". So that although from time to 
time in the chapters which follow their ideas are discussed in terms of 
hegemony, perhaps more emphasis is given to their social descriptions as 
respresentations of a particular way of life or mode of production.
20 .
Lucien Goldmann The Human Sciences and Philosophy, (Paris 1966, Cape 
edn., London 1969) 118-119, 128; Gramsci Notebooks, passim; Trotsky 
cited in W.J.H. Sprott, Social Psychology (London 1952), 66-7.
21 .
Gramsci, Notebooks, 327.
2 2 .
Gwyn A. Williams cited in Stoianovich Historical Method, 137-8.
23. Nigel Harris, Beliefs in Society (Pelican edn., 1971), 49.
24. Pocock, Moment, 408.
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The study of ideology, then, raises questions about cognition, about 
coherence or systematic thinking, about hegemony and about its relation­
ship to other types of knowing. In this sense I present the Anglo-Saxon 
myth as part of the history of ideologies, but there is also a 
distinction between myth and ideology.
Certain correspondences have been made between ideology and myth.
Yet, to grasp what follows it is important to realise that ideology as a
form of modern secular thought, arose at a certain point in time. Despite
Michael Walzer, 18th century politics and political thought was still
largely anti-programmatic or 'unsystematic', or not free of Providential 
25intervention. Only with the French Revolution is there the beginnings 
of a secular ideological mode of social thinking. Prior to this, the 
historical example used in much of 'political' discourse was simple and 
backward-looking and both these ideas are associated with a pre-Rationalist 
frame of mind. As a type of thinking ideology is closer to science than to 
myth or religion. Ideology is related to the rise of historical scholarship 
and is narrower in its concerns than myth. It is also associated with the 
idea of progress and breaks with the conceptions of time common to mythical 
thinking.^
Underlying the analysis of the 'case study' chapters is a concept of 
progress that is historically sensitive and based on a close attention to 
the total ideological context. By the 18th century, the situation was, as 
referred to before for the term 'revolution', complex in that there were 
at least two ideas of progress in existence. In order to gain a clear 
conception it is necessary to distinguish between uses of the word 
progress. The first remained tied to immutable natural law and the 
charismatic founding of social institutions, to divine Providence in 
which history has a goal but not one set up by men. The second is an 
idea of progress which is secular and related to scientific, technical, 
intellectual and moral progress, and tied to an ideological mode of thought. 
Or, as E.J. Hobsbawm has written, to a progress "which can be specified
Michael Walzer "The Revolution of the Saints" in Political Sociology 
(London 1971), 320-333.
2 6 On the modern and secular character of ideology see Ben Halpern 
"Myth and Ideology in Modern Usage in History and Theory Vol.l,
1961; and Bernard Crick, "Ideology, Openness and Freedom" 
(unpublished paper).
25.
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as process"; an idea which has been separated from the notion of Providence.
Providential 'progress' discounts secular progress in favour of its
spiritual form. This distinction is necessary even though by the 18th
century a belief in Providence and a modern notion of progress could be
27held together in the same mind. In trying to be historically specific
I am keen to look at the total structure of thought or avoid searching
for 'germs' or 'seeds' in the more usual manner of writing about ideas.
Consequently I have woven progress and ideology into a pattern that
includes utopia. From this angle, it is important to distinguish between
utopia and millenium. A failure to do so, as part of an effort to 'get at'
Marxism, has marred some otherwise very interesting and stimulating
2 8writing in the history of ideas. As a broad statement, it seems to be 
true that "where the nineteenth century socialist could look to a future 
utopia" his "radical predecessor" in the '18th century' looked to a past 
"golden age". While I accept as important J.F.C. Harrison's distinction 
between pre-millenialist and post-millenialist ideas, and would strongly 
emphasise his warnings about "the secularisation of the millenium", I would 
not accept that for purposes of analysis it is not useful to distinguish 
between the religious and the secular as distinctive types of thinking.
To say, as Harrison does, that Owenite millenialism and utopianism are 
the same thing is akin to saying that Owen's own religion and irreligion 
are the same thing. A utopia is secular and involves the idea of progress 
brought about by purely human endeavour. Even if I agree on the limitat­
ions of the dichotomy, history itself made the distinction in the long
27.
For a fuller discussion of these questions and some of the sources 
from which I have fashioned my own ideas, see James Fitzgerald 
"History as Progress: the revival of an idea" in Teaching History 
(New South Wales), Vol.4, Pt.3, December 1970, 14-23; J.B. Bury 
The Idea of Progress (London 1920), esp. pp.5, 11-12, 21, 73, 76; 
Sidney Pollard The Idea of Progress (Pelican edn. 1971 orig. pub. 
1968), 16, 19, 24, 28, 80, 100-2 on Burke as an Enlightment 
figure, a view which I do not accept. Stoianovich French 
Historical Method, 155, E.J. Hobsbawm "From Social History to
the History of Society" in Essays in Social History (Oxford 1974), 
17, M.W. Flinn and T.W. Smout (eds.)
See for example, Tuveson Millenium and Utopia, xi-xii, 6-7, where 
Marx is an "intellectual descendant" of St. John the Divine, where 
progress and millenium are "only apparently divergent" and where 
there is no distinction between "sparodic observations" or "the 
germ of a concept" and ideological formations and transformations.
28.
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run, once the point of rupture had been made; but it is also necessary
to get inside contemporary and "bizarre" combinations of thought and see
how they are made up; to uncover contradictions. Otherwise there is a
danger of historical nominalism, of taking words and meanings at their 
29face value.
The argument is that understanding will be advanced if the three 
concepts that I have attempted to elucidate are seen as a kind of ideational 
bloc which reflects a real long-term historical process. Opposed to these 
concepts of ideology, progress and utopia are the three concepts of 
myth, 'return' and millenarianism. In trying to fashion a useful concept 
of myth, there are similar problems to ideology. It is necessary to reject 
the sort of myth/reality distinction common to political language and 
ideology. Instead, I use a cognitive conception, based on its use in 
social anthropology. Leaning on Victor Turner's definition, I stress 
myth as a sacred narrative, as concerned with the distribution of power 
or legitimization and social order, with origins and charisma, with 
heroes and types, with nature and social differentiation. The association 
of myth with ritual and kinship is less invariable, although even these 
factors are not entirely absent in myths like the myth of the Anglo- 
Saxon Constitution. I have also borrowed some bits and pieces from Levi- 
Strauss. His critics, probably correctly, have attacked him for not 
allowing any intellectual space to discuss culture in terms of progress 
and change. But I have tried to see how he could be used by someone more 
historically-minded. It is helpful to show how 'universals' such as the 
culture/nature distinction were used in political rhetoric as a means of 
legitimation; to suggest why certain political arguments and symbols 
exercised an appeal to their audience. The trick is to show the relationship 
between these 'natural' forms and culture and history rather than reduce
For a discussion of the usefulness of the concepts of the religious 
and the secular, see the debate between Hildren Geertz, "An 
Anthropology of Religion and Magic I", Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, 6, 1975; 71-90 and Keith Thomas, "An Anthropology of 
Religion and Magic, II", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vi,
1, 1975; 91-109, esp., 96, where Thomas defends the use of the 
concept of the "magico-religious". I am inclined to favour Thomas.
For a distinction between utopia and the millenium, see Northrope 
Frye "Variations of Literary Utopias" in Utopias and Utopian Thought 
(ed.) Frank Manuel, 25-26; Harrison's early statement of his position 
is in "Millenialism and Social Reform in the Early 19th Century" in 
Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History, 22, 1972, 
esp. 4-5; see also his The Second Coming, (London, 1979) esp. "Introduct­
ion" where Harrison similarly argues for a functionalist and nominalist 
interpretation and sees millenarianism as forward-looking as a result.
He also repeats his argument concerning the religious and the secular
(p.10).
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history to the forms. The political and moral system turns "natural 
pairs" into hierarchical values by valuing them as plus or minus or good 
and bad. This valuing is a reflection of social and economic relationships. 
Later analysis also shows some acceptance of Levi-Strauss's characterisat­
ion of 'primitive' and mythical thinking as "a logic of concrete". Also, 
according to Levi-Strauss, the study of myth reveals a whole array of 
'natural' or conceptual oppositions. If myth tells a story about social 
relations, about individuals and social status, it rests on "basic 
oppositions" of above/below, this world/other world and so on. Besides 
culture/nature, in the body of the thesis I have made use of the purity/ 
pollution distinction. This gets politicised by relating it to ideas about 
rights and obligations. I have glossed on Mary Douglas's development of 
Levi-Strauss here. If "hygiene" is "an excellent route" to the under­
standing of religion, then so it is for the analysis of a mythicised 
'politics'. The analogies are fairly obvious. Dirt or pollution is 
"essentially disorder ... dirt offends against order". Talk of "the body 
politic" or "bodily perfection" as a symbol for an ideal 'theocracy' is 
common in 'pre-industrial' political discourse. As she says "the whole 
universe" including the laws of nature, are deployed in "men's attempts
to force one another into good citizenship". Contagion and pollution
30are used "in a dialogue of claims and counter-claims to status".
Another author I have drawn from is Mircea Eliade, who defines myth in 
terms of the three essential features "sacredness, origins and types".
Eliade's conception is at once both wider and narrower than Levi-Strauss's 
and is more helpful in the analysis of the sort of mental configuration 
found in post-'primitive' societies. Mythical logic leads backwards to 
origins and origins are sacred since they are beyond human memory or "time 
out of mind". Myth is essentially tautologous and 'closed'. In the myth of 
the Anglo-Saxon Constitution, the myth of the origin of corruption is held 
to be true by virtue of the contemporary system of Old Corruption. The 
set of facts or phenomena that the myth needs to explain are instead, as
30. Mary Douglas Purity and Danger (Pelican edn., 1970), 12-14. For 
other points raised in this paragraph, see also Ely Devons "The 
Role of Myth in Politics" in The Listener, 21.6.1956, 843-44;
Victor Turner "Myth" in The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 
(Collier-Macmillan, 1968); P. Cohen "Theories of Myth", in Man, 
Vol.4, No.3, Sept. 1969, 337-53; Henry Tudor Political Myth 
(London 1972), 13, 57; I.M. Lewis "Introduction" in History and 
Social Anthropology (London 1968); Claude Levis-Strauss The Savage 
Mind (London 1969 orig. pub. Paris 1962), Ch.I, 1-35 esp. 16, 20; 
Clause Levi-Strauss Structural Anthropology (London 1968), 216, 229, 
313; Raymond Firth Elements of Social Organisation (London 1951), 
208; Edmund Leach Levi-Strauss (London 1970) passim.
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Henry Tudor says, used "as evidence for the truth of the myth". Since
myth is also tied to nature and a pre-modern view of time, it is, a
language of "new beginnings" of "decay" or a constant return to origins
and so on. But I have rejected Tudor's criticism of Eliade as well as
his interpretation of the Anglo-Saxon myth which leans too heavily on
Christopher Hill, although Hill is more subtle. Neither is the distinction
between foundation myth and eschatological myth of much use here, and it
takes no account of the structured differences between myth and ideology.
In myth, the process of legitimation can be summed up in the words "unity"
and "type" Existing in societies with varying degrees of local and
regional sentiment, myth tends to be an "integrating" force in a manner
31that ideology is not, although functionally it can play this role.
To gain transcendence and promote unity a ruler or king must be
sanctioned by myth. In Indonesia, "an illegitimate ruler fosters only
intrigue and disloyalty; the religious and moral writ ... is neglected,
the network of harmonious relationships disintegrates, and turbulent
anarchy reigns supreme". All social groups, "assemblies of functionaries,
groupings of nobles ... gatherings of villages, and of course the great
and undifferentiated throng of subjects and servants are at various times
mentioned ... in some kind of relationship with the king". But the
legitimate ruler transcends particular group interests. There is an "ideal
32conception" of the ruler. All this exactly parallels certain versions 
of the Anglo-Saxon myth in 18th century England.
In Indonesia the "causal relationship" between "the character of the
king and his realm" is transmitted by means of a sacred text. This has
been mentioned because it is often said that literacy itself is sufficient
to do away with myth. In Indonesia, where literacy and illiteracy exist
side-by-side, in 1971 P.J. Worsley witnessed the clan worship of a sacred
babad or text. The babad, "was deposited permanently in one of the shrines
of the household temple, where it was treated with great reverence and
33workshipped during ceremonies." The 18th century did not go as far as 
this but the attitude towards the Magna Carta and certain other venerable 
documents borders on "great reverence".
31. Henry Tudor, Political Myth, 58-60; Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality, 
(New York, 1963), 5, 8.
P.J. Worsley, Babad Bulelen, (The Hague, 1972), 78. I owe this 
reference to Campbell MacKnight.
33. Worsley, Babad Bulelin, viii.
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If, in both myth and ideology "one component is invariably found, 
the justification and location of authority", in myth authority is located 
in some moral type, that is, as in the Indonesian example, in an ideal 
conception of the ruler. The association of type and authority in myth 
occurs because it is the character of the ruler which contributes "to 
the establishment and maintenance of the harmony of the legitimate order", 
which is "viewed as part of his protective function towards his subjects".
The good order of the polity is dependent upon the ruler's moral purity.
He must not be greedy (luxury). He must "model himself upon the behaviour 
of noble people" (political saints or heroes). These noble people "sought 
no material advantage, pleasure or fame in what they did" (virtue, Spence).
They "strove only to protect the religious and moral law" (natural law, 
common law). "Knowledge of the precepts" of this law "was the only reliable 
foundation" of orderly rule (gnosis, political knowledge). For, "from such 
knowledge flowed the discretion in the conduct of affairs which was so 
critical for the harmony and prosperity of the realm" (economic well-being). 
Through such knowledge and conduct the king could "remove the seven layers 
of darkness" which hid the light of goodness and threatened to overcome the 
world (darkness, catastrophe). As opposed to these virtues; "haughtiness 
because of one's parentage" or noble birth, or the "recklessness" associated 
with too much power "greed roused by wealth" and the "harshness" got from 
"heroic deeds in battle" or war-making, "venom" got from ability or ambition 
and over-indulgence of sexual pleasure, all go to make up the vices which 
contribute to moral and political pollution and so endanger the order and 
safety of the state and people. All these features, as well as the equivalents 
of the more positive features which I have put in parenthesis, find their 
parallels in the Anglo-Saxon myth. Likewise, there is an equivalence between 
18th century Radical literature and the Indonesian sacred chronicle when it 
states that "the realm exists not only for the good of the monarch, but also 
for the sustenance of its population. The king was required to listen to 
their grievances.
In short, and as another resemblance between the Indonesian myth and 
18th century mentality, "no attempt is made to develop a rounded individual 
human personality". The 'patriot king' "is presented simply as the embodiment 
of a latent legitimating power and ... as the type of the ideal king". There 
are other features in common, too. Not only the ruler but all the actors in
34. Vorsley, Babad Bulelen, 41, 44, 45.
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the babad's narrative are "depicted as types". They are "abstract ...
men who behave in a way wholly predictable within the logic of the image in
which they have been formed ... they belong as ancestors". An ancestor acts
35as an exemplar or paradigm. As in the narrative of the Anglo-Saxon myth, 
in the babad or sacred text, "a period of good fortune, of harmony and 
contentment ... gives way to one of disaster and misfortune". Also, most 
importantly,
While the babad is aware of time as duration, as an enduring
sequence of events ... it seems more concerned with the
classification of periods of time which are classified by
certain properties. ...The lack of interest in measuring
the precise duration of the passage of time so that the
relative position of one event with another is
established ... has led ... to a situation in which
criteria other than chronological criteria have determined
the argument of what is ostensibly a chronological
narrative.„„36
In other words, it is not a moral interpretation of history in itself
that 'mythicises' history, so that modern 'Whig' or socialist history
cannot be thought of in this light, it is rather how time is handled in
such a way that events are disconnected and juxtaposed in an arbitrary
fashion thereby squeezing out time from the notion of cause. Dates have no
37significance other than as markers in telling a story.
Myths are anti-historical in that they deal with "perennial and ultimate
features" in human existence. Yet they are a kind of "sacred history".
They try to reveal a mystery, the mystery of existence and the social order,
and they do so through a narrative which relates a sacred history. Engaging
in mythical discourse gives the story-teller access to special or divine
knowledge, what Turner calls "gnosis". Or, as Eliade puts it, "knowing the
origin of an object ... is equivalent to acquiring magical power over it"
38and through this power objects "can be controlled or reproduced". The 
Radical political 'saints' of late 18th century England thought of their 
'historical' knowledge as a kind of gnosis or privileged knowledge which
35.
Worsley, Babad Bulelen, 50, 80.
n £
Worsley, Babad Bulelen, 81.
37. On this question of time and dates, see M.I. Finley, "Myth, Memory 
and History" in History and Theory, Vol.IV, 1965, 286-7, 295-6; 
and Pocock, "Time, Institutions and Action: an Essay on Traditions 
and their Understanding" in Politics, 241.
38 . Eliade, Myth and Reality, 15.
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gave them the power to transform or transcend their existing situation
and status. Time acquires meaning only "from its relation to the eternal"
and history becomes meaningful "through subordination to eschatology".
This has to be materially grounded. In the 18th century mercantile
political economy "the cycles of circulation" of goods and services
were still strongly related "by the yearly occurrences of the harvest".
Each harvest was a return to a new beginning and subject to fortune, to
natural forces, to God's will, to the cycle and law of nature, to customary
observances or tradition and to virtuous behaviour. The secrets of these
laws and practices could be found in their origin, in the principles of
decay or corruption and renewal. What applied in the economy was also true
39in history and politics. The only way out of the "eternal cycle" was to
re-constitute a republic which was, in Pocock's words, "a blend or balance
of ... monarchy, aristocracy and democracy", and to have it coincide with
40the coming of the millenium.
It is also necessary to get up a working concept of millenarianism. In 
terms of the sort of typologies proposed by Hobsbawm and Peter Worsley it is 
helpful to put Southcottean millenarianism towards the religious end of a 
continuum and the Anglo-Saxon myth towards the 'secular' end. For, to quote 
Pocock again, "the English saint was not radically alienated from the 
secular order, but ... radically involved in it". Nevertheless, I agree 
with A C Haddon that millenarianism is essentially religious even if a form 
of religion that tries to "sanction political aspirations". E P Thompson's 
account which sees "radical politics" and "religious revivalism" at opposite 
poles is rejected since it suggests that people are constantly making 
'epistemological' switches. Of more use, is P S Gilbert's distinction 
between "active and passive" millenarianism. The thesis also argues with 
Thompson's overall impression that the "radical culture" of the artisans
"The constitution", said Lord Hawkesbury, is "a body whose parts" 
are "as by nature liable to frequent disorders ... if a constitution 
is only through age impaired it must be called back to its first 
principles". Even if some new situation has come about "it can 
be woven into the very spirit" of the constitution. Charles, Lord 
Hawkesbury, Constitutional Maxims Extracted from a Discourse on 
the Establishment of a National and Constitutional Force, (London, 
1757, reprinted by the London Corresponding Society, 1794), 2.
40. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 77, 84, 104-5.
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was as thoroughly secular and rationalised as it appeared to be.
Figures such as John Cartwright, whom Thompson sees as part of this
rationalised and Radical culture are shown through a close reading to have
all sorts of 'millenial' ideas floating around in their heads; so, too,
the more plebeian 'secularists' such as Thomas Spence. Even at this late
time, 'God's Englishman' must be set alongside Thompson's stress on the
idea of a "free-born Englishman". In any event, apocalyptic always had
a strong secular tinge. It is evident even among the earliest Christians.
Passages from the 17th and 18th centuries which are used by Tuveson to
support the secularisation of the millenium thesis are almost identical
with earlier passages by Lactantius in the 4th century. But my contention
is that in millenial thinking it is ultimately religious or mythical logic
42that structures political argument.
All this can be summarised and put in a slightly different way, in 
terms of an alternative trilogy of oppositions. Given the existing 
literature it is important to stress that ideology and myth belong to 
different intellectual structures or modes of thought. Ideology, it 
should be emphasised goes with science rather than myth so that an alternative 
formula is myth/magic/religion: ideology/science/secularism.
There is one other ambiguous word or concept that needs clarification 
or comment. From time to time in the thesis I have used the term 
'mercantilism'. A practical way of showing what I mean by the concept is 
to refer quickly to the ideas of Tom Paine, since it illustrates my treat­
ment or understanding of the ideas of other Radicals in the two 'empirical' 
chapters. Paine scholarship or historiography has, almost without exception, 
seen him as "one of the purest ideological spokesmen for the bourgeoisie"
41. But see E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, 
(Pelican edn., 1968), 882 as well as some later work.
42. Henry Tudor, Political Myth, 96. For the background to this paragraph 
and for clarification or context of some of the points raised and on 
millenarianism generally, see also, Peter Worsley, The Trumpet Shall 
Sound (Paladin, London 1970 orig. pub. 1957), 263; P.S. Gilbert, 
"Joanna Southcott: the Case of a Conservative Millenarian Movement", 
New Sociology, September 1971, Vol.l, No.l, 33, 45; E.J. Hobshawm, 
Labouring Men (London 1968) esp. 1-12; E.P. Thompson, Working Class, 
54, 194-5, 428, 487, 882; Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of 
Magic (London 1971), 96-7, 159, 165, 169.
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or a part of the socialist genealogy or tradition. In fact, from a 
mercantilist perspective, he is neither. He is neither a simple apologist 
for the free market and private property, nor does he adopt any plans for 
the socialisation of industry. His political language is neither exclusively 
Country nor particularly Court. His political economy is a language of 
trade, commerce and land: of mercantilism.
Pocock, too, sees these ideas and things at the centre of 18th century
social thought but his manner of analysis and characterisation is somewhat
different from mine, not least on questions of investment and the nature of 
A4trade. But, as he says, there is a shift from the idea of fortune to "commerce
and finance" as categories of political analysis and rhetoric, and, if it was
not revisionist to say so, a Marxist would see this as a mercantilist "rather
45than entrepreneurial" consciousness. Defining the concept in this way helps 
to 'specify' the post-medieval but pre-industrial period and avoids the
46problems involved in using, as Marxists do, the concept of the 'transitional'.
The difficulties go back to Marx's own x^ritings and are compounded in
47recent Marxian scholars. In the former, I find difficulties with Marx s
view that the mercantile system is a system of circulation rather than product­
ion; in the latter there are problems with their insistence that under 
capitalism production leads consumption. The implications of their analysis
The quotation comes from Isaac Kramnick in his long introduction to 
Paine's Common Sense, (Pelican edn. 1976 orig. pub. 1776). Horst Inde 
in Essays in Honour of William Gallacher...(Berlin 1966)(eds.) P.M.
Kemp Ashraf and Jack Mitchell gives a picture of Paine as a socialist. 
Other references are in my Bibliography.
44. See below, last chapter, esp. pp.270-1.
45. Pocock, Politics, 140.
46. In the history of ideas, despite the fact that, for example, he calls 
Locke "a mercantilist" (though in a different sense from the use here), 
a very interesting example of this approach is C.B. MacPherson in his 
The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford U.P. 1962)
But he uses two boxes or categories called capitalist and medieval 
and anything in between gets labelled transitional.
Karl Marx, Capital (Moscow 1962), Vol.III esp. 321-22, 324-5; Rodney 
Hilton et al The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (London 1978); 
but see D.C. Coleman's (ed) Revisions in Mercantilism (London 1964) 
esp. his Introduction. (This book is not listed in the thesis 
bibliography).
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is that from the 16th to the 18th centuries, mercantilist society was 
more modern than in fact it was. This seems to me to have further 
implications for the understanding of thought or mentality in that period, 
its degree of rationalisation or its 'pre-industrial' character. In 
terms of hegemony it is important to grasp the central role of the 
mercantile interest in the social relations of the time. Following from 
this, the understanding of the artisan mind, or large parts of it, is 
extended if it is looked at through the lens of trade, commerce and 
consumption rather than, say, the relationship of natural rights to capitalist 
development or looking for germs of socialist or capitalist thought which 
often implies an emphasis on production and investment. It was, at one 
stage, my intention to relate a mode of thinking to a full articulation of 
the notion of mercantile society but this has been omitted because of time 
and space. But it is implicit in what follows later that the 'native' theory 
of a representative figure like Gravenor Henson, although dressed up in a 
mythical garb of Anglo-Saxonism, is a better guide to understanding the
late 18th century and the early years of the 19th century than either Marx
. . 48or orthodox liberal historians.
* * * *
If true, this assertion in itself justifies going through in some 
detail the ideas of people like Henson who is one of my 'representative 
figures' or 'organic intellectuals', whose ideas make up the two case study 
chapters. These figures, as suggested before, are representatives of 
collective, ideas or consciousness and social groups, classes or movements. 
But the question remains, why choose these particular representatives?
The general answer is that I found in the writings of these historical 
figures statements or 'testaments' which although not political theory in 
the more formal sense of the term, contained ideas that were more in the 
shape of principles or 'worked out' to a much greater extent than in 
reports of speeches in newspapers or in short pamphlets. There is, of 
course, an element of fortuity about the choice and I have gone where my
Critique or criticism arises from the assumption that consciousness 
is, at least in part, false and apparent rather than 'real'. Merely 
to interpret consciousness is to share in its illusions. Consequently, 
for Marx, the falsity of "native theory" is of more interest than 
its content. See Zygmunt Bauman Hermeneutics and Social Science 
(New York, 1978) 62, 64.
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ideas and reading have led me. Selection is also involved; no doubt some 
of the writers and writings could have been replaced by others.
But in the first case study chapter, extensive treatment is given 
to Major John Cartwright because of his close ties to the artisan Radicals, 
because of his stature as a Radical leader, as well the length of time he 
was at the helm of Radical politics and because of his enormous output 
as a writer and not least because of his supposed intellectual eccentricity 
in being a firm believer in the myth of the Anglo-Saxon constitution.
The last reason that has been mentioned applies to all the Radical writers 
who are chosen here as does the fact that nearly all of them have been 
subject to critical interpretation; in Cartwright's case two Ph.D. theses 
and a book. I have re-assessed that interpretation in the light of a 
different approach or method outlined previously. Perhaps, Thomas 
Bewick, the next Radical considered, is the oddest selection. Yet it is 
not merely the case of falling in love with his engravings. He was active 
with Thomas Spence, in the Radical leadership at Newcastle, and his long 
memoir was used as something of an experiment since he expresses his 
ideas at a pragmatic or practical level, and like Cartwright has been 
praised as 'forward looking', for his Enlightenment mentality. His ideas 
are steeped in 'Border' culture, and so provide the opportunity to trace 
the relationship between social experience and beliefs and political ideas. 
The fact that his ideas are expressed in memoirs, as it were, unself­
consciously is also a test of the popularity or spread of Gothic mentality. 
William Cobbett's significance in the Radical movement are beyond doubt.
His History of the Protestant Reformation was still being published in the 
20th century and has been interpreted as part of a medievalist rather than 
a 'Saxonist' testament. Among other things, this book together with a 
few more of Cobbett's writings provide the opportunity to show why it was 
that language was so important in Radical political theory.
The last of the 'honorary' Radicals appearing in this chapter is 
represented by the rather aristocratic figure of Sir William Jones and 
by one of his writings only. His Principles of Government went through 
a number of editions but more importantly excerpts from it appear time 
and time again in the Radical journals of the period. It also contains 
one of the earliest statements of the labour theory of value from a 
purely workers' or artisans' viewpoint. Consequently, it provides the 
opportunity to 'place' that theory in the light of contemporary mentality 
and later developments in socialist ideology.
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The second case study chapter starts with a lengthy study of 
John Baxter. He is chosen partly because he was an obvious Radical 
leader, being at one time chairman of the London Corresponding Society.
He is also the author of a virtually unique History of England which 
although Baxter's own work is also the product of collective enterprise 
as his acknowledgements make clear. It is a treasure of Gothic or Anglo- 
Saxon intellectual archaeology. The next Radical leader I look at is 
Thomas Evans. Although on this occasion the sources are longish 
pamphlets they also contain a clear statement of principles and show how 
religious and mercantile Spencean political language could be. There is 
also an attempt to question Christopher Hill's judgement of Evans' as a 
secondary figure and his assumption that by this time 'Gothic' political 
assumptions were no more than a "rhetorical flourish". The next study 
of an organic intellectual, Thomas Spence himself, is also chosen in 
the light of the historiographical picture and because of the influence 
of Spence in the Radical movement and because of his alleged secularism 
and socialism, or his modernity. The last example, Henson, is another 
established artisan Radical leader. His History and Laws are challenging 
compositions for exegesis since they vie with Baxter's history, but also 
because of their late date of composition, their 'transitional' character 
and specifically again because of the expression of a nascent labour theory 
of value.
It should be emphasised that each of the representative figures I 
have referred to, with the exception of, perhaps, Bewick has been subject 
to a certain amount, in some cases a substantial amount, of historical 
criticism. So although I have rejected the (Marxian) method of critique 
for the contemporary ideology, I have embraced it when dealing with the 
historiography. I have felt it necessary to take the reader through the 
points at issue and often assert my position before proceeding with the 
analysis or exegesis. It is because of the historiographical literature 
that I have also taken the reader through a detailed structuralist 
'decomposition of the text', a step by step journey through the author's 
text. No doubt this method will seem like heavy weather to some readers, 
and perhaps even boring, but I hope it will have some appeal to the 
'specialist' who is fascinated by the warp and woof of Radical thought. 
Learning a language is tedious and this particular 'vulgar tongue', to 
use Vico's phrase, has been the subject of much mistaken identity in the 
past.
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If the earlier chapters look at the parts of that language, its verbs, 
nouns, even its syntax, the last chapter is an examination of the total 
structure. It looks at the relationships or connections between the 
various parts; ..it outlines the language as paradigm. On the empirical 
side of things in this chapter I use a variety of sources to suggest 
a wider use of this type of thinking than is perhaps intimated by the 
case study chapters. The chapter contains, to some extent, a critique, 
but more a modification and supplementation of Pocock. There is an 
attempt to show that such terms as independence have a meaning beyond the 
confines of gentry culture, to qualify Pocock's understanding of patriotism 
and to stress the crucial role of certain words or concepts such as 
simplicity which go unmentioned in nearly all 18th century historiography. 
Also, I have tried to 'materialise' these concepts through relating them 
to a conception of 18th century society as to some extent a natural 
society and economy. In this endeavour, and in constructing the paradigm 
I have been aided by certain anthropological concepts which elicit 
Faucault's sub-text or "what was being said in what was said". None of 
this means leaving out cultural development or 'specificity'. In the 
tension between the text (virtue, natural law and so forth) and the sub­
text (purity, culture/nature and so on), and in the discussion of the 
role of the state, there is an attempt in this chapter to place the 
paradigm within the context of 18th century English mercantile society.
More will be said about particular aspects of the paradigm in the 
conclusion.
Possibly, it will aid understanding if I go over my questions and 
aims in point form. They are:
(i) Can a structuralist-linguistic-paradigm method alter our 
perceptions of 18th century mentality or a segment of it?
(ii) Specifically, how significant is the 'Anglo-Saxon'/Gothic style 
of thinking at this time. In what way is it significant?
(iii) Is this kind of thinking rational or irrational (as some historians 
have argued)?
Following on from this, my aims are:
(iv) To present a fuller and deeper account of the 18th century version of 
the Anglo-Saxon myth than has so far been attempted.
28
(v) To apply a newish method of writing about the history of ideas 
or ideology and see what the results are.
(vi) To reorientate and to supplement and complement the historiographical 
understanding of John Cartwright, Sir William Jones, Thomas Spence etc.
(vii) Through stressing the importance of the Anglo-Saxon myth in the 
writings of Cartwright, Henson etc. to establish the Gothic mode 
of thinking as an important and rational but anti-Rationalist 
type of thought.
(viii) Pace Gramsci, to take popular ideas seriously as a form of popular 
philosophy; to discover their 'epistemology' or theories about 
social and economic life and to see what they are made up of.
Finally, there is one important concern that ought to have come in 
or been made much more explicit than it is. That is the question of pre­
destination. Despite the fact I have stressed the religious sub-structure 
of Gothic political language and have given weight to its deistical and 
millenarian underpinning, the question of pre-destination has not been 
given its proper place. There is a passing reference to the importance 
of pre-destination for understanding the myth of the Anglo-Saxon 
constitution in Christopher Hill's essay. It was only well after I 
completed the thesis when I was reading James Hogg's suggestive and 
illuminating psychological novel The Private Memoirs and Confessions 
of a Justified Sinner, that the real significance of pre-destination 
for 18th century thought struck me. The doctrine of pre-destination not 
only fashions "Whig" interpretations of history generally but underlies 
notions of political sainthood as a form of election and political
knowledge as a type of infallible knowing. The constitution is not only
49English and mythical it is also a source of Protestant rationality.
49 . (Cresset Press (edn) Frome 1947 orig. pub. 1824) see esp. 112, 142, 
and Andre Gide's important Introduction.
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CHAPTER ONE
SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS BASIS OF POLITICAL IDEAS
This short sketch is really about the religion of reason and the 
reason in religion or myth. It is about the level and character of 
rationality in the late 18th to early 19th century. The aim is to try 
to relate artisan political ideas to artisan social beliefs and to their 
general level of mentality. My concern is less with the functions and 
disfunctions of 'archaic' belief than with structure in the sense of 
an analogical relationship between social and political beliefs and with 
hegemony and incidence. The bases for the discussion are the contribut­
ions of J H Plumb, E P Thompson, Keith Thomas and Hildred Geertz on the 
general level of rationality in the 18th century. Although it is stated 
with some ambiguity, Plumb contrasts the upper classes flight from reason 
and their turn to "the forces of occultism and credulity" in the 18th 
century with the mental culture of "the educated artisan, shop-keeper 
or skilled worker" which was marked by a"growing belief in the power of 
education and empiricism" and was "both diverse and more secular" than 
in earlier times. Similarly, E P Thompson praises a secular Radical 
culture of "skilled men, artisans and some outworkers" but also points 
to the fact that "the English working people" were not "wholly open to 
secular ideology" and says ideas and terms "were often employed in the 
early Radical movement" in a way that for some "had ... a fetishistic 
rather than a rational value". Also, the 'irrational' often came into 
conflict "within the same mind".''’
Perhaps a definition of rationality, or at least rationalism, is 
still necessary. Rationalism in its pure form, allows that everything, 
including religion, is in principle open to doubt and reason. Causation 
in rationalism is seen as something natural and social and specific 
rather than extra-natural and generalised. In pre-rationalist thinking, 
in societies with natural economies and face-to-face relationships, there 
is an extra cause over and above natural and social ones, and disruption 
in one area is said to lead to disruption in other areas; "the disruption
J.H. Plumb "Reason and Unreason in the Eighteenth Century", In the 
Light of History (London 1972), 19-20; Thompson, Working Class 882; 
see also fn.29 in Introduction above.
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of social, moral and physical planes may be interlinked". As ideology, 
this interconnectedness of causation expresses itself as the idea of 
fortune or misfortune; it is no more than the reflection of the comparatively 
undivided social relations of the natural economy. Fortune has a material 
and moral side to it. In 'pre-industrial' societies, "the first reaction 
to a misfortune is to identify its moral origin". The search for the 
cause of misfortune often led to custom since the breaking of custom 
was the first cause. Custom was suitably ambiguous, and misfortune was 
explained as the result of the breaking of some custom or other, including 
political customs summarised in the ideal of the constitution. The 
violation of custom led to divine, semi-divine or magical intervention.
Although he presents ample material to the contrary, Keith Thomas
finally takes the view that by the 18th century, these sorts of archaic
habits of thinking were nowhere near as important as they were in the 17th
century. Overall, he paints the 18th century as the age of reason; his
view is not really much at odds with the traditional view. For example,
astrology was only popular until the late 17th century. About this time,
"it rapidly declined in status". Yet if "the supernatural" as a type of
explanation had declined by the late 18th and early 19th centuries, its
influence was still strong. Everything that Thomas uses to paint a picture
of 17th century mentality : Providence, ghosts, prayer, the Devil, wizards
and witches, curses, astrology, fasting, fairy beliefs, magic and natural
law beliefs were all prominent if perhaps not a_s prominent in the 18th
3century as they were a century before. In so far as they exist they are 
signs of a "natural economy", of alienated thought; they are cultural 
expressions of Marx's postulate that "magic is dominant when control of 
the environment is weak". Thomas plays this down, sees no coherent theory 
of magical explanation but only fragments at this time and in Weberian 
fashion separates ideas from their environment. Changes in mentality were 
dissociated from and preceded "changes in the economic and social structure". 
Magic declined before technical substitutes, technology, took its place.
This view, the view of "fragmentary survivals" only by the 18th century, 
is challenged by Thompson in a later essay as it is implicitly in this
Alan MacFarlane, The Family Life of Ralph Josselin, (Cambridge, 1970), 
194; Max Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa, (Oxford, 1966), 94-5; 
and the most elaborate interpretation of this frame of mind is in 
E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande, 
(Oxford, 1937), passim.
As against this, see Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, 
(London, 1971), 310, 384, 414, 538-9, 693, 695-6, 724, 756-7, 789, 797.
2 .
3 .
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sketch. Despite his denial, his tendency to oppose unsystematic popular 
magic to systematic upper and middle class religion is also attacked by 
Hildred Geertz. It is unnecessary to go through argument and counter­
argument except to note Geertz's comment that Thomas equates "logical 
coherence with explicit intellectual formulation" and Thomas' side­
swipe at French historians "schemes" of interpretation "which go far"
4beyond the ethnographic evidence". Here I am prepared to take a leaf 
out of Lucien Goldmann's book, and Pocock and Foucault, and to allow for 
the application of reason to evidence.
But first I need to establish the extent and 'lateness' of pre­
rationalist and pre-ideological thinking; to establish its incidence.
For this purpose there are a variety of primary and secondary literatures 
of which the bibliography gives some indication. Besides important older 
secondary sources such as W.C. Sydney's England and the English, I have 
read deeply into artisan memoirs and contemporary sources like Hone's 
Year Book, Southey's Letters from England and John Brand's Popular 
Antiquities. Among the artisan writers are Alexander Somerville, William 
Lovett, Thomas Holcroft, James Lackington, George Jacob Holyoake, Thomas 
Cooper, Samuel Bamford whose "mother's race ... bore the old Saxon name 
of Jobson", whose claims to lost family property stemmed from the time
"when the Saxons wrested it from the Celts", Benjamin Franklin and 
*
Thomas Carter. In these writings, alongside attitudes which are plainly 
secular and rationalist, there are also often at least sneaking half­
beliefs in myth, supernatural forces and the divine origin of society. 
Perhaps one of the best descriptions of this state of mind, comes from 
literature. George Eliot, an author noted for her attention to ethnographic 
detail, gives a vivid description of her artisan, Adam Bede's, response to 
an incident which occurred soon after his father died. There seems to be 
some association between Bede's feelings of guilt and his acceptance that 
supernatural forces were at work.^ George Eliot describes his general
4. E.P. Thompson, "Anthropology and the Discipline of Historical Context" 
Midland History, I, 1972, 41-55; Hildred Geertz, "An Anthropology of 
Religion and Magic I in Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 6, 1975, 
71-89; Keith Thomas, "An Anthropology of Religion and Magic II" in 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vi, 1, Summer 1975, 91-109.
She describes him as "at once penetrating and credulous. If a new 
building had fallen down and he had been told that this was a divine 
judgement, he would have said, 'May be but, the bearing o' the roof 
and walls wasn't right, else it wouldn't ha' come down'; yet he believed 
in dreams and prognostics, and to his dying day he told the story of 
the stroke and the willow wand", George Eliot, Adam Bede, (Airmont 
Classics edn., 1966), 45.
See the Bibliography for the works that have been studied.
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mental set as "that mental combination which is at once humble in the 
region of mystery and keen in the region of knowledge". There is, so to 
speak, a kind of lingering credulity which I believe is typical of 
artisan mentality for this period and is absent in only a few of the 
more deep-seated rationalists such as Francis Place. It accounts for 
the form political belief took.
This can be brought out more clearly through interpreting some 
material supplied by Samuel Bamford. One story he tells shows up the 
connection between the deterministic notion of Providence and the 
equally deterministic pre-suppositions of astrology which along with 
millenial determinism helped to structure political thinking so that it, 
too was deterministic. According to Bamford, this pre-rationalist frame 
of mind was "prevalent" in 1817 but by 1848 was quickly departing.
Although even then, pre-rationalism "retained its place". The connected­
ness of political, social and existential beliefs is suggested in Bamford's 
description of George Plant of Blackley, "a firm believer in ghosts, 
witches and hobgoblins" and a Radical. Plant was also interested in 
botany, herbs and astrology; Bamford hints at a possible connection 
between Plant's astrological interests and his politics. Plant had read 
Culpepper and Sibly. Plant, Bamford thinks, saw in Radical politics a 
"new political 'Heal-all'". There was, so to speak, an analogy between 
a gnostic knowledge of nature and political gnosis. By 1817, Ebenezer
Sibly's most popular book, the one that contained the heaviest political
6content, reached a twelfth edition.
The links in the chain are brought out clearly by Keith Thomas, "Even 
in the eighteenth century", Thomas says,
most sections of the English economy were dependent upon 
the weather ... this ... gave astrological predictions 
their plausibility. To predict the weather was to 
predict the harvest; and to predict the harvest was to 
predict the discontent which would follow the food 
shortage, and the rebellion which might follow 
discontent ... in a society which was dependent upon the 
weather for its efficient functioning ... it was not 
possible for a weather forecast to remain simply a weather 
forecast ... it carried with it a chain of far-reaching 
consequences of a social and political character. The 
prognostications which the astrologers issued annually 
in their almanacks were therefore highly plausible.^
See Appendix [ D ] for an analysis of Sibly's work in these terms. 
7* Thomas, Religion & Magic, 396.
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Knowledge and reasoning were an expression of ignorance, and expression 
of Marx's postulate concerning the relationship between production, 
knowledge and the control of nature. If magic is a kind of functional 
knowledge about the natural and social environment, it is also an 
expression of ignorance about these orders. If artisan literature 
provides a sort of mental map that is a guide to a now lost and 
mysterious world, it also gives some indication of the limits of knowledge 
the map contains.^
Another artisan, Thomas Carter, a tailor, describes how, until
he was nine, he knew nothing of any human or natural science. He describes
in some detail his ignorance of natural forces and of geography. He had
never heard of Asia. No one he asked could satisfactorily tell him where
9the Continent was: "whether it was in Europe, Africa or America". It is 
the gaps in knowledge, the ignorance of specific causes, that gives 
recourse to the search for a type of causation expressed as generalised 
origins. Cognition is mythical rather than ideological. This is true 
even of those bodies of discourse which present themselves as the 
respectable knowledge of the period.
To make that more than an assertion I want at least to give 
some indication of the shape that scientific or systematic knowledge 
had in the 18th century. Involving at least a heavy qualification of 
writers like A. Musson and E. Robinson, Arthur Donaldson and Keith Thomas 
my 'proof' of the co-existence and inter-penetration of 'magic' with 
scientific discourse and practice rests on the artisans' resort to 
astrology and herbalism for medical advice, on the lack of distinction 
between philosophy and science, as in "natural philosophy", on science's 
general lack of specificity, on its amateurism and exhibitionism, its 
manifestation as an object d'art and "public social badge for a gentleman". 
It is also characterised by its externality. Biology did not exist since 
"life did not exist : only living beings". The external and exhibitory 
side of science is a sign of its incomplete rationalism. "All nature forms
For example, Bamford tells of how, on his first voyage, when his ship 
hit a storm, the waves "having the appearance of streams of fire, were 
breaking over the bows of the vessel and sweeping the deck. In a 
moment I was up to my knees, and I actually jumped thinking I should 
be burned", Samuel Bamford, Early Days, (London, 1849), 236.
9 . Thomas Carter, Memoirs of a Working Man, (London, 1845), 35.
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one great fabric", weaved by the one God. Encylopaedias were "as full 
of superstition as of rational science", including giants. Thomas Cooper 
in attendance at the astronomy lectures of Matthew Holden mentions 
Holden's use of "zodiacal constellations". Isaac Newton's prophetic 
literature was still widely read; Catherine Macaulay, Joseph Priestley 
and Thomas Paine, all put limits on the extent of the rationalistic 
probing. As Paine argued, it was "from the study of true theology that 
all our knowledge of science was derived". In England, Biblical criticism 
was slow to develop. The term "myth" was generally applied to only non- 
Christian beliefs.^
Biblical myth was treated as true but sacred history.
Consequently, it helped structure and limit secular historical enquiry.
The line between myth, politics and history was indistinct. Sacred, and 
secular history were used to extract moral and political lessons, and both 
types of discourse were premissed on the search for origins. To discover 
the origin of an institution was to explain and justify it or to account 
for collective misfortune. It provided a source of legitimation or 
illegitimation. This meant that political argument took on a strong 
mythical, that is religious, and 'historical' colouring. Not until the 
19th century is there the kind of history, an historicism, "which 
cannot be fitted over natural laws". Natural law, and the 'Whig' history 
that partly rested on it, involved "the anti-historical assumption that 
political behaviour is the same at all times and places". Also, the 18th 
century like the century before, sustained a large "prophetic literature" 
with strong mythico-historical overtones. As with the previous century, 
political prophecy, in Keith Thomas's words, rested on the belief that 
"even the most revolutionary doings of contemporaries had been forseen by 
usages of the past". Revolutionary actions were sanctioned by reference 
to similar actions by ancestors, and prophecies "provided a validating 
charter". "This had the effect of disguising any essentially revolutionary 
step by concealing it under the sanction of the past approval". As Thomas 
says (for the 17th century),
the prophecy was a divine one, indicating that 
rebellious activity was in accordance with God's 
will and therefore not a sin but a positive duty.
It gave ... moral justification to those engaged in 
the gambler's throw of rebellion ...
^  ’ See Bibliography for references upon which these statements are made.
Thomas, Religion and Magic, 503.
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Clearly such a political formula had 'hegemonic' implications and set
epistemic limits for political counter-arguments. It was psychologically
more comforting, then, if, as in the discourse of political millenium,
prophecy was divine suggesting that rebellion was sanctioned "by God's
will" and was "not a sin but a positive duty". This also suggests,
against Pocock, the conflation of custom and charisma as part of the same
mental set. But I cannot agree with Thomas that the ancient prophesies,
legend, and the Anglo-Saxon myth and other similar beliefs had "wilted
away" by the 18th century. Gwyn Williams study of the myth of Madoc
suggests otherwise, although Williams' interest lies in function and
legitimation rather than form or structure. The myth of Madoc is produced
by a political situation or event which is then reduced to economic
12interests, with very little concern for its mythic structure. I 
concentrate on a whole mental outlook which sees the present needs to 
be re-made in terms of the past and its paradigms, without ignoring the 
cultural expression. I speak here not merely of perceptions of historical 
experience but of habits or "strategems" of thought.
In part, the 18th century expressed its mythic or non-rational 
consciousness in terms of a religion of reason : deism. But the fact that 
it claimed reason for its own, makes deism no less mythical, no less a 
variety of mental fetishism, even though at least from Marx and Engels 
onwards deism is frequently seen as "but an easy way of getting rid of 
religion". Yet deism is another example of the limits of 18th century 
scepticism and enquiry. In the following chapters the importance of 
deistic assumptions can hardly be underestimated. It is therefore 
important to stress that the deistic God is not necessarily a God who is 
absent from the world of men; that he wound up the machine and everything 
moved without his aid or assistance. Deism stressed God's unity or oneness 
and his perfection. It saw him active in the world through "the means of 
divinely sanctioned natural laws, both moral and physical". Also, "the 
ordering of events constitutes a general providence"; the tendency was to 
deny special providence in the form of miracles and so on, but this was 
not invariable. God's natural law endowed men with reason, and the main 
religious injunction or obligation was to lead a moral or virtuous life. 
"Those who fulfill the moral law and live according to nature are 'saved'".
12 . For the points raised in this paragraph, see Gwyn A. Williams,
"Welsh Indians and the First Welsh Radicalism", in History Workshop, 
No. 1, Spring, 1976, 140-1, 144, 152.
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Finally, other religious ideas and practices that go against these tenets
are "at best indifferent political institutions and beliefs or errors to 
13be condemned". Against Paine, not all deists rejected revelation or 
revealed religion; for some, parts of the Bible were "the republication of 
the law of nature". But reason and not the authority of the Church is the 
basis of interpretation.
In keeping with the 18th century concept of reason, Right Reason 
was at the same time empirical and rational. Because it operated through 
reason, deism was "the name given to a set of epistemological and 
metaphysical claims". Since reason was double-sided some deists used 
"a priori arguments, while others claimed that their conclusions were 
based wholly on empirical evidence". Paine's deism is one of the best 
examples of a priori principles. Since deism was the religion of nature 
and nature was unchangeable then genuine religion could be apprehended 
in these terms. Yet nature and religion were also in the world; they 
were things of experience. And experience meant variation; variation 
meant "error". For if "all reasoning men" had "the same religious views 
in any time or place" then history or experience contained "a history of
14
religious error but not of religious evolution". Among the errors 
giving rise to religious diversity is "the transmission of false information". 
If, as it is argued here, deism provides the structure or analogy for the 
Anglo-Saxon myth then it is fairly obvious why many Radicals regarded 
political information or knowledge as so important. The aim was to dispel 
both religious and political error. But error was enshrined in tradition.
So tradition must be attacked by reason; or at least some parts of it 
ought to be. Also, since tradition was the repository of history and was 
national and particular, the attention that deism gave to history tended 
to undermine the universalism of its reason.
There are other ways in which deism and its reading of history led to 
politics. Deism's principles, said the Cap of Liberty, "are apparent to 
the meanest capacity". As such, "it justified and sanctioned republican 
government and served as a counterweight to theories of divine right".
The order of society was not sacrosanct since civil society was the product
Roger Emerson, "Deism" in Dictionary of Ideas, (New York, 1968), 646; 
E.C. Mossner, "Deism" in Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (New York & 
London, 1967), 8 vols. Vol.2, 328-29.
13.
14. Emerson, "Deism", 646.
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of man's reason. The deists "held that political institutions had been 
invented at one bound by legislators, and religions by priests". Against 
this, primitive or deistical religion was "a civic function conducted 
by an assembly of citizens" and could "become equated with the priesthood 
of all believers and the rule of saints foretold in the millenium".^ 
Both the millenium and deism sought a return to a more primitive and 
purer origin. Ideally, then, there was one genuine law, one genuine 
religion and one genuine polity: "the affirmation of the principle of 
oneness in humanity". Even if a deist is not a Christian, "he will 
insist that he believes in one God". The "metaphysical pathos of the 
word one is very intense". Oneness was what was really real or genuine:
But in what sense was the One real? In the sense 
that it was the source of everything else, was 
timeless, incorporeal and a universal predicate 
... to find ... the One was to find there also the
source of values...1 6
In deism, error is equivalent to diversity, to culture. Error and 
culture are plural and are to be contrasted with nature: "error ... 
neglected Nature".^ Yet at certain historical moments, the plurality 
inherent in culture had been transcended; and could be again. The 
identification of religious with civil or political liberty and of virtue 
"in the civic sense" with salvation had been and could again be realised 
in the life of the nation. One God and one religion found its analogy in 
a unified polity without parties. Nature became identified with culture. 
In particular, the English constitution, became the universal measure of 
all things. Deism gave to politics a vocabulary built around the words 
of corruption, mystery, simplicity, reason and so on.
Hope of the millenium could be combined with deism since millenial 
catastrophe would destroy existing institutions and allow for a return 
to the original deistical religion. In keeping with the 'level of the 
rationality' objective, my aim is to deny the propositions of Christopher 
Hill and Keith Thomas that millenialism in the late 18th century was "a 
harmless hobby", or that prophecy was no more than a "survival". This
15.
16.
Cap of Liberty, No.5, 1819, 69; Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 512. 
George Boas, The History of Ideas, (New York, 1969), 187-88, 203-4.
17 . Cap of Liberty, No.13, Dec.l, 1809, 201.
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can be done through a reconsideration of the secondary literature and
a re-evaluation of some of the millenial prophets. For example, Richard
Brothers apparent shift from religion to politics is no more than a shift
of emphasis; political corruption is an extension, not a break, not a
secularisation, with individual or religious corruption. Just as the
so-called "children of despair" and "revolutionary millenarianism" may
have the same epistemic root, so the shift in popular support from Brothers
to Joanna Southcott may be less dramatic than it at first seems.
Southcottean millenialism is not as non-political, as Thompson and
Clarke Garrett would have it, or as conservative as another author suggests.
John Cartwright and other Radicals were eager in support of Britain against
the French invasion threat, without giving up their radical political ideals.
Joanna Southcott's attack on Paine, for example, attacked his religious
writing, his denial of the Second Coming, his denial of the Devil and so
forth. She got into strife with the Established Church and condemned bills
of exchange and the system on which they hinged on the grounds of "reason,
justice, equity and truth between man and man". Her patriotism has to be
seen in the same light : as not especially conservative, given the
patriotic ideal and Christian substructure through the belief in England
as the elect nation. One writer has talked about the latency of millenarian
belief in English culture of a "fairly widespread ... implicit Millenarianism"
which given the right conditions could "force the conversion of implicit to
explicit Millenarianism". It is important to distinguish empirical flows
from the basic structures of thought and society. In this sense,
millenarianism in the 1790s and early 1800s did not offer a novel
interpretation of crisis. Its forms of explanation were traditional. The
lack of any real distinction between the political and the religious can,
perhaps, be illustrated by artisans like William Sharp who shifted quite
easily from the Brothers' 'political' pole to the Southcottean 'religious'
end. But it is important to point out that while I am arguing against
millenarianism as part of an evolutionary model of class and political
rationalisation, neither do I favour explanations couched in terms of
18"the partial independence of the religious factor.
18. Clarke Garrett Respectable Folly (Baltimore 1975), 230 & 1-3, 9, 121, 
168; on other points raised in this paragraph, see P.S. Gilbert 
"Joanna Southcott : the case of a conservative Millenarian Movement" 
in New Sociology, Sept., 1971, Vol.l, No.l; 30-1, 49; Thomas,
Religion & Magic 172-3; Christopher Hill Puritanism St Revolution 
(London 1958), 322-3; Joanna Southcott An Answer to Thomas Paine's 
Third Part of the Age of Reason (London 1812) 2-3, 5-6, 61;
Joanna Southcott "An Account of the Trials on the Bills of Exchange" 
in The Kingdom of Christ Is at Hand (London 1806) 3, 55 and see 
"The Long-Wished for Revolution also in Kingdom 1, 58 and other works 
listed in the Bibliography.
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Identifying England as the elect nation was a way of giving English
culture a universal value and of giving the millenial experience in
English history a particular cultural stamp. Yet other deistical
elements emphasised natural laws, the natural order of things. The
other, half-hidden sub-theme is therefore the nature/culture theme that
signifies its existence as myth. Millenial discourse is another example
of the limits of the control of the productive forces over nature, of a
natural or semi-natural economy. It needs, then, to be joined up with
astrology as part of a "mental set". Both went in for "general predictions"
for a theory of general causation related to three kinds of signs of the
times - to "political developments", to "natural circumstances" and to the
"temper of men" - all of which were linked together. The lack of control
over nature, and the lack of corresponding social differentiation, is
expressed as a lack of epistemic differentiation between politics and
religion. Again, there is a body of opinion and scholarship that suggests
19otherxtfise or subordinates the religious to the political. Yet, "even the 
doctrine of the sovereignty of the people could be cast in a religious 
mould". Rather, the following chapters show how the two were joined or 
undifferentiated. John Cartwright saw politics as "practical religion 
... pre-eminently under the Christian dispensation". The partition between 
politics and religion could lead to the separation between private interests 
and the public benefit.
19. Christopher Hill, "The Political Sermons of John Preston" in 
Puritanism and Revolution, 263; M. Dorothy George, English Political 
Caricature : a Study of Opinion and Propaganda, (Oxford, 1959), Vol.l, 
71, suggests that the mixture of religion and politics ended with the 
Sacheverell incident; Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, (London, 1790, Everyman edn., London 1910), 9-10; G.H. Sabine, 
A History of Political Thought, (3rd edn. London, 1963), 616-7;
G.S. Veitch, The Genesis of Parliamentary Reform, (London 1965, orig. 
pub. 1916), 75; Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 399. According to 
Pocock, James Harrington "ended by subordinating spiritual experience 
to political", and he says that neo-Harringtonianism had a big part 
to play in the 18th century. I have given much more stress to 
millenarianism and deism in the 18th century than Pocock. Eric 
Foner has even argued for the influence of millenialist categories 
on Tom Paine's thought, "Tom Paine's Republic: Radical Ideology and 
Social Change" in The American Revolution: Explorations in the History 
of American Radicalism, (DeKalb, 1976), 206 and 203-4 for Radicalism 
generally. See also Clarke Garrett, Respectable Folly, (Baltimore, 
1975), 13 and Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution, (Cambridge, Mass. 1967), 89.
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Even the nominally political act of getting elected to Parliament 
could be conceived as something basically religious.
Every man who enters into Parliament, with any 
personal view whatever and not wholly or exclusively 
for the service of his country must be deemed bona 
fida to have sold his soul; and also every man who 
joins any party to vote on all occasions for the 
purpose of promoting or supporting that party at all 
events, is perpetually guilty of the same act of 
selling his s o uI.^q
King Alfred, said William Hone, looked not to "political sources" but to
"the providence of God" to explain events. In the pamphlets of John
Harrison, "a Sheffield razor-maker", religion,in the form of copious
quotations from Revelations, morality and politics are all linked
together in a general causal sequence. It is worth giving one example
of the chain of reasoning. "John Bull" one of the "lower sort of people"
without "liberal education" and unfamiliar with "the regular rules of
composition" tells how "god gives the means to produce a certain end".
To England, he gave the acorn. Explanation starts from nature and the
super-natural. Acorns, "when planted ... become oaks ... and in the
process of time become plank, knees, masts ... fit for building a ship".
God has ordained the British navy and Britain as a "great maritime and
commercial power" and a barrier to Napoleon. Napoleon was protected by
God so that he could fulfill his purposes. This gives some indication
of the appeal that Napoleon could have in Radical circles. He could be
conceived as a political hero since he was the destroyer of feudal,
autocratic and Catholic monarchies. God protects and sets limits to
Napoleon's actions and powers but Napoleon also has a certain freedom of
thought and action. But he can only use it to his cost if he goes against
God's will. Napoleon has "escaped plots, assassinations, and poison
miraculously". But when he blustered about "having ships, commerce and
colonies", he spoke nonsense. He was "attempting what does not come within
the purposes of God: Great Britain is fenced in by God's waves ... naval
21power is given to Britain". Lastly, there is the 'Jacobin' Thomas Hardy's
Nathaniel B. Halhed, "A Short Reply to Dr. Horne's Pamphlet" in 
Mr. Halhed's Speech in the House of Commons ... And a Short Account 
of Mr. Brother's Prophecies, (London, 1795), 13.
20.
21. John Bull", John Bull, (London, 1808), 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 41-2.
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recommendation of "an excellent pamphlet ... recently published entitled
Sacred Politicks". Quoting from it, he brings out the religious basis
of the Radical shibboleths: "Unity" ye are all one in Jesus Christ ...
Fraternity: all ye are bretheren ... Liberty: 'Christ hath made you
free' ... Equality: There is neither Greek nor Jew, Barbarian ... but
Christ is all in all". He points to "the political character of Jesus
Christ himself" who offended against and was seized by the "Church and
State". The same words but hardly the concepts of the political rhetoric
22of the French Revolution.
The ultimate aspect of rationality to be considered is literacy 
and its relationship to artisan mentality. In the secondary literature 
of R.K. Webb, Victor Neuberg, E.P. Thompson and others, there is little
stress given to the 'irrational' in. pLebeian literature; but literacy in
itself is not a sign of a more rationalistic outlook. To demonstrate this,
I refer again the recollections of Lovett, Carter, Holcroft, Cooper and *Bamford. Chapbooks, were full of "traditional heroes", were "essentially
English in their contents", and reproduced "an ancient tradition petrified
in print". Important here is the figure of Robin Hood, mentioned in all
the sources. Also important is "Ossian" mentioned by Bamford among others.
MacPherson's quasi-mythical composition, he says, "gave me a glimpse of our
23most ancient lore, interested my feelings and absorbed my attention".
Robin Hood's exploits always had a rural setting and could lend themselves 
to political interpretation. In general, the Anglo-Saxon myth can be seen 
as a kind of political enchantment analogous to the social enchantment 
generated by chapbook literature. 'Politics' was merely one part of the 
same mental universe. King Alfred, who also entered chapbook literature,
Thomas Hardy in Place Papers, B. Mus, Add. Mss, 27814.
23 . Samuel Bamford, Early Days, (London, 1849), 40-1, 43, 94ff, 280-1. 
According to MacPherson, the Ossian poems "form a regular kind of 
history". Although "the general charge of forgery ... was 
unjustifiable", they were, it seems, part forgery and seem to 
have been composed from legend and oral history. James MacPherson, 
The Poems of Ossian, (London, 1796), 3 vols. It has been said that, 
"Ossian flowed like a tide over Europe ... it would be hard to 
overestimate their impact ... Ossian was widely thought to represent 
that early pure religion ... Ossian provides the only concrete 
example or illustration of the early simple and natural religion 
posited by the deists". B. Feldman & R. Richardson, The Rise of 
Modern Mythology, (Bloomington, 1972), 201-2.
* On the secondary and the primary literature, see the Bibliography, 
under the names of the authors mentioned.
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and his band of Anglo-Saxons were not much more than a politicised version
of Robin Hood and his merry men. I would also emphasise as strongly as
possible Thomas Carter's observation that earlier reading was more
important than is often realised "when it is considered that the human
mind retains in mature years, much of the tastes and habits acquired in 
24childhood". Heroes and history, reason as origins and custom, this 
was the mental universe of the artisan; a mental world far removed 
from modern thinking about society and politics.
24. Carter, Memoirs, 25, 27.
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CHAPTER TWO
REPRESENTATIVE FIGURE 1 : "HONORARY RADICAL JACKS"
There are habits of thinking peculiar to different 
conditions, and to find them out is truly the study 
of mankind.
Tom Paine
Vulgar traditions must have had public grounds of 
truth by virtue of which they came into being and 
were preserved by entire peoples over long periods 
of time. It will be another great labour of this 
Science to recover these grounds of truth - truth 
which, with the passage of years and the changes 
in languages and customs, has come down to us 
enveloped in falsehood.
This chapter considers the more Gothicist side of Radical 
ideology. They are the ideas of those who were either read or had 
close contact with artisan leaders. But why give all this time, 
space and thought to the Gothic mind, to the myth of the Anglo-Saxon 
constitution. Despite what Althusser says about the need to study 
customs and traditions, the structuralist version of Marxism has 
ignored culture to an extent not found in Marx's own writings. Culture 
and tradition are important because they are often mentally 
crystallised as style and, as E.J. Hobsbawm says, "style may be of 
more than superficial interest" since these are times when "it is the 
man, or rather the movement."
Giambattista Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, abridged 
and translated by T.G. Bergin and M.H. Fisch (Cornell University 
Press, 1970), 23.
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JOHN CARTWRIGHT
The first writer I examine as a contributor or purveyor of 
the Gothic style or mentality is Major John Cartwright. This 
examination is undertaken with a number of questions in mind which 
have come out of the previous analysis or scholarship devoted to 
Cartwright's writings. The first question is whether or not 
Cartwright is a 'Lockeian' or a 'Machiavellian'; whether his writings 
are guided by natural law or structured by virtue. And what role does 
custom or constitutionalism play? Is there any shift, any ideological 
break, between the 1770s when he first put pen to paper and the 1820s 
when his last compositions were published? What sense, if any, is 
he a revolutionary? Is he a Jacobin? Is he a 'modern' , an 
Enlightenment figure, or are his ideas backward-looking and even 
eccentric or irrational? What is the role of religion in his thinking? 
What is his class position or social background; how is he related to 
the artisans? How popular was his writing and ideas? And generally, 
how does he view the 'polity', that is the economy, politics and 
society of his time. Specifically, what does he understand by such 
words as republicanism, patriotism and property? Is Cartwright 
Court or Country? What was the conceptual structure that organised 
these political outlooks?
Major John Cartwright had read and used Hulme's Essay in his own
popular publication Take Your Choice. But Cartwright's reading and
usages were selective and critical. Take Your Choice, Cartwright's
"most famous book" containing "the basis of most of his political
philosophy", is said to have "much of its content ... derived directly 
2from John Burgh". Certainly Cartwright's pamphlet contains fairly 
copious comment from Burgh. The question of 'influence' is raised, 
but what follows shows how complicated any answer would be. When a 
writer is mentioned it is more the question of paradigms that needs to 
be kept in mind. For example, in a publication, published eight years 
later in 1784, not the 'commonwealthmen' Hulme and Burgh but Locke is 
the master "of the science of civil government". Another writing praises
Christopher Hill, "The Norman Yoke", in Puritanism and Revolution, 
(Panther edn. 1968, orig. pub. 1958), 99; James Walvin, "English 
Democratic Societies and Popular Radicalism, 1791-1800", Ph.D. 
thesis, University of York, 1969, viii; John Osborne, John 
Cartwright, (Cambridge, 1972), 17.
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Thomas More and his Utopia ♦ Paine, too, is of some influence
if only for his opposition to hereditary government. Cartwright
was a republican of sorts, but "never wholehearted follower
of Tom Paine". If he would not go even as far as Locke in his
revolutionary beliefs, this must refer to Cartwright's practical
politics; the problem of his intellectual relationship to
Paine is still an unsettled question. At Horne Tooke's trial,
he indicated that he seems to have read the Rights of Man; in
1819 he said he had not yet read the Age of Reason but intended
to get a copy. On the personal level, Paine was "among his
associates" even if "unlike Paine he distinguished America from
France". But both are said to share Leveller antecedents so far
3as radical parliamentary democracy goes.
Which, if based on natural rights theory, seems to bring 
Cartwright closer to Locke than to the neo-Harringtonian and 
commonwealth paradigm. According to one writer, "Cartwright's 
ideas were inspired by two main sources, the Bible and John Locke".
For his biographer as the Anglo-Saxon myth took a grip on Cartwright's 
mind, "the references to Locke disappeared". But around 1820, the 
primacy of the constitution over parliament was still being validated 
by using Locke. His niece claimed that in one of his last literary 
efforts in 1823, his ideas were no different "from his first essay 
on the subject of politics in the year 1776". Often associated 
with Cartwright's supposedly Lockeian cast of mind is his incorpora­
tion into the Enlightenment which has the effect of stressing his 
rationalism. Yet Cartwright presented to the Society for 
Constitutional Information copies of Burgh's Disquisitions and 
Hulme's Essay as the two works which had most influenced his own 
writings; there is evidence Cartwright had read the latter by or
in 1782. It has been said Granville Sharp won Cartwright over to
4the Anglo-Saxon myth.
F.D. Cartwright, (ed.), The Life and Correspondence of Major John 
Cartwright, (London, 1826), Vol.l, 51; R.W. Harris, Political 
Ideas, (London, 1963), 172; E.P. Thompson, The Making of the 
English Working Class, (Pelican edn. 1968), 725; David Drinkwater- 
Lunn, "John Cartwright, Political Education and English Radicalism", 
Oxford University Ph.D., 1970, 509-10.
Harris, Ideas, 170; Osborne, Cartwright, 22; Cartwright, Life, 
Vol.II, 197, 232; Drinkwater-Lunn, "John Cartwright" 24, 45-6,
158, 168-69.
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Cartwright was himself an 'influence' in Radical circles and 
-I merely mention two connections which seem worthy of further 
investigation or research. On 20 July 1820, according to his neice, 
he "again" met Thelwall "a kind friend". He had a number of friends 
and acquaintances including a quite close relationship with Thomas 
Wooler to whom Cartwright "opened his library". The relationship 
with Wooler and others takes on more significance if we try to 
assess the wider 'influence' of Cartwright's ideas. His English 
Constitution Produced and Illustrated "was privately printed and 
almost ignored in the journals of opinion". On the one hand, it 
is doubted whether many of the working classes read his writings, 
on the other hand it is said many of Cartwright's ideas were "at 
large" in the early 19th century. A number of the ideas were 
publicised in "that considerable section of the newspaper press which 
addressed itself to poor and politically uneducated Englishmen" among 
which "Wooler's Black Dwarf" is "the most conspicuous example". The 
problem with this is the Dwarf was not only the major vehicle for 
those, including Wooler, who were inspired by Cartwright's thinking, 
but also that Cartwright was an important contributor to the paper. 
Neither does every book fall into the same category of the English 
Constitution. The initial publication of the Declaration of Rights 
amounted to one thousand copies. In 1781 an additional 4,000 copies 
were printed, and there were three more editions of the work in 
1782 and 1783.5
Having raised the question of readership and class, as an entry 
into the substance of John Cartwright's thought it is useful to now 
to on to discuss his own class position and attitudes. To what extent 
is he an "organic intellectual"? Starting with social origins, 
Cartwright's ancestors fought on the side of Charles I in the Civil 
War and lost much of their landed property as a result. But his 
immediate family was well-connected, rubbing shoulders with 
archbishops and the like. His father's sister married a Whig 
aristocrat who is said to have had a great influence over John 
Cartwright. But as he put it, "mine was a Tory family" and
5 . Osborne, Cartwright, 150, 161; Walvin, "Democratic Societies", 21.
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"Popery was once its religion". One author has argued Cartwright's 
social position protected him from the prosecutions that befell 
other Radicals. In fact, the precise nature of Cartwright's 
social status is not all that clear. According to another 
authority, his father was "a landowner whose property had 
gradually diminished". Cartwright himself "had a poor formal 
education at Newark Grammar School and Heath Academy in Yorkshire". 
Veitch says he got "a measure of respect" from the authorities 
because he had "a stake in the country ... a small estate which 
appears to have maintained him in comfort if not in luxury".
He is described by P.A. Brown as coming from "a family of small 
gentry in the Midlands", while another source refers to him buying 
"a large estate in Lincolnshire". Elsewhere, Cartwright is 
described as remaining "at heart a landed gentleman" who would 
"purchase land himself when he had the opportunity". His writings, 
it is said, "were coloured by partiality for agriculture as a way 
of life" while there was "a deepening prejudice against commercial 
interests" as he grew older. Many of Cartwright's fellow- 
reformers were "nostalgic gentry" who as a class were suffering a 
decline in living standards and social position. Certainly, the 
Anglo-Saxon myth and natural law have a strong agrarian flavour, 
although the question of commercial interest is more problematical.
In 1788, he became an unsuccessful mill-owner; though he has been 
called "an improving landlord and a forward-looking millowner".
John Cartwright's younger brother was, of course, Edmund Cartwright 
and John "certainly shared in Edmund's industrial adventures".^
Edmund's experience of "labour violence", the "machine- 
smashing and factory burning" by handloom weavers fearful of "low 
wages and technological unemployment" is said to have led to the 
Major's "later denunciations of the Luddites" and presumably coloured
Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 57, 172, 177; Naomi Churgin Miller, 
"John Cartwright and Radical Parliamentary Reform 1808-1819" 
in English Historical Review, No.338, October 1968, 706;
Sonya Jowett, "The Role of Language and the Development of 
English Political Ideas in the Late Eighteenth Century", 
University of Manchester Ph.D. thesis, 107; G.S. Veitch,
The Genesis of Parliamentary Reform, (London, 1965, orig. pub. 
1916), 47; P.A. Brown, The French Revolution in English 
History, (London 1918), 17; Osborne, Cartwright, 14; A 
Memoir of Edmund Cartwright, (ed.) Kenneth Ponting, (Bath, 
1971, orig. pub. 1843), 6, 174, 194ff.
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his attitude to the working classes in general. On his 
Lincolnshire estate, he tried to form a sort of cartel with 
other woad-growers. One of its aims, in Cartwright's words, 
was "to keep our woad-labourers quiet without shifting from one 
master to another".7 It is now then necessary to turn to the 
question of Cartwright's attitudes to working class groups like 
the Luddites, as well as to the working classes in general.
There is some evidence from the working class themselves of 
reciprocal hostility between Cartwright and the workers. For one 
historian, he is "a troublesome colleague" who "was not a very 
welcome caller in the library of Francis Place". Place's rationalist 
turn of mind gave short shift to Anglo-Saxonism. This attitude would 
not have been shared by Gravenor Henson, although Henson had other 
reasons for looking askance at the Major despite the position he 
occupied in Radical politics. Henson gives a fairly detailed 
account of how Cartwright persuaded a jury into an unpopular 
decision over rights of patent. According to Henson, he was at 
the time generally very unpopular "on account of the severe, 
whimsical and tyrannical discipline he had established while 
commanding the Nottingham militia". Henson cites the Nottingham 
election of 1780 when Cartwright got only 149 votes because of the 
latter's "arbitrary notions of military discipline". Yet Cartwright 
had cordial relations with other working class Radicals, for example 
Thomas Hardy, with whom he is in correspondence in 1801. There is 
still in existence Cartwright's London Corresponding Society 
membership card countersigned by Hardy as secretary. Joseph Mitchell, 
the Radical agitator and "first self-appointed political missionary" 
maintained himself at one time through the sale of Cartwright's 
political pamphlets, received Cartwright's advice and purported to 
be his 'delegate'. There was in fact a certain harmony of belief 
and experience between the attitude of loss of a certain part of 
the gentry and that of, say, the Scottish weavers who "looked back 
on a supposed Golden Age" and to men like Cartwright "to gain lost
7.
Osborne, Cartwright, 65; Cartwright, Life, Vol.l, 177.
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prestige". The 'lower classes' were closer to Cartwright than to 
Paine in that they believed their rights "were infringed rather 
than never existed". If there is a latent antagonism of 
interest between Cartwright and his artisan allies, there is 
also a certain common perspective.^
Perhaps this comes out best in Samuel Bamford. For Bamford,
the Radical movement needed to stick to the maxim of "our venerable
political Father", Major Cartwright, and "'Hold fast by the laws'".
He regards Cartwright as a sort of political hero, a figure worthy
of veneration. Immediately after Bamford's trial and during his
prison term, Cartwright made personal contact with Bamford, on
one occasion sending Bamford some books on Spanish which, however,
remained unused. Erroneously, Bamford sees Cartwright as a purely
political reformer or saint. Using a moral-political language
similar to Cartwright's he criticises him for not going far enough
and seeking moral as well as political salvation. The "worthy old
Major" did not go "to the root-end of radicalism"; he did not seek
9to purify personal corruption.
If Cartwright associated with the more plebeian reformers 
he was never really one of them. He was never really a true organic 
intellectual in the sense of coming from within the class he wanted 
to represent. He was at most what has been called an "'honorary' 
Radical Jack" or "honorary artisan". The question of representative­
ness is, in fact, problematical. Cartwright was always held in high 
regard by the gentlemen reformers such as Fox and Wyvill, as his 
correspondence bears witness. He sent copies of his Aegis to 
cabinet ministers. As late as 1805 he was writing to a number of 
dukes and earls calling for another county meeting. Yet the response 
made him cynical and sick of "the old dull road of meetings of 
freeholders convened by the aristocracy". He was always ready
Veitch, Genesis, 47; Brown, Revolution, 17; Gravenor Henson,
The Civil, Political and Mechanical History of the Framework-Knitters 
in Europe and America, (Nottingham, 1831, reprinted Newton Abbot 1970) 
312, 385; W.M. Roach, "The Radical War in Scotland", Bulletin of the 
Society for the Study of Labour History, 27, Autumn 1973, 16-17; Drink 
water-Lunn, "John Cartwright", xxii; Osborne, Cartwright, 95, 104.
Samuel Bamford, Passages in the Life of a Radical, (2nd edn. Heywood, 
1839-41), Vol.I, 31-2, 36, 44, 154; Vol.II, 161, 165, 188.
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to attack the upper class monopoly of political power. He urged 
the Society for Constitutional Information to cast aside "with 
disdain all aristocratic reserves" and to meet the people face to 
face. His appeals to the middle classes were barely more successful, 
as shown by his lack of success at Westminster. He is said not to 
have shared Wyvill's "predilection for the gentry". By the early 
1880s he placed no reliance in them at all. His confidence in the 
masses "was impressive in a person of his class and generation".
Yet in 1815 he is arguing that the reformers "must for a season at 
least work for the most part by the middle classes" so that "the 
higher then ... will see the necessity". Cartwright's political 
object was not any particular class but the people as a whole.^
Even so, towards the end of his career Cartwright made a 
particular effort to get close to the "labouring classes". Of his 
exertions on behalf of the Hampden Clubs it has been said it is 
difficult "to overstate the importance of Cartwright's evangelising 
tours of 1812, 1813 and 1815". Founded by a group of high Whig 
reformers in 1812, Cartwright was the only person to turn up at a 
meeting held in 1815. During the years 1816 to 1817 he was believed 
by the government to be the person most responsible for re-creating 
reform agitation among the lower orders. The membership of the 
Hampden Clubs consisted of "small manufacturers and artisans: 
cobblers, weavers, framesmiths, mechanics, cutlers, printers, hatters, 
drapers, cotton manufacturers" and so on. It may be true in the 
earlier parts of his career Cartwright "ignored the working classes" 
but it is a distortion to say that he "remained faithful to his class". 
His beliefs were far from an "irrelevance" to "working class ends".^
Cartwright, Life, Vol.l, 278, 326; Thompson, Working Class, 
718; Osborne, Cartwright, 126; D.R. Dinwiddy, Christopher 
Wyvill & Reform 1790-1820, (York, 1971), 27.
Thompson, Working Class, 66ff, 698, 722-4; Miller, "John 
Cartwright" 709; Osborne, Cartwright, 59, 60-1, 102.
Cartwright's attitude towards working class activity and towards
the working classes themselves as a social grouping is tinged with
ambiguity, even where political and social violence is concerned. When
the farm labourers rioted in Lincolnshire in 1791, he recommended the
farmers arm themselves so that there would be "no bullying anyone out
of the profits of his harvest". During the naval mutiny in 1797, he
wrote to the government suggesting ways to bring back "the discontented
sailors to their duty". In 1800, on hearing of an intended food riot in
Sheffield, Cartwright found a party of the would-be rioters assembled in
a barn, and, in the words of his niece, "he entered it alone, spent the
whole night among them, reasoned them into calmness". So that "in the
morning they returned peaceably to their famishing families". Peace and
order, it would seem, are valued above everything else, even the momentary
satisfying of starvation. Yet unlike the majority of middle class Radicals
and Whigs, Cartwright did not panic in the face of working class violence.
Neither did he turn on the working classes. Although the Luddites dealt
some mortal blows at the reform movement, Cartwright took his campaign and
ideas to those areas where Luddite activity was thickest. And if he
condemned the violence of Luddism, there is the suggestion that he
encouraged and knew of the plans of the Blanketeers. He failed to
attend Peterloo, although scheduled to arrive, but appeared at a protest
meeting in London. Cartwright, in fact, did not even keep his distance
from the Luddites themselves. He tried to attend one of their trials in
Manchester and was in close touch with political activists in the Luddite
districts in an attempt to quell "the tempest of discontent", converting
it into the "genuine patriotism" of radical political reform. He wanted
to give to the "friends of reform of every description" a banner "under
which they can rally". If he would comment on the riots in Lincolnshire
that "one musket and bayonet in defence of peace and law, is a match
for scores of scythes in the hands of men of conscious criminality", it ;
also remains true he was not without sympathy on certain occasions when
the working classes were acting violently in defence of their lives and
12political liberties.
Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 240, 260; Vol.II, 32; Thompson, Working Class, 
717-719; Osborne, Cartwright, 127, 129.
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The political rights of the working classes were based on the 
natural equality of men, and on their fraternity. The Bible told us 
"all men are our brethren, and that we should do to others as we would 
others should do to us". Men were created "equally and freely" and these 
principles ought to be the basis of political action. Obviously, the 
statement that Cartwright "was never a social leveller or an egalitarian" 
needs some kind of qualification, as does reference to his "subtle anti­
egalitarianism". The concept of equality has many sides to it, and it is 
misleading to say that unlike Cobbett "Cartwright's attention was riveted 
to the property taxes which fell upon the middle class". It is something 
of a parody to contrast John Cartwright's political radicalism with the 
more economic and social concerns of Cobbett. Despite his treatment of 
starving food-rioters it is inaccurate to accuse him of indifference towards 
unemployment and economic distress. "Personality" Cartwright wrote, "is 
the sole foundation of being represented" ... property "in land, goods or 
chattels", are merely "the laws of men"; but the "property" of liberty 
and representation and of being equal is "more sacred". He also emphasised 
that the poverty of the poor reformers would exclude them from a fair trial. 
Because of the effects on political and civil rights, poverty is a kind of 
national sin. Forget your Grand Tour, your visits to lakes and mountains, 
your journeys to see ruins and abbeys, he says. Travel instead "to see 
the actual condition of starving people". Go around the country and 
"you will discover in the mass of the middle and working classes, a very 
general sense of wrong and misery". But it is in the cause of poverty 
Cartwright differs from later reformers. Not the type of economic 
organisation but the state and the political system lie at the root of 
poverty and gross inequality. Political and moral corruption and degener­
ation breeds the social evil of poverty. There is, then, this agreement 
between Burke and Cartwright, and who is to say that in 1813 John Cartwright 
was wrong. Poverty had political and moral causes and could in consequence 
be remedied. Any "defects in the character of the lower classes" could 
by overcome by "enobling the depraved mind by paying it respect and 
teaching it to know its own value". As he put it, "your liberties can 
be safe in the hands of none but yourself". Political education rather 
than deference was needed.^
l0* Walvin, "Democratic Societies", 22; Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 119, 
Vol.II, 38, 46-7; Osborne, Cartwright, 18, 22, 107, 110, 144;
Carl Cone, The English Jacobins, (New York) 69-72; Drinkwater-Lunn, 
"John Cartwright", 106, 143.
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Once again, though, we must expect to find paradox and contradiction 
in thought and action which only logicians and dogmatists or puritans seek 
to exclude. The patronage-deference nexus was so much a part of social life 
in Cartwright’s time it would be surprising to find him untouched by it.
His niece describes his "acts of justice" carried out "with infinite labour 
and perseverance" on behalf of "the poor Irish, who came over at the 
fishing season, and who were frequently imposed upon and ill-treated by 
their employers". As well as being an instance of patronage, this is of 
course a further example of Cartwright's concern for the living and 
working conditions of the poor. In a similar vein, on his farm in 
Lincolnshire he established a school. Patronage of this sort would make 
the poor and ignorant look to their own best interests. While he also 
provided welfare facilities for his employees and the poor of the district, 
he urged that they become independent of the Poor Laws by forming friendly 
societies. At the same time, according to his niece , he did not expect 
the "lowest classes" to enter parliament in their own right since their 
"want of education" made them "unfit to associate with gentlemen". They 
would defer, she records him saying, "to persons of more consideration than 
themselves". Towards Cartwright "the greatest deference and respect were 
observable" from the working classes "whenever intercourse took place 
between them on the subject of politics". John Cartwright refers to the "def­
erence and affection" he received. Yet in areas where patronage might 
be expected to come through most strongly, he drew back. In 1823, in a 
letter to Birkbeck he accepted the honour of membership of the London 
Mechanics Institute but added, since he was not himself an operative 
mechanic, "I shall not think myself entitled to have any voice in the 
framing of its laws, or any claim to partake in its management".
Agreeing with Thomas Hodgskin and other Radicals who argued for an 
independent working class education he stated that these tasks "must 
remain exclusively in the hands of the operative alone" in order that the 
Institution would prosper. This was not only "an unusual sentiment for a 
middle class reformer to hold"; it also showed an insight into working 
class attitudes and consciousness which may of his contemporaries lacked.-^
Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 31, 85, Vol.II, 47, 252; Drinkwater Lunn, "John
Cartwright", 449-50; Osborne, Cartwright, 144.
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In his writings we find further expression of his politico- 
religious view of equality. Again equality is based on Christian 
fraternity. Christ knew the poor were "equally valuable in the eyes of 
God", were equal to the rich since "the poor were their brethren”. 
Consequently, in order to balance things, if the law showed any bias, "it 
ought to favour the poor". Every man in the community ought to jointly 
partake "in the sovereign power". God has made men equal by nature and 
"liberty not dominion", not status or property, "is held by divine right".
Yet in an early tract, in Take Your Choice!, he virtually suggests a 
property qualification is needed for the nation's representatives; neither 
the "farmer nor mechanic" are fit to make momentous decisions. The 
generality of the people can decide the broad principles, but the particulars 
are decided for them. The people have the liberty "to vote for gentlemen". 
Almost echoing Gravenor Henson's criticism, Cartwright says in the militia 
there should be "ample provision against too much equality" in its 
organisation. But that he knew the people were exploited by the crown and 
the aristocracy and their political and social institutions is clearly 
illustrated by the frontespiece of Take Your Choice! which displays an 
edifice similar to the propagandistic 'cartoon' of the Russian anarchists 
tiered 'cake' of the 19th century.
Cartwright's view of the aristocracy was taken from the place it 
occupied in the myth of the Anglo-Saxon constitution. "Hereditary nobles", 
introduced by William the Bastard, formed the basis of corruption within 
the constitution. There were no hereditary legislators in the Anglo-Saxon 
parliament. But in one of his earliest publications, Cartwright expresses 
the 'Rousseauean' idea that the type of government needs to be related to 
the size of the community. In 18th century England there had to be a 
departure from the pure Alfredian form, from "strict natural justice". 
Provided there were tight democratic controls, there was room for a kind 
of aristocracy. If hereditary political rights were abolished, the 
reformed parliament would still, therefore, be a parliament of gentlemen. 
Cartwright regrets the aristocracy were deprived of their military 
position. Consequently, if riots now spring up "under the nose" of a peer 
as in the Priestley Riots and the Gordon Riots earlier, he is powerless 
to act. He has in mind here the role of the aristocracy as guardians of 
public order; and their independence from the crown. In their role as 
"civil magistrates", the "nobility and gentry" could keep a watch over the 
principles of the militia's foundation. What the gentry was and what
15. See the cover of George Woodcock's Anarchism, (Pelican edn. 1962).
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i t  might  be were two d i f f e r e n t  t h i n g s .
C a r t w r i g h t  a l lowed a r o l e  in  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  t h i n k i n g  f o r  a v i r t u o u s
a r i s t o c r a c y  w hi le  a t  t h e  same t ime wanting to  ex tend the  idea  o f  th e
p e o p le  to  i n c l u d e  th e  working c l a s s e s ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  a l l  a d u l t  males who were
s a n e .  The v i r t u o u s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  would "do in  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  f o r  h i s
c o n s t i t u e n t s  t h a t  which th e y ,  i f  p r e s e n t ,  and a c t i n g  w i s e l y ,  would do f o r
t h e m s e l v e s " .  Here,  th e n ,  i s  a n o th e r  echo o f  Rousseau,  t h e  id e a  t h a t
t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  the  peop le  would only a c t  w i th  v i r t u e  i f  he
r e p r e s e n t e d  th e  r e a l  w i l l  o f  the peop le .  To ensure  h i s  v i r t u e  t h e r e  would
be annual  e l e c t i o n s .  The House o f  Commons "ought  to  be dependent  on th e
PEOPLE, c o m p le te ly  dependen t;  t h e  very organ o f  t h e i r  w i l l " .  This  be ing
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  " o rd a in e d  by A l f red  th e  b e s t  o f  a l l  our  k in g s  except  h i s
p r e s e n t  m a jes ty " .  Annual p a r l i a m e n t s  -ould be a c c e p t a b l e  to  "a p r i n c e  o f
genu ine  v i r t u e  and magnanimity" .  But xf  a v i r t u o u s  k ing  a l s o  had a r o l e
to  p l a y  in  a t r u l y  dem ocra t ic  system, annual  p a r l i a m e n t s  were on ly  p r e f e r r e d
i f  the y  were chosen  upon th e  b a s i s  o f  equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  As he says ,
" t h e r e  i s  n o th i n g  an a s s o c i a t e d  n a t i o n  cannot  do, i t  can l e v e l  the  th rone
w i th  e a r t h  and t r a m p le  a u t h o r i t y  in  the  d u s t " .  Or, as he pu ts  i t  e l sew here ,
i f  " t h e  law be vox p o p u l i "  i t  "makes i t  vox D e i " . The peo p le  a r e  ob v io u s ly
s o v e r e ig n  even i f  i t  i s  a media ted  s o v e r e ig n t y ,  and to ensu re  t h i s  he makes
o t h e r  p r o p o s a l s  to  ensu re  t h a t  power i s  " t r u l y  d e l e g a t e d  from th e  p e o p le " .
Among C a r t w r i g h t ' s  s u g g e s t io n s  i s  t h a t  M.Ps r e c e i v e  "no h ig h e r  emolument
a t  most th a n  r e a s o n a b l e  wages from the c o n s t i t u e n t s " .  .Another s u g g e s t io n
i s  t h e  re fo rm ed  e l e c t o r a l  d i s t r i c t s  should c o n t a i n  between 2500 and 2600
p e r s o n s ,  w h i l e  th e  on ly  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  s u f f r a g e  ought  to be "age and
p a r o c h i a l  r e s i d e n c e "  - which seems to g ive women th e  v o t e .  "Exc lus ion
1 7from s u f f r a g e "  i s  "a  s l a v e  mark".
C a r t w r i g h t ' s  and o t h e r  R a d i c a l s '  p ro p o s a l s  f o r  u n i v e r s a l  s u f f r a g e  
p e r t a i n  to  t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y  i f  no t  the  r a t i o n a l i s m  o f  t h e i r  th o u g h t .  Annual
 ^ * John C a r t w r i g h t ,  I n t e r n a l  Evidence or  an Enquiry  i n t o  How Far Truth 
and th e  C h r i s t i a n  R e l ig io n  Have Been Consu lted  by th e  Author of  
Thoughts °n P a r l i a m e n t a ry  Reform, (London, 1784),  16; An Abridgement 
o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n , (London, 1824), 11, 25, 33; Take Your Choice 1, 
(London, 1776) ,  2 -3 ,  93,  f r o n t i s p i e c e ,  5; E n g la n d ' s  A e g i s , (London, 
1804),  27, 37.
C a r t w r i g h t ,  Li f e , , V o l . I I ,  77; C a r tw r ig h t ,  Abr idgement, 13, 27; 
I n t e r n a l  E v id e n c e , 50; Take Your C h o ic e , 41, 76, 82, 84, 96;
A egis ,  66.
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parliaments do not seem so far-fetched if we ignore modern parliamentary 
elections and representation and their enormous costs. Cartwright and 
his fellow Radicals had in mind the ideal of the amateur parliamentarian. 
Politics, like the rest of life’s activities, ought not to be a full-time 
occupation since it would lead to a loss of full perspective and 
independence. On this point some recent work or scholarship has questioned 
Pocock’s interpretation of Cartwright's thought. The question becomes 
one of whether there are one or two major paradigms in Cartwright’s political 
ideas or of which one is dominant. A third possibility is that there is 
a degree of coherence in his thinking suggestive of a single paradigm.
It has been strongly argued that although Cartwright used ’traditional’ 
18th century language, constitutionalist rhetoric and so forth, he transformed 
contemporary political theory into a radical mode of thought which ’’contained 
all the fundamental characteristics attributed to radicalism after the 
French Revolution". Cartwright's ideology is "not neo-Harringtonian", and 
the key element in this is his development of a concept of universal male 
suffrage which involved a fundamental departure away from a suffrage based on 
propertied independence. Cartwright and his Radical friends are said to 
have carried out a major transformation "of certain theological and 
rationalist concepts" while retaining "all the traditional styles of 
eighteenth century rhetoric”. Partial support for this view comes from 
E.P. Thompson who argues that although Cartwright couched his arguments "in 
terms of precedent and tradition", he "believed in methods of agitation 
among ’members unlimited’". In the more sophisticated version, Cartwright's 
political language is not neo-Harringtonian since landed property ceases to 
be the basis of political rights. His interpretation of "Christian theology" 
is said to be fundamental to his concept of universal male suffrage. If 
he uses other languages or paradigms, "the terms of political rationalism, 
the ancient constitution and the classical theory of government", they 
were without real significance since Cartwright "transformed the meaning 
of all these political theories". He used "a traditional style of 
language to express totally new ideas". What, then, we are confronted with 
is not merely an argument that proposes Cartwright's political vocabulary 
is filled with Lockeian moments rather than neo-Harringtonian moments.
Without apparently realising it the author suggests a reading or rendering 
of Cartwright's ideas in terms of a fundamental break between his language 
and 'traditional' political categories, and an essentialist view whereby
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18the old categories are a mere epiphenomenon.
What does an analysis of Cartwright's writing suggest? In
Take Your Choice! there is, as in all his writings, support for the
argument that has just been presented. It is argued there, for example,
that land tax as a basis of representation must be unjust since
everyone pays purchase tax and yet there is no universal suffrage. Wealth
in general cannot provide the measure of political rights either since
"any sum laid down as a qualification is arbitrary". Voting should be
universal since all Englishmen are rational beings"; reason is the sole
measure. But although there is to be no property qualification Cartwright
reminds us that propertied independence is vital for the people’s 
19representatives.
If there is a break, it is neither clean nor clear cut. The 
matter needs further investigation with regard to Cartwright's views on 
property. In going on to consider this it is enlightening to put the 
argument concerning Cartwright's radical democratic sentiment and his 
ideological break alongside an interpretation mentioned earlier which 
stressed his gentry connections and his polemics against the land tax.
To develop this latter argument a bit more, it is said Cartwright's 
proposals for political reform lose their impact once it is realised 
he did not visualise any change in the social order after the reforms had 
been carried out. Not only did he not want the poor to invade the 
property of the rich through social upheaval, but he was against all land­
sharing and dividing schemes whether of the Spencean or Paineite kind.
If these propositions are acceptable, they would of course dilute the 
radicalism of Cartwright's democratic theory and question the degree of 
novelty in his idea of universal suffrage. A yet third position argues 
he had a Lockeian theory of political rights that was also connected to 
Locke's labour theory of value. Consequently, Cartwright "belonged 
more to the Enlightenment and less to the Commonwealthmen". This 
idea will receive greater attention later but it is now given some 
consideration, along with the two other interpretations that have just
Jowett, "Language", 19, 20, 23-24, 106-7, 134; Thompson, Working Class, 
93.
Cartwright, Choice, 35-6, 69.★ See above, Introduction p.l and see Louis Althusser § Balibar Etienne, 
Reading Capital, (Paris, 1968; N.L.B. edn., London, 1970), 35-6 and 
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, (London, 1972) , 22, 103, 
146.
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been elaborated.
Take the question of land tax and property first. On one occasion 
at least, Cartwright states taxation attacks men’s property and if substant­
ial or excessive endangers their position and their independence. Excessive 
taxation goes against the principles found in Magna Carta and the consitut- 
ion. Property tax, he says elsewhere, is ’’obviously inconsistent with 
every principle of English liberty". Property tax is "subversive of ... 
native and hereditary rights" and "utterly irreconcilable to the spirit of 
a free constitution". That property is dear to Cartwright's heart is also 
shown in 1804 when he exhorts Englishmen to "preserve your property, defend 
your females, and drive the Frenchmen into the sea". He distinguishes 
between the "self-armed" 800,00 men in the militia who appear to be 
householders and "the supplementary" 400,000 men who seem to be non-house­
holders . 21
There is, then, a genuine concern for the rights of ’property’. The 
question is what reasons, what assumptions and what interests lie behind this 
concern. Showing perhaps his gentry connections and suggesting, too, he 
has not dropped entirely ’neo-Harringtonian' assumptions, Cartwright argues 
that property tax would "vest in the Crown, the whole landed property 
in the realm". Yet property tax is not only evil because it undermines the 
independence of the landed gentlemen. As Lord Stanhope wrote to Cartwright, 
it is a corrupting influence because,
it is evident that the tenant’s property tax tends 
to compel the farmer to raise his corn and grain on 
the consumer; and has in its principle the same kind 
of objection to it as exists against those most 
impolitic and more permanent taxes on candles, soap, 
leather, coarse sugar, beer salt Sc. The price of 
meat is affected ... as also the price of beer ...
Taxes ... on the necessaries of life ... tend also 
to injure this nations export trade ... The tenant's 
property tax ... tends to oppress the poor and 
middling classes ... The cause of all this is, that 
the householders Sc have not in the constitution 
at present the right which they ought to have.
22
Osborne, Cartwright, 43, 53-54, 60; Drinkwater-Lunn, "John Cartwright" 
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Cartwright's own opinions corresponded closely with Lord Stanhope's 
views. Political remedies are sought for political causes and there is 
more than a touch of anachronism in saying Cartwright ought to be looking 
at social and economic causes when even more radical and artisan Radicals 
came up with the same answers and explanation. His questioning of 
property tax is certainly much more than a sign of his class position and 
interests. In confirmation of this, Cartwright's niece records her uncle 
found property tax less objectionable than other kinds of taxes because 
"it was not levied on the poor".
This kind of statement could be suggestive of a departure from 
'commonwealth' assumptions. Usually, Cartwright's emphasis on 
personality rather than property is said to signal his break with pre­
modern ideas. "Liberty is the end of the social compact, property 
mere useful means ... liberty is planted by God in the very nature of man". 
Part-reformers are guilty of "trafficking with the principles of the 
constitution, as with merchandise in which they had private property".
Since suffrage is the birthright of Englishmen it cannot be bought or sold 
and it cannot be dependent upon a property qualification. Natural equality 
"excludes degrees of freedom" so that "personality is the sole foundation 
of the right to be represented". Clearly, there is evidence in Cartwright's
writings to suggest he based political rights on personality rather than 
2 3landed property.
Whether this in itself is sufficient to prove a complete or 
fundamental break with 'Country' ideas is a different thing. The 
danger of centring on a single concept has been mentioned before. The 
extent to which Cartwright breaks away from the natural law assumptions 
of Locke and the Levellers is also doubtful. Neither can his interest in 
property tax be dismissed out of hand. His argument that a property 
qualification and landed property in particular is necessary to ensure 
the independence of the people's representatives against corruption by the 
crown also needs to be taken into account. And there is more. It is 
true Cartwright often spoke out against the invasion of the property of 
the rich by the poor, thereby suggesting land was of no consequence to 
political rights. No doubt he was, in the words of his niece, against 
Spence and his followers "who promulgated a wild system of an equal
23 . Cartwright, Abridgement, 16; Internal Evidence, 52; Choice, 19, 22.
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division of landed property". But, in keeping with many other Radicals, 
including the more plebeian sort, Cartwright, like Paine, saw a monopoly in 
the ownership of land. "Nobles vied with Ecclesiastics in monopolising 
the soil". There are ample references to "the present extreme inequality 
of property" which meant "tenants, tradesmen and others are dependent on
:k
the wealthy for bread and justice". They are therefore liable to
corruption just as much as a pensioned member of parliament. So
Cartwright was obviously in favour of a more equal distribution of
property, further evidence of which is suggested by his constant use of
Cato's Letters. It was a major theme of the Letters that a free republic
was not possible without some redistribution of property. Cato desired
"not so much a levelling of property as an agrarian law". Without it,
taxation and the loss of political rights would reduce the people to
dependence and corruption. And, to quote from Cartwright again, "those
valuable members of the state by whose manual labours its very existence
is preserved" needed some kind of real wealth in addition to their political
24birthright to avoid this state of affairs.
Conceptually, if not entirely politically, this brings Cartwright 
close to Paine and perhaps to Locke, although we must keep in mind again 
the "mixed minds" conception. There are problems to be overcome in 
locating a dominant Lockeian paradigm in Cartwright's thinking. If we go 
along with Pocock and see in Locke a defence of mercantile monied and 
moveable property against the landed interest there are particular 
ambiguities. While he was not against commerce, Cartwright had no love 
for the power of big money. There were limits to be put on capital 
accumulation if only because "an unbounded and unguarded liberty in 
commerce would soon degenerate into licentiousness of the worst kind".
State regulation was necessary to avoid this situation. Trading companies 
were, after all, artificial and not natural creations and therefore 
could claim no special rights. There would, of course, be much more 
to bring in to show that Cartwright could not be fitted into any
Lockeian straitjacket, but here all I have wanted to indicate is the
25difficulties with the economic side of the relationship.
24 Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 245, Vol.II, 133; Cartwright, Abridgement, 12; 
J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, (Princeton, 1975), 468-9, 
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see Agrarian Justice, (2nd edn. orig. pub. 1797).
25 Osborne, Cartwright, 33; Drinkwater-Lunn, "John Cartwright", 578; 
for an explanation of the terms 'neo-Harringtonian', Country and so on, 
see Pocock's work, previously cited and his Politics, Language and Time, 
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Further knowledge of the modernity or otherwise of Cartwright's
thought, as well as his relatedness to Locke and Paine, can be gleaned from
an examination of his ideas about revolution and reform. To some extent
this issue has already been dealt with in this chapter. What I wish to do
now is to raise a different set of questions, those of a more conceptual
nature. Cartwright considered himself as an ultra-radical reformer and
distinguished himself from the revolutionaries, on the one hand, and the
26
more faint-hearted and Whiggish Radicals on the other. The task is to 
show precisely what CartwTight meant by radical reform, and in so doing 
we will see that, conceptually speaking, his ideas are not all that removed 
from the revolutionary Tom Paine,
First consider the question of Cartwright's supposed Jacobinism.
He was on more than one occasion called "Jacobinical". It was said of him,
"if there is a revolution a la francaise in England, he will be its
generalissimo". Without going quite as far as this some modern commentators
number him among the foremost English Jacobins, even if he is usually
seen as a moderate when placed beside figures like Paine and Spence.
Against this, is the view of John Osborne and other historians who try to
cast Cartwright in a more conservative mould. Cartwright, he says, "had no
connection with the L.C.S.", the London Corresponding Society of course
being construed by Thompson and others as a hotbed of English Jacobinism.
Osborne plays down the role of the physical force Radicals and notions of
rebellion and revolution in Radical ideology, while at the same time putting
the blame on the Spenceans for the Spa Fields Riots in 1816. Without
necessarily wanting to agree with the view of the "socialist historians"
or of the "liberal and conservative historians", it is possible to detect
a similar inconsistency or lack of logic in his view that the Tory government
of the time were still in a panic over France and saw Jacobinism and
revolutionary intention where, in fact, none existed. There is something in
this thesis but it is hardly sufficient if only because it posits collective
illusion on the part of the government and suggests an irrational and
psychological account of causation. No doubt there was an element of
the irrational, as well as the cynical, in the government of the time
27but there are other explanations available.
^ * Cartwright, Life, Vol.II, 222, 226; Cartwright, Choice, vi.
^ * Thompson, Working Class, 725; Osborne, Cartwright, 32, 113, 114.
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For what are probably different reasons I can, though, at least
agree with the proposition that it is a distortion to label Cartwright
and most other Radicals, even of the physical force variety, Jacobin.
Robespierre was "that monster". In 1795 Cartwright was calling for
"associations for our defence against banditti, cutthroats and Jacobins".
There is also truth in the statement that his constitutionalism was "an
antidote to Paine and Jacobin excess". Yet Cartwright's intellectual
and political relationship to Paine is complex - if even Paine can be
thought of as a Jacobin - and though he says he is "no advocate for Mr.
Paine" his defence of Paine against Arthur Young has more to it than the
intemperance of Young's language. But as if to prove the conservative
point, there is Cartwright's dedication of England's Aegis to Fox in 1804.
Like Fox, Cartwright had soon become disillusioned and advocated "Reform
instead of Revolution". Initially the French Revolution was supported
because it seemed to fit "British Whig political theory"; it was abandoned
when it was realised Jacobin revolutionary practice and constitutionalist
rhetoric no longer harmonised. Yet if in 1804 Cartwright was perhaps still
seeing himself as a "true Whig" soon after this he was wanting to separate
the Whigs from the Radicals. Also, prior to this Cartwright had been in
frequent correspondence with Thomas Hardy, as he still was in 1801, and
as seen before there is in existence a ticket showing Cartwright's,
no doubt inactive, membership of the London Corresponding Society. Further,
the constitutionalist movement which arose following the Pentridge
rising showed "the policy of open constitutionalism was proving more
revolutionary in its implications than the policy of conspiracy and
insurrection". It taught universal suffrage and mass organisation and it
taught the right of every citizen to bear arms which led to the manufacture
of pikes in some areas. The Tory government, it seems had reason as well
28as panic on their side.
But whether all this amounts to Jacobinism, whether it takes 
Cartwright very far away from "Lockeian ambiguities" in relation to 
revolution and political action and organisation is another question. 
Cartwright's 'Machiavellian' rather than Jacobin belief in the militia 
and the right of every citizen to bear arms in defence of his home
' John Cartwright, The Commonwealth in Danger, (London, 1795), xvi; 
Aegis, vi; Drinkwater-Lunn, "John Cartwright", 475; Thompson, 
Working Class, 149ff.
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against the intrusions of the state was behind the manufacture of pikes.
It was essentially a belief in the right of self-defence and was bound up 
with other ideas such as patriotism. I leave to social historians the 
sifting of historical evidence to argue revolutionary idealism and to 
debate over the metaphysics of revolutionary intent. What concerns me 
here is the structure of thought or the conceptual associations and 
assumptions which suggest, first, that Cartwright could believe in only 
political revolution or reform and, second, that his conception of 
revolution and reform was pre-modern.
Looked at from this angle, English Jacobinism seems to be a
strange pot-pourri or distortion of the French original. The "grass roots
organisation" was not rationalistic and geometrical but harked back to
"tythings", a "folkmoot" and so on. In 1820, there is the picture of
Cartwright "clad in the uniform of the Nottinghamshire militia, complete
with buttons having the cap of liberty engraved upon them" petitioning
Queen Caroline on behalf of the "Artisans, Mechanics and Labouring Classes".
The liberty tree and the cap of liberty are, for Thompson, always signs
of French Jacobinism, but these symbols have a long English political
tradition. It also appears that arguments from precedent and tradition,
from "birthrights" were "already somewhat discounted on the Continent".
But England, as Cartwright wrote to Hardy, did not have to follow the
example of France since it had preserved certain constitutional rights
29which "deserve saving". These rights could be discovered in 
contemporary English law.
Yet the call to "stand fast to the laws" is less a conservative 
injunction than it is radical and reactionary. Most present-day law 
was corrupt; it is mainly the ancient laws that Cartwright referred to.
To bring in the constitution is not so much an act of novelty and progress 
as a restoration and a return. It is a return to the "essentials of 
the constitution". This could appear conservative as it did during the 
1821 trial when Cartwright argued he "did not conspire at Birmingham to 
overthrow the government but instead used his best efforts to restore and 
renovate the constitution". But once he got down to details, the 
fundamental radicalism of the laws and principles was clear. He usually
Osborne, Cartwright, 134; Cartwright, Life, Vol.II, 113; Drinkwater- 
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started off with the demand for universal suffrage and annual parliaments, 
but frequently went on to elaborate the "five parts" or "five elements".
These were once inscribed by Cartwright on "several thousand medals" which 
showed them as "the genuine polity of England". They were,
Those principles of truth and morality on which 
the social order depends. A militia of all men 
capable of armsbearing. A Wittenagemot annually 
elected by the people for enacting laws. Grand 
and petit juries of the people fairly drawn for 
applying the laws. A magistry elected by the 
people for duly performing all executive duties.
This was England's "ancient polity", a balanced constitution which 
"maintained the prerogative". Lacking any ideas of utopia and progress to use 
as legitimation, lacking any idea of a progressive social revolution, the 
mind's eye turned to ideas of natural law, custom and virtue embodied in 
the traditional and 'concretized' figure of the patriot king. Also, 
contrary to Pocock, the tendency was for an English king as guardian of an 
English constitution to undermine the cosmopolitan and classical or 
Enlightenment elements in the idea of patriotism. An argument has been 
put by an American writer that Cartwright shifted away from his early 
monarchist beliefs. In fact, this is a fairly common interpretation based,
I think, on importing 20th century meanings into 18th century use of the 
term 'republicanism'. One writer refers to Cartwright's "growing 
admiration for a presidential form of government" which he says he interprets 
from Cartwright's advice to the Spanish "to adopt the principle of an 
elective regent". The Major also asserted "that England was basically a 
republic" as well as striking "at kings in general", although it is added 
as an afterthought that "we cannot be sure he really wanted an end to 
kingship". ^
In fact, in Radical ideology the question is more complex than 
being simply for or against monarchy and wanting republican government on 
the 20th century model. If we look at Cartwright's beliefs and career
^  Cartwright, Aegis, 68; Cartwright, Life, I, 133, 284, II, 208; 
Osborne, Cartwright, 32, 132; Cartwright, Choice, vii.
Cartwright, Life, Vol.II, 244.
^  Osborne, Cartwright, 82, 157, 160.
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we will see why this is. In 1789, when the King's recovery was declared 
he "caused an illumination in the village and my residence, gave roasted 
sheep, and ale and music, to the populace, and even drank the king's 
health". There were many such instances during his life. A member of the 
Society for Constitutional Information, Cartwright states he would not 
have remained in the Society if the members had shown they "were not 
friends of the king's government", but "no man in the society ever started 
such an idea". During the wars with the French, in 1807, his hope was 
that "in the hour of trial, the throne may be preserved to his Majesty, 
and the constitution to the people". In November 1809, the King entered the 
fiftieth year of his reign and Cartwright went to Windsor in the hope of 
presenting "a congratulatory address and a petition". During 1816, one of 
the toasts at a Hampden Club meeting was "the Constitution and the King". 
Surprisingly, perhaps, George III was a "patriot king" who was the "father 
of his people", although Cartwright warned that if the monarch failed to 
fulfill this role the people "must take care of themselves".
The same conditional support was expressed on more than one occasion.
Above allegiance to the crown was loyalty to the "natural and fundamental
laws of society" which it was the duty of the patriotic monarch to guard and
protect. If the king had this guardianship, it was also the duty of the
House of Commons to provide "a check upon the crown". Like Paine, Cartwright
believed the King was often "misadvised by ministers". He refers to a song
which exhorts, "a king who feels the common cause/ and fights for liberty
33and laws" is a legitimate king. If Cartwright was hardly a republican in 
the modern sense, his belief in monarchy was conditional on the traditions 
and needs of the people or nation. As he put it in 1795,
If the habits of the people and the circumstances 
of the time make it probable that abolishing royalty 
will produce more evil than good, it ought to 
remain, and be supported.
34
Abolishing royalty in England at that time would be "an immoral act 
much as it would to impose royalty on the Swiss or the Americans". Seven 
years earlier he was congratulating the French for their "theoretic purity"
Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 182, 215, 394; Cartwright, Commonwealth, xxi; 
Aegis, 111-113.
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in making "the presidency of a king" the people's choice, and later he was 
arguing against the death penalty for the King of France on the grounds 
that he doubted "the competency of human authority ... deliberately 
to punish with death". He was praising the French for adopting an elective 
monarchy on English lines in place of an absolutist one. In "great a 
degree" Anglo-Saxon kings "were always elective", hereditary monarchy being 
"unnatural". Any substantial veto power of the Anglo-Saxon king "cannot 
be proved". Alfred the Great was a republican prince or hero-king who had 
guarded and promoted annual parliaments and the representation of the common 
people in parliament. This apparent paradox or blurring of modern concepts 
is drawn even wider when Cartwright refers to America "where 22 kings are 
annually elected". The idea of a republican monarchy and a monarchical 
republic however strange to the modern mind was fully rational in terms 
of 18th century political logic. ^
There is a similar logic, or ambiguity and paradox, in the Whig- 
Radical notion of patriotism. Although the idea of a patriot had certain 
cosmopolitan connotations, the overall effect of using it as part of a 
political vocabulary is to undermine any "Jacobinical" tendencies and 
interpretations. Patriotism was often defined by the Radicals in contradist­
inction to Jacobinism. Francis Burdett said at a meeting held in 1825, for 
the purpose erecting a public monument to Cartwright, "his character was 
purely English, no tinsel, no glitter; all was solid and sterling worth".
Had he been alive such words would have pleased Cartwright who believed 
"the name of the patriot" to be "the greatest of all earthly appellations, 
regal and imperial titles not excepted".
Perhaps not surprisingly, the ambiguities referred to have led 
again to opposing interpretations of the idea and of the man or his mind.
On the one hand, Cartwright is accused of anti-Semitism and his views are 
associated with the "thoroughly xenophobic English working class". On the 
other hand, his conception of patriotism is founded in a religiously-based 
theory of natural rights "pursued with Enlightenment clarity and rational 
analysis". Free national constitutions are alleged to be inferior or 
secondary to a "universal constitution of Christianity" wherein the "nation 
is inferior to mankind". Despite the fact Cartwright and Paine found
7 r * Cartwright, Commonwealth, xxxvi; Cartwright, Life, I, 182-3; 
Abridgement, 24, 53.
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themselves taking opposing positions over a possible French invasion in
the early 1800s, Cartwright's ideas are said to be closer to Paine than to
"old Whig patriotism". Appeals to a narrower sense of patriotism, in
speeches and writings, are a question of expediency: "to rouse an audience",
or for reasons of "practicality". The alteration of the title of one of
Cartwright's works in order to direct it at a more specific group of
people is said to be propagandistic. Again, then, there are rival interpret- 
36ations.
Continuing with the second of these interpretations, it is first
necessary to question any Enlightenment view of Cartwright's notion of
patriotism given his belief in the Anglo-Saxon polity and his insistence that
the constitution was most definitely English and not Scottish, Irish or
anything else. It is well to recall that the publication referred to,
Give Us Our Rights, was published two years before the more Gothicized
Declaration and that Cartwright's belief in Anglo-Saxonism seems to have
deepened as time passed by. Also, while "universal benevolence" was all to
the good, "Providence commanded the application in the immediate area of
one's existence". Practical effort and politics, linked with the
paradigmatic effects of the Anglo-Saxon trope - rather than mere expediency
- had the effect of undermining the universalism of Paineite-style patriotism.
Where the nation and government adopted a policy of self-interest and was
"oppressive externally or internally" a citizen was without a country to
fight for; paradoxically, the policy has a patriotic effect since it is
"injuries done to our country". As for Paine, in 1806 he was aligned with
Napoleon and therefore an anti-patriot, though this can be construed in
3 7terms of political opposition.
That more than this is involved comes out in Cartwright's 
exchanges with the political cleric, Soame Jenyns. Jenyns emphasised the 
universalist nature of Christianity which implied Christians were citizens 
of the world. Whereas Christianity "commands us to love all mankind", 
patriotism demands that we "oppress all other countries to advance the 
imaginary prosperity of our own". It implies "oppression, mean partiality 
to our country, injustice and cruelty". Cartwright's reply is instructive.
He defines "real patriotism" as "a principle of affection and duty to one's
* Osborne, Cartwright, 161; Drinkwater-Lunn, "John Cartwright", 325, 
328-9, 33Ö, 336.
Drinkwater-Lunn, "John Cartwright", 330, 332; Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 
333; Cartwright, Evidence, 6-7, 58-60.
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country". While Jenyns crosses off patriotism from the list of Christian
virtues, Cartwright refers to Paul and Christ who weep over the capital
of their country. Using these sacred origins as a form of legitimation, as
well as "the reason of the thing", Cartwright simultaneously undercuts and
incorporates any cosmopolitan, humanist or Enlightenment elements found in
other versions of the patriotic ethic. Sacred history and reason point to
the conclusion "that our family, our parish, our country, are the immediate
spheres in which by the limitation of our faculties and the boundaries
of our powers, Providence has required us to perform in an especial manner 
, 38the duties of a Christian". The passage that follows is not only a 
reinforcement of this very 'Burkeian' sentiment, it also questions any 
interpretation which stresses the commonwealth or neo-Machiavellian connot­
ations supposedly ever-present when Cartwright puts down words as 
ambiguous as patriotism and virtue. "The honest ploughman", Cartwright 
writes, "who",
in his own family and within his own parish, 
contributes with a truly Christian heart, his 
mite towards the general sum of human happiness 
is ... a citizen of the world ... a citizen of his 
own country ... Although Pagan patriotism ... were 
grossly adulterated with error and vice, surely 
Christian patriotism animating the citizen to 
study and promote, not only the temporal welfare 
of his country, but true religion, the virtue and 
happiness of his countrymen both here and here­
after, has a duty owing to God and his neighbour, 
and as contributing to the sum of human 
happiness, which totally excludes every wish 
to depress or injure other nations ... the writer 
has found ever the truest patriotism united with 
the truest Christianity; which as taught him to 
place little dependence on that public spirit 
which has not religion as its guide.
39
What is suggested here is a kind of internal duty, active but not 
aggressive against other peoples and nations because it incorporates 
Christian values and respects their rights and own patriotic feeling. 
Cartwright does from time to time express certain uncoordinated latent 
racial or cultural prejudices. But these are so hemmed in and constrained 
by contradication that they seem to lack any real ideological effect.
As he writes in his correspondence, "I have see Asiatics and persons of
38. Cartwright, Evidence, 6-7, 58-60.
39. Cartwright, Evidence, 7-8.
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mixed descent, with very agreeable complexions but my own experience in that
way has not, I own, been sufficiently extensive to overcome my preference
40to European flesh and blood".
Despite remarks like this, his attitude towards other races appears 
paternalist rather than racist or imperialist and nationalistic in any 19th 
century sense. If the true constitution is, in practice, English and 
Anglo-Saxon its principles are universal. Consequently his attitude towards 
civilisation is ambiguous. Early in his career, in 1768, Cartwright wrote 
a piece called Remarks on the Situation of the Aborigines of Newfoundland 
which contains a detailed description of the indians ecological relation­
ships and material culture, and which brings these ambiguities to the fore. 
He "sought friendly intercourse with them", he writes, "in order to promote 
their civilisation, and render them ... useful subjects to his majesty". 
This, it is implied, would give them some protection against "reciprocal 
injuries and murders" which were mostly the fault of the Whites. The 
inhumanity of the English fishermen sinks far below the level of savages.
He cites a number of examples including a "well-known" one of a pregnant 
indian woman attacked by the Whites who "ript open her womb" and cut off "the 
hand of the murdered woman, which they displayed ... as a trophy". In 
summer "a Red Indian ... may be compared to a beast of the chase".
Compared to this, the behaviour of the indians cannot but be thought noble 
since,
If they know not the arts that embellish life, 
and those sciences that dignify humanity, they 
are ignorant also of the long train of vices 
that corrupt the manners of civilised nations, 
and of the enormous crime that debase mankind.
42
In the face of natural virtue, culture and civilisation has a 
certain negative value. This does not mean there ought to be a return to 
primitivism since because the indians lack the benefits of the arts and 
sciences "they can be little acquainted with the rational pleasure of 
reflection". Because they lack reflection and therefore political education,
Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 225.
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their form of government must be imperfect. Also, defensive action "against
43the irruption of savages" is legitimate.
The idea of defence was at the heart of the Radical conception 
of patriotism. Britain had been the aggressor, Cartwright said, but "I 
will nevertheless use my sword against either Frenchman or American who 
shall invade this country". Even if a citizen of England for his pleasure 
or profit were to venture into land ruled by a despot, there were strict 
limits to what the mother country could do, and it should certainly not 
go to war in order to protect his property. But a defensive or patriotic 
war could take place on foreign soil, especially if it was waged against 
a despot such as Napoleon who denied other nations their rights and 
liberties. An extension of this was to some extent to internationalise 
defensive and patriotic wars of liberation. He supported aid to the 
Spanish patriots. Cartwright in fact had fairly strong connections with 
the national independence movements in Spain, Italy, Mexico and Greece.
Wars of defence and national liberty were the only just wars; offensive, 
nationalistic and imperial wars were unlawful. Countries wrongfully 
claimed "the right to immense regions" but "all modern acquisitions have 
been made with an eye to aggrandisation and an increase in power, more than 
for ... satisfying wants and the reasonable desires of mankind". Or, as 
he put it elsewhere, there were two justifications for war, first, "defence 
of our own nation’s freedom" and, second, "aiding in defence of any other 
nation whose liberty or property are invaded or violated". Empire or "a 
lust for foreign dominion" saps the foundation of a nation's greatness. 
Colonising is only permissible "for the benefit of an overflowing 
population" but then the colonists "carry with them the free polity of the 
Mother Country and ... found independent states". There is not, then, 
as one writer would have it, an inconsistency in Cartwright's refusal to 
fight against the Americans in the 1760s and his preparations in case of 
French invasion. His patriotism lacked the cosmopolitan impulse of 
Paine's, and the second war only could appeal to the patriotic spirit of 
Englishmen. It also follows, to reverse Rutt's praise of Cartwright at 
the 1825 meeting, that in conception and practice Cartwright was a patriot 
of England first and a citizen of the world second. "Would Englishmen'/, 
he declared, "understand the true principles of national defence, let them 
resort not only to the camp, but to the CONSTITUTION!" A proper grasp
43. Cartwright, Life, Vol.II, 321; Cartwright, Choice, vii.
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of patriotism was dependent upon a knowledge of the internal traditions,
44principles and political institutions of England.
This ’pre-industrial' idea of patriotism defines itself not 
so much in relation to external affairs but as internal mode of 
political conduct. Much more than love and defence of country is 
involved. These are almost by-products of the fight against internal 
corruption in all its forms. Patriotism is, for example, a force for 
national unity, but underlying this notion is the principle that faction 
or party is a sin against a deistic unity. The patriot, "ought always to 
take the comprehensive view"; he will "always sacrifice to the public good". 
Patriotism, Cartwright said, opposed party". In keeping with the deistical 
foundations, there is also "real patriotism" and "genuine patriotism" 
which was opposed to "mock patriotism". To be a real or genuine patriot 
you had to be a democrat since only democracy would preserve political 
and economic independence. It is "true popular election which creates, 
which calls forth, which animates and preserves patriotism". Institutions, 
annual elections, are more than merely functional; as parts of the whole 
constitution and as preservers of its spirit, of which patriotism is an 
element, they are sacred.* 4^
Institutions were the material basis of the constitution; ideas 
made up its spirit. Like patriotism, the idea of liberty was part of this 
spirit. Paradigmatically, if there is anything to notice in the Radical 
notion of liberty it is that it is not necessarily associated with the 
doctrine of laissez-faire or free market economics and it is not 
associated with the essentially 19th century concept of secular progress. 
Generally speaking, it is a mistake to read these 19th century assumptions 
into the 18th century idea of liberty, just as it is a confusion to 
interpret the Radical and 18th century concept of political liberty as 
liberal in the 19th century sense because of its failure to direct itself 
to social and economic conditions and causes. The truth of these assertions 
is shown in further analysis.
44' Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 118-9, 369, 413; Life, Vol.II, 295;
Osborne, Cartwright, 76; Drinkwater-Lunn, "John Cartwright", 334, 571;
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356.
72 -
Patriotism, Cartwright thinks, is dependent upon liberty in a 
number of ways. An unfree people will not defend their country. "A 
population who hate their rulers, for withholding from them the rights 
and liberties by which they are exposed to the curse of taxation without 
representation are but too well prepared for the purposes of the invader". 
Liberty was also necessary for ’internal' patriotism, that is to permit 
participation in national affairs "for public service and benefit". Not 
private, civil or economic liberty but political and "public liberty" 
were necessary and therefore"as dear" as patriotic duty. In turn, the 
idea and practice of freedom is dependent upon a people's militia. The 
"universality of arms" is "the very secret of good government of freedom 
and law". Where there was a people's militia under a freely elected 
parliament liberty would be secured since the people would not "destroy 
their own work, their own prosperity, their own happiness". Self-interest, 
if nothing else, would work against it.^
"The most important of all earthly objects, human liberty" is 
also "sole parent of national prosperity and human happiness". But 
"liberty is the end of the social compact, property mere useful means" 
for "liberty is planted by God in the very nature of man", while property is 
therefore merely culture. There is the mythological idea of a
politico-religious or moral state determining the health of the economy.
Also, because liberty is the natural gift of God it "cannot be taken away". 
Because of this, "no degree of acquiesence ... not even the concurrence of 
any number of succeeding generations can establish iniquity ... for no 
constitution could establish it without the power of revocation". 
Consequently, "no precedents could sanction, no length of time confirm" 
iniquity or despotic rule. Seemingly this is a total rejection of 'Burkeian' 
notions of time and custom, confirmation of which appears to come from an 
early piece by Cartwright. In 1775, before Paine published his two most 
famous tracts, Cartwright was vehemently denying political liberty could be 
considered "in the same light as an estate or a chattel". Tradition and 
custom, "grants and charters by custom and usage, and by municipal statutes" 
were only "rotten foundations". Liberty was not to be found "among mouldy 
parchments, or in the cobwebs of a casuist's brain"; it was "the immediate 
gift of God". Yet in his last writing, in The English Constitution Produced
Cartwright, Life, Vol.II, 21, 68; Cartwright, Abridgement, 13; Aegis, 33, S4“—  -----------
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and Illustrated, said to be Cartwright's "last will and testament to the 
nation" in which "the views expressed in it were carefully considered", 
he delves among the parchments and spins his webs with the best or worst 
of the casuists. The Norman Conquest and the subsequent aristocratic 
and ecclesiastic hegemony is made worse by the absence of written documents 
supporting customary Anglo-Saxon liberties. The fight for freedom was 
not so much a matter of progess as "an endeavour to recover the proper 
liberties of England". Ideal liberty was in the past; in the English past.
As Lord Holland wrote to Cartwright, neither "the general principles, 
nor the practical enlargement" of freedom was to be sought in the Roman 
language which meant "a total disregard for legal and monkish Latin".
The measure of the libertarian effects of any new law was by reference to 
the English constitution and to the Anglo-Saxon constitution in particular.^
Clarification of these themes and ideas can be furthered through 
an examination of the place of the Anglo-Saxon polity in Cartwright's total 
thought-pattern. This will be done again by starting from consideration 
of the historiographical interpretation. One of these interpretations is,
I think, indicative of the difficulties encountered. Rightly, it is said 
Cartwright's message or ideology contained "an appeal to reason, Christian 
precept and the legendary democracy he believed once existed under King 
Alfred". But the latter are discounted since we are told Cartwright judged 
issues "according to the dictates of reason, morality and common sense; never 
in terms of inherited prejudices or traditional loyalties". Another 
commentator remarks that Cartwright and his fellow Radicals gave primacy to 
principle or natural law and "not simply, or even fundamentally, upon the 
myth of Anglo-Saxon democracy". At the same time "they pre-empted Burke's 
concept of the constitution as a culmination of historical process". It is 
reiterated that constitutionalist arguments are secondary or dependent upon 
Christian principles and the law of nature. There are apparently no 
problems with this view and the recognition that Cartwright strongly 
disputed Paine's assertion that there was no constitution. Again, there is 
the insistence that Cartwright is an Enlightenment thinker. A third scholar 
specifies the dependency relationship supposed to exist between principle 
and historical example. Historical example "never had more than an 
illustrative or teaching purpose". There is no "fundamental role ... assigned
Cartwright, Abridgement, 15-16; Cartwright, Life, I, 65; Osborne, 
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to history in shaping radical thinking". In support there is reference
to two of Cartwright’s works, one a very early publication, American
Independence, first put out in 1775. Missing in all this criticism or
interpretation is any chronological and proper paradigmatic appreciation 
48of the texts. The latter omission does not apply to Pocock who assoc­
iates statements about the Anglo-Saxon myth with the millenial paradigm. 
But to continue with the point about chronology, there are Cartwright's 
own words from a much later text to support the proposition that Gothicism 
had no fundamental role to play in Radical thinking. In Internal Evidence 
... published in 1784 Cartwright states clearly and emphatically,
our constitution can only be defined or ascer­
tained by its principles; for in vain shall we 
attempt to fix its identity, by reference to 
the practice of this period or that; by talking 
of the revolution, the Norman or Saxon aeras, 
or any other epoch ancient or modern.
49
Nothing, it seems could be clearer. More surprisingly, given some 
of the things written about him, Cartwright reiterates this position, in 
even stronger terms, as late as 1795. The appendix to one of Arthur 
Young's works, he says, would,
for the most part ... figure better among the 
antiquarian trash of the Gentleman's Magazine, 
than in political discourse in 1794. In that 
appendix he quotes, and perhaps refutes, The 
Peoples Barrier, respecting a representation 
of the Commons in the Saxon Parliaments. Had 
he turned to p29 of that work, he would have 
seen what sovereign contempt I took on such 
questions.^
Even so, in the Barrier there is reference to Alfred as "that godlike 
prince", and the debate between Young and Cartwright is in itself 
interesting. By 1813, and in 1824, there is evidence of Cartwright's 
Gothicist 'conversion'. In An Abridgement of the Constitution, published 
in the last year of his life, Cartwright refers to his earlier writings 
"before" he "had attained a like knowledge and conviction of the Norman
48 Miller, "John Cartwright and Reform", 706-7; Drinkwater-Lunn, 
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imposition ... and usurpations, frauds and forgeries, of the feudal 
tyranny". Interestingly, in the light of other recent historiography, 
Cartwright's shift seems to coincide with the taking up of a more radical 
position in relation to the aristocracy. Also, some years before 1813, there 
is evidence that his "sovereign contempt" for "antiquarian trash" had 
changed to adulation. The Trident, published in 1802, is its embodiment. 
Lacking the evidence to support a more precise statement that might come 
out of more detailed research, it would, then, seem Cartwright's shift 
or break occurred somewhere between 1795 and 1802 and is probably linked 
with the increasing militarisation of the French Revolution and the 
growing external threat to England.^
Yet there are problems with such tidy-mindedness, and the critical 
interpretations referred to before need to be countered more directly.
There are first some general arguments to be put. Not the least of these 
is that Cartwright cannot always be taken at his word. Well before his 
shift or conversion, Anglo-Saxon assumptions and illustrations play a 
greater role in his thinking than he or his interpreters care to admit.
Far more than Locke or Paine, historical illustration is, even in his 
earliest writings, used as a form of legitimation along with natural rights 
arguments. Another point is that too much attention has been paid to 
form and not enough to content. Even in one of the earliest publications,
Take Your Choice, there is use of much Gothic material: there is reference 
to Blackstone's Commentaries, Hulme's Essay, annual parliaments and so on.
If all this stuff has only a secondary role to play, it cannot be assumed 
its function in thought is negligible. Looking at the wider body of his 
work, to tease out a single paradigm is to assume a philosophical 
coherence which it does not have. A final point, is that the separation of 
rationalism and empiricism, or the separation of principle or natural 
rights from history and experience, is basically a mis-reading of 18th 
century epistemology.
The problems involved in reading the texts are substantial. Seemingly, 
two paradigm statements are involved in Cartwright's assertion that the 
subject of civil liberty in England is to be regarded in two lights. "First, 
in the abstract" through which it is to be decided "what sort of government 
would be most agreeable to the will of the Deity, and most beneficial to man"
51. Cartwright, Life, Vol.II, 57; Cartwright, Abridgement, 43.
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i n  g e n e r a l .  And second,  "how to  p r e s e rv e  what i s  most v a l u a b l e  i n  the  
c o n s t i t u t i o n " .  That  th e s e  a r e  complementary r a t h e r  than  opposing  
pa rad igm s ,  comes f o r t h  in  a l e t t e r  from C a r tw r ig h t  to Whitbread  where he 
r e f e r s  to  " s e l f - e v i d e n t  t r u t h s  . . .  grown up w i th  e x p e r i e n c e "  and 
cemented by "a sense  o f  moral and r e l i g i o u s  o b l i g a t i o n " .  When Thomas 
J e f f e r s o n  w r i t e s  t h a t  the  Americans were face d  w i th  a t a b u l a  r a s a  
s i t u a t i o n  and cou ld  s t a r t  from n a tu re  i t s e l f  r a t h e r  tha n  " s e a r c h  i n t o  
musty r e c o r d s "  o r  " i n v e s t i g a t e  . . .  a sem i -b a rb a ro u s  a n c e s t r y " ,  C a r tw r ig h t  
r e p l i e s  by d i r e c t i n g  him to  t h e  lo c a l  government i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  
"Saxon A l f r e d " .  N a tu ra l  law a lone  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  and i m p e r f e c t .
N a tu r a l  law p r o v id e s  the  b a s i c  unchanging s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
w h i le  h i s t o r i c a l  e x p e r i en ce  al lows i t  to change a c c o rd in g  to  new c i rcum ­
s t a n c e s .  I t  i s  a g a in  a q u e s t i o n  o f  c o n t e n t  and form; bo th  a r e  n e c e ss a ry  
to  the  whole.  To some e x t e n t ,  the  c o n t e n t  may be h idden  o r  v e i l e d  bu t  a 
l e a f  from " th e  s a c r e d  book o f  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  f i r s t  composed in  the 
Saxon tongue and th e  Saxon s t i l e  ( s i c ) "  i s  " i m p r i n t e d  on eve ry  Eng l ish  
h e a r t " .  I t  i s  n o t  a q u e s t i o n  o f  a b s t r a c t  p r i n c i p l e s  b u t  o f  t h e  r i g h t s  
o f  Englishmen and o f  an o r i g i n a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n  t h a t  was E n g l i s h .  The 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l e a f  C a r tw r ig h t  examines i s  n o t  so much the  n a t u r a l  r i g h t  o f  
s e l f - d e f e n c e  b u t  th e  r i g h t  o f  Englishmen to  b e a r  arms: a r i g h t  a t  one and 
t h e  same t ime n a t u r a l  and c u l t u r a l .  In t h i s  s e n s e ,  n a t u r a l  law 
p r i n c i p l e s  a re  a l s o  an i n h e r i t a n c e .  R a ther  l i k e  the  n a t u r e / n u r t u r e  deba te  
in  p sycho logy ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  p r i n c i p l e  v e r s u s  e x p e r i e n c e  c lo u d s  the  
i s s u e .  S o c i a l i s a t i o n  i s  a p ro ces s  o f  n a t u r a l  endowment and l e a r n i n g  and 
t h i s  i s  r a t h e r  how C ar tw r ig h t  and many o t h e r s  i n  the  18th c e n t u r y  saw
p o l i t i c s ,  a l though  o f t e n  w i thou t  an awareness o f  t h e  k in d  o f  dichotomy 
52im p l ie d  h e r e .
I t  would seem i f  the h i s t o r i c a l  p r o c e s s  a l low s  a p l a c e  f o r  change 
and a d a p t a t i o n  t h a t  the  Anglo-Saxon s t r a t e g e m  does in v o lv e  a Burkeian n o t io n  
o r  paradigm o f  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  as a c u l m in a t io n  o f  h i s t o r y .  There i s  
something  i n  t h i s ;  t h e r e  i s  a sense in  which t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  
c u m u la t i v e .  Magna C a r t a ,  1688 and so f o r t h  a l l  add b i t s  to  th e  e d i f i c e  
o f  E n g l i s h  l i b e r t y .  But engaging in  Gothic v o c a b u la ry  and concep ts  a l s o  
im p l i e s  t h a t  the  l i b e r t a r i a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  s u b j e c t  to  e r o s i o n  and decay
C a r t w r ig h t ,  L i f e , V o l . I ,  263, V o l . I I ,  58,  267, 271, 368-9;  C a r tw r ig h t ,  
A egis ,  x i i i - i x .
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w ith  the  pas sage  o f  h i s t o r y .  S ta tem en ts  such as  " n e i t h e r  custom nor  
a u t h o r i t y  a re  to  be reg a rd ed ,  when they  tend  to  e r r o r  o r  m i s c h i e f " ,  need 
to  be u n d e r s to o d  i n  t h i s  l i g h t .  "Should a c r a f t y  r u l e r " ,  C a r t w r ig h t  says 
"embezzle  the  parchm en ts ,  s t i l l  p rov ided  t h e  sword remain in  th e  hands o f  
t h e  p e o p le ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be no danger" .  What i s  th e  p a r a d i g m a t i c  s t a t u s  o f  
such s t a t e m e n t s ?  Because o f  i t s  r e f e r e n c e  to  t h e  m i l i t i a ,  i s  i t  neo- 
M a c h ia v e l l i a n ;  o r  because  o f  th e  r e f e r e n c e  to  l i b e r t a r i a n  customs does i t  
f i t  b e t t e r  w i th  a ' B u r k e i a n ’ paradigm? C a r t w r i g h t ' s  r e p l y  to  J e f f e r s o n  i s  
a r e f e r e n c e  to  Anglo-Saxon customs and t r a d i t i o n s  in  l o c a l  government.
In C a r t w r i g h t ' s  p o l i t i c a l  p a r a b l e ,  the  peop le  r e g a i n  t h e i r  v i r t u e  by a 
r e t u r n  to  " t h e  o ld  cus toms" .  His Abridgement opens w i th  an ep ig raph  from 
Pa ine  s t a t i n g  England has  no c o n s t i t u t i o n  and t h a t  the  n a t i o n  can c o n s t i t u t e  
i t s e l f  "wi th  what power i t  p l e a s e s " .  Yet f u r t h e r  and c l o s e r  r e a d in g  shows 
C a r t w r ig h t  d e s c r i b i n g  a s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  e x i s t s  i n  th e  p r e s e n t  n o t  in  the  
p a s t  o r  as i t  ought  to  be in  the  f u t u r e .  The r e a l  o r  genu ine  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
i s  something " a n t e r i o r  to  Norman in n o v a t i o n s " .  Only the  " a n c i e n t  c o n s t i t ­
u t i o n "  i s  a u t h e n t i c .  In r e l a t i o n  to  h i s t o r y  and custom i t  was n e c e s s a r y  to  
r e f e r  to  reason  (n a tu re )  and knowledge ( e x p e r i e n c e )  . In common law, which 
i s  mere ly  the  r e i f i c a t i o n  o f  custom, " i t  i s  t h e  du ty  o f  ou r  judges  to  d e p a r t  
from d e f e c t i v e  p r e c e d e n t " .  C i v i l  and p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  should  always 
conform to  t h e  " h a b i t s  o f  the  p e o p le " .  Custom, th e n ,  was n o t  to  be den ied  
i n  f av o u r  o f  m i l l e n i a l i s m  o r  n a t u r a l  law, i t  was to  be r e g a rd e d  c r i t i c a l l y
and s e l e c t i v e l y  a c c o rd in g  to the  e t h i c  o f  l i b e r t y .  This  produces  t h e  e f f e c t
5 3o f  patchwork o r  b r i c o l a g e .
The r ea s o n  f o r  c r i t i c i s m  and s e l e c t i o n  i s  t h a t  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
was h idden ;  "Norman p o l i c y  and i t s  feudal  system long o v e r l a i d  the  Saxon 
i n s t i t u t i o n " .  There were "customs o f  old . . .  which we sh o u ld  n o t  h i d e " .
I f  t h e r e  was room to  improve on " A l f r e d ' s  m i l i t a r y  p r i n c i p l e " ,  i t  was s t i l l  
n e c e s s a r y  to  keep to  i t s  " p r i n c i p l e  and s p i r i t " .  There was a need to  
r e c u s i t a t e  and r e t u r n  to  the  o ld  customs such as th e  f r a n k  p le d g e .  W r i t ing  
to  the  Speaker o f  th e  House o f  Commons, C a r t w r ig h t  b rushed  a s i d e  o b j e c t i o n s  
to  a r e t u r n  o r  r e - i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  the  f rank  p le d g e  on t h e  grounds o f  i t s  
anachronism and a l t e r e d  s o c i a l  c o n t e x t .  O b je c t io n s  a r e  " s u p e r f i c i a l ,  and 
w i th o u t  having  f o u n d a t i o n " .  Under the  p r e s e n t  " c o r r u p t i o n  o f  government" 
and "degeneracy  o f  the  peop le"  t h e r e  i s  no doubt  " t h e  same remedy w i l l  be
C a r t w r ig h t ,  L i f e , V o l .1 ,3 6 9 ,  V o l . I I ,  265-7 ,  271; C a r t w r ig h t ,  
Abridgement, v i ,  11, 40; C a r tw r ig h t ,  C h o ic e , 11.
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as efficacious now as when Alfred, Arthur, or even Moses . . . first applied
it"; and "all the notorious outrages and tumults of the late election ...
are mere consequences of the disuse of frank pledge in Westminster". This
amazing statement about a return to customary origins has a millenial
aura. The birthrights of Englishmen were sacred and Anglo-Saxon
democracy was "an original polity". The return was a millenial return
and the origins were mythic. The trope or strategem of the Anglo-Saxon
myth contains several paradigmatic moments and its logic is the logic of 
54
myth.
A moment closely associated with the idea of custom, and one that 
also legitimates through its original nature, is that of common law, and 
law in general. Like custom, upon which good law is based, laws need to 
be looked at critically. If founded on the constitution they are to be 
obeyed; if they are subversive of the constitution then disobedience and 
resistance is the duty of every citizen. The latter, radical, interpretation 
the' artisans involved in the March of the Blanketeers gave to Cartwright's 
motto "hold fast by the laws". If the laws were being abused or corrupted 
by those in authority, it was necessary to rebel and disobey the law in 
order to defend genuine constitutional laws. The rulers would not be 
acting according to law but merely according to individual will and 
ambition. This was the crime of Napoleon. The idea of law in Radical 
vocabulary is not only problematical and ambiguous because of this paradox 
but also because it is used in the three senses of "the law of nature 
... the common law and ... the constitution" which are sometimes different-, 
iated and other times identified. The conceptual density involved in 
the word 'law' has led to persistent misinterpretation of Radical ideas, 
with the emphasis being placed on one sort of law rather than another; 
an emphasis that was pragmatic or strategic for the Radicals, not 
philosophic. The measure was whether or not a law was democratic but this 
did not put reason and nature above other sorts of law. "LAW TO BIND ALL 
MUST BE ASSENTED BY ALL", yet law was not merely the result of rational 
reflection but an inheritance handed down through generations and orig­
inating in "our Saxon ancestors". Good law, then, was essentially 
English law. Cartwright disliked Henry Dundas on the grounds that he was a 
Scot trained in Roman law. In keeping with this aversion and with democratic
Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 396; Cartwright, Aegis, 40; Drinkwater-Lunn,
"John Cartwright", 371, 358-9.
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sentiment Cartwright, and others like him, felt that a jury was the best 
upholder of English law and liberty. The attacks on the constitution 
through the state trials of Hardy and his fellow Radicals had been 
thwarted by "three immortal juries". Trial by jury was "the main spring 
and potent element of our simple and lucid Constitution", the defender of 
common laws and liberties. At his death Cartwright was working on a 
history of juries, on a treatise not of the principles of law but on the 
history of English law."^
I stress this mode of speaking and thinking - Cartwright's resort 
to the model of the Anglo-Saxon polity, his use of assumptions from common 
law and custom, his 'empiricism' - since previous exegesis has emphasised 
the natural law and 'commonwealth' side of his mind. One strategem 
said to be supportive of a commonwealth interpretation is the use of 
the 'classical model'. The ideal polity is Greece or Rome, or if Anglo- 
Saxon Britain only because it enshrines certain principles already 
extracted from the two former models. That Cartwright drew on classical 
ideas, especially Grecian, is indisputable. In The Trident his temple 
shows a strong influence of classical style. The sports and games associated 
with temple ritual seem to be taken directly from the Aristotelian and 
Olympic ideal. Yet Cartwright's plan for a modem Greek constitution drew 
not on classical precedents but was "English through and through", 
although this statement is later qualified. Included are plans for a 
Witenagmot, trial by jury and so on. Writing in 1816, Cartwright made it 
plain why he took from the English example. Britain had "a climate 
favouring mental vigour, and an active industry that forms a prominent part 
of the national character". It also had "a government of all by all" which 
in the Greeks or Romans was "rather a divine speculation than to be hoped 
for among men". The true English constitution was "conspicuously superior to 
the best boasted states of antient Greece or Italy". The Romans did not 
understand free government. The Greeks were foolish in rejecting Christianity. 
It would seem fairly clear Cartwright did not see America as "a classical 
republic". Cartwright's niece tells us the Major had a copy of the American 
independence declaration framed and "hung up in his dining-room"; but the 
"magnificent American mirror" sparkled according to the extent to which it 
was polished with the principles of English rather than Athenian liberty.
Cartwright, Abridgement, 21, 34; Thompson, Working Class, 118; 
Cartwright, Aegis, 101; Cartwright, Life, Vol. II, 133; Osborne, 
Cartwright, 62, 1155-6; Cartwright, Commonwealth, "Advertisement".
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Apart from free and equal representation, America was the land of trial by-
jury, individual liberty, "freedom of religion, freedom of property, and
freedom of the press" on the English or Anglo-Saxon model. The latter rather
than America itself realised the millenial dream. American democracy,
despite being " a magnificant constellation" had "specks of darkness" which
56blotched its purity and perfection.
Yet criticism of the classical polity, and preference for English 
ideas and institutions, ought not to be taken as an absence of a commonwealth 
or 'Machiavellian' moment in Cartwright's mental make-up. Machiavelli and 
Harrington are often favourably cited and the corruption of the political 
system is a central problem. Parliament was "the sink of corruption", 
corruption being a seemingly cyclical process in which the two outstanding 
dates were 1066 and 1688. The origins of corruption were to be found in 
luxury, the 18th century being "this most voluptuous age" in Cartwright's 
eyes. If political corruption explains the existence of luxury, then luxury 
as a social habit or as the economic process of consumption feeds political 
corruption. There was nothing worse than "a mere man of fashion" addicted 
to "the frivolous occupations of fashionable life". As he explains, "the 
frothy syllabub of human life is a good ingredient among other sweets of 
the feast; but it is a very sorry food to subsist upon". Consequently,
"the opinion of the unthinking fashionables ... is not worth regarding".
They were creatures of passion and instinct, and "ease and luxury are 
contemptible in the good man when the country demands his labours". But 
luxury and corruption do not merely undermine secular virtue and patriotism; 
we are not merely dealing with a series of statements shaped by the 
'commonwealth' paradigm. There is a double meaning and connection involved 
in that those who follow their passions and go in for luxury and
57corruption "expressly exclude themselves from the benefits of religion".
But if luxury and corruption had private and religious consequences, 
as historical processes they were described in neo-Machiavellian terms. 
Quoting from Machiavelli, in 1791 Cartwright passed a resolution at a meeting 
of the Friends of the People in favour of a balanced constitution of 
"king, lords and commons" or the one, the few and the many. Such a
56 * Cartwright, Abridgement, 25, 140; Cartwright, Life, Vol.II, 265, 
268.
57, Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 63, 64, 227; Vol. II, 114.
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balanced constitution was more in keeping with English traditions than the
"pure republicanism" of Paine and his followers. If Cartwright ever did
question the idea of a balanced or mixed government, it did not occur
"until 1823" a year before his death. Throughout his writings there is
sufficient evidence to support the idea that the 1791 statement, contrary
to much critical commentary, was no aberration. Cartwright believed in
both the separation (executive, legislature, judiciary) and the division
(king, lords, commons) of powers with ultimate sovereignty in the hands of
the people. His criticism of Horne Tooke was that the latter bent too
far "in favour of the monarchical and aristocratical part". Against
those critics who emphasise the modernity of Cartwright's concept of
democracy I agree with Ian Christie that "the thinking ... even of
Cartwright was coloured by concepts of 'constitutional balance' not
necessarily identical with democracy in the modem sense". There is a
lack of identity because democracy was seen as a perfect balance, a 'return'
resulting from an 'historical' and cyclical process. This assumption
Cartwright and his fellow Radicals had in mind when they spoke and wrote so
repetitively about a "restoration" of constitutional vigour and the need to
"destroy corruption". Rights had been "lost" and needed to be restored,
not created anew. Because of this underlying idea of a cycle and a
historical "return" the ideas of Cartwright, and others like him, are
often criticised as "backward" and "backward-looking". But such criticism is
misdirected in that it is critical of a whole historical mentality, of a
metaphysical depth and determined mode of apprehension. Finally, Cartwright
seems to derive "the principle of renovation" empirically from English
history, although, virtue was moral and religious as well as political.
Perhaps it is in the idea of the militia as a guard against "natural
decay" and "perpetual decay" and as an agent of "periodical renovation"
58that Cartwright's Machiavellian moment comes through strongest.
Yet even here, meaning is problematical and ambiguous. The 
militia was an important element in 18th century social structure, and it 
was the militia role in English rather than Italian history that Cartwright 
looked to. It is again informative to examine content as well as form.
"Saxon ... manumission of a slave", Cartwright says, "was the gift of a SWORD 
and a SPEAR; how it sinks in comparison the Roman woollen cap". Alfred
58* Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 110, 128, 192-3, 206; Vol.II, 86, 134;
Thompson, Working Class, 718; Ian Christie, Myth and Reality in Late
18th Century British Politics, (London, 1970), Introduction;
Veitch, Genesis, xiii; Osborne, Cartwright, 155; Drinkwater-Lunn,
"John Cartwright", 308.
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institutionalised the right of "free arms-bearing" by founding "our
free Saxon militia". Cartwright recognises the contemporary militia is
far away from this original ideal, but although the 18th century militia is
"in great degree composed of hired substitutes" he rejects Arthur Young's
characterisation of them as "the dregs of the people". They were, after
all, Englishmen. Through service in the militia "an English soldier"
scorned hardship and learned manliness; he did not "tarry at home and rock
the cradle". Militia service gave entitlements to liberty and political
59rights; it also made them something of a male prerogative.
Within the militia itself, the question of freedom and democratic 
rights is more cloudy. Unlike Gravenor Henson, Cartwright's niece praises 
his moderate discipline in the Nottingham militia. Condemning "bacchanalian 
officers", Cartwright wrote that "love and respect, mixed with awe" are the 
sort of sentiments officers ought to induce in their men. "Every worthy 
officer will be a friend and a father" to a good soldier. Paternalism seems 
to go hand-in-hand with hierarchy. Writing in England's Aegis, in 1804, 
Cartwright is of the opinion that a newly constituted militia ought 
"not altogether to overlook those gradations of society which are created by 
birth, station, knowledge and property". At the same time, any ranking 
should come from election by householder suffrage. According to Granville 
Sharp, who influenced the Major greatly on the militia question, among 
the losses since Anglo-Saxon times was the loss of the election of 
militia officers. ^
From all this there would seem to be support for Pocock's
characterisation of the commonwealthman or citizen as English freeholders
"with swords in their hands". As Cartwright himself puts it, unless a
man "has arms in his own house ... he is not in a condition to perform his
duties as a citizen". Private ownership of arms and real property were the
foundations of the defence of "our liberty" our "purses" and "property".
If arms were publicly supplied and owned, or if arms were privately owned
without any real property, the people's liberties would be in danger. At
least in the short term before the redistribution of property, householders
61
should be given some primacy in the running of the militia.
Cartwright, Commonwealth, ix-x; Cartwright, Life, Vol.II, 330.
Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 70, 249-53; Vol.II, 325; Cartwright, Aegis.
J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time, (New York, 1971), 110, 113; 
Cartwright, Aegis, xxii.
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The reason being the militia were the cornerstone of the constitution, 
the practical guarantee of the health of polity. Old Corruption was no 
more than "a military government under a mask". A free militia was 
contrasted to a standing army. Under a standing army "the state will 
perish" and "the people sink into perfect servitude", or, worse, into 
civil war. The Roman citizen never lifted a hand against his own 
country until "the honest militia men of Rome were changed into standing 
forces". Servitude and the consequent high taxation which are both a cause 
and a result of a standing army "disrupts the industry of the country".
But a reformed militia, based on citizenship, would be an "invaluable 
service". A citizen militia again incorporates the amateur or anti­
professional ideal where social and political perspectives are not narrowed 
and services are freely given. "Of all the human means for the prevention 
of war", Cartwright assures us, "a cheap preparedness for it, accompanied 
by a high martial spirit is best". A citizen militia, is a safeguard 
against "the cause of the national debt". A cheap and democratic form of
9military defence would mean cheap and democratic government. Reformation 
of the militia would lead to other constitutional reforms, and a political 
and economic millenium would dawn whereby
the reduction of taxes, and the altered scale 
of our expenses, the triumph of our manufactures 
over competition in every foreign market; 
agriculture improved to gardening; commerce and 
navigation extending their sphere, and awakening 
to a friendly intercourse, and to civilisation, 
the yet torpid nations; while the overflowings 
of wealth and of population would stimulate to 
new enterprise and beget new colonies, planting 
the principles of true liberty, and the arts 
of beneficent government, in the most distant 
regions of the earth; making England the friend 
of man, and man over the face of the globe the
friend of England...63
It is easy to see why Cartwright saw the militia as "the first 
step" and "grand fundamental" in the formation of a free state. Liberty 
and patriotism both depended upon the militia: "it was crucial to the 
concept of a moral and patriotic community". The militia was, as it were, 
the material basis of patriotism and like patriotism it had the idea of
Cartwright, Choice, 51; Cartwright, Aegis, xxii, 62, 85-86.62.
63. Cartwright, Aegis, 159.
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defence rather than conquest or expansion behind it. On joining the militia 
the recruit had to swear an oath; the place of oath-taking was a field 
called "Patria". The oath mainly concerned the provision of arms.
Militia arms were truly sacred since they could be neither bought nor sold, 
lent or borrowed nor even "seized by a creditor in payment of debt". To 
break the oath would lead to shame and exile since "they are for thy 
neighbour and thy country". A "defensive military system" was "in the very 
texture of the English Constitution". Disarmingly, besides being a part 
of English political tradition or custom, as well as relating to 
propertied independence and virtue, the militia principle being a personal 
defence of "laws and liberties" and life is also "a law of nature". The 
idea of (patriotic) defence, "the sacred name of DEFENCE" collapsed all 
these paradigms into a single logic. Yet if "the great end" of an armed 
militia was "to defend the nation against foreign attacks" without being 
"a danger to liberty", defence also included militia protection for "our 
foreign possessions". ^
The other thing defence referred to was defence against internal 
disorder. The militia functioned "not only in repelling invasion, but in 
putting down rebellion or insurrection, or even ... ordinary tumult".
One thing Cartwright had obviously in mind were the disturbances close to 
his own estate in Lincolnshire. There were, of course, other ends for the 
militia less to do with the defence of property and more aimed at 
classical goals. The militia and military spirit were to be incorporated 
into the public games associated with "Hieronauticon" or "school of 
national manners and public virtue". ^
The idea of public virtue, a relatively secularised concept of 
virtue that is, has been held to be central to the neo-Machiavellian or 
'Country' paradigm. The word 'virtue' was certainly a common one in 
Cartwright's political vocabulary. So was the sense just mentioned. Virtue 
was equally as important as liberty; without virtue there could be no 
liberty. America had liberty because it was virtuous; it had "virtuous 
liberty". Virtue, then, was a political attribute and another phrase,
Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 118; Drinkwater-Lunn, "John Cartwright", 339; 
Cartwright, Life, Vol.II, 328, 361-2; Cartwright, Abridgement, v, 17; 
Cartwright, Aegis, xvi, xxiv, 60, 67.
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"patriotic virtue" emphasises its public nature. The House of Commons in 
the English Civil War is adjudged to have acted virtuously until "it 
became independent of the people". Its members, it would seem, gave up 
"manly reasoning and virtuous reform" for something like "court delusions". 
Unlike Burke, Cartwright did not see virtue solely as the mental property 
of the aristocracy. He wrote of "the contemptible nonsense of family blood". 
Public virtue through "patriot services" in the aid of liberty is "true 
nobility". A virtuous parliament would consist of members of noble 
"CHARACTER", that is persons with "uncontaminated habits of life, virtuous 
connexions, approved integrity and a general zeal for service to the public". 
In this statement public and private virtue were related and combined.
Private virtue had tangible origins in "the laws of God" but even public 
virtue in defence of freedom is "the evident duty of every moral man, 
and every Christian". In one sense, virtue was merely a means to "the great 
end" of human existence "moral perfection". Though ignored, the word and 
idea of perfection had its own political and paradigmatic resonance. And 
without constitutional protections, such as annual parliaments, Cartwright 
reminds us, virtue will hardly flourish. ^
It is helpful to look further at the role of "the laws of God" or 
natural law in Cartwright's thinking. In doing so, it will also be 
useful to consider the related ideas of reason, country and nature/culture.
In addition to the previous discussion of Cartwright's 'Lockeian principles', 
the last few pages or so, accepting the cautionary words they contain, can 
be taken as a rejection of a purely Lockeian interpretation, just as 
Cartwright's Lockeianisms or Court presuppositions compromise any purely 
Commonwealth exegesis. Seeing Cartwright as the purveyor of 'Lockeian' 
mentality is the most popular if not the most eloquent and sophisticated 
presentation. But statements to the effect that Cartwright "overthrew the 
whole basis of neo-Harrington thought" by "insisting that freedom was the 
inalienable gift of God" cannot be sustained. A less strong though not too 
dissimilar statement comes from another author who places Cartwright 
squarely within "the natural rights school", and consequently sees him 
as an "advocate of the a priori in politics". For another writer, "his
J.G.A Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, (Princeton, 1975), viii; 
Cartwright, Choice, 1-2; Cartwright, Internal Evidence, 47, 59, 82; 
Osborne, Cartwright, 141; Cartwright, Life, Vol.II, 282.
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method was fundamentally Lockean" signifying his "Enlightenment approach".
If for our original interpreter Cartwright's ideas had more similarities
"with Enlightenment thinking" than with any Commonwealth tradition or
constitutionalism, ultimately there is always a return to "his theological
basis". This last statement reveals the problems involved in the concept
of the Enlightenment, while the second writer reveals the difficulties
inherent in the a priori principle. He finds the Major arguing on the level
of "both precedent and principle", discovers his "principle was not
abstract" but insists this does nothing to compromise Cartwright's natural 
6 7law principles. Part of the solution or problem, as was shown above, 
is in the shift that took place in Cartwright's thinking; part is in the
•k
nature or shape of 18th century thought.
There is, as I have shown above and reinforce now, ample 
evidence to support the 'Lockeian' thesis, especially in the early works 
where there is relatively scant reference to the Anglo-Saxon example. Here 
he often, as later, spoke of "first principles on which all the rest depends". 
Such "principles of government" he wrote in 1823 "are eternal". We have 
"first to contemplate" a thing "abstractly so that we may discover the first 
principles". These first principles constitute "the law of Nature's God". 
Representation is "every man's natural right" which forms the basis of the 
English constitution. Yet in the same work in which this statement is made, 
in the early Internal Evidence, it is also argued that measures for 
parliamentary reform have to be "agreeable to the laws of nature, and the 
experience of mankind". The "statutes of Edward III" are brought in to 
legitimate the principle of annual parliaments, while the "unnecessary 
separation of practice from principle" is roundly condemned. In a 
later work, the initial insistence "not boroughs but men" ought to be the 
basic political unit is an argument for natural right against custom.
Yet an appeal is made further on to historical experience, to the sentiments 
"of my countrymen", and to the constitution perceived as an historical 
entity. It has been argued that the constitution, for Cartwright, was 
merely derived from the Christian religion, the laws of nature and reason.
ft 7 * Jowett, "Language", 120, 121, 125; Osborne, Cartwright, 63; Drinkwater 
Lunn, "John Cartwright", 52, 54, 104.
*
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In one of his last publications, A Suggestion Submitted to the Lawgivers of 
Greece, where a distinction is drawn between the law and the constitution, 
there is a clear identity made between natural law and the constitution.
But here it is_ an identity rather than a cause and effect or substructure- 
superstructure relationship. Natural law is subsumed by the constitution 
as much as the constitution is subsumed by natural law. The principle that 
unites the constitution and natural law is the idea of a return to origins, 
although it is important to emphasise again that it is a return to culture 
(Anglo-Saxons) rather than nature (Indians). Otherwise, the shift to Saxon- 
ist vocabulary counts for nothing. Also, it is notso much a question of 
the primacy and generative value of "theological terminology" and 
"theological concepts" as of the mythological structure of thought. If 
there is to be found in Cartwright' s thought both Lockeian capitalist and 
Machiavellian country moments, to say nothing of others, what is then to 
be said of a "representative figure" in terms of social interest or class 
and modes of production and thought?
Before we consider, in the first instance, only one part of this
question it is interesting first to examine the abstract and the concrete
sides or aspects of natural law. On the abstract side, on the shape of
Radical reason, the lack of divergence between its rational and
empirical features has already been commented on. Like others, Cartwright
also stressed the impartiality and scientific character of Radical reason.
Despite his often passionate millenial rhetoric, and his insistence that
"no man is infallible either in politics or in any other science", there
is a strong conviction that politics was a science reducible to the
fundamental principles of natural law. God could not be accused of
partiality or of party so that as long as you stuck to natural law
principles you could claim right reason and scientific impartiality to the
69other sides' error: your light and their darkness.
On the concrete side of things, a connection rarely if ever made 
is between natural rights and the expression of pastoral and Georgic 
ideals. Several events in Cartwright's personal experience led him to
Cartwright, Life, Vol.II, 228, 386; Cartwright, Abridgement, 25; 
Cartwright, Evidence, 9-10, 37; Cartwright, Choice, 15, 58-59, 60, 
88; Jowett, "Language", 69, 112; Cartwright, Commonwealth, iii.
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form such associations. Pastoral romanticism could be used as a means for 
conveying the idea of England as the blessed country, of the place gifted 
with God’s natural endowments. "Next to the sight of a mistress or 
friend after a long absence", Cartwright once wrote, "the richness, perfume, 
lively verdure and pleasing variety of the country are to the drooping soul 
of the sea-worn sailor, sources of the highest enjoyment". But just as the 
Anglo-Saxon polity was an improvement upon the rights of the noble savage 
in the state of nature, so English nature could be improved upon. But 
even here, as in politics, it was important not to violate nature’s laws, 
to over-embellish. There was a Radical or Whig and Tory pastoral 
complementary to politics. Doing some landscape gardening at Kent,
Cartwright kept to the rule of nature’s "extreme simplicity" using as the 
centrepiece the "great store of grand oaks" he found there. The more 
overtly political implications of the pastoral come through in a poem in 
praise of Alfred where he writes of "maids, matrons, infants and rustics" 
who ought to "bleed no more". He also wrote similar things about the 
noble savage who stood somewhere in-between the pastoral and Georgic ideals. 
Here, Cartwright's Newfoundland experience is significant. Not only is 
there an attempt to convey an impression of untamed idyll in life among 
virgin forests, animals and Indians, but the savage or simple life is seen 
as generating the similar sort of values found in the Georgic or agricultural 
life. In this latter respect, although Cartwright sold his farm in 
1813, he spent most of his life as landowner and farmer and would often turn 
to these occupations when political controversy and life got too hot or 
too despairing. Horticultural produce and samples as well as ideas were 
exchanged in the correspondence between Cartwright and Horne Took. Apart 
from government and science, "perhaps the most learned, the best informed, 
and the most polished, will be found amongst those whose chief occupation 
is agriculture". Celebration of the qualities engendered by agrarian 
pursuits spilled over into the use of 'agricultural' metaphors for talking 
about politics. "Cultivating our gardens" always had political implications. 
If to botanists a weed was a plant in the wrong place then "weeds of 
conduct and conversation" are commonly no other than words done or spoken 
in the wrong place. The harvest will be a bad one since "the com in 
the country has wanted sun"; but the "political harvest will be a good one". 
The term 'Country' then has a wider cultural significance as a form of 
political speech, while in association with the ideas of luxury and 
corruption the agrarian metaphor was used to express an anti-city feeling.
_  89  _
The s i l e n c e  o r  gap a l s o  n o t i c e a b l e  i s  t h e  absence  o f  a mechanica l  metaphor,  
so f o n d ly  employed i n  much 19th c e n t u r y  p o l i t i c a l  po lem ic .  Even the  m i l len ium 
was conce ived  as a r e t u r n  to a s imple a g r a r i a n  p a s t .  "We have now to f i g h t " ,  
C a r t w r i g h t  dec la im ed ,  "no t  on ly  f o r  our  f i e l d s  and f i r e s i d e s ,  b u t  those  laws 
and l i b e r t i e s  which made an E ng l ishm an 's  f i e l d  an Eden, and h i s  f i r e s i d e
an e a r t h l y  heaven" .  To a l a r g e  e x t e n t ,  t h e  new heaven was a new e a r t h  i n
t • . 70a v e ry  l i t e r a l  s e n s e .
Hardly  mentioned by most C a r tw r ig h t  s c h o l a r s ,  and i f  so u s u a l l y
g iven  a s e c u l a r  emphas is ,  the  i d e a  o f  th e  m i l len ium  p la y e d  an im p o r tan t
and c r u c i a l  r o l e  i n  h i s  t h i n k i n g .  In g e n e r a l  opinion has tended  to  d i s c o u n t  and
c o n t r a s t  " t h e  r e l i g i o u s  tone"  and " m i l l e n i a l  temper"  a g a i n s t  C a r t w r i g h t ' s
r a t i o n a l i s t  frame o f  mind and t u r n  o f  p h r a s e .  Perhaps  too  much c redence  has
been  g iven  to  F.D. C a r t w r i g h t ' s  remark t h a t  Will iam S h a r p ' s  " f r e q u e n t
endeavours  to  c o n v e r t  Major C a r tw r ig h t  to  a b e l i e f  in  h i s  f a v o u r i t e  p ro p h e t
and p r o p h e t e s s e s  were f r u i t l e s s " .  She i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  r e f e r r i n g  to  Richard
B ro th e rs  and Joanna  S o u th c o t t  bu t  the  M a jo r ' s  f a i l u r e  to  b e l i e v e  in  c u r r e n t
p r o p h e t s  t a k e s  n o th i n g  away from him a t t r i b u t i n g  s i m i l a r  fab u lo u s  powers to
A l f r e d  the  Grea t  and o t h e r  h i s t o r i c a l  f i g u r e s .  There a r e  mere ly  d i f f e r e n t
71ty p e s  o f  c r e d u l i t y  w i t h i n  a b a s i c a l l y  s i m i l a r  s t r u c t u r e  o f  tho u g h t .
I t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  h i s  m i l l e n i a l  t u r n  o f  mind,  I t h i n k ,  t h a t  has l e d  
to  f a i r l y  f r e q u e n t  comment on C a r t w r i g h t ' s  a l l e g e d  i r r a t i o n a l i t y .  Once, 
in  a l e t t e r  to  h i s  w i fe ,  he r e f e r s  to h i m s e l f  as "your  Don Q u ixo te" .  The 
f i g u r e  o f  Don Q uixo te ,  and what he r e p r e s e n t e d ,  was f r e q u e n t l y  in  
C a r t w r i g h t ' s  mind and on h i s  l i p s  as i t  was f o r  many in  the  18th c e n tu ry ;
Don Quixote  be ing  one o f  the  most w ide ly  read  books o f  th e  p e r i o d .  As 
he wrote  i n  h i s  most p o p u la r  p o l i t i c a l  t r a c t ,  "no man in  t h e s e  days can l a b o u r  
f o r  the  b e n e f i t  o f  mankind . . .  w i th o u t  be in g  reckoned  an e n t h u s i a s t  - perhaps  
a Q u ix o te " .  Th is ,  d i s m i s s i v e l y ,  i s  how many co n te m p o ra r i e s  and modern 
commentators  have seen him. T h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  to  m i l l e n i a l  f a n t a s y  have been 
s i m i l a r  s i n c e  Don Q u ix o te , among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  i s  p r e c i s e l y  a book about  
f a n t a s y  and th e  im a g in a t io n .  Yet n o t  on ly  does Cervan tes  show t h e r e  i s  
a c e r t a i n  method i n  Don Q u ix o te ' s  madness:  " I  am mad and w i l l  be mad u n t i l
C a r t w r ig h t ,  L i f e , V o l . I ,  24, 3 0 f f ,  41,  261, 409; V o l . I I ,  40; 
C a r t w r ig h t ,  Aegis ,  v i - v i i .
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th y  r e t u r n  with  an answer".  He a l s o  has him v o ic i n g  sen t im e n t s  t h a t
C a r t w r ig h t  would no doubt  have d e l i g h t e d  i n  q u o t in g  a t  h i s  enemies and
d e t r a c t o r s :  " t h e  r a r i t y  i s  to  run  mad w i th o u t  a c a u s e ,  w i th o u t  the  l e a s t
c o n s t r a i n t  o r  n e c e s s i t y " .  Major C a r t w r ig h t  c e r t a i n l y  had a cause j u s t  as
he was c o n s t r a i n e d  by c e r t a i n  conven t ions  o f  th o u g h t .  As one o f  h i s
s e v e r e s t  modern c r i t i c s  has s a i d ,  he d id  n o t ,  l i k e  Burke,  have a m ys t i c a l
o r  " b l i n d  r e v e r e n c e "  f o r  the  p a s t ;  and a t  a t ime when "many educa ted  men"
b e l i e v e d  E n g l i s h  l i b e r t y  da ted  from .Anglo-Saxon t im e s ,  C a r t w r i g h t ' s  id e as
" d id  n o t  a l t o g e t h e r  seem r i d i c u l o u s " .  I f  h i s  b e l i e f s  were no t  r a t i o n a l i s t ,
were no t  p a r t  o f  the  movement known as r a t i o n a l i s m ,  th e n  they  were
72c e r t a i n l y  n o t  i r r a t i o n a l .
Yet none o f  t h i s  b e l i e s  a c e r t a i n  k ind  o f  menta l  f e t i s h i s m  found 
in  m i l l e n i a l  t h i n k i n g ,  to  which p r e v io u s  r e f e r e n c e  has been made. I t  i s  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  h i s  p r e - u t o p i a n  mode o f  th ough t  t h a t  i t  l a cked  any 
r e a l  i d e a  o f  a programme. Like Thomas Spence,  he f r e q u e n t l y  s l i p p e d  in t o  
speak ing  abou t  h i s  p la n  o r  programme, b u t  i n  h i s  moments o f  c l a r i t y  
ad m i t t e d  he had no " ' p l a n '  o r  p r o j e c t  o r  p r o p o s i t i o n "  and,  i n  language 
s i m i l a r  to Spence,  " c a l l e d  th e  p u b l i c  a t t e n t i o n  to the  s im p le ,  c l e a r  and 
a l l - p o w e r f u l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n " .  P o l i t i c a l  programmes, i n  
th e  modem sense  o f  the  term, were h a r d l y  n e c e s s a r y  g iven  " th e  m a n i fe s t  
s u f f i c i e n c y "  o f  " p o l i t i c a l  s a l v a t i o n " .  The " s a c r e d  c o n s t i t u t i o n "  was 
a m a t t e r  o f  " d i v i n e  r e v e l a t i o n  . . .  and th e  law o f  n a t u r e ,  no l e s s  d i v i n e " .  
The p o l i t i c a l  m i l len ium  depended n o t  so much upon a s e c u l a r  programme and 
th e o ry  as  i t  d id  upon t h e  r e v e a l i n g  hand o f  P rov idence .  In 1819, C a r t ­
w r ig h t  was w r i t i n g  on how " P rov idence"  used  " no t  i n v e n t i o n ,  b u t  r e s t o r a t i o n  
. . .  n o t  o r i g i n a l  p l a n n in g  . . .  b u t  . . .  r e p a i r i n g " .  At a p r e v io u s  t ime the  
S o c i e ty  f o r  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  I n fo rm a t io n  was c a s t  in  the  r o l e  o f  th e  agency 
o f  " t h a t  f l o o d  o f  l i g h t  and t r u t h  which,  under  a ben ign  P rov idence ,  i s  
now sweeping from e a r t h  despo t i sm  in  a l l  i t s  fo rms" .  Under such
73c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  s e v e re  l i m i t s  a r e  p l a c e d  on human p l a n n in g  and endeavour .  
This  i s  b rough t  ou t  even more c l e a r l y  i n  th e  fo l l o w in g  passage  i n  which 
we a r e  informed t h a t ,
C a r t w r ig h t ,  C ho ic e , v i ,  x x i i ;  Miguel de C e rv a n te s ,  Don Q u ix o te , 
(Everyman edn.  1906, o r i g .  pub.  Madrid,  1605, 1615),  2 v o l s .  V o l . I ,  
100, 112, 117, 183-4,  259, 260-1;  Osborne,  C a r t w r i g h t , 159, 162-3.
^ * Osborne,  C a r t w r i g h t , 158; C a r t w r ig h t ,  L i f e ,  61,  171, 348-9;  J o w e t t ,  
"Language",  135.
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the seeds of renovation had long been prep­
aring France for a change; and referring all 
such secondary causes of events to their true 
original, the First Great Cause of all; HE 
it was that I considered as the true and 
proper author of a revolution in human affairs 
so beneficent ... Did I not sincerely rejoice in 
the French Revolution, I should not dare to 
call man my brother, nor God my heavenly father.
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The French Revolution, Cartwright goes on, was "a glorious dispen­
sation of Divine Providence to improve virtue”. God was immanent in the 
world since he was "that Being whose providence is over men and nations".
At the same time, human action and planning counted for something since 
"Providence, for bringing about its purposes in human affairs" operates 
not directly through God but indirectly "through human actions". In 
sum, then, the workings of Providence could be understood through revealed 
religion, through the Bible, history and so on, and revealed religion 
contained a doctrine of salvation. Two consequences followed from this.
One was that "the doctrine of salvation" was democratic since "he who 
runs may read". God had placed salvation "within the reach of the poor 
and illiterate, who are required only to comprehend very plain things 
and act upon them". The second consequence was since Providence worked 
through human agency and institutions the path to salvation was declared 
both "in the English Constitution" and "in Christian Scripture". In this 
way, political and religious salvation were identified since they both had 
the same divine origins which gave the English constitution its sacred 
character. Reform was "the sacred cause of reform" in much more than 
a metaphorical sense. It was sacred in the sense that it was not something 
to be compromised with; it meant that reform was something outside the 
world of normal political exchange, and entered into the world of pure 
morality. "Radical reform", Cartwright said, "speaks from the souls of 
men, whereas moderate reform is spiritually cold and excites no emotion".
Radical reform had religious underpinnings and legitimation, whereas
75moderate reform was no more than secular politics.
Placed side by side with other statements this identification 
between politics and religion seems strange and ambiguous. What is 
apparent is that, in the first instance, Cartwright wants to separate
Cartwright, Commonwealth, xv-xvi.
75* Cited in Drinkwater-Lunn, "John Cartwright", xiii; cited in- 
Osborn, Cartwright, 135.
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religion, that is to say religious sectarianism and institutions, 
from politics. One of William the Conqueror's great sins is that he was 
responsible for the corporate church, a church which strayed from the 
purely moral and simple order of the early church and involved itself in 
the affairs of the state. Jesus "was not a teacher of politics, of civil 
government"; he was a purely religious and moral leader. This statement 
stands in strange contrast to other statements from the same book but it 
makes more sense if it is viewed in the light of the historical role of 
the church and religious sectarianism. Cartwright himself seems to have 
been tolerant of Catholics, and even atheists, and deplored slogans such 
as "no Popery" entering into politics. Religion is private; only 
politics is public. It is in this 'functional' light that these statements
nr
must be understood. '
When it comes to ideas and principle things are different.
Universal suffrage and political equality he finds "agreeable to the 
practice of both Christ and the Apostles". Political principles are 
"defined by the laws of God and nature". Or, as he put it elsewhere, "the 
political conduct of men and nations, to be correct, must be in conformity 
with that morality which hath its root in the existence of God". The 
true constitution is no more than "practical Christianity". Consequently, 
the refusal of parliament to hear the reformers' petitions is not only 
political tyranny but "a mockery of God and his laws ... the utmost impiety". 
Because of this rejection it was "the evident duty" not only of "every 
moral man" but of "every Christian" to "use all the virtuous means in his 
power to correct such an evil". The line between private morality and 
public politics is, then, not so clearly drawn as it might seem. Cartwright 
explicitly disputes Soame Jenyns assertion "that Christianity has nothing to 
do with 'civil government' and 'national policy'". He disputes Jenyns' 
separation of Christian principle from public life, since "the moral 
precepts of the gospel are equally a law to all men in all stations ... 
public as well as private". Such moral contradiction is against natural 
law "as revealed by the divine legislator". In the manner of mythical 
thinking, the political and the religious, the individual and the public or 
communal are merged and in fact political ideas get organised or
Cartwright, Abridgement, 12; Cartwright, Evidence, 17, Cartwright, 
Life, Vol. I, 79.
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77'structured' by religious categories. The Christian content, the 
"theological ideas" are important but perhaps moreso again is the mythic 
substructure.
Of significance so far as content and form go is Cartwright's 
deism. He remarks how he prefers Locke's views on Christianity over those 
of Hume. Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity ... is "the most satis­
factory book of its kind I ever met with in my life". At one time he had a 
better opinion of Hume's writings; Hume "taught me many useful things". 
According to one scholar, Cartwright's religious opinions underwent "some 
change" between 1780 and 1787" when he ended up adopting Unitarianism. 
According to his niece, he sought truth in the Bible which he read regularly 
in "the revelations of the Almighty" and in reason. Deism and unitarianism 
no doubt led him to believe that God "is one" and that "his UNITY cannot 
... be separated" and further that Jesus is "the chosen one". Oneness, it 
seems, rather than the one, the many and the few has the most strategic
7 0significance. /0
Because of deism and its central concept of unity the word party 
has a metaphysical depth totally lacking in its use as part of modern 
political discourse. Cartwright was critical of both Whigs and Tories 
in that they subordinated their political activity to a particular interest, 
and to expediency. Interest was associated with ambition since it was by 
nature sectional and self-seeking and was antipathetic to the wholeness and 
unity of patriotism and virtue. But ambition was not only associated 
with corruption and therefore a first cause of political and cyclical 
degeneration, it was also a sin. Party therefore was a sinful activity with 
historically momentous repercussions.
Unity or oneness had further connotations in terms of simplicity, 
while simplicity in turn was associated with nature and the super-natural. 
Underlying this association is the idea that if nature is simple then 
culture is complex. Man's creations are simple only when they accord with 
nature. Like the idea of nature and natural law the idea of simplicity 
through various mediations, represents a concrete reality. Two particular
Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 59; Cartwright, Abridgement, 62; Cartwright, 
Evidence, 77, 82.
* Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 49-50; Vol.II, 287-88; Drinkwater-Lunn,
"John Cartwright", 305.
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manifestations are dress and speech. Cartwright's own dress, like Cobbett's 
and many other Radicals, was not only old-fashioned but simple and anti­
luxury. As the Major's niece described him, "his dress was peculiar, for in 
that he consulted convenience alone, and therefore, for many years had not 
varied the form of this clothes to suit the whims and fashions of the day".
In London, heading a delegation of mostly working class delegates it was 
remarked how simple his dress was, including "a plain brown wig". An old 
school friend is virtuous since "everything about him, is in the true, plain, 
plentiful and comfortable style of an old-fashioned country gentleman". This 
country, pastoral and gentry connection is extended to include Cartwright's 
own efforts at land improvement described by Arthur Young as having "great 
simplicity". Speech also had the same value put upon it. His niece 
remarked on "the correctness and purity of his English", its "dignified 
simplicity". In 1776, before Paine, Cartwright was explaining how "a 
plainer and indeed coarser language is necessary for the unrefined, tho'
sensible bulk of the people". In this he was following Christ who "pure and
79simple" spoke in "the sweet, plain and forcible language of nature".
Simple language went hand-in-hand with simple doctrines. "All
systems founded in the laws of nature", Cartwright wrote, "being the work
of the Deity are simple; that is ultimately resolvable into a few self-
evident PRINCIPLES". God's will as part of nature was simple and therefore
comprehensible to the dullest mind. What applied to religion also applied
to "the POLITY" with "the fewness of its elementary principles, being
in accordance with the simplicity of Nature as well as ... Science".
And, as in religion, "the simpler the constitution, the sooner and better
it will be understood". Measuring up best to this rule was "England's long
hidden, long unknown constitution, a constitution supreme in simplicity and
80excellence". Militia defence had "the simplicity of nature".
Of course, simplicity had its opposite. Moderate or partial reform 
involved the politics of party and compromise. By its nature, "every mere 
palliative must be complex". Partial reform therefore recommends "a complex 
in place of a simple theory ... an imperfect in place of a perfect system". 
His advice to Bentham was to "avoid ... complexity in constitutions". With­
out realising that it would fall on deaf ears, he goes on to describe how
Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 82-3, 379-80; Osborne, Cartwright, 66.
o n
Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 62, Vol.II, 38-9, 285; Osborne, Cartwright, 
91, 115; Drinkwater-Lunn, "John Cartwright", 129, 387, 444-6; 
Cartwright, Abridgement, vii, 43, 71.
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despite "many modem refinements" it is vital to return to and restore "the
plain Saxon fabric of our constitution". The Normans had introduced "the
complexity and confusion which ... have rendered our system an almost
incomprehensible mystery". Complexity in politics is associated with
mystery; with the ideological means used by the crown and the aristocracy
to control and exploit the people. Once again Burke was merely stood on his
81head; there was no rupture or break.
Unity and oneness was not only simple, it also possessed wholeness 
or integrity. In myth and religion integrity is usually talked about in 
relation to the idea of purity. The source or cause of impurity is excess; 
French revolutionary excesses were due to the lack of an "antient 
constitution" on the English model, to the lack of a model of purity.
"All English liberty and good government flows from the clear and wholesome 
fountain of our Saxon Constitution", Cartwright wrote. "If the stream 
becomes obstructed or turbid with impurity" it is necessary to return to 
these origins. Corruption, which is implied in this statement, and excess 
need not, then, have Machiavellian roots. The mythico-religious dialectic of 
purity and pollution in which the individual human body is analogous to the 
collective political body or constituion is equally relevant. The ultimate 
cause of the "deep taint of impurity" and an "infected habitation" is the 
body’s "passions". Only radical reform will drive out "infection" and 
restore "purity to the government and energy to the constitution". Moderate 
reform was "a mere palliative for a sick man, whose energies were departed". •*
Genuine reform would ensure that "our purified Constitution shall emerge 
from the flames, with its ancient vigour and renovated lustre". Clearly 
ideas about renovation, restoration and return were loaded not only with time 
but also referred to bodily health. Equally, ideas about health, excess and
corruption extended beyond the area of political analogy and politics into
8 2the social and personal areas. Rhetorically Cartwright asks,
are not our prisons and our treatment of prisoners 
shocking and foolish? ... are we not suffering from 
the distress and idleness of the poor? ... do we 
not leave millions of acres uncultivated? Is not 
the metropolis and whole kingdom over-run with
^ * Cartwright, Life, Vol.II, 30, 171; Cartwright, Abridgement, 71.
o 2 Cartwright, Life, Vol. II, 30, 330; Cartwright, Aegis, 78; Cartwright, 
Choice, 66.
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vagrants and beggars, notwithstanding 
our astonishing provisions against want?
Is not every city, town and village crowded 
with alehouses, those hotbeds of idleness 
and vice? 83
Apart from noticing the puritan and ’bourgeois' rather than
socialist elements in this, I would use it as support to disagree with
Samuel Bamford and some modem commentators that Cartwright did not go
beyond "political purification". I see with another author a very
definite bent towards "moral reformation" as well. The constitution or
commonwealth, which includes social and economic life, has become by the
1790s "the filthy receptacle of unclean things" giving forth a "temporary
dirt and stink". There is a widespread "corruption of the heart".
Obviously this is a language of morality perhaps even more fundamentally
than it is a language of politics, although there is a backwards and
forwards movement in thought. Just as there is an ideal moral purity
so there is a bodily purity and perfection and, by analogy, a political
perfection. Radical reform, or "the full and complete representation"
of the whole people added up to "a perfect institution" harmonious
with "the perfection of human reason". Constitutional government was not
only "co-eval with, erected upon, and regulated by, the spirit of the common
law of England", it was a "universal, simple, pure and perfect, plan of
religious reform". These words, taken from two different texts, are not
randomly chosen; as it were, they put in a nutshell the broad and underlying
84assumptions of Radical vocabulary and 'epistemology'.
Perfection, though, was not easily attained. Whether bodily or 
mental, it was a matter of effort and knowledge. It followed that if the 
constitution was the source of knowledge and was hidden or overlaid by 
Norman corruptions, then knowledge itself was hidden. It might be that the 
constitution and God's providence consisted of a few essential and simple 
principles, but they were not easy to get at. The rulers had a lot to 
gain through shrouding the principles of political liberty in a veil of 
mystery. The phrase "political education" had, then, much more to it than 
the desire to propagate rhetoric and slogans about annual parliaments, 
liberty and universal male suffrage. Political education was also a
83 * Cartwright, Choice, xvi.
84 * Drinkwater-Lunn, "John Cartwright", iv-v; Osborne, Cartwrith, 94; 
Cartwright, Commonwealth, ii-iv; Cartwright, Choice, 10, 16; Cartwright, 
Evidence, 20.
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a gnostic process involving the study of 'history* or myth as a means of 
individual and national salvation and freedom.
Freedom would return when "England's unknown constitution" was
"once made known" and "England's lost polity once found". It was necessary
to battle with reason against ignorance and conspiracy. The "well-known
principles of the English constitution ... the plain maxims of the law of
nature and the clearest doctrines of Christianity" are all "so simple and
clear as to be understood by ... thousands of plain men". Yet these men,
the common people, "know not that they are possessed of so useful a
treasure". Political knowledge has to be revealed in much the same way as
Ebenezer Sibly described the revelation of astrological knowledge.* Like
astrology, political knowledge, the militia principle for example, is
gained "by those who shall seek it". A political saint or virtuoso was
someone versed in lore and tradition. "Were the English Constitution
utterly lost and forgotten", Cartwright says, "a close attention to the
principles of liberty to be collected from our law books, and other English
writings would suffice for its recovery". True knowledge, therefore, was
to be gained from the English historical and political experience and was
found in the past rather than the present or the future. It was not new
knowledge. Political knowledge had its limits and was not infinitely
progressive. If there was an enlightenment, it was an enlightenment of
"recovery" gained from a study of the English past. When, in 1814,
Cartwright wrote of "the progress made, even in the countries of despotism in
the fusion of political knowledge", it was exactly this kind of 'antiquarian'
and 'racial' knowledge he had in mind. When he spoke of its diffusion and
of "progress" in "the debased nations of Asia and Africa" and in training
negroes "to habits and duties of citizens", it was just such an enlightenment 
85he envisaged.
It was, so to speak, a mythic enlightenment. To emphasise still 
further the mythical elements in Cartwright's mind, some reference needs 
to be made to his penchant for symbolic expression. One scholar has noted 
"the visual appeal" of his works, although this is by no means peculiar to 
Cartwright. They were full of medals, seals and other paraphernalia as well 
as graphic representations of the principles of liberty or its corruption.
85. „Cartwright, Abridgement, 10, 17, 28-9; 
Cartwright, Aegis, xvii. Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 65;
* See Appendix D.
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His seal bore "the cap of liberty, bible, swords of freedom, dates of Magna 
Carta and the Glorious Revolution, and the name of Alfred". The frontispiece 
of one work contained designs for copper medals of "the English polity"; 
the S.C.I. voted that another of his works be supplemented with various 
designs, "emblems and allegories" and slogans. Part of the reason behind 
this move is said to have been to make it "more appealing to the lower 
orders",to the semi-literate. The engraving was done by William Sharp.
One of the most common symbols was the cap of liberty, whose origins 
Cartwright saw as English rather than French. It is perhaps surprising to 
find Cartwright writing to Burke in 1775 agreeing with him "in hanging Mr. 
Wilkes if he can be legally tucked up", while defending the cap of liberty 
on the presumed grounds that it was an English invention. So much did 
Cartwright associate the cap of liberty with patriotism or Englishness 
that he drew up a design for a regimental button with the cap on it. Another 
English symbol in constant use was the oak. Reform and liberty were often 
described and graphically illustrated through the use of this symbol. He 
would be content, Cartwright said, "to deposit the acorn in the ground, 
provided posterity might live under the branches of an oak". The signif­
icance of using this kind of agrarian symbol, was that nature had its laws
and its limits. The outcome of planting an acorn, should it reach maturity,
8 6was known; the result was not open-ended.
Yet if the shape of his thinking was determined by some mythic 
metaphysic, we are still Marxist enough to want to 'materialise' it and 
see his ideas about the 'economic' structure as a reflection of a 
particular type of society. This is important in view of the fact, 
mentioned before, that Cartwright and most of his Radical contemporaries 
had no conception of economic problems. Cartwright, we are told, lacked 
any "comprehension of economic issues"; and had a "general non-involvement 
in economic problems". At the same time, there is some recognition that 
economic difficulties were "blamed upon the political system". Cartwright 
is held to be not only myopic but wrong to see political institutions at 
the root of "the large national debt and high taxes". Disregarding this 
question for the moment, what needs to be shown, and has already to some 
extent, is that Cartwright, in common with Obadiah Hulme and a host of 
other Radical pamphleteers, was very much concerned with economic issues
86. Drinkwater-Lunn, "John Cartwright", 133, 151, 607, 715; Cartwright, 
Abridgement, frontispiece; Cartwright, Life, Vol..I, 54.
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through taking as a central problem in nearly all his writings the
taxation question. Like Paine he was not against taxation as such.
He was only against "unconstitutional taxation" which occurred when
"the few" had "the power of taxing the many", resulting in a large
public debt. But the ultimate cause of the high level of the
National Debt was war: "WAR has been the cause of all our debt".
Hugh debts were needed to pay for the cost of the standing army,
"which must be our ruin". Up to a point, it is equally valid to see
his love of the militia merely as a means of avoiding the nation's
economic ruin. It was a cheap form of defence, although again it needs
to be emphasised Cartwright was not so much concerned with limiting
the powers of the state as ensuring taxation was kept at reasonable
levels. Equally, economic conditions had an effect on "the morals
and habits" of the people and economic explanation was determined by
moral and political considerations. For this reason, general prosperity
was crucial and it was the state's role to promote this prosperity.
It could do this by not protecting but promoting trade. Again, trade
rather than manufacture was central to Cartwright's thinking and mental 
87horizons. To this end, the navy rather than the militia assumed 
a crucial significance.
In order to establish this it is necessary to turn to a close 
examination of Cartwright's strangest or most 'archaic' production,
The Trident. This work is usually dismissed as Cartwright's greatest 
eccentricity and is only given a cursory glance by scholars. The 
contents are barely mentioned and if referred to at all, The Trident 
is seen as an example of his 'classical' turn of mind. Yet in reality 
it is a celebration of Anglo-Saxon democracy and Englishness and brings 
together in one piece, as it were, nearly all the themes and ideas 
explored above. For these reasons, The Trident deserves close analysis, 
reading and description.*
So what has been learned about Cartwright's thought in the 
light of the questions posed at the start of this chapter? Some
8 7 Osborne, Cartwright, 70; John Cartwright, The Trident: or the 
National Policy of Naval Celebration . . ., (London, 1802), 6, 
208; Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 287, 300, 305, 306; Vol.II, 
190, 350;
See Appendix A.
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evidence has been given to suggest the extent of Cartwright's 
'influence'. His class, position, if that is what it is, has been 
shown to be ambiguous to a certain extent. And he was less afraid 
of the violence of the working class than many who shared his social 
background; he was also not as condenscending. Yet he was no out- 
and-out egalitarian, French style. In this sense his thinking is 
pre-Revolutionary. His 'moderation' and 'archaism' comes out in 
his views on property and tax. His concern for law is Harringtonian 
or Country, but he is not against commerce, and not against taxes 
on real property because they do not fall on the poor or because 
they are not taxes on consumption. Yet political rights, and even 
more, representation are based on land (virtue Harrington, Machiavelli), 
but on personality, too (natural law, Locke). Also, land ought to 
be more equally divided. Cartwright, as I have said, saw himself 
as an ultra-Radical reformer, but not a Jacobin. He wanted manhood 
universal suffrage and annual parliaments, the grounds of which 
were founded in the English constitution and history. In this light 
his attitude towards the monarchy and republicanism has been shown 
to be equally complex. A country's form of government depended, to 
some extent, upon its historical experience, and for England he 
favoured an elective a constitutional monarchy based on the 
historical model of the Anglo-Saxons.
Out of this came his concept of a patriotism. Consequently, 
my analysis denies an Enlightenment universalist patriotism, in 
favour of an idea that is closer to Burke. Yet neither is it 
nationalism, in the 19th century sense. It is as much, as I have said, 
"an internal mode of political conduct" as anything else. Like liberty 
it is drawn from the lessons of English history. So, although 
there are 'Lockeian' natural law elements in Cartwright's thought, 
as I have shown in a chronological appreciation of the texts, the 
Gothic or "customs' side of Cartwright's view of liberty is both 
continuing and vital. There is custom and common law as well as 
natural rights, although there is also the 'Machiavellian' militia 
as an upholder of libertarian values and institutions. And on the 
last point, there is further Cartwright's criticism of luxury and 
corruption. Likewise there is virtue.
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To understand how all these things connect up, I looked 
at the role of reason;at country and nature as concrete 
expressions of natural rights and at the role of religion or deism 
and millenarianism in Cartwright's thought. To take the last 
first, I have suggested that "Country' (and natural rights) should 
be looked at not only as a political concept but as a way of living.
In country life, in the simple life, is found the sources of virtue 
and liberty. They are also to be found in destical, millenial 
religion. This provided radical reform with its divine inspiration 
and Providential blessing. Millenial deism also extolled the virtues 
of simplicity and oneness. A party, complex reform was, therefore, 
for Cartwright not only a political mistake or error but a political 
sin. And religious discourse is also about morality, about purity 
and pollution. Starting from the body through the mind and on to 
society and then the government, the Anglo-Saxon constitution is 
seen as a model of political purity. Ultimately then, Cartwright's 
political enlightenment is a religious or mythical enlightenment.
This is reinforced in an appendix in my analysis of Cartwright's 
Trident in which heavy symbolisation or 'concrete' and allegorical 
thought is used as political argument. Yet all this has a material 
or "mercantilist' basis and the Trident is a celebration of the 
navy (light on taxes) as a protector of trade rather than manufacture. 
It is also a ritualistic celebration of Anglo-Saxon democracy.
The argument is, then, that interpretation of John Cartwright's 
thought or mind is advanced by looking not at one or two concepts 
that he uses but at all the concepts together. That is, to look 
at the wider structure or language. In one sense Cartwright is 
the embodiment of this language-structure or paradigm that is 
developed in the last chapter. The other writers chosen tend to 
emphasise or elaborate this or that aspect of the structure.
THOMAS BEWICK
The questioning or 'interrogation' of Thomas Bewick's Memoirs 
must therefore necessarily follow a similar pattern. But there is 
little in the way of critical historiography on Bewick. Yet, 
because of Marat's stay at Newcastle, by association, one interpretation 
sees Bewick as something of a revolutionary. Another aspect of
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investigation will be Bewick's class or status position, especially 
his relationships with the gentry. Connected with both these 
things is his understanding of equality. For the first time, 
that is, I have posed the question of hegemony and the class 
nature of Gothic thinking. In this respect, close attention is 
given to Bewick's notion of independence. The Memoirs, as will 
be shown, are a good source for discovering the cultural foundations 
of Gothic mentality or Anglo-Saxonism. Included in this are 
questions about the role of cultural heroes, and the relationship 
between political belief, religion or myth and popular culture.
Out of this come questions about political 'philosophy', about 
political rectitude and social life. Related to this, in turn, 
is Bewick's belief, like Cartwright, in the role of political 
knowledge. Lastly, I look briefly at Bewick's political economy.
At first glance it may seem odd to place Bewick alongside 
Cartwright, especially since Bewick's friend, Thomas Spence, is 
left to the next chapter. In terms of class origins, Spence 
and Bewick have a lot in common. But Spence had much greater 
contact with the more popular or 'lo\jer' forms of political 
radicalism, and his ideas found a receptive audience among the 
"lower sort of people". Thomas Bewick's Radicalism, both in tone 
and content, was more moderate and more respectable. So, although 
he never came from the gentry classes, his ideas are closer to 
Cartwright's. In fact, he was even less radical than Major 
Cartwright. He rejected Cartwright's "unqualified scheme for 
universal suffrage". Despite this, emphasis is usually placed on 
Bewick as a supporter "of new ideas both technical and social"; 
that is, if his ideas are considered at all. Usually Bewick is 
considered as an engraver, as an object of artistic criticism.
Yet his memoir is stuffed full, if on a pragmatic or 'practical' 
level, of the kind of ideas discussed in previous pages; they are 
open to the same kind of analysis. As with some other writers 
considered it is useful and informative to begin with a discussion 
of reading 'influences', friends and so on, although not in this 
case the question of circulation since he was not a political 
theorist or pamphleteer.
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Bewick's connection with Thomas Spence has already been
alluded to. It was a friendship of long standing; as early as 1776
he mentions "his friend Thomas Spence", and the friendship is said
to have been "one of the most significant and dearest to Bewick to
the end of his days". Bewick and Spence were both members of the
same "Philosophical Society" at Newcastle from which Spence was
expelled for breaking the Society's rules by publishing one of his
lectures. Bewick did not oppose the expulsion and later had a
physical fight with him. The quarrel did not last and Bewick
thought of Spence as "sincere and honest". It has been said Spence's
"general philosophical and political ideas" influenced Bewick "a
great deal". The basis of this judgement is a number of books,
pamphlets and tokens produced by Spence and known to have been in
Bewick's possession. Yet Bewick refers to Spence's ideas as
"mistaken" and clearly disagrees with Spence with regard to the
control and ownership of land. There would seem to be some sort of
'philosophical' correspondence, and, leaving aside the question of
88influence, this will be brought out later. Another important 
influence and a source of Bewick's Enlightenment frame of mind is 
said to be the French revolutionary Jean Paul Marat. Marat lived in 
Newcastle, practising as a doctor, during the years 1770 to 1773.
He became a member of some of the patriotic or reform societies in 
the area and an edition of his Chains of Slavery was published in 
1775 and sold in Newcastle. It has been said Bewick's life-long 
defence of the French Revolution and his social and political ideas 
in general "show that he had deeply absorbed the ideas Marat 
propagated". Yet there is not a shred of evidence Bewick met Marat 
or read his book. Bewick's ideas seem to be an amalgam of English 
intellectual components combined with personal and cultural 
experience. One of these native intellectual components was derived 
from Thomson's Seasons, "one of the best-loved and most significant 
books of the 18th century" and "a lifelong favourite of Bewick's". 
Thomson's celebration of nature, liberty and Whiggish political 
philosophy and their interconnection would have appealed to Bewick's
Ray Watkinson, Thomas Bewick, Artist, Naturalist & Radical
1753-1825, (Our History Series, No.25), 14; reprinted in
The Luddites & Other Essays, (London, 1971), (ed.) Lionel Munby.
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intuition and helped shape his thoughts. In terms of agrarian sentiment
and nostalgia, Cobbett "of whose Political Register" Bewick was "a
89faithful reader" is a similar sort of 'influence'.
Besides these two authors, the Memoir gives numerous examples
of Bewick's reading. While at his master's house he read "the then
new publication of 'Smollett's History of England'" and "for a long
time afterwards" he "clearly remembered everything of note which it
contained". At this time his reading was avid. Access was gained
through Gilbert Gray's son William "a bookbinder of some repute" who
often filled his workshop with "the works of the best authors".
Also read around this time were "waggon loads of sermons". As he puts
it, "I got myself into a labyrinth - bewildered with dogmas, creeds
and opinions". During this period, books were his only companions
over which he spent his "mornings and evenings, late and early".
Perhaps worthy of mention in the light of Bewick's religious readings
is the "political theologican" James Murray, author of Sermons for
Asses; Murray was the only member of the Philosophical Society against
Spence's expulsion. Another batch of reading worth mentioning is the
90natural histories, including "Gilbert White's History of Selbourne".
Men as well as books shaped Bewick's character and ideas. He 
describes one, Gilbert Gray, a bookbinder and formerly a shopman and 
bookbinder to Allan Ramsay poet and bookseller, as "the most valuable 
acquaintance and friend I ever met with". Grah seems to have made a 
mark on Bewick through the puritanism of his personal habits and thoughts. 
Gray was remarkable for his "detestation of vice, his industry and his 
temperance". He lived life according to the dictates of nature.
Ignoring social conventions, he ate only when hungry, drank when 
thirsty, slept when tired and so on. According to Bewick, this 
"mode of life" enabled him to pursue a successful publishing career.
Gray, besides training for a while as a priest, had had "a liberal 
education bestowed upon him" and "had read a great deal and reflected 
upon what he read". Bewick "lived in habits of intimacy with him
R. Watkinson, Thomas Bewick, 15, 18; Thomas Bewick, A Memoir of 
Thomas Bewick Written By Himself, (London and Newcastle, 1862), 
110.
89.
90. Bewick, A Memoir, 65, 153-4.
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to the end of his life". Another friend was Nathanial Bales, a 
surgeon, who, among other things was "eminent for his learning .. a 
tolerably good engraver and a good mechanic". Bales headed the 
committee "of Burgesses" who opposed the magistrates appropriation 
of the Town Moor or commons in Newcastle. There is also mention of 
George Gray, another son of Gilbert, and William's half-brother.
Although "eminent as a fruit painter", he "dipped into almost every 
art and science". George was also remarkable for his "genuine 
simplicity of manners". Matthew Prior "one of the best mechanics 
in the kingdom" who gave evidence before a house of Commons committee 
also gets a mention. So does "Major Bainbridge a local patriot" 
and his friend the divine who was also a schoolteacher and small 
farmer. Not of least importance is his former master and eventual 
partner Ralph Beilby towards whom, in his memoir, Bewick has ambivalent 
feelings. In order to build up a proper picture of the collective 
nature of Bewick's thinking, a close study of all these men and books 
would be desirable.^
They are certainly helpful in trying to draw a picture of Bewick's 
class position and his attitudes or consciousness of class. Ray 
Watkinson's summary of this position has a nice accuracy. Bewick's 
background, he writes, is of "solid yeoman independence, of moderate 
comfort won by constant hard work, of country skills and earnest 
education". His paternal grandfather was said to be a successful 
farmer; his maternal grandfather a schoolteacher. His father was a 
farmer who also employed "pitmen". Bewick's grandmother left him 
£20 for an apprentice fee. The connection between craft and country 
comes out in Bewick's uncle "Thomas Blackett, silversmith" who had 
been a foreman and his aunt who "being the widow of a freeman kept a 
cow upon the Town Moor". In later life as a wood engraver Bewick would 
have counted as a sort of "superior artisan". As a master engraver 
he employed a few men but engravers were below artists "Who ranked 
themselves as gentlemen" and "insisted that engravers wait upon them".
They belonged to "a fairly independent trade", this independence perhaps 
being underlined by the lack of trade union activity among engravers.
Bewick, Memoir, 62-4, 68, 162-3; See also Bewick's own adoption 
of a strict diet and his reading of "Lewis Cornaro and other books 
which treated of temperance". He also "greatly valued the advice 
given in the "Spectator" which strongly recommended all people to 
have their days of absence". 69.
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The membership of the "Swarley Club" which Bewick joined around 1790
consisted of "merchants or respectable tradesmen". As E.P. Thompson
has pointed out many of them expressed hostility to "the gentry,
capitalists and large farmers" while at the same time they were
"intimidated", though perhaps deferential is a better description,
by and to the aristocracy. Like Major Cartwright, Bewick's
condemnation and disregard of the gentry was just as conditional,
and his contacts with the upper classes seem to have been both
92friendly and profitable.
He had quite a few particular grudges against the gentry. 
Forgetting the "exertions of their forefathers", the gentry, during 
the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars had let the people down 
through their apathy. Nowadays "there is not virtue enough left in 
the country gentlemen", Bewick says. Many of the "lairds" and country 
gentlemen were "grossly ignorant and ... offensively proud". Their 
loss of virtue was associated with their dissipation and consequent 
loss of lands and houses or "halls". The gentlemen ought to remember 
they are "the natural guardians of public morals" while the "bold 
peasantry" are the sinews and strength of the country. But during the 
war, the gentry "whirled about in aristocratic pomposity" and "could 
not at these times drink anything but wine" while the "industrious 
labourer" was subjected to "great privations". Bewick had more 
respect for his own class origins, for the class below the aristocracy, 
the gentry and the lairds. Although often their intelligence was 
below labouring men because they were "exclusively occupied with the 
management of their farms", the farmers were mostly of "a kind and 
hospitable disposition, well-intentioned plain, plodding men".
Bewick's judgement of the aristocracy is equally ambiguous. The 
game laws were the product of "feudal tyranny" and an "overbearing 
aristocracy". Yet the nobles "are or ought to be, the pride and 
glory of every civilised land". They were responsible for the general 
virtue of the people. Without them there would be a lapse into
Watkinson, Thomas Bewick, 29; Bewick, Memoirs, 51, 75, 140-1; 
F.B. Smith, Radical Artisan: W.J. Linton 1812-97, (New Jersey, 
1973), 4, 35; Thompson, Working Class, 198-9.
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barbarism. Using language similar to Burke, Bewick argues that
improving landlords and aristocratic patronage generate the general
93moral health and economic well-being of the country.
Bewick believed in equality of opportunity, but he did not
believe in any kind of natural or social equality. "Intellectual
and reasoning powers" were "the gift of Providence". Yet effort
and opportunity was needed for their cultivation. "Want of effort"
is largely the reason for "the inequalities of rank and fortune of
which the community is composed". But provision must be made for
"the intelligent and the industrious". In order to "give every man
a fair chance" the community has "an imperative duty" to provide
"a rational and virtuous education". The virtuous, then, are those
who have risen by their own industry and effort, not necessarily an
hereditary aristocracy. At the same time, society is based on unequal
reciprocity. Both "master and servant" have "reciprocal duties";
neither tyranny from the one nor disobedience from the other is
acceptable. To ensure this, the relationship needed to be governed
94by equal and just laws.
All men of sound understanding, and who are 
capable of reflection, will clearly see that 
there is not and cannot be any such thing as 
equality. There must, and ever will be, high 
and low, rich and poor, and this inequality in 
civilised states, is necessary for the comfort 
and happiness of all. A cement is thus formed 
which binds together in union the strength, 
the beauty and the symmetry of the whole. In 
the freest state, man must not expect to have 
the unrestrained liberty of the savage, but 
must give up part of his freedom for the good 
of the whole; for liberty consists in this that 
every man may do as he pleases, provided he does 
nothing to injure his neighbour, or the community 
of which he is a member ... it is the will of 
Providence that it should be so.
95
93. Watkinson, Bewick, 16; Bewick, Memoir, 46-7, 211, 212.
94. Bewick, Memoir, 190-2.
95. Bewick, Memoir, 194.
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Only by the most tortuous argument can this sort of essentially
mythological reasoning be assimilated into a socialist tradition of thinking.
Also, despite some prefiguring of J.S. Mill, the Chain of Being assumptions
implicit in the quotation set it apart from 19th century liberalism.
Neither is it symptomatic of an unmediated hegemony. Virtual representation
is good enough for "the ignorant and the wicked". For this reason Major
Cartwright’s plan of universal manhood suffrage is rejected. Bewick's
social position as a small master and householder comes to the fore when
he proposes giving the vote to "householders of probity and honour" who "by
industry and intelligence" are able to "maintain themselves respectably".
These included fell-men or those who had rights to the common - to some
form of landed property - thereby putting into perspective his other state-
96ment that "the poor are equally as wise as the rich". In terms of
political doctrine, Bewick is close to Obadiah Hulme; in terms of paradigms 
his moralistic and 'classical' categories show that he is entirely 
'traditional'.
Additional evidence that he was not merely deferential towards
mainstream aristocratic and gentry social and political theory is found in
his unwavering support for French Revolution, although personally Bewick
was a pacifist. To be viewed in a similar light is his support for American
Independence. Founded on "the liberties and the rights of man", America
showed it was possible to stride towards national as well as individual
perfection. Republican governments in France and America were a warning to
97the use of arbitrary power by kings.
Both countries, then, seem to be examples of "classical republics" 
and it is of interest to look for other examples to see how far Bewick 
used "neo-Machiavellian" categories in his social and political analysis. 
Using this paradigm focus, it is clear that virtue is a part of his 
vocabulary. Since they have "opulence and independence", landed gentlemen 
or freeholders ought to be "the patrons of every virtue in the people".
Their wealth needed to be put to social use and not wasted in luxury. 
Individual and social virtue were connected. It was wrong that "a great 
proportion of mankind '"lives to eat - not eat to live"'. In the Memoir,
Bewick, Memoir, 200-1.
97. Bewick, Memoir, 44, 176-77, 130.
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Bewick continually praises a simple diet. He gives a very detailed account
of the spartan life he led which, he says, "hardened the constitution".
What would harden the bodily constitution would also have a beneficial
effect on the political, social and moral constitution. Currently,
"pampering and spoiling the appetites of children" led to a loss of
physical and moral purity such that, especially among girls, "notions of
fashion and gentility ... have taken deep root". Treated "like hot-house
plants" girls have become "the nerveless outcasts of nature" and "unfit
to become the mothers of Englishmen” . Routs, balls and "midnight
assemblies" should be replaced by the pursuits of horticulture, to allow them
"to make use of their limbs". They needed "a plain diet, temperance and
exercise". There is nothing eccentric in these anti-luxury sentiments of
Bewick; they are found in Major Cartwright, in Wooler's Black Dwarf, and
in a host of other Radical writers and publications. Radicalism was not
98merely a politics: it was a way of life. Another long passage worth 
quoting at length shows the extent to which thinking was structured by the 
commonplace assumptions of 'classical' language. "Well constituted govern­
ments", Bewick writes,
if occasionally revised, and as often as necessary 
scrupulously amended, may be rendered as 
permanent as time. If wisely and virtuously 
administered they would be indestructible and 
incalculably contribute by their vigour to the 
mental and moral aggrandisement of man. It is 
a truth confirmed by universal history that the 
happiness or misery of a people entirely depend 
upon the principles of their government and 
the conduct of their rulers. When just and 
honourable intentions exist there is nothing 
to dread: but when only a semblance of these is 
put on ... Thence follows the degradation of man, 
and the consequent decay of states and nations.
99
If "governments ... are lost in considerations about their own 
private selfish concerns", or are blinded by false ambition", Bewick 
continues, then "the bulk of the people must be enlightened and amended". 
This basically classical language or analysis takes on a "neo-Harringtonian" 
complexion when it is applied to the English House of Commons, to 
corruption and "the compact confederacy of undeserving placemen and 
pensioners". Besides key words such as "virtue", "ambition", "decay" and
98. Bewick, Memoir, 112, 209-11, 211.
99. Bewick, Memoir, 195.
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so on, t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  words and id e as  which need  equal  emphasis .  In the 
i d e a  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o r  p o l i t y  t h a t  i s  "permanent  i n  t im e " ,  once aga in  a 
m i l l e n a r i a n  moment i s  exp res sed  along  w i th  a M a c h ia v e l l i a n  one.  In the  
i d e a  t h a t  p o l i t i c s  de termines  the  g en e ra l  mental  and m a t e r i a l  s t a t e  o f  
th e  people  o r  n a t i o n  an e s s e n t i a l l y  p r e - i n d u s t r i a l  form o f  id e o lo g y  i s  
i n t i m a t e d .  In th e  i d e a  t h a t  the  moral h e a l t h  o f  th e  r u l e r s  a c t s  as the  
p r im ary  f a c t o r  in  h i s t o r i c a l  c a u s a t i o n ,  a m y t h i c o - r e l i g i o u s  mode o f  thought 
i s  be in g  e x p re s s e d .  The q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  d i s c r e t e n e s s  o f  paradigms 
a r i s e s  w ith  Bewick as with  o t h e r  Radica l  w r i t e r s .  The en l ig h ten m en t  o f  th e  
peop le  i s  a q u e s t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  knowledge and p o l i t i c a l  s a i n t l i n e s s ,  
o f  the  p ro p e r  u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f  " R e l ig io n  and P o l i t i c s " .  The "wages o f  
c o r r u p t i o n "  a r e  no t  mere ly  p o l i t i c a l  s i n c e  placemen and p e n s io n e r s  have 
" s in n e d  themse lves  o u t  o f  a l l  shame". P u r i t y  and p o l l u t i o n  a r e  a t  i s s u e  as 
w el l  as  a l a ck  o f  p o l i t i c a l  and p u b l i c  du ty .
Before going to  to c o n s i d e r  t h i s ,  i t  i s  as  wel l  to  remember t h a t  n o t  
on ly  does Pocock g ive  pr imacy to  p o l i t i c s  o ve r  r e l i g i o n  i n  th e  s t r u c t u r i n g  
o f  much o f  18th c e n t u r y  tho u g h t ,  he a l s o  s ee s  the  i d e a  o f  independence as 
an im p o r tan t  a s p e c t  o f  M a c h i a v e l l i ' s E n g l i s h  f a c e .  Bewick 's  use  o f  the  
i d e a  o f  independence shows i t  was an a c c e p t a b l e  n o t i o n  on ly  because  i t  
f i t t e d  with  a c e r t a i n  s o c i a l  r e a l i t y  and because  t h i s  r e a l i t y  e x i s t e d  or  
had e x i s t e d ;  independence c a r r i e d  with  i t  the  n o t i o n  o f  freedom from c l a s s  
c o n t r o l  and p a t e r n a l i s m  and d e fe r e n c e .  Independence was connec ted  wi th  
the  e n c l o s u r e s  and the  use and ownership o f  l a n d .
The " f e l l "  o r  common c l o s e  to  Bewick 's  home c o n t a i n i n g  n e a r l y  two 
thousand a c r e s  was d iv i d e d  up in  1812. "By t h i s  d i v i s i o n  the  poor  man was 
ro o te d  ou t  and v a r io u s  mechanics o f  th e  v i l l a g e s  d ep r iv e d  o f  a l l  b e n e f i t  o f  i t " .  
Like th e  a n c i e n t  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i t  had been " t h e  poor  man's  h e r i t a g e  f o r  ages 
p a s t " ,  and had now been l o s t .  Formerly,  "he k e p t  a few sheep ,  o r  a Kyloe 
cow, perhaps  a f lo c k  o f  geese ,  and mos t ly  a s to c k  o f  b e e h i v e s " .  I t  was a l s o  
a p la c e  o f  "w i ld  b e a u t i f u l  s cene ry"  where t h e  movements o f  n a t u r e  could  be 
observed .  Now, a l l  was "swept away". Being a sou rce  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  the 
commons was a l s o  a source  o f  independence  s i n c e ,
Here and t h e r e  on t h i s  common were to  be seen 
a c o t t a g e ,  o r  r a t h e r  h o v e l ,  o f  some l a b o u r i n g  
man, b u i l t  a t  h i s  own expense ,  and m os t ly  w i th  
h i s  own hands;  and to  t h i s  he always added a
1 0 0 . Bewick, Memoir, 34-5.
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g a r th  and a garden ,  upon which g r e a t  p a i n s  and 
l a b o u r  were bestowed to  make bo th  p r o d u c t i v e  . . .
These v a r io u s  concerns  e x c i t e d  the a t t e n t i o n  and 
i n d u s t r y  o f  the  hardy occupants  which en ab led  
them to  p r o s p e r  and made them d e s p i s e  ev e r  b e in g  
numbered wi th  the  p a r i s h  poor .  These men . . .  
might  t r u l y  be c a l l e d  'A bo ld  p e a s a n t r y ,  t h e i r  
c o u n t r y ' s  p r i d e '  and t o  t h i s  day I th i n k  I 
see t h e i r  broad  s h o u ld e r s  and t h e i r  ha rdy  
s u n -b u rn t  lo o k s ,  which a l t o g e t h e r  bespoke th e  
v igou r  o f  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  . . .  These c o t t a g e r s  
. . .  were o f  an h ones t  and in dependen t  c h a r a c t e r ,  
while a t  th e  same t ime they  h e l d  th e  n e ig h b o u r in g  
g e n t ry  in  g r e a t  e s t i m a t i o n  and th e s e  i n  t u r n  d id  
not  over look  them.
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Here i s  a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  the  m e n t a l i t y  George E l i o t  p a i n t e d  i n  h e r
:k
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  o f  Adam Bede. Independence and d e fe r e n c e  seem to  go
t o g e t h e r ;  de fe rence  i s  a m a t t e r  o f  exchange.  I t  i s  c o n d i t i o n a l  upon the
g e n t r y ' s  d i sch a rg e  o f  i t s  p u b l i c  du ty .  Independence o f  mind,  based  upon
economic independence a l s o  su g g es ted  l i m i t s  to  s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  and
dominance.  This  independence would no doubt  be r e i n f o r c e d  by the  va lues
t r a n s m i t t e d  th rough the  c o t t a g e r s ' r e a d in g  m a t e r i a l :  " t h e  B ib l e ,  l o c a l
h i s t o r i e s  and o ld  b a l l a d s " .  T h e i r  knowledge,  a l th o u g h  " l i m i t e d "  was no t
to  be sneered  a t  s in c e  one o f  t h e i r  number "Wil l  Bewick" had t a u g h t  Thomas
Bewick "knowledge o f  astronomy and o f  the  magnitude o f  th e  u n i v e r s e " .
Another " f e l l - s i d e  ne ig h b o u r" ,  Anthony L id d e l l  was th e  l i v i n g  i n c a r n a t i o n
o f  the  independence i d e a l .  He "might  be c a l l e d  th e  ' v i l l a g e  Hampden'",
and " th e  whole c a s t  o f  h i s  c h a r a c t e r  was formed by th e  B ib le  which he read
through and th rough" .  He t r e a t e d  with  contempt a c t s  o f  p a r l i a m e n t  t h a t
c l a s h e d  with  God's laws.  He igno red  th e  game laws.  "He f e a r e d  no man,
he sco rned  to  skulk  o r  to  do a ny th ing  by s t e a l t h "  and " th e  gaol  had no
t e r r o r s  f o r  him". Bes ides  s tu d y in g  the B ib l e ,  "he was a g r e a t  r e a d e r  o f
h i s t o r y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  those  p a r t s  where wars and b a t t l e s  were d e s c r ib e d  . . .
he took the  l e a d  i n  d i s c o u r s e s  o f  t h i s  k in d " .  His independence  o f  a c t i o n
and mind meant "he t r e a t e d  a l l  men as e q u a l s " .  Bewick goes on to  d e s c r ib e
o t h e r  independen tly -minded  " f e l l - s i d e "  c h a r a c t e r s ,  r em ark ing  t h a t  he "might
swe l l  the  l i s t  o f  such c h a r a c t e r s "  who compare f a v o u r a b l y  with  "some o f  the  
102u n th in k in g  g r e a t " .
Bewick, Memoir, 34-5.
* Bewick, Memoir, 35, 41-2.
*
See above,  Chapter  One, 31.
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Independence, then, including independence of mind, was closely 
associated with the ownership and use of landed property however small.
"The late Duke of Northumberland" acted virtuously and "must have had an 
eye to raising the character of the peasantry when he granted small portions 
of land at a reasonable rate". There would be no need for the poor laws if 
"the lands commonly attached to townships had been continued ... and let in 
small portions to mechanics and labourers". By this means, "all men" would 
be "made sensible of the manly pleasure of being independent". Independence 
was also a matter of keeping out of debt and not accepting monetary gifts. 
Yet Bewick did not value thrift or saving or any kind of investment. He 
spent his money and "a small sum", he says, was "sufficient to make me 
independent".
Without independence there could be no patriotism. Under Pitt's 
government, the country gentlemen, "lost their former independent 
character". For Bewick, as for Cartwright and others, patriotism was as 
much an internal as an external affair. Pitt put on "the mask of 
patriotism" and extended "the system of place and patronage". The gentry 
"fell into the vortex of corruption", and, like a part of the people in 
general, forgot "the exertions of their forefathers". Patriotism again is 
not cosmopolitan but associated with the liberty embedded in English 
history. This does not prevent it being associated with the Christian 
religion since anyone who neglects "the love of our country" fails to 
revere and adore "his Maker". Like Paine, Bewick dislikes Jews, in part 
from personal experience, but also probably because as cosmopolitans they 
have no country. Like other Radicals, Bewick believed that "all wars 
except defensive ones are detestable".1^4 Again, then, the idea of 
patriotism seems to provide the link between the paradigm based on 
virtue and a paradigm involving a return to libertarian customs. Again, 
the symbol of Alfred the Great provides the connection. Alfred is at once 
the supreme patriot and the virtuous leader, the origin of goodness. "We 
have felt the benefit of equal laws" Bewick says,
Bewick, Memoirs, 47-48, 103.
1(^ 4 * Bewick, Memoirs, 124-5, 177, 189.
103
113
f i r s t  a c t e d  upon and handed down by the  Great
A l f r e d ,  and m a in ta ined  . . .  amids t  a l l  a t t e m p t s
o f  despo t i sm to  o v e r tu rn  them - by men famed
f o r  . . .  v i r t u e . _ _
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Like C a r tw r ig h t ,  Bewick wants monuments e r e c t e d  to  th o se  he roes  o f  
E n g l i s h  l i b e r t y  who d i s p la y e d  " v i r t u e  and p a t r i o t i s m " .  And " th e  f i r s t  
name f i x e d  upon ought to  be t h a t  o f  A l f r e d  th e  G re a t " .  As a k in g ,  A l f r ed  
was " th e  w i s e s t ,  the  b r a v e s t  and the  b e s t  the  world ev e r  knew" who ' l a i d  the 
fo u n d a t io n  o f  the  l i b e r t i e s  o f  h i s  c o u n t ry " .  He i s  a l s o  a s s o c i a t e d  with  the 
m i l l e n i a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n  s in c e  i f  k ings  fo l low ed  th e  example o f  A l f r e d  no
c o n s p i r a c y  cou ld  u p s e t  t h e i r  r u l e .  Like him the y  needed to  promote the
a r t s  and s c ie n c e s  and " e n l i g h t e n  the  minds and a m e l i o r a t e  th e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
mankind".
Other  p a t r i o t s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  A l f r e d  were the  h e ro e s  o f  the  navy.
Bewick d e s c r ib e s  t h e  c o n te n t  and themes o f  p r i n t s ,  "so common when I was a
boy to  be seen in  every  farmhouse th roughou t  th e  c o u n t ry " .  Sold  a t  a cheap 
p r i c e ,  th e  p r i n t s ,  b e s id e s  c a r r y i n g  p o r t r a i t s  o f  " r e b e l  l o r d s " ,  d e p i c t e d  naval  
scenes  and "remarkab le  v i c t o r i e s  a t  s e a " .  They had a " p a t r i o t i c  o r  r u r a l  
tendency"  and a l s o  c o n ta in e d  p o r t r a i t s  o f  "Admiral  Haddock, Admiral Benbow 
and o t h e r  a d m i r a l s " .  H i s t o r y  i s  m y th ic i s e d  through  being
un d e r s to o d  by the  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  heroes  o r  v i l l a i n s .  But Bewick a l s o  u n d e r ­
s tood  the  l e s s  romantic s id e  o f  naval  e v e n t s .  "By the  v a l o u r  o f  h e r  seamen"
B r i t a i n  " r e ig n e d  'comple te  m i s t r e s s  o f  t h e  deep '  and the  commerce o f  the
107world  poured  i n t o  h e r  l a p " .
J u s t  as B r i t a i n  had a nava l  t r a d i t i o n  going back to  A l f r e d  the Grea t ,  
so i n  Bewick's  mind th e r e  were a s e t  o f  s o c i a l  customs t h a t  went back a t  
l e a s t  as f a r  and p rov ided  the  b a s i s  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r t y  and independence .  
Things l i k e  home-brewing - "b e fo re  th e  p e r n i c i o u s  use o f  chem ical  compounds 
was known, o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  improvements had qu ickened  th e  eyes o f  l a n d lo rd s  
and ban i shed  many small  fa rmers"  - w r e s t l i n g ,  danc ing ,  music were a s ign  o f  
th e  f r e e  s p i r i t  o f  t h e  Eng l ish  p e o p l e . Old customs were a reminder  t h a t  o ld
* Bewick, Memoirs, 194.
Bewick, Memoirs, 234-5,  236, 127-9.
1 0 6 .
1 0 7 . Bewick, Memoirs, 245-7,  179; Watkinson,  Thomas Bewick, 16.
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liberties were not dead and were usually assocated with a rural existence.
Yet "the liberty of the poor peasant, the old houses, the green 
land" were dying. Bewick's thoughts and feelings were saturated with rural 
nostalgia. Yet again nature takes on a positive hue while culture is 
cast in a poor light and yet again there is a blending of the georgic and 
pastoral modes of country life. The nostalgia appears to have a basis in 
Bewick's own experience. From his descriptions, the pastoral idyll seems 
to have been very real in his boyhood days. But now, "the needy gentry care 
little about the beauty of the country" while formerly all around were 
"old oaks". In the Memoir he describes how he looks after sheep, milks the 
cows, does gardening and goes in for a spot of ornithology as well as being 
able to appreciate natural beauty. Practice and aesthetics go together; in 
fact Georgic practice made the pastoral eye sharper. When apprenticed, 
and forced to leave the countryside, he remarks "my heart was like to break 
... to leave its beauties behind me". The "sole stimulant" for taking up 
wood-engraving was "the pleasure derived from imitating natural objects".
The "summit" of his wishes was to retire to a cottage "surrounded with woods 
and wilds" and to fill up his leisure time with "gardening and fishing". 
Angling combined amusement with appreciation of nature's aesthetic and
109productive properties. Bewick proposed setting up Isaac Walton societies.
He recounts how when he was a boy in the 1760s there used to be a 
clause in every apprentice's indentures that he could not be made to eat 
salmon more than twice a week. Salmon in those days were plentiful. But 
they are now becoming scarce. "The filth of the manufactories is ... very 
injurious, as well as the refuse which is washed off the uncleaned streets 
of the large towns by heavy rains". Industrial production was already 
showing up the worst aspects of civilisation and culture. The epizoon 
feeding upon this system, the great Whore of Babylon, was for Bewick, as for 
Samuel Bamford, London. Sooner than have to stay in London, Bewick writes, 
he would "enlist for a soldier" or "go and herd sheep at five shillings a 
week". The artist or engraver ought "to have his dwelling in the country" 
and "should only occasionally visit the city or smokey town". Rural scenery, 
nature, was superior to anything man had produced. Nature is divine since
* Bewick, Memoir, 81, 83, 87.
1 DQ Watkinson, Thomas Bewick, 28 . Bewick, Memoir, 32-3, 10-11, 51, 183, 
344.
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God is "the Author of Nature". Yet, as with Paine, Locke and others, 
culture could not be an entirely negative order. Despite primitive 
virtues, nobody wanted to go back to being a noble savage. And God had 
given man the propensity for culture. "It was the intention of the 
Omnipotence that men should live in a state of civilised society", Bewick
"Savages" were pagans. Not the least advantage civilised men had 
over the uncivilised was their form of religion. In one sense, in a deist 
sense, religion has "the same complexion and character in all nations".
Yet, "Christianity in its purity is the most liberal and best religion in 
the world". Primitive religion was flawed, presumably by its lack of 
monotheism. Bewick probably classed the religion of non-literate peoples 
in with the sort of beliefs popular in his own time. There is a long 
reference to popular witchcraft beliefs in 17th century Newcastle. He also 
shows that such beliefs still had a strong currency at the time he was 
writing. These "prejudices" were "early rooted" and "not easily removed". 
Among "the worst" were the beliefs "in ghosts, boggles, apparations" and so 
forth. During Bewick's childhood they "wrought powerfully upon the fears 
of the great bulk of the people", and many were "not rooted out even at this 
day". Men, "both old and young" who faced almost "any danger" were "afraid 
of their own shadows" when it came to the activities of supernatural beings. 
The "pitmen" or miners employed by his father seem to have been deep 
believers in magical religion. There was also a cunning man or magician "a 
kind of village Caesar". Bewick himself was once frightened into believing 
he was being chased by the devil. The matter was taken so seriously that 
Bewick thought the person responsible "had been obliged to leave the 
village". Tales of ghosts and the like were probably told during the 
same "winter evenings" spent "listening to the traditionary tales and 
songs" which "particularly affected ... and greatly distressed". One that 
stuck in Bewick's memory was the beheading of the Earl of Derwentwater in 
1715, a kind of Alfredian hero who was "venerated as a saint upon earth".
Without knowing more details about the beliefs it is no wild conjecture to
suggest not only were the two kinds of tales told in similar social and
psychological situations, but that the structure of assumptions and beliefs 
underlying the tales were similar, and correspondingly similar too, to 
the Alfredian myth.^^
110‘ Bewick, Memoir, 223, 225, 102, 251, 256, 257. 
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The f i g u r e  o f  t h e  Devi l  a c t s  as the  b r id g e  between p o p u la r  r e l i g i o n
and magic and th e  more r e s p e c t a b l e  C h r i s t i a n  r e l i g i o n .  Bewick’s f a t h e r
v en ted  h i s  anger  on th e  poor u n f o r t u n a t e  who t e r r o r i s e d  Bewick wi th  the  Devil
and Bewick s e n i o r  p r e s s e d  r e l i g i o n  upon h i s  son " i n  a way I d id  n o t  f o r g e t " .
Bewick was b ro u g h t  up in  the  Church o f  England f a i t h .  I t s  c l e r g y  he found
" t h e  most l e a r n e d  o f  any" and in  g e n e ra l  they  l i v e d  o f f  "poor  l i v i n g s "  which
he says  gave them an income " h a r d l y  b e t t e r  th a n  th e  wages o f  mechanic s" .
At the  same t ime he p reached  r e l i g i o u s  t o l e r a t i o n  and a bho r red  s e c t a r i a n i s m .
He advoca ted  C a t h o l i c  em anc ipa t ion  i n  I r e l a n d  even though C a th o l i c i s m  was
" b i g o t r y  and s u p e r s t i t i o n " .  God " t a u g h t  n e i t h e r  i n t o l e r a n c e  no r  p e r s e c u t i o n " ,
and " th e  " d o c t r i n e s  he  l a i d  down a re  p l a i n  pure  and s im p le" .  They a re  a l l
112d e r iv e d  "from one and the  same pure  so u rce" .
T h i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i s  a b a s i c  t e n e t  o f  deism; Bewick was a C h r i s t i a n
d e i s t .  He was a r e g u l a r  church a t t e n d e r  and b e l i e v e d  the  Bible  c o n ta in e d
"subl ime p r e c e p t s " .  But a l though  the  Bible  i s  " th e  f i r s t  i n s t ru m e n t  o f
knowledge",  p o r t i o n s  o f  the  s c r i p t u r e s  a re  to  be u n de r s tood  " a l l e g o r i c a l l y "
and i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  to  have " o t h e r  systems o f  m o r a l i t y " .  Although touched
by the  form o f  m i l l e n i a l  b e l i e f ,  l i k e  C a r tw r ig h t  Bewick r e j e c t s  " the
r e v e r i e s  o f  Joanna S o u t h c o t t ,  and the  r a v in g s  o f  the  r a n t e r s " .  R e j e c t i n g
f a i t h  and p a s s i o n  i n  r e l i g i o n ,  Bewick a s s e r t s  th e  pr imacy o f  rea s o n .  Since
reason  had been c r e a t e d  by God, th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  reason  d i r e c t s  thought
towards "one God". Also ,  a l th o u g h  reason a l low s  f o r  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  op in ion
and t h e r e f o r e  r e l i g i o u s  t o l e r a t i o n ,  the  d i r e c t i o n  o f  reason  i s  away from
r e l i g i o u s  d i v i s i o n  and com plex i ty .  "True r e l i g i o n " ,  o r  n a t u r a l  r e l i g i o n ,  i s
" independe n t  o f  human c a p r i c e " .  R e l ig io u s  e r r o r  and com plex i ty  had c r e p t
in  - "Pagans in  I n d i a ,  Mohometans in  Turkey" - because  reason  has been
abandoned. "Systems o f  revenue and ag rand i sem en t" ,  o r  r e l i g i o u s  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,
have been s e t  up and " in te rw oven  deeply  i n t o  a l l  t h e  v a r io u s  governments o f
d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s " .  Like h i s  co n te m p o ra r i e s ,  Bewick p o i n t s  to  the  i n s t i t -
u t i o n a l  c o n n e c t io n  between r e l i g i o n  and p o l i t i c s ,  w h i le  a l s o  a s s e r t i n g  t h i s
113connec t ion  l e d  to  t h e  c o r r u p t i o n  o f  an o r i g i n a l ,  pure  and n a t u r a l  r e l i g i o n .
At th e  same t im e ,  r e l i g i o n  and p o l i t i c a l  r e g e n e r a t i o n  a re  founded on 
a p o l i t i c a l  s o l u t i o n  which i s ,  i n  t u r n ,  underp inned  by r e l i g i o u s  p r i n c i p l e .
Bewick, Memoir, 52-3 ,  100, 149, 155-56.
Watkinson,  Thomas Bewick, 18; Bewick, Memoir, 269-7 ,  273-4.
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The first step in reform means the people must learn to use their reason 
"the nobles gift bestowed on them by the Creator". Corruption, the concept 
or idea of corruption, is again at least as much a religious as a secular 
or Machiavellian idea since politicians through undermining "the purity of 
the constitution" had "sinned themselves out of all shame". The "highest 
character" a man could hope to attain was that of a "religious philosopher". 
If this was accomplished by every clergyman, who ought also to be non­
sectarian, then every village church "would thus become a religious, a moral 
and patriotic little community". In effect, a millenial moment would 
arrive in which this "system of religious worship" and "system of education" 
would "stamp the character of the whole people". There would be regime of 
"purity and simplicity" set up "from government" in which the church would be 
disestablished. It would be an "excellent constitution" and "a renovated 
order of things".
Yet what needs emphasis is not so much the religious or Christian
cast of Bewick’s ideas about corruption and virtue, as the way in which his
thinking in general is structured by elements common to all mythological
thinking. A renovated order of things, was, of course, an order that looked
to a model from the past and based itself on the original principles
embodied in the model. Contemporary politicians needed to look back to
"the exertions of their forefathers" and so on. Origins of this kind were
both simple and pure. The connection between personal purity and social
and political purity has already been suggested. Indebtedness destroyed
independence and "makes all who do so become demoralised and dishonest".
It is implicit that publicly it would leave them open to political
corruption. The aim of life ought to be "to take every care that the
soul shall return to the Being who gave it pure, unpolluted and spotless as
possible". With this end in mind, engaging in political corruption is
115analogous to having dealings with prostitutes.
Bewick also used the mythic language of party and complexity and 
its opposite simplicity. Once again there is the close association between 
the pure and the simple. Purity of heart and virtue was a matter of 
following religious doctrine. According to Bewick, "the beauty and
Bewick, Memoir, 195-99, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282.
70, 76, 96-7, 282.
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s i m p l i c i t y  o f  the  d o c t r i n e s  . . .  a r e  y e t  themse lves  p e r f e c t " .  This
a s s o c i a t i o n  Bewick c a r r i e d  through to  h i s  eng rav ing  t e c h n iq u e s  which he
d e s c r ib e d  as " s im p le  and easy p e r f e c t i o n " .  T y p i c a l l y ,  he c a s t i g a t e s  the
laws and lawyers  f o r  be ing  "so  m u l t i f a r i o u s  and complex". Only a few
lawyers a re  "ornaments to  t h e i r  c o u n t ry " .  The laws as the y  s t a n d  ought  to
be " a b o l i s h e d  a t  once" .  Bewick read  h i s t o r y  in  terms o f  moral t y p e s ,  and
lawyers f i t t e d  i n t o  the  ca t e g o ry  o f  "knaves" ,  the  o t h e r  two types  be ing
" f o o l s "  and "h o n e s t  men". The a p o t h e o s i s  o f  th e  h o n e s t  man, the  embodiment
o f  the  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  hones ty  and p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  in  p o l i t i c s  was the  p a t r i o t
k in g .  Using words t h a t  could  have come s t r a i g h t  from Indones ian  myth,
Bewick i s  emphatic t h a t  " th e  k ing  (whose i n t e r e s t s  a re  the  same as the
p e o p l e ' s )  i f  f r e e d  from the  adv ice  o f  e v i l  c o n s e l l o r s "  would " i n s i s t  on
1 1 6having  the c o n s t i t u t i o n  r e s t o r e d  to  i t s  p u r i t y " .
P o l i t i c a l  knowledge i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  same m y th ica l  complex.  Founded 
in  r e l i g i o u s  p r i n c i p l e ,  i t  was open to eve ry  man. Despots s in c e  they  keep the  
peop le  in the  dark a re  "conf irmed enemies o f  knowledge".  Mystery ,  ignorance  
or  e r r o r  i s  a " c r im e" .  A l l  have a r e l i g i o u s  o r  moral c o n n o t a t i o n .
Ignorance ,  o r  b e l i e f  i n  t h e  Devi l ,  le ads  to  " p la g u e ,  p e s t i l e n c e  and famine" .  
This  was c e n t r a l  to  m i l l e n i a l  b e l i e f  as  was the  i d e a  t h a t  ev idence  to 
suppo r t  the  p r o p o s i t i o n  cou ld  be found " i n  the  b loody pages o f  h i s t o r y " .  I f  
r eason  i s  the  t o o l  f o r  c u t t i n g  through the  v e i l s  o f  igno ranc e  and myste ry ,  
and i s  a l s o  th e  g i f t  o f  God, i t  fo l lows t h a t  reason  i s  p a r t  o f  the  same p a t t e r n  
o f  m y th ica l  tho u g h t .  Reason was not  mere ly  a s e c u l a r  i n s t ru m e n t  f o r  
r e v e a l i n g  t r u t h ,  as  i t  came to  be in  th e  19th c e n t u r y ,  i t  was t h e r e  to  guide 
and c o n t r o l  man's  "bad p a s s i o n s  and g ro ss  a p p e t i t e s "  and p r e v e n t  him from 
d i s f i g u r i n g  the  "image o f  God". Reason i s  i n t e g r a l l y  r e l a t e d  to the  concep ts  
o f  luxury  and c o r r u p t i o n ,  f o r  luxury  would "overpower h i s  r e a s o n " .  Again,  
p ro o f  o f  the  p r i n c i p l e  i s  to be gained  from s tu d y in g  the  p a t t e r n s  o r  c y c l e s  
o f  h i s t o r y  in  which " n a t i o n  a f t e r  n a t i o n "  has been " h u r l e d  i n t o  o b l i v i o n  " 
th rough l i v i n g  o f f  wickedness and p a s s io n  and t r a n s g r e s s i n g  God's n a t u r a l  
laws.  Reason,  th e n ,  i s  p r e - 1 9 t h  ce n tu ry  o r  ' p r e - i n d u s t r i a l '  in  a n o t h e r  s en s e .  
True o r  n a t u r a l  r e l i g i o n  " i s  founded on the  immutable p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t r u t h ,  
r e a s o n " ,  t h a t  i s  to  say r a t i o n a l i s t  r e a s o n ,  and "common s e n s e " ,  t h a t  i s  to  say 
p r a c t i c a l  o r  e m p i r i c a l  r e a s o n .  I t  i s  c apa b le  " o f  d e m o n s t r a t io n  l i k e  the  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  m a them at ic s" ,  o r  l o g i c ,  y e t  " i s  a c q u i r e d  by e x p e r i e n c e " .  There
1 1 6 . Bewick, Memoir, 65-67 ,  190.
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is, then, no opposition between the categories of natural law and experi-.
117 ence. '
It remains to look quickly at Bewick's 'economic' ideas. Like 
other Radicals he pointed to taxation as the source of evil and exploitation. 
The political system of place and patronage or "this demi-oligarcy" was 
"the best organised system of exorting money that ever appeared in the 
world". Placemen "met together to tax-tax-tax ... to rob the people 
'according to the law"'. Consequently "arbitrary laws were enacted". This 
economic foundation accounts for the centrality given to the law in Radical 
ideology. Part and parcel of the legal and taxation process was the 
increased inequality in the distribution of landed property. Bewick 
recounts how he held that Spence's land plan might succeed in "some uninhab­
ited country or island" but did not think it was right to "upset the present 
state of society by taking from the people what is their own". Property was
sacred. The "honestly obtaining of it was a great stimulant to industry"
118and "kept all things in order and society in full health and vigour".'
Like Burke, Bewick saw the role of the big landowners as especially 
important:
Without their countenance, arts and sciences, 
and artisans, would languish, industry would be 
paralized and barbarism again rear its benumbed 
hands and stupid head ... gentlemen should endeav­
our to improve their lands ... Lord Ravensworth 
used to say there was nothing grateful but the 
earth.
119
Because the land, given by God, was particularly important and 
sacred it was crucial that the people should have access to it and its 
fruits. There were clear limits to aristocratic rights in this area.
Cruel laws that denied to the poor "the fowls of the air" and the catching 
of fish, "the birthright of everyone", were nothing more than "feudal 
tyranny" and "overstretched distinctions". "Private interest" had supplanted 
"public good". The social contract, the exchange between the aristocracy 
and the artisan-peasantry had been dishonoured; the laws carried "the
11 7 Bewick, Memoir, 202, 260-1, 267, 272, 326ff. 
Bewick, Memoir, 179, 72-74.
Bewick, Memoir, 212.
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120sacredness of property too far". Landed property, was less a question of
ownership than of trust. As Bewick puts it,
Property in every country should be held 
sacred, but it should also have its bounds; 
and, in ray opinion it should be, in a 
certain degree, held in trust for the 
benefit of its owners and the good of society.
To exercise the right of property beyond this 
is despotism, the offspring of misplaced 
aristocratic pride.
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From the point of view of epistemology, Bewick is using Burkeian 
concepts; from the point of view of hegemony, he is turning them on their 
head. The right of property, narrowly defined, has its limits and must 
not be exercised to the detriment of other rights and properties such as 
liberty, security, independence and equal opportunity. With regard to 
paradigms, most of the discussion has ostensibly referred to the Country 
elements in Bewick's political language. Yet Lockeian moments are implied, 
too, if only in the references 'to reason and natural law. Both paradigms in 
fact are implicit in Bewick's practical concern with the effects of the 
enclosures. On the one hand, the question of natural rights is involved; 
on the other hand, there was the question of independence which the use and 
ownership of land gave. Paradigms or traditions of thought only have 
substance in so far as they relate to social structure or refer to a 
social problem.
In this section, then, I have been highly sceptical of Jean Paul 
Marat's supposed influence on Bewick. Instead I have built up a 
partial picture of his ideas by looking at who he knew and what he 
read. Family background, occupation and religious reading all play 
a part in the formation of his political ideas. His attitude towards 
the gentry and aristocracy is ambiguous. They had lost their virtue 
but they needed to regain it and spread it among the people. Society 
was a system of rights and duties but the gentry had failed to fulfil 
their obligations. Even so, the working classes had their duties, 
and while they should not be denied equality of opportunity, Bewick 
did not believe in any general form of social equality. He is a
Bewick, Memoir, 218-19.120
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Radical not a socialist. Still there is the suggestion that more 
virtue is found among the working classes. For political virtue 
emanates from the simple life, from the avoidance of luxury in 
social and private life. Underlying political 'philosophy' are 
the mythological categories of purity and pollution.
In terms of hegemony, rather than meaning, the political 
philosophy is ambiguous. Like Adam Bede, Bewick's political 
ideas are a mixture of conditional deference and independence.
Much more than Cartwright, and perhaps any other writer chosen, Bewick 
makes clear the concrete relationship between political independence 
and contact with the land. Independence as a value was also 
reinforced by immersion in popular culture. This culture being 
historical or mythical, being rooted in English historical 
experience is also patriotic. It is mythical since it sees 
history in terms of heroes and villains. Bewick's Memoirs also 
bring out the anti-industrialisation aspects of popular mentality. 
Another aspect of that culture or mentality is religion or magic.
The Devil is the connecting link between magic and religion and 
politics. He is the source of impurity in public and private life. 
Against the corruption of time, Bewick like Cartwright, sees a 
solution in millenial deism, in a pure and simple millenialist 
polity that would stand for evermore. But this could only be 
brought about if (political) ignorance, fostered by the Devil, 
were overcome by a programme of political education. In his 
political economy, Bewick sees the taxation system as standing in 
the way of those plans, and he wants to put limits on the economic 
power of the aristocracy and restore the polity to its former 'balance'
WILLIAM COBBETT
In the analysis of Cobbett, there is a different paradigmatic 
emphasis. In Bewick it was found that the idea of independence was 
most to the fore, although notions about virtue, custom, natural 
rights and so on were all discovered in the Memoirs. One particular 
Cobbett text is often seen as a repository of medievalism. But is it? 
What is the significance of the myth of the Anglo-Saxon constitution 
in this text? What are the accompanying ideas or concepts? The
122
Strategie role of custom is fairly evident but does that separate 
Cobbett from other Radicals who turn more, so it seems, towards 
natural rights or virtue? There is also the question of the 
rather cloudy nature of Cobbett's religious opinions. Cobbett 
also raises, in a rather novel way, the question of the function 
of (political) knowledge and language in Radical ideology. The 
question of heroes, raised in the analysis of Bewick's Memoirs 
is developed in the interpretation of Cobbett's book.
One of William Cobbett's works, another political testament 
posing as an impartial history, concerns the social problem of 
Catholic emancipation. Cobbett's History of the Protestant 
'Reformation' is interesting and instructive in that it brings out 
quite starkly how political oppositions can be expressed within 
the frame of conceptual identity. To some extent, this point can 
be seen to be implied in E.P. Thompson's statement that a medieval 
and social compact between the Church and the gentry and the 
labourers was used to uphold new social rights in the same way that 
the Anglo-Saxon myth was used to justify new political rights. Yet 
more than legitimacy and the functional role of beliefs are at 
issue. Identity or correspondence occurs within a mythic framework 
of thought. There is even in Cobbett's mind, at least residual belief 
that the monastic estates confiscated during the English Reformation 
had a divine curse laid on them. In Cobbett's 'history', all the 
usurpers come to a bad and preordained end.122
Apart from a few references to his Grammar, only the History 
is considered for analysis. It was a widely read book. At least 
four editions were published in America. For Britain, the British 
Museum Catalogue lists editions for the years 1824 (1824-6), 1827, 
1829, 1844, 1868 and 1896. The Grammar was even more popular and 
republication continued into the early 20th century. Under 
investigation, the problem of popularity and influence is again 
encountered as a set of ambiguities. As against the city artisans, 
Cobbett is credited with drawing the rural stockingers and weavers 
"into the same dialogue". Generally speaking, Cobbett reflects 
the voice of his "own audience". The nature of that voice, of that
Thompson, Working Class, 836-7; Keith Thomas, Religion and 
the Decline of Magic, (London, 1973), 113, 602.
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reflection, is, however, far from simple. The readership of, say,
the Political Register as well as Cobbett's other publications,
was immense. Thomas Carter, the tailor, relates how he often
told his workmates "about the contents of the Political Register,
as they were warm admirers of that clever man" (sic), suggesting
an even wider circulation for Cobbett's ideas through oral
communication. Yet the audience could be just as fickle in its
attachments as Cobbett himself. At another shop, subscription
to the Register was soon exchanged "for the 'Courier' which in a
short time gave place to the 'Independent Whig'". Certainly a
large section of his artisan audience would have been turned off
by Cobbett's attacks on Blackstone and Foxe's millenial Book of
Martyrs. There are similar problems encountered in Cobbett's
ideological relationship with Paine. Paine's Decline and Fall of
the English System of Finance was named as Cobbett's textbook.
Yet the Rights of Man asserted that divine right doctrine was
founded "in imitation of the Pope". In both instances of
'influence' and readership, it is at least equally important to
look at categories of thought as it is to try to establish
correspondence in political belief especially since in some
123important respects the correspondence is clearly lacking.
In his social origins, Cobbett shared a common background 
with the artisans. But as he rose in the world he clothed himself 
in the dress "of an old-fashioned gentleman farmer". E.P. Thompson 
describes him as "the 'free-born' Englishman incarnate", represent­
ing the "small producers" or "the little bourgeoisie" and champion­
ing the "values of sturdy individualism and independence". These
123. Thompson, Working Class, 830-1, 834; Thomas Carter, Memoirs 
of a Working Man, (London, 1845), 90, 189; William Cobbett,
A History of the Protestant 'Reformation' in England and 
Ireland ..., (London, 1824), 18, 171; Thomas Paine, Rights 
of Man, (London, 1791-2, Everyman edn. London, 1915), 46.
For a critical assessment of Cobbett's History see G.C. 
Coulton, Medieval Village, Manor and Monastry (Cambridge,
U.P., 1925), 415-418. Coulton's analysis is polemical. He 
is concerned to establish that Cobbett's book is mythical in 
the sense of being a distortion of the facts. Coulton notes 
that "on popular platforms, men of the most opposite religious 
views may be heard preaching Cobbett's gospel, that the 
Reformation was a revolt of the rich against the poor".
Writing in 1925 he also notes that the "latest edition" (1896) 
"still sells".
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social categories and ideas need to be examined critically in 
relation to the question of hegemony. If independence was a 
shibboleth in gentry ideology, it could also be used against them.
The monastries were "a prize for 'reformation gentry' to share 
among them". Sequestering monastic lands, the gentry "despoiled 
the working classes of their patrimony". Not having any access 
to these lands and their produce the working classes now suffered 
from greater inequality than in Catholic times when the pay of 
those of high rank was comparatively low. No doubt it was a return 
to this situation Cobbett had in mind when, like Paine, he argued
that "we should lose more than we should gain by getting rid of
. „ „ 124our aristocracy .
Cobbett says that since the Reformation the people have been
divided into "masters and slaves", the slavery beginning when
England lost the protection of the Pope. Whiggish liberty rhetoric
is turned on its head but a pre-industrial idea of liberty is still
being used. Poverty is not so much a product of social inequality
as "the never-failing badge of slavery", while loss of liberty
leads to the loss of virtue rather than any of the goods and
benefits proclaimed by 19th century liberalism. Liberty while
allowing "the rightful enjoyment" of property was itself a property
provided by natural law. Ultimately, it was tied to access to land.
It was part and parcel of the same ideological configuration that
Cobbett perceived the new factory proletariat in the north "less
as new-fangled men than as little producers who had lost their
independence and rights" and that political rights functioned less
to inhibit the activity of the state than to prevent the imposition
125of "taxes that ought not to be paid".
Like fellow Radical, William Benbow, to whom the 1819 
edition of the Grammar was dedicated, Cobbett believed the 
"robbery of the fruits of labour" occurred "mainly through taxation". 
In good Queen Mary's days taxes were imposed only for wars" and 
other really national purposes". They were, so to speak, 
patriotic taxes and therefore legitimate. Under the Catholic
124. Thompson, Working Class, 829; Cobbett, History, 33, 335.
125. Cobbett, History, 16, 52, 326, 327; Thompson, Working 
Class, 835-6.
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monastic system, taxes were low and Cobbett sees that property, 
that is the transfer of land and revenue, was the basis of the 
Reformation. While not liking the new forms of industry, 
besides taxation the central object of analysis for Cobbett 
is land. Society originated where "proprietorship in land 
vas acknowledged and maintained by law". Like the Conquest, 
the Reformation involved the illegal acquisition of land. Land 
vas the basic unit of production: "from the land all the good 
things come". And "somebody must own the land", while "those 
vho own the land must have the distribution of its revenues".
But like Bewick, Cobbett believed the owners had a duty to live 
tn the land. Exploitation from its revenues ought also to be 
limited since the revenue would be "chiefly distributed amongst 
r hem from whose labours they arise, and in such a way as to 
afford them good maintenance on easy terms". In this way "the
v u .. 126community must be happy .
The community was unhappy because the old agrarian 
values and equity had been lost. The monied interest had taken 
over. Initially the take-over occurred through the Reformation 
which "made Jews and papermoney makers the real owners of a 
large part of the estates of this kingdom". Then it was 
intensified by the Protestant William of Orange under whose reign 
"arose loans, funds, banks, bankers, banknotes and a NATIONAL 
DEBT". The "Protestant NATIONAL DEBT" is associated with 
”knee-swelling and lung-destroying cotton factories" and "the 
whiskered standing army". Factories, in Cobbett's mind, do not 
betoken a new system but are a part of Old Corruption, just as 
much as the National Debt. The Debt had mortgaged "the whole of 
ehe country, all the lands, all the houses ... and even all the 
labour, to those who would lend money to the state". It produced 
"starvation in the midst of abundance". Worse, it broke with the 
deistical principle of unity. By dividing "into two classes, the
2 6 I. Prothero, "William Benbow and the Concept of the 'General 
Strike'" in Past and Present, 63, May 1974, 132-71, 158; 
Cobbett, History, 7, 28, 95, 160.
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tax-payers and the tax-eaters", the "community was completely 
divided" such that the National Debt had a moral effect, 
besides producing high taxes. In this aspect of his political 
ideology, Cobbett is far less equivocal than Paine in his criticism 
of the monied interest. But apart from financing the National 
Debt, high taxation also supported the system of "places, 
commissions, sinecures, pensions". David Hume "forgets that 'a 
poor government makes rich people". Again, though, since Cobbett 
gives an important paternalist role to the state it is necessary
to stress cheap and decentralised government against the more 19th
_ .. 127century concept of small government.
Perhaps when I refer to state paternalism, I am drawing 
attention to the unintended consequences of Radical philosophy. 
Alternatively, it was not the state acting on behalf of the people 
so much as the people carrying out the functions of the state at 
the level of the local community. Certainly in so far as state 
paternalism implied a lessening or loss of independence, the 
Radicals would have rejected the idea. Cobbett did not see Church 
charity, or even state charity, in these terms since he considered 
charity as a right. The right was embedded in the idea of the 
church as a corporate body, and as corporate and private property 
it was, or ought to be, "independent of both aristocracy and the 
crown". Additionally, the Catholic monastries had caused "a 
class of yeomen to exist, real yeomen, independent of the 
aristocracy". True independence, then, is landed independence.
More cognitively significant, is the implicit distinction in 
Cobbett between independence and the more 19th century idea of 
self-help. He launches a strong attack on the Bishop of Winchester 
as vice-patron of the Hampshire Friendly Society. The aim of the 
society is to raise subscriptions among the poor "for their 
mutual relief and maintenance"; or in other words to induce the 
poor labourers to save out of their earnings the means of 
supporting themselves, in sickness or in old age, without coming
127. Cobbett, History, 6, 280, 284,5, 53, 289, 290, 336, 79, 317.
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f o r  r e l i e f  to  the  poor  r a t e s !" .  I t  was the  r o l e  o f  the  s t a t e  and church to
p ro v id e  s o c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e ;  C a th o l ic  c h a r i t y  was p r e f e r a b l e  to  P r o t e s t a n t  
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s e l f - h e l p .
The q u e s t i o n  now to  be p u t  i s  whether  C o b b e t t ' s  use  o f  the  idea  o f  
independence i s  p a r t  o f  a neo -M ach iave l l i an  o r  n e o -H a r r in g to n  paradigm. Is 
i t  i n t e g r a t e d  o r  even a s s o c i a t e d  with o t h e r  concep ts  s a i d  to  be t y p i c a l  o f  
the  paradigm? In h i s  r e f e r e n c e  to  the "whiskered  s t a n d i n g  army", t h e r e  has 
a l r e a d y  been a h i n t  t h a t  he i s  in  favour o f  a p e o p l e ' s  m i l i t i a .  The 
m i l i t i a  was, o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  guard ian  o f  v i r t u e .  Formerly,  England had been 
" t h e  l a n d  o f  v i r t u e  and p l e n t y " .  A lf red  the  Grea t  had been " th e  . . .  most 
v i r t u o u s  o f  men"; " th e  ' r e f o r m a t i o n '  was no t  the  work o f  v i r t u e ,  b u t  o f  
f a n a t i c i s m ,  o f  e r r o r ,  o f  am bi t ion ;  o f  a love o f  p lu n d e r " .  This  l a s t  
q u o t a t i o n ,  w i th  i t s  d e i s t i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  r a i s e s  the  q u e s t i o n  whether  
Cobbet t  had a c l a s s i c a l  o r  C h r i s t i a n  n o t io n  o f  v i r t u e ,  a l though  perhaps  by 
t h i s  t ime i t  has  been s u f f i c i e n t l y  shown the  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  no t  a l l  t h a t  
im p o r t a n t .  ^ 9
As w i th  o t h e r  Rad ica l  w r i t e r s ,  the  key a r e a  o f  d i s c o u r s e  i n  which the  
' n e o - H a r r i n g t o n i a n ' assumpt ions  merge i n t o  o t h e r s  i s  in  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o r  
a s s e r t i o n  o f  p a t r i o t i s m .  Some e x p re s s io n s  o f  C o b b e t t ' s  p a t r i o t i c  s en t im en t s  
a r e  c l o s e r  to  19th c e n t u r y  n a t io n a l i s m .  On the  whole,  though,  s in c e  
p a t r i o t i s m  i s  a l s o  v i t a l l y  a q u es t i o n  o f  the  i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c o - m o r a l  o r d e r  
and o f  d e fen c e ,  h i s  use  o f  the  id e a  f i t s  in  b e t t e r  w ith  an 18th ce n tu ry  frame 
o f  mind. His chauvin ism o r  n a t io n a l i s m  comes ou t  c l e a r e s t  in  h i s  lament 
a t  th e  l o s s  o f  C a l a i s .  He c o n t r a s t s  " th e  day when g l o r i o u s  ALFRED e x p e l l e d  
the  Danes" w i th  " E l i z a b e t h ' s  l o s s  o f  C a l a i s " ,  presumably because Cobbett  
c o n s i d e r s  i t  v i t a l  to  E ng l i sh  defence .  The lo s s  was a P r o t e s t a n t  l o s s .  
E l i z a b e t h  a l s o  fomented r e b e l l i o n s  agains  P h i l i p ,  th e re b y  in d u l g in g  in  
n a t i o n a l  a g g es s io n  o r  promoting n a t io n a l i s m .  But when P h i l i p  a t t a c k e d  England 
the  p eop le  responded  from " love  o f  coun t ry" ,  t h a t  i s  they  a c t e d  p a t r i o t i c a l l y .  
Cobbet t  e x p l a i n s  E l i z a b e t h ' s  p o p u l a r i t y  in  terms o f  h e r  p a t r i o t i c  appea l .  
D esp i te  the  f a c t  t h a t  she was "as g r e a t  a t y r a n t  as  eve r  l i v e d "  and " the  
most c r u e l  o f  women" whose " d i s g u s t i n g  amours were n o t o r i o u s " ,  she was a l s o  
" th e  most p o p u la r  s o v e re ig n  t h a t  ever  l i v e d  s in c e  the  days o f  A l f r e d " .  The
1 2 8 .
Cobbet t ,  H i s t o r y ,  137, 318, 95, 77.
129 . Cobbet t ,  H i s t o r y ,  50-2,  92,  133.
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r ea son  f o r  t h i s  was t h a t  the  peo p le  " saw n o th in g  b u t  h e r  between them and 
s u b j e c t i o n  to  f o r e i g n e r s  . . .  th e  m a s t e r s h i p  o f  the  Sco tch  and th e  F r e n c h " . 
The f a c t  t h a t  Mary S t u a r t  was a C a t h o l i c  had n o th in g  to  do with  h e r  lack  
o f  p o p u l a r i t y  s in c e  most o f  h e r  s u b j e c t s  were C a t h o l i c s ,  t o o .  I t  was Mary 's  
f o r e i g n  c o n n e c t io n s  t h a t  m a t t e r e d .  E l i z a b e t h  s to o d  f o r  " in d e p en d en ce" ,
1 ^f)n o t  " s u b j e c t i o n  to  f o r e i g n e r s " .
C o b b e t t ' s  d i s l i k e  o f  f o r e i g n e r s  i s  l e s s  s e l e c t i v e  than  P a i n e ' s
y e t  the  i d e o l o g i c a l  consequences  a r e  th e  same. Fore ign  c o n t r o l  has  a
tendency  to  s u b v e r t  p a t r i o t i s m  and undermine independence .  The two
th i n g s  a re  r e l a t e d .  P a r l i a m e n t  had a d v i se d  Mary n o t  to  marry a f o r e i g n e r ;
b u t  "how s t r a n g e l y  ou r  t a s t e  has  changed".  Soon a f t e r  th e  Reformation the
E n g l i s h  found a monarch who s t a r t e d  " th e  work o f  f u n d in g , and the  making o f
n a t i o n a l  d e b t s " . P r o t e s t a n t i s m ,  th e n ,  causes  a n t i - p a t r i o t i c  f e e l i n g s  and
le a d s  t o  the  l o s s  o f  independence .  Cobbet t  makes l i g h t  o f  the  f a c t  t h a t
the  p e r s o n s  ex ec u ted  in  Mary's  r e i g n  "were c h i e f l y  o f  v e ry  infamous
c h a r a c t e r ,  many f o r e i g n e r s , "  and "a lm os t  t h e  whole r e s i d i n g  in  London".
Wil l iam I I I  b rough t  ove r  "a Dutch army" and got  r i d  o f  " th e  E n g l i s h  g u a rd s " .
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  th e  Germans v i e  w i th  the  Dutch as o b j e c t s  f o r  C o b b e t t ' s
h a t r e d .  C a t h o l i c i s m  was " the  r e l i g i o n  o f  England" ,  P r o t e s t a n t i s m  " t h a t  o f
p a r t  o f  Germany". Cobbet t  reminds h i s  r e a d e r s  t h a t  he was se n te n c e d  to  two
y e a r ' s  im prisonment f o r  w r i t i n g  a g a i n s t  " th e  f l o g g i n g  o f  E ng l i sh  lo c a l
m i l i t i a - m e n ,  in  the  h e a r t  o f  England,  under  a guard  o f  German t r o o p s " .  The
Scots  g e t  i t  i n  th e  neck as w e l l .  Apar t  from f r e q u e n t  a t t a c k s  on David
Hume, he cha rges  " t h e  usu ry  o r  fund ing  system" was the  i n v e n t i o n  o f  G i l b e r t
Burne t  a " P r o t e s t a n t  Bishop" ,  a "Scotchman" and "a m ons t rous ly  l y i n g
h i s t o r i a n " .  Also ,  i t  i s  a reminder  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  v a r i a t i o n  in  Radica l
id e a s  t h a t  l i k e  Bewick, b u t  u n l i k e  the  a r t i s a n  John B ax te r ,  Cobbet t  had
131g r e a t  sympathy f o r  the  I r i s h ,  " t h a t  devoted  p e o p l e " .
Once a g a i n ,  i t  i s  easy  to  f i n d  i n  such s t a t e m e n t s ,  as many s c h o la r s  
have done,  ev idence  to  s u p p o r t  arguments c r i t i c i s i n g  Radica l  and
p o p u la r  p r e j u d i c e  and i n s u l a r i t y .  V.Tien Cobbet t  says  t h a t  between Saxon 
t imes  and the  Reformation  England was " th e  h a p p i e s t  and the  g r e a t e s t  
c o u n t ry  . . .  t h a t  Europe had ev e r  s e e n " ,  i t  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  to  f i n d  
i n t i m a t i o n s  o f  a s u b - im p e r i a l  theme. But r e a l l y  what Cobbet t  has  i n  mind 
i s  the  i n t e r n a l  h e a l t h  and l i b e r t i e s  o f  England,  n o t  so much h e r  e x t e r n a l
C obbe t t ,  H i s t o r y ,  195, 324, 220-1,  210-11.
* Cobbe t t ,  H i s t o r y , 168, 170, 259, 130, 270,  109, 222, 141, 142.
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power r e l a t i v e  to  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  - ex c e p t  perhaps  i n  terms o f  commerce. What
r e a l l y  m a t t e r s  i n  te rms o f  p a t r i o t i s m  i s  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  the  laws, l i b e r t i e s
and customs o f  England.  Perhaps  because  o f  h i s  ’T o ry ’ background Cobbet t
b e t t e r  than  any o t h e r  Radica l  b r i n g s  o u t  t h e  c o n ce p tu a l  harmony o r  s i m i l a r i t y
to  Burke, a l th o u g h  t h e r e  i s  no fundamenta l  d i f f e r e n c e  between Cobbett  and
o t h e r  ' G o t h i c i s t '  R a d i c a l s .  For C o b b e t t ,  as  say  f o r  Will iam Hone or  Gravenor
Henson, " love  o f  c o u n t ry  . . .  p a t r i o t i s m "  i s  a t h i n g  o f  t ime .  In p a r t ,  i t
c o n s i s t s  o f  " t h e  a d m i ra t i o n  o f  and v e n e r a t i o n  f o r "  a n c i e n t  t h i n g s ,  the se
c u l t u r a l  o b j e c t s  b e in g  a s ig n  o f  the  n a t i o n a l  gen ius  o r  s p i r i t .  Among
such a n c i e n t  a r t i f a c t s  were,  n o t  any cosm opo l i tan  l i b e r t i e s ,  b u t  the o ld
" l i b e r t i e s  o f  England";  such th i n g s  as " laws which r e g u l a t e  the  descen t  and
p o s s e s s io n  o f  p r o p e r t y " ,  as  " t r i a l  by j u r y "  and so on.  Radica l  l i b e r t y  was
as much a c o r p o r a t e  t h i n g ,  a " pa t r im ony" ,  as  an y th in g  o f  the  Whig-Tory
131ao r  Burkeian v a r i e t y .
The j u r y  system and so f o r t h  was a s o r t  o f  p r o p e r t y  handed down from 
g e n e r a t i o n  to  g e n e r a t i o n .  These "laws o f  England" ,  t h e s e  " s a c r e d  laws" ,  
were the  ga ins  o f  " th e  s t r u g g l e s  o f  our  f o r e f a t h e r s "  a g a i n s t  " d e s p o t i c  
a m b i t i o n " .  Tha t  t h e r e  i s  an i d e n t i t y  in  C o b b e t t ' s  mind, as t h e r e  i s  f o r  
o t h e r  R a d i c a l s ,  between law and custom i s  p l a i n  from the  examples he g i v e s .
The c o r o n a t io n  was a cus tomary form o f  e l e c t i o n ,  " t h e  a n c i e n t  Engl ish  custom 
o f  ask ing  the  p eop le  i f  t h e y  were w i l l i n g  to  have and obey the  King" . 
Express ing  a s i m i l a r  r e v e re n c e  f o r  th e  p a s s a g e  o f  t im e ,  Cobbet t  a l s o  bemoans 
t h a t  a t  the  Reformation  "whole l i b r a r i e s ,  th e  g e t t i n g  o f  which had taken  
ages and ages . . .  were s c a t t e r e d  a b road" .  Like John C a r tw r ig h t  and John 
Baxte r ,  Cobbet t  j o i n s  p o l i t i c a l  n o s t a l g i a  w i th  p o l i t i c a l  a n t i q u a r i a n i s m .
Like Bewick, he l i n k s  t h e  l a t t e r  with  s o c i a l  cus tom. A f t e r  the  Reformation ,  
" t h i s  land  o f  r o a s t  b e e f  was changed,  a l l  o f  a sudden,  i n t o  a land o f  d r y - 
b read  and oatmeal  p o r r i d g e " .  In p a r t ,  C a t h o l i c i s m  g a in s  i t s  l e g i t im a c y  from 
i t s  long l i n e a g e .  I t  was " t h e  ONLY CHRISTIAN r e l i g i o n  i n  the  world f o r  
f i f t e e n  hundred y e a r s  a f t e r  the  dea th  o f  C h r i s t " .  Not only  would C h r i s t  
no t  have al lowed a f a l s e  c ree d  to  be h e l d  " a l l  t h i s  w h i le "  b u t  i f  we deny 
the  v a l i d i t y  o f  " t h e  f a i t h  o f  ou r  a n c e s t o r s "  we imply t h a t  " f o r  twelve 
hundred yea rs  t h e r e  were no t r u e  C h r i s t i a n s  i n  the  w or ld" .  For Cobbet t ,  c i v i l  
and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t s  were i n  p a r t  a m a t t e r  o f  " t r a d i t i o n a l i s m "  or  
" th e  s a n c t i t y  o f  cus tom".
Cobbet t ,  H i s t o r y ,  109, 328, 98,  327, 269.
1 32 Thompson, Working C l a s s , 831; C o b b e t t ,  H i s t o r y , 332, 129, 110, 105, 84, 9 
9, 10; Will iam Cobbe t t ,  A Grammar o f  th e  E n g l i s h  Language, (London,
1819; a l s o  1827 and 1831 e d i t i o n s ) ,  4.
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If there is something of Burke, is there anything of Locke in 
Cobbett? Certainly, he thinks his History speaks with the sweet and unpolluted 
voices of nature and reason. Even through the Reformation excites "nothing 
that is not of a kind to fill us with horror and disgust", we "must keep 
ourselves cool; we must reason ourselves ourselves out of our ordinary 
impulses". Like Locke, Cobbett believes that "reason is the common gift 
of God to man". In a real sense, then, "TRUTH is immortal", and it can be seen 
how in this sense the constitution was said to have had a continuing 
existence even though it had been trampled underfoot by Norman tyranny. To put 
out the light of the constitution you had to put out the light of reason in 
men's hearts. And, "there always ... comes something to cause her to 
triumph over falsehood". Falsehood or error was founded in passion. So was 
faith. It was a Protestant lie that faith by itself was sufficient for 
salvation. In Radical hands, it is almost possible to speak of a faith or 
fetish of reason, while not denying that this fetish in the History is a moral 
one; to prove that before the Reformation England "was greater, more wealthy, 
more moral" and so on. Because of Henry VIII' s role in the downfall of England, 
he wants to plunge a dagger "into the heart of the tyrant". Yet the rational­
ity of "impartial" history and reason is fairly clear. His sources, he says, 
are "acts of parliament, and ... other sources, which everyone can refer to, 
and the correctness of which is beyond dispute". This, among other things, 
distinguishes the impartial histories, of which Cobbett's is an example, 
from other "so-called histories of England". Just as for many of his Radical 
friends these histories contained Catholic and High Church bias, so for 
Cobbett such histories were little more than Protestant, and especially 
Dissenter, propaganda. Only the content or political position is different, 
not the form of the argument. The bias of these histories is clear when it
is known they are written by "modern romancers, called historians, everyone
133who has written for place, or pension".
If experience (Burke) and virtue (Machiavelli, Harrington) and 
reason (Locke) had a tendency to merge or unify, then it is necessary to look 
for the principle of unity. Beyond that, we must seek out other principles 
found in association and thereby attempt to discover the "deep structure" of 
the Gothicism mind or moment. For Cobbett, as for other Radicals, the
Cobbett, History, 90, 58, 116, 121, 317; Grammar, 160; on Locke's 
view of reason, see Gough, "Introduction", xi, xx-xxi; Locke,
Second Treatise, (Blackwells edn.), 9, 30-1, 51-2, 87-88; Peter 
Laslett, "Introduction" to Two Treaties of Government, (Mentor edn., 
New York, 1965), 89, 91, 192.
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p r i n c i p l e  o f  u n i t y  i s  o r i g i n s ,  and o r i g i n s  a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  o t h e r  
p r i n c i p l e s  t y p i c a l  o f  a mythic mode o f  t h o u g h t .  Custom o r  ex p e r i e n c e  a re  
a s s o c i a t e d  e i t h e r  w i th  n a t u r a l  o r  c u l t u r a l  o r i g i n s ,  r eason  w i th  n a t u r a l  
o r i g i n s  (God) and v i r t u e  with c u l t u r a l  o r i g i n s  ( A l f r e d ) . The C a th o l i c  church 
ga in s  l e g i t i m a c y  n o t  only  from i t s  g r e a t  a n t i q u i t y  b u t  a l s o  because  i t  i s  
the  o r i g i n a l  church  and r e l i g i o n .
To d i g r e s s  f o r  a moment, and given t h e  a lmos t  i n v a r i a b l e  connec t ion  
made between Radica l i sm and D is se n t ,  i t  i s  worth r e c o r d i n g  t h a t  Cobbet t  sha red  
Thomas Bewick's  c re e d  o f  Church o f  England.  I f  Cobbet t  d id  n o t  a f f i r m  h i s  
P r o t e s t a n t i s m  in  the  H i s t o r y , the  r e a d e r  cou ld  e a s i l y  go away th i n k i n g  Cobbet t  
h i m s e l f  was a C a t h o l i c .  He i s  w r i t i n g  th e  H i s t o r y  s in c e  "a  f u l l  t h i r d  p a r t  
o f  our  fe l low  s u b j e c t s  a re  s t i l l  C a t h o l i c s "  y e t  " exc luded  from c i v i l  r i g h t s " .
The i r o n y  i s  C a t h o l i c  monarchs and the church ,  have been more mindful  o f  
c i v i l  r i g h t s .  Magna C a r ta ,  he reminds u s ,  was d e p o s i t e d  i n  a monast ry .  In 
h i s  d e s i r e  to a s s e r t  t h i s  he almos t  comes to  the  p o i n t  o f  e x c lu d in g  the  
Bartholemew massacre and p lays  downs the  numbers k i l l e d .  Cobbet t  c o n s t a n t l y  
reminds h i s  r e a d e r s  A l f r e d  the  Great  was a C a t h o l i c .  He a l s o  a l low s  the 
D i s s e n t e r s  a l though  "wicked and ou t rageous" ,  neve r  p e r s e c u t e d  the  C a th o l i c s  
with  the  v igou r  and c r u e l t y  " t h a t  the  Church o f  England had done" .  Yet e s p e c i a l  
venom i s  r e s e r v e d  f o r  D i s s e n t in g  h i s t o r i a n s .  David Hume, f o r  example,  i s  
one o f  the band o f  " th e  m a l ignan t  Scotch h i s t o r i a n s  i n  g e n e r a l " .  He was "a 
g r e a t  f a t  f e l lo w ,  fed  in  c o n s id e r a b l e  p a r t  on p u b l i c  money" who "never  had 
a f am i ly  o r  a w i f e " .
But, i t  i s  n o t  C o b b e t t ’s l i b e r a l  l e a n i n g s  i n  th e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  the  
C a t h o l i c  r e l i g i o n  o r  h i 5 own P r o t e s t a n t i s m  t h a t  i s  c o g n i t i v e l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  
Cobbett  makes the  p o i n t  t h a t  " th e  C a t h o l i c  Church o r i g i n a t e d  w i th  Jesus  
h im s e l f " .  Also the  Pope f i r s t  b l e s s e d  England w i th  C h r i s t i a n i t y ;  b e fo re  
t h a t  th e  Engl ish  o r  Saxons were pagans .  Because the y  acknowledged the  Pope 
"was k ing  ALFRED, and a l l  th e  long l i n e  o f  E n g l i s h  Kings f o r  900 yea rs  
degraded b e in g s ? " .  A l f r e d  i s  in  a sense t h e  f i r s t  E n g l i s h  k in g ,  the  
founder  and s a v io u r  o f  Engl ish  l i b e r t i e s .  The j u r y  system was " e r e c t e d "  
by the  C a th o l ic  A l f r e d  who a t  t h e  same t ime was " z e a l o u s l y  engaged i n  the  
founding  o f  m o n a s t r i e s " .  The P r o t e s t a n t  church  was e s t a b l i s h e d  "backed by 
fo r e ig n  bayonets  . . .  h e re  we see i t s  o r i g i n " .  Th is  was v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  "from
1 3 4 . Cobbet t ,  H i s t o r y , 5,  8 0 f f ,  85, 199-200,  254,  280,  317.
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the  commencement o f  the  Church o f  England" , ( the  C a t h o l i c  ch u rc h ) .  T y p i c a l l y ,
p u r i t y  o f  o r i g i n s  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  with  economic p l e n t y  and moral h e a l t h ,  w ith
" ease  and p l e n t y  and r e a l  freedom".  Lines l i k e  t h e s e  have l e d  to  Cobbet t
be ing  l a b e l l e d  a " n o s t a l g i c  rom an t ic" .  He says  "we want g r e a t  a l t e r a t i o n
b u t  we want n o th i n g  new". Lines l i k e  t h e s e  s u g g e s t  how i n a p p r o p r i a t e  i t  i s
to  l a b e l  him a l s o  as "more r e a c t i o n a r y  than  r e fo rm e r" .  Like o t h e r  R ad ica l s
he was bo th  a t  once.  The manner or  mode o f  e x p r e s s i o n  t h a t  a l low s  both
135p o s s i b i l i t i e s  to  be en u n c ia te d  i s  perhaps  more s i g n i f i c a n t .
I t  i s  i m p l i c i t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an a s s o c i a t i o n  between o r i g i n s  and 
p u r i t y .  The n a t u r e  o f  a t h i n g ' s  o r i g i n s  de t e rm in e s  i t s  s a c r e d n e s s  and 
t h e r e f o r e  i t s  degree  o f  p u r i t y .  As with  Thomas Bewick, t h e r e  i s  a connec t ion  
between id e as  and s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e .  Cobbet t  t e l l s  us t h a t  in  h i s  household  
"no c a r d s ,  no d i c e ,  no gaming, no s e n s e l e s s  pas t im e  o f  any d e s c r i p t i o n  ev e r  
found a p l a c e " .  Pe rsona l  o r  moral p u r i t y  s p i l l s  over  i n t o  s o c i a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  p u r i t y  and i s  absorbed i n t o  the  language  o f  luxu ry  and c o r r u p t i o n .  
Henry V III  d ie d  "with body swe lled  and b u r s t i n g  from luxu ry  . . .  w ith  a mind 
t o m  by con tend ing  p a s s i o n s " .  Gambling and so f o r t h  a r e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
p ro d u c t s  o f  th e  p a s s i o n s .  Motivated by p a s s i o n ,  t h a t  i s  g reed ,  and t h e r e f o r e  
impure,  the  Reformation "impover ished  and degraded  the  main body o f  the  
p e o p l e " .  Lu ther ,  Calvin  and company d id  no t  mere ly  c r e a t e  a s o c i a l l y  
obnoxious r e l i g i o u s  movement, "every  one o f  them was n o t o r i o u s  f o r  the  most 
scanda lous  v i c e s " .  Allowing the  c l e r g y  to  marry ,  c r e a t e d  "an o r d e r  f o r  the  
p r o c r e a t i o n  o f  dependants  on the  s t a t e " .  There i s ,  t h e n ,  a t  l e a s t  as s t r o n g  
a connec t ion  to  be made between c o r r u p t i o n  o r  luxu ry  and o r i g i n s  and p u r i t y
136as t h e r e  i s  between c o r r u p t i o n  and any n e o -M a c h ia v e l l i a n  concep t  o f  v i r t u e .
Other  s ig n s  o f  a m yth ic i sed  s t r u c t u r e  o f  thought a re  p r e s e n t .  The 
n a t u r e  a n d c u l t u r e  d i a l e c t i c  i s  m a n i fe s ted  th rough  the  i d e a  o f  e x c e ss ;  excess  
i s  th e  cause  o f  im p u r i ty .  The whole o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  language o f  v i r t u e  and 
reason  ex p re s s e s  t h e  n o t io n  o f  an excess  o f  c u l t u r e :  luxu ry  i s  n o th in g  more 
than  t h a t .  O ver-educa ted ,  o v e r - c u l t u r e d  "Scotch  ' f e e l o s o f e r s ' "  prowled about  
the  co u n t ry  l e c t u r i n g  to a r t i s a n s  and i n s t r u c t i n g  them i n  the  u n n a t u r a l  
s c i e n c e  " o f  p r e v e n t i n g  t h e i r  wives from be ing  m o th e r s " .  C o n t r a s t  t h i s  to
Cobbe t t ,  H i s t o r y , 24-5,  50, 53, 142; Thompson, Working C l a s s , 831, 833; 
Osborne,  C a r t w r i g h t , 118.
Cobbet t ,  Grammar, 5 $ f f ;  Cobbet t ,  H i s t o r y ,  79, 128, 132.
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"our  C a t h o l i c  f o r e f a t h e r s "  who d id  n o t  " r e a d  newspapers" o r  " t a l k  about  
d e b a t e s "  and had no t a s e  " f o r  'menta l  e n j o y m e n t " ' .  Cobbet t  mocks the  
Bishop o f  W in c h e s te r ' s  grammar which l e a d s  Cobbet t  on to  a t t a c k  s o - c a l l e d  
l e a r n e d n e s s  and i t s  a s s o c i a t i o n  with  "power,  ease  and lu x u ry " .  I t  has 
been p r e v i o u s l y  shown how Cobbet t  l i n k e d  c l a s s i c a l  ed u c a t io n  wi th  luxury  or  
an excess  o f  c u l t u r e .
Im pur i ty  o f  o r i g i n s  leads  n o t  on ly  to  e x c e s s ,  i t  a l s o  le ad s  to 
p l u r a l i t y ,  to  a l o s s  o f  u n i t y  and community. A g a in s t  P r o t e s t a n t i s m ,  
which i s  p l u r a l i s t ,  " t h e  s c r i p t u r e  t e l l s  us t h a t  C h r i s t ' s  Church was to  be 
one" .  One God means one church ,  t h e r e f o r e  one b e l i e f  o r  r e l i g i o n ,  t h e r e f o r e  
one head  o f  church ,  one n a t i o n ,  one peop le  and so on. Cobbet t  i s  a g a i n s t  
U n i t a r i a n i s m ,  y e t  he argues  t h e r e  i s  on ly  one u n i f i e d  o r  t r u e  o r  pure r e l i g i o n .  
By d e f i n i t i o n ,  the  o th e r s  must be f a l s e ,  be based  on e r r o r ,  on d a rk n e s s ,  on 
p a s s i o n .  "The law",  Cobbe tt  w r i t e s ,  " sh o u ld  acknowledge and t o l e r a t e  bu t  one 
r e l i g i o n " .  The same p r i n c i p l e  a p p l i e s  to  B i b l i c a l  c r i t i c i s m  and i n t e r p r e t ­
a t i o n .  In d iv i d u a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  B ib le ,  where every  man i s  " h i s  own 
i n t e r p r e t e r "  l eads  to p l u r a l i s m .  " I f  t h e r e  c o u ld  be one new r e l i g i o n  . . .  
why n o t  a thousand" .  And then ,  how i s  i t  to  be dec ided  which one i s  t r u e  o r  
c o r r e c t .  E r r o r  would p r e v a i l  and so would e v i l  s i n c e  e r r o r  i s  the  source
o f  e v i l .  At t h e  Reformation when e r r o r  m u l t i p l i e d ,  " th e  community was
138com ple te ly  d iv i d e d " .  Like o t h e r  R a d i c a l s ,  Cobbet t  e x p r e s s e s  the  p r i n c i p l e  
o f  u n i t y  o r  community th rough  the  i d e a  o f  h o s p i t a l i t y .  "There i s  now",
Cobbe tt  s ays ,  "no h o s p i t a l i t y  i n  England".
Words have changed t h e i r  meaning.  We now g ive  e n t e r ­
ta inm en t  t o  those  who e n t e r t a i n  us i n  r e t u r n .  We 
e n t e r t a i n  people  because we l i k e  them p e r s o n a l l y ;  
and ve ry  seldom because they  s t a n d  i n  need  o f  
e n t e r t a i n m e n t .  An h o s p i t a l , i n  th o s e  days meant a 
p la ce  o f  f r e e  e n t e r t a i n m e n t ;  and n o t  a p l a c e  
merely f o r  th e  lame the  s i c k  and the  b l i n d ,  and 
the very  sound o f  th e  words 'Old E n g l i s h  H o s p i t a l ­
i t y ' ,  ought  to  r a i s e  a b lush  to every  P r o t e s t a n t  
c h e e k .
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Cobbet t ,  H i s t o r y , 90, 326; Grammar L e t t e r  xx iv .  
Cobbet t ,  H i s t o r y ,  47, 133-34,  136, 179, 253.
1 3 9 . Cobbet t ,  H i s to r y ,  117.
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True hospitality is, then, English and communitarian, a kind of 
personalised impersonalism, to be contrasted to the foreign and individualised 
or personal but anti-social entertainment. Hospitality also varies accord­
ing to historical period or rather according to the character of the 
reigning monarch. Alfred's reign was remarkable for the extent of the 
hospitality which prevailed as well as for the degree of community spirit 
or national unity. All these things, of course, emanate from the moral 
character of the king or queen and Cobbett is no different from other 
Radicals in interpreting history mythologically as a matter of moral types. 
Henry VIII exhibited "beastly lust", that is adultery and incest, for Ann 
Boleyn. Cobbett sees this as a cause, perhaps the main cause, of the 
Reformation. Since he robbed the poor, Henry VIII is adjudged "worse then 
NERO"; he also "soaked the earth" with Protestant blood. Worse than 
William the Conqueror, Henry is "the ... most sanguinary tyrant that the 
world had ever beheld". The next most villainous historical personage is 
his daughter Elizabeth. Cobbett implies Elizabeth's "'virgin' propensity" 
led her to develop a preference for anal intercourse. She is accused of 
"the most hardened profligacy ... ever witnessed in a woman". The "racking 
and ripping-up Betsy" was "the worst woman that ever existed in England, or 
in the whole world". Under her the people were "reduced to beggary". Once 
again a causal connection is made between the moral character of the monarch 
and the moral health and economic prosperity of the people or nation.
Important in this respect, too, are the king's close advisers. Sir Walter 
Raleigh is "that unprincipled minion". Other villains include Robespierre 
who is a tyrant, and Cromwell who is similarly judged although Cobbett 
passes over Cromwell in a fairly light-handed way. Algernon Sydney, the 
Radical patriot, is not a hero to Cobbett. The "Protestant and Catholic- 
hating Sydney ... conspired in open rebellion against the King". He 
deserved to be executed. The Gordon Riots are also condemned because of 
their anti-Catholicism.
This, as it were, is the dark side of historical personality. There 
are also a number of heroes or heroines to shed light. Queen Mary, Elizabeth's 
sister, "was one of the most virtuous of human beings". And "for every drop 
of blood that Mary shed, Elizabeth shed a pint". Mary restored the 
"ancient religion". Her virtue, as it were, enabled her to "pay the debts 
due by the crown", while she "largely remitted taxes at the same time". Other
140. Cobbett, History, 34, 36, 54, 63, 70, 126, 201, 233, 246, 274, 277.
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heroes include Thomas More who is praised for his "learning, integrity and 
piety". There is mention of Edward the Confessor but other than that he 
richly endowed an abbey nothing much is said about him. Alfred the real 
patriot king, embodies the tie or social contract that exists between king 
and people.
For Cobbett’s History is almost as much a part of the myth of the
Anglo-Saxon polity as it is of the myth of a feudal idyll. His praise of
Alfred the Great is at least as ecstatic as other Gothicist writers.
"Perhaps ALFRED was the greatest man that ever lived", Cobbett says. Alfred,
as a type, fulfills the dual role of founding hero and embodiment of the
values associated with the myth. He was a king and a soldier, also a
patriot. He is a model "of virtue, piety, wisdom, valour and patriotism"
and possesses "every excellence without a single fault". In the course of
ridding England of foreign invaders Alfred had "to resort to the habit of
a herdsman". He was also a teacher to the people, through "his example"
(empirical) and "by his precepts" (rational); he "promoted learning in all
the sciences". Alfred also originated trial by jury, and Cobbett even
turns to Blackstone as authority for the proposition that the Anglo-Saxon
king founded the common law, the counties, the hundreds, the tythings and
the courts of justice. In fact, Alfred performs feats beyond human
endeavour and is the symbol of Englishness or national character. He was
"the founder of those rights, liberties, and laws which made England what
England has been, which gave her a character above that of other nations".
He also gave her wealth and happiness "beyond all her neighbours".
Consequently, and significantly, "if there be a name under heaven to which
Englishmen ought to bow with reverence, approaching towards adoration, it is
the name ALFRED". Under his mantle, "this maker of the English name", both
142Protestants and Catholics should unite. Alfred the Great is no longer a 
historical person but a figure of myth. Cobbett is dreaming the dream of 
an earthly paradise vouchsafed by a patriot king. In a passage resembling 
a similar piece by the artisan John Baxter and others Cobbett describes how,
It is related of ALFRED, that he made the people 
so honest, that he could hang bracelets up by 
the way-side, without danger of their being 
touched ... in the days of Alfred there were no 
paupers; no miserable creatures compelled to
141‘ Cobbett, History, 151, 156, 180, 51. 
* Cobbett, History, 91-2, 119-20.
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labour from month's end to month's end without 
seeing meat.
143
There is, then, no theft and no dire poverty: a state of 
perfection is being described; a paradise or perfection that is mythico- 
religious or founded in the moral precepts of honesty, virtue and so 
on, all the things that go to make up goodness or good character. The 
paradise or millenium is also drawn from the past, from the English 
past. There is no hint of an explanation or casual sequence in which 
social evils and their remedies give no place to character, to the 
deeds and misdeeds of semi-fabulous actors; in a sense individual 
good and evil are transcended in the later utopian thinking. There 
is also very little or nothing to suggest a 'cultureless' secular 
universal equality which is projected into a progressive future.
Generally, it has been shown that Cobbett's History is as 
much, if not more, Gothic or Anglo-Saxon as it is medievalist. Other 
aspects of the nature of this 'Gothicism' have also been intimated 
Specifically, poverty is related to liberty and the loss of independence 
rather than economic inequality, as in the 19th century. It is also 
related to the role of the state, rather than the market, and to 
taxation and the loss of community. A community is a (deistical) 
unity, and involves a more equitable pattern of landholding. A 
communal landholding community gives personal independence and 
promotes virtue. And for a model, as we have seen for other writers 
Cobbett searches English history.
In doing this searching Cobbett displays his patriotism, but 
he also allows me to show some additional pieces of the mythological 
puzzle. The wealth of the community is related, by Cobbett in great 
detail, to moral character, to the doings of heroes and villains 
rather than impersonal causes. Their moral purity is at issue and 
that moral purity is related to the original source of a thing or 
person, to mythical origins. The analysis has, therefore, brought 
out some of the mythical substructure of Gothic politics. Yet, 
perhaps the most prevalent concept in the History is custom.
143. Cobbett, History, 121.
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A theme running through the book is that freedom, if a natural 
right, is also to be found in the free customs of the people. 
Consequently this analysis of Cobbett has allowed me to bring out 
how, in an 'epistemological' sense, Radical political philosophy 
was in fact 'Burkean'. Also, if some of these free customs are 
hidden by the passage of time, and aristocratic political 
mystique, Radical political ideology needs to propagate political 
knowledge. It also needs a tool or medium by which to get the 
message across. This tool is language, and to reach the common man 
it must be direct and simple. This, then, is not merely the political 
basis of Cobbett's Grammar, it also leads back to the substructure 
of his religious beliefs, to the deistical values of simplicity and 
unity and ultimately to myth.
WILLIAM JONES
The reasons for picking Jones' pamphlet have been outlined 
in the Introduction. The questions asked of the text are the same 
paradigmatic ones as before, but again there is a shift of 
emphasis. The pamphlet, despite Jones' social background, brings 
us closer to the artisans in a number of senses. First of all, 
it was widely circulated in artisan literature. Second, it takes 
the form of a dialogue between a peasant or artisan and a scholar 
or gentleman. Third, it takes the trade club as its model of 
political democracy. Government or the state in general is, or 
ought to be, governed by the same principles as a trade club.
Also, what historiographical interpretation there is again raises 
questions about natural right versus custom. Yet questions of 
virtue and independence are also raised. Jones' experience in 
India also provides the occasion to develop further the arguments 
made previously about patriotism. The pamphlet and analysis end 
with a statement, taken up and developed in the next chapter, 
on the rights of labour and the question of value. It announces 
the concerns of the artisans themselves.
The one final piece of writing to consider, is 
Sir William Jones' political tract, The Principles of Government in 
a Dialogue Between A Scholar and a Peasant, originally published in
1782. In part it has been chosen because it is a good example of
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how the different intellectual and ideological strands of Lockeianism, 
Machiavellianism and traditionalism can be knitted together through 
a dialectic of myth to form a whole or unity. The result is not so 
much a series of contradictions, at least not at this level, as a 
mental outlook or cognitive set. Jones's Principles has also been 
selected because it nicely connects up with the ideas of the 
artisans themselves. The pamphlet certainly had a wide artisan 
audience. Originally "written by a Member of the Society for 
Constitutional Information" and "printed and distributed gratis" 
by the S.C.I., the Principles was continually reproduced, either in 
whole or in part, in the mass circulation artisan periodicals and 
pamphlets. The British Museum Catalogue lists editions for the years 
1782, 1785, 1797, 1800 and 1818. There were also two editions of 
Jones' collected works in 1799 and 1807. If initial publication 
"attracted no attention" this is obviously not true of the pamphlet's 
subsequent history. Dean Shipley published an edition in 1783 sub­
stituting the words "gentlemen and farmer" (farmworker) for "Scholar 
and Peasant", thereby giving it more political immediacy. This sub­
title appears in addition to the original sub-title in the 1799 
edition of Jones's Works. The Dean was prosecuted and at first found 
guilty for his pains. The Society for Constitutional information 
celebrated the event with a publication of three thousand copies of 
Jones's tract. At a new trial Shipley was let off with the judge 
ruling the publication was "abstract, without any particular 
assertion about the King or his government". During the first trial, 
it was argued by the defence the content was "abstract" and 
"speculative" and it has been remarked by a modern interpreter that 
"armed resistance was urged in a theoretical context". In fact, 
the pamphlet used 'traditional' language to support revolutionary 
or at least radical reformist ideas and its implications are far 
from theoretical or speculative given the nature of its audience. 
Precisely because it used analogies familiar to an artisan audience
and their experience it found its way into so many of their 
144publications.
144. Sir William Jones, The Principles of Government in a Dialogue 
Between a Scholar and a Peasant ..., (London, 1782), Title 
page; Peter Brown, The Chathamites, (London, 1967), 374,
379, 381.
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Jones, whose father had farming origins and was a member
of the intelligentsia, held a very Whiggish view of the
constitution in his early days. The American War of Independence
and his friendship with John Cartwright changed all that. Jones,
we are told, "soon advocated universal suffrage on the basis of
Cartwright's denial of the relevance of property to constitutional
rights". The fact of the matter, as we have seen for Cartwright
and will see for Jones, was more complicated. He was a
founding member of the Society for Constitutional Information
and said Cartwright's Declaration of Rights deserved to be written
"in letters of gold". According to one authority, "from about
1775" his politics were "neither Whig nor Tory but what after 1818
became known as radical". His affinities with Unitarian belief
are also worth noting. The most important "intellectual influence"
145on Jones is said to have been Milton.
It would be a mistake, though, to equate Jone's Radicalism 
with any sort of Jacobinism, if by Jacobinism we accept Burke's 
interpretation of a political philosophy or ideology based purely 
on natural as opposed to traditional rights. Like many others,
Jones gave enthusiastic support to the initial stages of the French 
Revolution. But like Richard Price, whose sermon he applauded, 
he related this event to the Glorious Revolution of 1688: both 
were moments in the struggle for liberty. This principle under­
pinned his attitude towards the Gordon Riots when, in 1780, 
he wrote a pamphlet in which he argued "every gentleman" should be 
armed in order to defend liberty. The question of the violent 
overthrow of government does not come into it. Later, in the 
Principles, he was urging the working classes to arm themselves as 
a deterrent to absolutist government. Armed resistance was not so 
much a question of tactics and strategy, as it is perhaps today, as it 
was a moral question and a traditional right. The meaning of political 
violence was quite different in the 18th century. In the first 
instance 'Lockeian' principle was involved, that is the notions
145. Brown, Chathamites, 342, 356-7, 367',-412, 413, 346.
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of trust and contract. To get these ideas across, Jones uses an 
analogy drawn directly from the artisans own experience. He uses 
the example of a trade club or friendly society. The club was first 
formed, that is had its origins, "by our own choice". A "master" or 
king or parliamentary representative, is chosen on a regular basis 
"by all the company present". But he does not make the laws to control 
the passions, to control "ill temper and misbehaviour" that would 
remain uncchecked in the pre-club or natural society situation. "We 
have", the peasant says, "all agreed to a set of equal rules, which are 
signed by every newcomer" and which are written down. If someone were 
to try to set himself up as "perpetual master" and tried to alter the 
rules "at pleasure", through his will that is, "he would be expelled".
On a theoretical level, at least, it can be defined with reasonable 
clarity that acts of violence are only legitimate if in defence and in
defence of the constitution and liberty and emanating from the majority
. , 1 4 6of the people.
This much is clear from what follows. If the master called for 
military assistance and brought them into the neighbourhood, "we should 
resist if we could". If the military was used to "take money from your 
pockets", to extract high taxes, "we should submit, perhaps, at the time, 
but afterwards should try to apprehend the robbers ... we might kill them 
... and if the King would not pardon us God would". More than a moral 
injunction, rebellion was almost a religious duty. If, instead of an 
absolute ruler or master "a few of the club", an oligarchy, were to 
dominate the rest the same course of action is advised. While defining 
rebellion in purely Lockeian terms, Jones is simultaneously using the 
supposedly 'Machiavellian' categories of the one, the few and the many.
The "funds of the club", which must be taken as representing taxes, are 
entrusted to "young Spelman" a figure standing for a member of 
parliament versed in the laws. If he deceives the many, he too is 
removed. "Did it ever occur to you", the scholar asks the peasant,
"that every state or nation was only a great club"? And like a club 
"the end of government is happiness, security and relief from want". Even 
Cobbett could not have struck a sweeter chord in artisan hearts. Also, 
the king does not make laws only "the whole nation
146. Brown, Chathamites, 401-2, 365; Jones, Principles, 3, 4.
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or people". If there is disagreement "the opinion of the greatest number, 
as in our village clubs, must be taken to prevail". Problems of size, "if the 
society were so large that all could not meet in the same place", are overcome 
by the usual recourse to representation. Any resistance to the people’s 
will is to be met with force and, if necessary, physical force. Each 
'peasant' would keep "a strong firelock in the comer of his bed-room ... that 
would be legal as well as rational". The gentry ought to supply the people 
with arms. Jones does not see this as seditious since the aim is self- 
defence, the defence of constitutional rights. Jones also advises the people 
to drill with fixed bayonets "every morning", just as Samuel Bamford and his 
comrades were doing on the eve of Peterloo. In conception this did not 
amount to revolutionary or Jacobinical action. The people would only be 
acting for the defence of traditional rights; they were not creating new 
rights. The king or the aristocracy were the agressors and were the rebels 
against the people. Whatever the practical outcome of these beliefs, they 
must be related to a 'traditional' social structure rather than one that is 
in the "making".
That part of the tract is where a "Lockeian influence" is most 
discernible in Jones's mind. Yet the "natural right" of rebellion, or rather 
resistance, is also a "traditional right", founded on customs or culture 
as well as nature. Of interest here, leaving aside the question of social 
structure, is Jones's reading; although ultimately reading must be taken as 
part of the social structure. In one of his translations from the Greek 
classics Jones "bore in mind Sir Matthew Hale's summary of property laws 
among the Greeks, Romans and Hebrews, which prefaced the History of the 
Common Law". By 1771 Jones had read the first two volumes of Blackstone's 
Commentaries. In 1773, Jones described Blackstone as Lockeian reason 
"reduced in the admirable laws of this country". Recently emphasis has been 
given to the practical or constitutionalist rather than the natural rights 
side of Blackstone's thought. Common law is given precedence over the 
natural law elements in Blackstone's thinking. But what Jones's original 
statement points to is the unity or identity of the two strands. Stress 
has also been put on Jones's later shift away from Blackstone. Blackstone, 
Jones wrote, defined a law as "a rule prescribed by a superior power" but 
"I define it as 'the will of the whole community so far as it can be
147. Jones, Principles, 5, 6, 7.
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collected with convenience'". For my purposes it is emphasised that the 
political element or difference in this statement is more important than 
the cognitive.
One way to bring this out more fully is to extend Peter Brown's 
perceptive comments on the differences in thought and practice between 
Jones and the Benthamites. Brown sees a fundamental difference between the 
ideas of Jones and Bentham. As he says,
Jones justified his political and legal views 
historically. He believed that the common law 
and early English constitutional development 
already endowed his fellow countrymen with 
democratic liberties. Jones and Wyvill hoped to 
save the ancient English Constitution from 
subsequent perversions, as fervently as the 
lawyers of 1640. Jones's approach was as 
historical as Burke's, the difference between 
them lying in their conclusions. Bentham differed 
from Jones and Burke in his repudiation of 
prescriptive authority.
Conceptually speaking, there is more involved than this last 
statement would suggest but the separation of Bentham the Radical and 
Jones the Radical and the identity between the Radical Jones and the 
conservative Whig Burke is important. The latter are associated "in their 
respect for historical tradition". Brown also hints at the conceptual 
gulf between 18th century 'liberalism' and the 19th century utilitarian 
variety. As he says, "Jones's political liberalism had been traditionalist, 
in the sense that he maintained that the liberties which he advocated were 
implicit in English common law". William Jones career in India also 
offers a practical example of how on the level of policy 18th century 
Radicalism or 'liberalism' differed from what followed in the 19th. This 
devergence of policy brings out nicely the opposition or break between 
18th century patriotism of the Whig-Radical variety, and 19th century 
nationalism and its connections with utilitarianism. Jones's actions 
as judge of the Supreme Court in Calcutta stand out in stark contrast 
against the later nationalistic policies of the utilitarians. Whereas Jones 
saw very little difference between Indian and European civilisation James 
Mill, for example, denied any comparison could be made between 18th century
148. „Brown, Chathamites, 360, 356, 361. 
• Brown, Chathamites, 362.
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Europe and classical Greece and "the welter of barbaric Hindu superstitions". 
In contrast to Jones's pioneering researches into Hindu literature and 
culture, Mill could find there not knowledge but only "'a great deal of what 
was frivolous'" and '"not a little of what was purely mischievous"'. Under 
Mill and Macaulay, Jones's plan for the codification of Hundu and Moslem 
civil law was set aside for "a highly Anglicised Code of Civil Procedure".
For Jones a renaissance of Sanskrit learning was connected with "an 
increasing degree of Indian autonomy"; for the utilitarians, "the revival of 
Hindu culture was treated as a positive evil". As Brown says, William 
Jones, like Burke, held to the principle that "India was to be governed in 
the interests of the native populations", whereas "the utilitarians believed 
that an authoritarian government and western educational precepts were in 
the interests of India". Respect for custom and tradition and love of your 
own country implied respect for the customs and traditions of other peoples. 
Had the British rulers of Empire stuck more firmly to this idea, its 
history would have been more humane and less bloody.
The ultimate guardian of these liberties of Britons and of 
other peoples under their protection was the king. "The king therefore ought 
to be a good man", that is a patriot king, "and the parliament to consist
of men equally good", that is it should be a patriot parliament. "The King
alone can do no harm", Jones says, "but who must judge the goodness of 
Parliament-men?". The answer is "all those whose property, freedom and 
lives may be affected by their laws", in other words the people. Here, then, 
with patriotism and the patriot king, is the underlying unity and diversity 
in Jones's thought. There is the mythical idea that kingship is in essence 
good and necessary and naturally allied with the people's interests. "If 
the king tried to become absolute ruler" or "if ministers assumed absulute 
power", that is if either "employed force against the nation", they must be 
overthrown. In doing this we, the people, are fighting "for the king 
ourselves", that is for a purer form of kingship. Historically the princip­
les of liberty have been at war with the "principle of the feudal system", 
democracy with oligarchy, or the many with the few and the one. What Jones
looked for was a return to origins to "the restoration of you all to the
right of chusing law-makers".
Brown, Chathamites, 415, 416, 418, 420, 428. 
* Jones, Principles, 6.
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The language of purity and origins and patriotism is also the
language of corruption and hence of luxury and virtue and independence.
There are 'Machiavellian' as well as 'Lockeian' elements in Jones's
vocabulary. Apart from the gentry supplying arms to the people "some of my
neighbours who have served in the militia will readily teach me" in the use
of arms as indeed happened in Samuel Bamford's locality. Jones believed
membership of a democratic militia was the right and the duty of every
citizen. The militia was the guarantee against corruption and luxury. If
the gentry by supplying arms to the people would "spare a little from their
vices and luxury" they might "turn to some sense of honour and virtue".
Honour and virtue are not, Burke-like, "conferred by patent or descried like
heirlooms in great families"; they are "attained equally by the prince
and the peasant". According to Brown, in 1779 Jones still held to the idea
that property was a necessary condition for the realisation of virtue but
152"by 1782 he had adopted principles of universal suffrage". Yet the 
belief in universal suffrage was not necessarily incompatible with a 
belief in property and landed property in particular as a basis, if not for 
voting, then for independence. Without independence, votes could be bought 
universal suffrage or not. Anyone who did not have some kind of property 
was neither free nor independent. A free state was like "a club in the 
village" of which the peasant was a member. Yet there were limits to 
membership. The club, the peasant or farmworker says,
is an assembly of men, who meet after work every 
Saturday to be merry and happy for a few hours 
in the week ... we have a box, into which we cont­
ribute equally from our monthly or weekly savings, 
and out of which any members of the club are to 
be relieved in sickness or poverty; for the parish 
officers are so cruel and insolent, that it 
were better to starve than to apply to them for 
relief.
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Unlike Cobbett, then, Jones sees the artisan clubs and societies 
as a source of independence rather than dependence. They are also a sort 
of state in miniature and a source of property. "A free state is only 
a more numerous and powerful club, and he is only a free man, who is a
Jones, Principles, 6, 7; Brown, Chathamites, 396-7, 367.152.
153. Jones, Principles, 3.
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member of such a state". Independence, freedom and the right to vote
are related to membership or having some kind of property claim on
the state or in the club. "The chusers" of the representatives are
"all who were not on the parish". As the peasant emphasises, "in
our club, if a man asks relief of the overseer, he ceases to be one
154of us, because he must depend on the overseer". But the property,
if not merely personality, need not be landed property. The peasant 
or artisan need only to own his own means of production and gain a 
return for his labour as the following conversation between the 
scholar and peasant shows:
Scholar: Have you a freehold in any county of 
forty shillings a year? Peasant: I have nothing 
in the world but my cattle, implements of husbandry, 
and household goods, together with my farm for which 
I pay a fixed rent to the squire. Scholar: Have 
you a vote in any city or borough? Peasant: I have 
no vote at all: but I am able by my honest labour 
to support my wife and four children and while I 
act honestly I may defy the laws.^^
This passage needs to be read with care. Ownership of the means 
of production is specified and production is connected with agriculture 
rather than industry. Labour is a source of independence and therefore 
connected with political rights; this meaning is more heavily involved 
than the later socialist conception of labour as the origin of value.
It is a meaning very much in tune with beliefs held by the artisans 
themselves.*
The study of Jones ideas has shown a number of things which 
fit in yet lead on from the previous analysis of the ideas of other 
figures. Again, it has been shown that political violence, whatever 
is outcome, is seen in constitutionalist rather than revolutionary 
terms. Rebellion is a (Lockeian) natural right but it is also a 
(Burkeian) traditional right. The emphasis on tradition and custom
Jones, Principles, 7.
Jones, Principles, 5.
In this chapter, not wanting to add to its Gallic length, I have 
left aside analysis of the "collective representations" of the 
Society for Constitutional Information.
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led Jones to respect the customary rights of England's subject peoples. 
His historical patriotism led him to value Indian culture in a manner 
foreign to 19th century liberal nationalism. As with internal English 
liberties, protection of foreign customs was dependent up the existence 
of a hero, upon a patriot king, or upon character or a 'type'.
Like Cartwright and the others, Jones, as has been seen, 
linked independence to property, to land use (Harrington), to 
household ownership, to ownership of tools and even to labour and 
personality (Locke). He gave Locke's theory of value a democratic 
twist, yet not one sufficient to break it free from the ideological 
and epistemological complex of virtue, custom and natural rights. 
Neither did it free labour's rights from their mythical or religious 
moorings.
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CHAPTER THREE
REPRESENTATIVE FIGURE II : "ORGANIC INTELLECTUALS"
The vulgar tongues should be the most weighty 
witnesses concerning those ancient customs of 
the peoples that were in use at the time the 
language was formed.
Giambattista Vico
JOHN BAXTER
The chapter seeks to establish a linguistic, paradigmatic 
or conceptual correlation between the more 'middling' mentality 
and the political minds of the artisans. The general drift of 
previous historical criticism would not anticipate such a 
correlation since John Baxter, and other representative figures 
I will be looking at, have in the main been seen as revolutionary 
Jacobins. Their constitutionalism, if spotted, has usually been 
argued away or discounted.
The historiography is dealt with at the start of my analysis 
and in an appendix. Of Baxter's two publications, one appears to 
be 'Lockeian' while the other seems constitutionalist or 
'Burkeian' or Charismatic (Pocock) or perhaps even Machiavellian, 
although the last is not usually noted. I have attempted to 
resolve this paradox and to interrogate Baxter's ideas along now 
familiar lines; that is using the same structure of political 
concepts and searching for the same religious or mythical 
substructure as in the previous chapter. But I also aim to bring 
out the individuality of Baxter's mind. And I try to show, in 
greater detail than previously, why it is that 18th century 
Radicalism chose the Anglo-Saxon rather than classical or more 
primitive (ancient Britons) models of democracy.
148
Not much is known about Baxter. Although he was for a 
time chairman of the London Corresponding Society in the 1790s, 
he is not as well-known as other leaders such as Thomas Hardy.
The amount of biographical material available on Baxter is sparse. 
Baxter is one of those working class heroes who appears on the 
scene for a while, and then just disappears without trace into 
the historical night. He is a true 'organic intellectual' 
because he does not come to the working class or classes to 
lead them from outside. He deserves, then, something better 
than near-anonymity and condescension that historians have so 
far handed out. Usually, Baxter is portrayed as a believer 
in political violence: a physical force Radical, a man of 
deep revolutionary conviction.*
The historiography dealing with with Baxter's actions, 
as well as the historiographical interpretation of his pamphlet 
and book has been critically dealt with elsewhere.** The 
following analysis of Baxter's writing is to be read in the 
light of that criticism. Before doing the analysis, it may be 
useful to present a fuller version of E.P. Thompson's 
criticism than was allowed for before. Basically, Thompson's 
understanding of Baxter's political ideas rests on the 
assumption that Baxter sees the true constitution as emanating 
from the primitive ancient Britons. Consequently, "Saxon 
precedent is almost indistinguishable from the state of nature, 
the noble savage or the original social compact". All English 
history was the history of the corruption of the constitution 
from that primitive origin. Also, using "industrious 
constitutional arguments" Baxter arrives "at the right of 
the people to defy the Constitution". This reading of Baxter
For more details of Baxter's life see Appendix B, 
'Biographical Notes'.
See Appendix B.
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is extremely 'Lockeian*. Other aspects of Thompson's interpretation 
are similarly "essentialist". After the French Revolution, 
Anglo-Saxonisms or Gothic-style thinking became a sort of "black 
propaganda" for concealing what was really intended. Gothic 
language "became for many Jacobins", including Baxter, a covering 
for "almost any constitutional innovation for which a Saxon 
precedent could be vamped up". The real political language 
at this time was Paineite and it would seem Thompson in one 
sense sees him as a follower of Paine, even if unintentionally.
In another sense, and seemingly in contradiction, even when 
constitutionalist rhetoric is "tricked out in Baxter's improbable 
Saxon terms" it has a conservative effect. Artisans like Baxter 
appear to be the victims of the ideological hegemony of the upper 
classes since the rhetoric,
implied the absolute sanctity of certain 
conventions: respect for the institution 
of monarchy, for the hereditary principle, 
for the traditional rights of landowners 
and the Established Church, and for the 
representation not of human rights but 
of property rights.^
Apart from the outright misinterpretation involved there is 
the problematical nature of Radical attitudes towards the monarchy, 
the landowners, property and so on to be considered. It has been 
shown for less plebeian Radicals like Cartwright, Jones and Bewick 
ruling ideas could be given a democratic twist. Thompson himself 
hints as much and even goes on to see Baxter's association with 
extreme Radicalism as a sign of his revolutionary and violent 
intentions.*
1 . E.P. 
edn. ,
Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, (Pelican 
London, 1968), 94, 96, 97.
* See Appendix B for general support of Thompson's thesis.
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The argument that Baxter was something of a revolutionary rests,
in part, on a certain interpretation of his political pamphlet,
2 *Resistance to Oppression. To examine the validity of this argument
it is necessary to take a close look at the pamphlet. The first words,
bring out the paradoxical nature of English Radicalism at this time.
The sub-title refers to "the constitutional rights of Britons asserted",
while the pamphlet itself starts with the cosmopolitan and Jacobin
address of "citizens". Baxter writes of "this accursed War" which makes
widows of wives and orphans of children. The war with the French has
brought hardship to "the middling Tradesman" and unemployment to "the
Manufacturer" (i.e. worker). The charity dished out by the wealthy to
ameliorate the effects of the war on the condition of the poor, is given
"as a bribe" for the protection of the rich and to quieten the poor's
"present Clamours". The present low state of the people, and therefore
of the nation, Baxter says, is due to a corrupt political system. The
rule of the aristocracy is at the bottom of "this pressing Calamity,
these growing evils". Enclosures and "the Infamous System of Monopoly",
protected by parliament are responsible for the present dearness of
provisions. So long as "the whole Power of the State is confided to
3Men of Landed Property" then partial reforms are a waste of time.
Baxter's analysis and condemnation of the existing system and 
situation is radical enough. But what of his remedies? The people, he 
suggests, have a right to resist the measures of the present government 
since it is undermining the foundation of the constitution: "in general 
... any act which is totally subversive of the CONSTITUTION, is a just 
ground of Resistance". What, though, is the exact nature of the 
resistance that Baxter is recommending? Drawing on a series of historical 
examples, he argues it is not the case that "Resistance to a Government 
upon all occasions is rebellion; for in this country in particular, it is
The full title is Resistance to Oppression, The Constitutional Rights 
of Britons Asserted in a Lecture Delivered before Section 2 of the 
Society of the Friends of Liberty, (London, 1795).
Resistance, 4-5.
The distinction between resistance and revolution is more than a 
theoretical quibble. French resistance during the Second World War 
was hardly revolution, even though it was violent, and perhaps not 
even rebellion.
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a Maxim essential to the Constituion and has been acted upon at various 
4Times” . Resistance is part of the English constitution and as a political 
right is manifested in substantive law. Lockeian political rhetoric 
saturates the supposedly Jacobin ideology of English Radicalism. For,
"the Right to Resist Oppression", Baxter declares, is "recognised by Law"; 
that is by the 1688 Bill of Rights. If it is unlawful to take arms against 
the King, then the present King must be a usurper since he owes his throne 
to 1688. Despite his protestation, it does seem Baxter is advocating some 
kind of rebellion - a legal rebellion. It is a nice point for discussion 
whether or not such a thing is possible. But Baxter does not think things 
have reached the point of (armed) resistance. This kind of resistance 
should be only "the last resort of a much injured and suffering People".
Yet the people "are not yet reduced to the awful necessity of opposing 
Force to Force". Instead,
there is a line of conduct which present 
circumstances demand you should persue 
as the only effectual means of preventing 
this Country from being plunged into the 
horrors of a Civil War. Namely by Assoc­
iation to obtain a Redress of Grievances, 
not only in Political Societies, as the 
Friends of Liberty, the Corresponding or 
any other; but in Parish, Town and Couny 
Meetings.^
Baxter emphasises parish meetings are best able "to express the 
public mind" since they have the big advantage of "being recognised by 
the Law". This is all pretty orthodox stuff. The radical bit comes in 
when he argues the meetings would be legal even if they were opposed by 
the parish officers. Out of the meetings an alternative parliamentary 
system might be expected to develop in which those elected would be 
more in the nature of delegates than representatives. Also, Baxter urges 
the usual Radical programme of universal suffrage and annual parliaments 
by which means the people would break up the political and economic power 
of the landed monopoly. In this state of liberty, "Peace and Plenty will 
bless our Isle". The supposedly 'Jacobin1 Baxter urges his readers not 
to be alarmed. "I respect the Laws and Constitution of my country", he 
says, "and when I speak of Resistance to Oppression, it is not to destroy
Resistance, 
Resistance,
4.
5.
4.
4-5.
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them but to preserve them". Yet a slim pamphlet may be a poor guide to 
a man's political mentality. Baxter's political testament is his massive 
History of England.
Resistance to Oppression was published in 1795; A New and Impartial
7History of England was published in 1796. But it can be guessed much 
of the History was composed in 1794 when Baxter was in gaol with Hardy 
and the others awaiting trial. Baxter says his composition of the book 
was assisted "by several gentlemen, distinguished Friends to Liberty and 
Parliamentary Reform". John Home Tooke, although never formally a member 
of the London Corresponding Society, has been considered its guiding 
intellectual light, and it is likely he exerted a big influence over 
Baxter's ideas. Tooke, a veteran of the Wilkes agitation, was a firm 
believer in the myth of the Saxon Constitution and this myth - the 
assumptions connected with it - pervades the pages of Baxter's book.
There is no mention of the myth in Baxter's Resistance to Oppress- 
ion. Given the place of King Alfred in the myth, and Baxter's later 
disparagement of leaders when he was a member of the Society of the 
Friends of Liberty, it could be thought there was something of a shift 
in his ideas between the writing of the History and the publication of 
Resistance. Yet I have quoted or summarised enough of Laxter's pamphlet 
to show he still adhered to the constituionalist ideology and that it 
is shot through with assumptions from the Saxon Constitution myth.
The tensions involved in constitutionalist ideas come out even 
more clearly in the History. He shows that although he is an admirer . 
of the Quakers, he is not against political violence under any circum­
stances. Peace is desirable and a much-sought-after end in Baxter's 
political thinking, but it is not to be gained at all costs. He quotes 
a piece from Locke which says that in a state of nature "'every man has 
a right to defend himself'" and can never be '"deprived of public safety 
and private defence"'. Using the title of his pamphlet, Baxter says 
this "doctrine of resistance to oppression" is "so strongly founded" in 
concrete nature and "in the great charter of England" that "no abstract
Resistance, 3.
John Baxter, A New and Impartial History of England, From the Most 
Early Period of Genuine Historical Evidence to the Present Important 
and Alarming Crisis, (London, 1796).
7
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arguments can overturn it". Charles I had attempted to impose arbitrary
rule and had therefore broken the contract between king, parliament and
people. Both natural liberty and the laws of England had given the
8people the right to rebel or resist.
Baxter also quotes from the Lockeian Bill of Rights of 1689, he 
copies it out in full, a passage which provides that "'subjects who are 
protestants, may have arms for their defence'". On the basis of their 
right to natural liberty, Baxter supports the revolts of the Negro slaves 
in Jamaica in 1760. Calling the French Revolution of 1789 "an event more 
important in its consequences than anything ... found in history", and 
seeing the revolutionaries as a "virtuous band of patriots", Baxter argues 
that "the principles of despotism were too deep-rooted" in France "to 
be cleansed by anything short of an entire change". By implication, he is 
not recommending anything so drastic for England. This is also suggested 
by the fact that he reserves his most enthusiastic support for the 
American rebels. Their rebellion stemmed from their patriotism. They 
"united professions of allegiance with the necessity of self-defence", 
and their declaration of rights was based on the principles of life, 
liberty and property "handed down from their ancestors, consonant with the 
spirit of the British constitution". They had drawn their arguments from 
"charters" based on the documents of British liberty. So, the colonists' 
war with the mother country was "a horrid ... civil war".
Baxter, then, supports political violence but, in the Anglo- 
Saxon world, for purposes of rebellion rather than revolution* Even here, 
only as a last resort, and only when it is carried out by the people 
in the true spirit of the principles of the British Constitution. Baxter 
goes so far as to give some respect and legitimacy to the 18th century mob. 
Through an involved bit of etymology, and though law, he traces the word 
'mob' back to Saxon times where he says it was called 'mot' thereby being 
associated with the Saxon word for parliament - "Wittenagmot". Yet 
though he gives the mob and the people this respectability he recognises 
they can be deceived and misled. In the popular uprisings against Henry 
VIII they were misled by a prior disguised as a mechanic, called "captain 
Cobler". Baxter seems to distinguish between the hired mob and the 
popular mob but when he writes of the mob riots of 1768 which he says were 
due to the "distress of the poor", he comments that "much mischief was done,
Baxter, A New and Impartial History, 462-3.
•k See Appendix B .
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and l i v e s  l o s t  i n  d i f f e r e n t  p l a c e s ” , th u s  showing g e n e ra l  d i s a p p r o v a l .
S i m i l a r l y ,  he condemns the  Gordon r i o t s ,  r e f e r r i n g  to  " t h e s e  misguided
p e o p l e ” and to  " o u t r a g e s ” . He t a k es  up a p o s i t i o n  s i m i l a r  to  the
gent lemen o f  t h e  Rad ica l  bu t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  S o c i e t y  f o r  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l
In fo rm a t io n  when he seems to  s e p a r a t e  t h e  mob from the  p e o p le  and
j o i n s  th e  S . C . I .  i n  s ay ing  t h a t  " i f  t h e r e  had been  th e  s m a l l e s t  courage
among the  p e o p l e ,  o r  i f  th ey  had been p r o v id e d  w i th  f i r e - a r m s ,  t h i s
d r e a d fu l  r i o t  might  have been su p p re s se d  i n  t h e  b eg in n in g  w i th o u t  c a l l i n g
9
in  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e ” . In p a r t i c u l a r ,  B a x te r  d e p l o r e s  th e  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  
Lord M a n s f i e l d ’ s l i b r a r y ,  m a n u sc r ip t s  and p a i n t i n g s . He shows the  same 
s k i l l e d  a r t i s a n ' s  co n s c io u s n e s s  o r  love  o f  f i n e  t h i n g s  when he laments 
th e  f i r i n g  o f  Dresden by the  A u s t r i a n s ,  r em ark ing  Dresden,  "one o f  the  
most e l e g a n t  towns o f  Europe” w i th  " l o f t y  and m a g n i f i c a n t  h o u s e s ” was a 
p l a c e  where " th e  most f a s h i o n a b l e  and w e a l th y  c l a s s  o f  p e o p le  r e s i d e d "  
and where "a number o f  a r t i s t s  c a r r i e d  on a v a r i e t y  o f  m a n u fa c tu r e r s " .
I t  i s  c l e a r  Bax te r  i s  n o t  a t  a l l  e a g e r  to  use  p o l i t i c a l  v i o l e n c e  
a g a i n s t  e i t h e r  men o r  p r o p e r t y .  Bax te r  the  supposed ’ e x t r e m i s t '  even 
shows a q u a l i f i e d  b u t  genu ine s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  v e ry  modera te reforms o f  th e  
Rockingham a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  in  1782. They were based  on sound p r i n c i p l e s ,  
he s ay s .  In a l l ,  i t  can be conc luded  t h a t  John B ax te r ,  l i k e  Major C a r t ­
w r ig h t  and o t h e r  l e a d i n g  R a d i c a l s ,  would have  p r e f e r r e d ,  t o  use  B a x t e r ' s  
own p h r a s e ,  "a r e v o l u t i o n  in  s e n t i m e n t "  to  any p o l i t i c a l  o r  s o c i a l  
r e v o l u t i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  one b rough t  abou t  by v i o l e n c e .
His p r a i s e  o f  t h e  p e o p le ,  shows B ax te r  t o  be a t r u e  r e p u b l i c a n .
But i s  he a r e p u b l i c a n  i n  the  more modem and J a c o b i n i c a l  s ense  o f  
wanting  to  do away w i th  th e  monarchy as w e l l ?  At f i r s t  s i g h t  i t  seems 
so.  In h i s  H i s t o r y , t h e r e  i s  a p l a t e  which shows th e  e x e c u t io n  o f  Louis 
XVI i n  a l l  i t s  gory  d e t a i l .  There i s  a l s o  B a x t e r ' s  remark t h a t  i t  was 
"a s t e r n  o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  M il ton"  t h a t  th e  t r a p p i n g s  o f  monarchy "were more 
than s u f f i c i e n t  to  d e f r a y  th e  whole expence o f  a r e p u b l i c " .  On the  f ace  
o f  i t ,  the  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  monarchy underminded one o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  t e n e t s  
o f  Rad ica l i sm  "cheap  government" .  A k in g  meant  a c o u r t ,  and a c o u r t  meant 
lu xury  and c o r r u p t i o n .  Yet the  absence  o f  a  k in g  d id  n o t  mean t h e r e  was 
a r e p u b l i c .  The p e r i o d  o f  the  Commonwealth was n o t  a "pure  r e p u b l i c "  
b u t  "an infamous m i l i t a r y  government,  t h e  w o r s t  o f  a l l  t y r a n n i e s " .  The
H i s t o r y ,  802.9 .
1 0 . H i s t o r y ,  4,  723,771,  818.
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political system of "military violence" is far worse, in Baxter's mind, 
than the existence of a monarchy. Yet there is some doubt whether the 
monarchy is a necessary component in the polity. The independence of 
Scotland was preserved despite the fact that Edward III kept the King of 
Scotland a prisoner for eleven years.
Apart from the expenses of court, the English monarchy also meant 
foreign influence - either Norman (French) or Germanic. A strong theme 
in the Saxon myth, is the post-Conquest kings' disdain for their own people 
and for their reliance on foreign parties. Richard II is said to have 
stated that he would rather rely, "nay even submit himself" to his cousin, 
the King of France, than "truckle to his own subjects". George II, 
"sacrificed the blood and treasure of Great Britain". In short, foreign 
kings meant foreign interests; foreign interests meant foreign wars, high 
taxes, and, worst of all, standing armies. Yet Baxter does not even blame 
George II entirely. "We do not so much blame the prince", he says,
"as we should detest a succession of venal ministers". The king or queen 
is often the people's defence against the court and aristocracy. In 
Stephen's time, the nobles' castles "were become the receptacles of 
licensed robbers". Stephen restored peace. So, he was "received with the 
warmest demonstrations of loyalty by the people". Henry V is praised by 
Baxter for, at the beginning of his reign, wanting "to bury all party 
distinctions". Individual monarchs are fitted into Baxter's types of 
heroes and villains. The monarch as hero is fitted in to the political 
tradition of the patriot king; as villain, he becomes a despot. Richard 
II is "without virtue, without moral personality". Although William III 
is accused of setting up corruption as a system, of his wife Mary,"the 
nation ever retained highest respect for her memory".
A patriot king or queen performed his or her duties according to 
the principles of an elective or constitutional monarchy. When Richard 
II was deposed, Baxter says, parliament exercised the "right of election". 
This right he traces back to Saxon times; "according to the spirit of the 
constitution, succession to the throne was originally elective". After 
the Norman Conquest, succession to the crown became "either elective or 
hereditary or a mixture of both. But the people's support was always 
sought in order to give the contending claimants legitimacy. Even 
William the Bastard did not rule by the right of conquest but because he 
was "elected by the will of the people in general". William claimed to 
rule through the bequest of Edward the Confessor, "and he readily agreed 
to preserve to the English all the rights and liberties of the nation".
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The election of a monarch was done, that is to say it ought to be 
done, by either the people or their representatives and it was justified 
by "ancient usage". Under the Saxons, both king and nobility were 
elected for life by freeholders who assembled once a year. That 
hereditary right was not the doctrine even after the conquest is confirmed, 
in particular, by the wars between Stephen and Matilda. Through the 
Revolution and the Bill of Rights, "the existence of a compact between 
the king and the people was confirmed beyond all dispute, as well as 
the right of. the latter to dismiss even the highest officer in the 
state if he should be found to abuse the trust reposed in him". The 
monarchy, then, had its place in the English constitution. In the period 
of the English Civil War, Baxter supports "the moderate presbyterians" 
as against the rigid presbyterians for the former sought to "re-establish 
both the king and parliament in their constitutional authority, privileges 
and freedom". Baxter presents the old theory of the balance of powers 
in which "the king is at the head of the executive authority; the 
parliament make the laws, and are a check upon the royal prerogative".
But "all government is derived from the people and was originally chosen 
for their good". Sovereignty is ultimately theirs - through parliament. 
Parliament, though, cannot always be trusted to reflect the will of the 
people. So Baxter favours the 1694 bill for triennial parliaments which 
gave the king the power to dissolve parliaments every three years or 
"sooner if he thought proper". Baxter retains royal power as the 
guardian and symbol of the people’s rights. Yet, of course, he is also 
distrustful of the monarchy. He refers to the 1701 bill of succession 
which restricted the right of the king to make war. War was an act of 
will. Baxter revives the arguments of a previous time and contrasts the 
king's will against the reason and custom of the people.^
Since the Enlightenment and Burke and Paine, there is a 
strong tendency to see reason and custom as dialectical opposites. In the 
Saxon myth, reason and custom get interwoven. Gothic Radicalism does not 
see the English constitution as the slow accretion of custom and experience 
over time; neither does it argue there is no constitution and that custom 
and experience do not count. The Gothicist Radicals use reason, somewhat 
fetishistically, as a tool with which to examine the foundations of 
custom. Reason is used to discover and separate the 'true' constitution
11. History, 70-1, 82, 206, 293, 311, 456, 463, 485, 552, 585, 748, 815.
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from the 'false'. Reason is the tool or gnosis. Reason is gnosis since 
history is a mystery. In this way, history becomes myth. According to 
Marcel Eliade, myth is a sacred history. "To relate a sacred history is 
equivalent to revealing a mystery". For John Baxter, and others like 
him, history is the history of sacred liberty. Reason separates periods 
of light or liberty from periods of darkness or despotism; it shows up 
who are villains and who are "culture heroes".
Wliy, though, use reason? Why not use faith as a means of gnosis?
A first answer is that faith is uncritical. It accepts mystery on its
face value and uses it as a basis of action. Just as in deism reason is
used to discover error in religious history, so in civil history reason is
used to find out political error. Ever since the Norman Conquest, English
society was overlaid by religious and civil error, as well as by false
reason. Baxter gives a neat summary of what the 'Gothicists' thought
had been inherited from Norman culture when he says the "more homely and
more sensible manners of the Saxons were exchanged for affectations of
chivalry, and the subtleties of school philosophy, and the feudal ideas
12of civil government, and Roman sentiments in religion". The Norman 
system of government is not only despotic, it also originates corruption, 
the present curse of the English polity. Edward I, originated the system 
of corruption when he chose to get his will through parliament rather than 
use force. Corruption operates through "trickery". Trickery needs to be 
hidden. Corruption therefore gives rise to mystery; to the "scandalous 
practices in the mystery of corruption".
The mystery of corruption hid the "true" or real constitution 
as against the false one imposed by Norman kings. There is the constit­
ution based on the monarch's coronation oath and "various compacts with 
the people"; and there is that constitution "established by force". This 
latter "is not the constitution of England", and, "nor can time, nor any 
trifling change ever make it so". The real constitution is always present, 
as it were, underneath the false one. More significantly, it is there for 
ever. It is both timeless and in time. The "ancient and glorious 
constitution" is to be found "would but Britons but read the history of 
this constitution". If they did they would discover "the radical 
rottenness and mischievous effects" of the present system of parliamentary 
representation. By reading history in the right way, by the application
12. History, 112, 114.
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of reason, Britons would find out the "established rules of the 
constitution". How else could a rule be understood except by reason?
No matter how long a law had been on the statute book it could never 
become a law or custom in the true sense if, like the Scottish law that 
gave substance to the hereditary principle, it went against the people's 
democratic rights and did not embody reason. History was the history 
of reason as well as liberty.
In some measure, this accounts for the emphasis given in 
historiography to the Radicals' interest in political matters rather than 
economics. On the face of it, history for the Radicals was political 
and legal rather than economic. Law and law-making was a key feature 
for them. Through studying the laws you could get at the constitution.
One example, Baxter gives is how Henry II demanded that Becket and his 
fellow bishops submit themselves to "the ancient laws of the kingdom" drawn 
up in a document known as the Constitution of Clarendon. "The ancient 
customs of the realm were reduced to writing". Read through the eyes of 
right reason, law was seen as codified custom. Baxter did not share 
Thomas Spence's contempt for statute law. Spence wanted to burn all the 
old legal documents. But the idea of law as codified custom, produced 
in Baxter and others like him, a strange a fetishistic reverence for the 
written word. When he condemns the excesses of the Reformation during 
Edward Vi's time, he especially singles out the destruction of the books 
in the universities. Baxter also makes much of the fact that when 
Algernon Sidney, the patriotic hero, was arrested he had his papers seized. 
"The papers", he adds,
contained principles favourable to liberty, and such 
as the best men of all ages have been known to embrace; 
the origin of the social contract, the source of power 
derived from the consent of the people, the lawfulness 
of resisting tyrants and the preference of liberty to 
the government of a single person.^
When Edward I beat the Scots, he "gave orders to destroy all the 
records which might preserve the memory of the independence of the king­
dom". Here, is the Radical faith in the power of law, reason and public 
opinion through the use of the written word. This is why Baxter, along 
with many other Radicals, says "the freedom of the press is justly termed 
the palladium of English liberty".
13. Baxter, History, 551-2.
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Freedom of the press is also important because the press, as
carrier of the written word, is the vehicle of reason. Yet not any old
kind of reason will do. Especially, not that which displays the
"subtleties of school philosophy". Rather, it is a reason simple and
concrete. Neither is it the ahistorical and rational reason of Paine
and the Jacobins. Again Baxter brings up the name of John Locke "whose
Essays on the Human Understanding and Government and other works have
immortalised his name". He takes from Locke the pre-modern dichotomy of
empirical and rational reason. Reason is both a matter of experience
and of principle. When Alfred founded the jury system, he was the
embodiment of "the rational method". Freedom is a matter of "the common
rights of mankind and the customs of the Anglo-Saxons"; from these
"Englishmen must deduce their constitution and their liberties". Reason,
then, gives a special kind of political knowledge. Baxter calls his
History "impartial" and "new", common epithets of the time, since he feels
he is writing history by means of a pure and uncorrupted reason. Yet
what Baxter was really producing was a political and moral history, a
people's sacred history. Reason was a faculty that nearly everyone
possessed. Derived from nature, it was also simple. It was within the
capacity of everyone to read history through reason. Yet here Baxter
reveals an ambiguity that was and is common to many Radical leaders.
Political knowledge is also gnosis, a knowledge possessed, at least for
the moment, by only the few. Apart from "a few rational citizens ... the
multitude are never affected by any rational principles of opposition and
complaint". Of Queen Anne, though she had virtue in her private life,
she did not understand "the art of government, and the political happiness
14of society, sciences understood by the very few".
Rational principles of opposition and complaint meant knowledge 
of natural rights obtained through the use of reason. In the Radical 
version of the Gothic mind, natural rights were no more abstract than 
the conception of reason. In a deep epistemological sense, their notions 
of natural rights were much more Burkeian than Paineite or Jacobin. They 
opposed Burke's view that "the inheritable principle" was the spirit of 
the constitution, but they accpeted his prismatic conception that 
"metaphysic rights", as Burke called them, are "like rays of light which 
pierce into a dense medium ... refracted from their straight line".
14. Baxter, History, ix, 98, 189.
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They would also have agreed that "the primitive rights of men undergo 
... a variety of refractions and reflections", and that "the science of 
constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, is, like 
every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori". John 
Baxter accepted all this. For Radicals, the key natural right was 
liberty. On the title-page of Baxter's History, a piece of verse from 
the British poet James Thomson begins, "LIBERTY - 'Tis a substantial thing 
and not a word". When Baxter writes of John Ball leading the peasants 
against the aristocracy, he says they were inspired by "their equal 
right to liberty and to all the goods of nature". These doctrines are 
conformable to the "ideas of primitive equality" which are "engraven on 
the hearts of all men" and "were felt by the suffering people, among whom 
the following distich was common: 'When Adam delv'd and Eve span/Where 
then was the gentleman"'. But although 'primitive' is a plus word in 
this sort of Radical rhetoric, it is plain Baxter feels that primitive 
or deculturised rights are imperfect and impractical. He faults the 
peasant rebels for not insisting "on a full restoration of the Saxon 
constitution".
From this, it is clear that the kind of political millenium 
opted for affects the structure of thought. This is why Thompson's point 
about Baxter's preference for the ancient Britons is more important than 
it seems. The ancient Britons, as a primitive people, are much closer to 
nature and natural right than the Saxons. Yet Baxter thinks the 
constitution of the ancient Britons was deficient and lacked the integ­
rity of the Saxon's. The ancient Britons lost their purity when they 
were conquered by the Romans. This event showed they lacked military 
knowledge and this "exposed them to the Roman yoke". Again, Baxter's neo- 
Harringtonian beliefs come through. The Roman occupation is especially 
odious since it is a military occupation. Nothing corrupts a constitution 
more than a standing army. With their militaristic and aristocratic ways, 
the Romans "debauched the simplicity of the manners" of the Britons. This 
loss of original purity and degeneracy in the Briton's government meant 
the Saxon invasion was fully justified. The Briton's rulers went wrong 
when they hired Saxon (foreign] troops to overawe the people. The 
Saxons imposed their laws. These "gave much more freedom to the British" 
than the indigenous laws. The Saxons also destroyed the sort of feudalism 
the Romans had imposed upon the Britons for "when they conquered the
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, (Everyman edn., 
London, 1910, orig. pub. 1790), 32, 38, 44, 46-7, 56-8,
15.
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country they preserved their own liberty". Historical continuity, that is 
to say neo-feudalism, was broken since "the ancient inhabitants of England 
were completely eliminated by the Saxons". The importance of the Saxon 
Constitution as a political paradigm becomes tangible when Baxter shows 
that the worst time for political liberty is not so much the present, 
although things are bad enough, as the time of the Norman Conquest when 
the "Saxon laws and constitution were lain prostrate".
Natural rights, then, although founded on principle are also in 
history and are specific. They are to be found in the Magna Carta and 
the Bill of Rights; they are to be found in the utterances of great 
patriots and heroes, as well as in the Saxon Constitution. Apart from the 
freedom of the press, natural rights include freedom of speech, the free­
dom from arbitrary arrest and, not least, rights in property. As Baxter 
puts it, "the disposal of their own property is the inherent right of 
freemen; that there can be no property in that which another can, of right, 
take from them without their consent".^ At this point, Baxter indicates 
he has a view of equality much more moderate than that held by, say,
Thomas Spence or Babeuf. We have already seen that Baxter rejected 
primitive social and economic equality as impractical. His view of 
equality has a religious basis and is to be got from the English historical 
experience. Apart from his enthusiasm for the democracy in Quaker religious 
organisation and ideas, Baxter also praises Puritanism or Dissent in 
general, remarking its tenets are "more calculated to support that 
equality which obtains in the state of nature". What this suggests is a 
belief in a spiritual or metaphysical equality. His reference to the 
Levellers contains no sympathetic comment. The American Declaration of 
Independence is called "a masterpiece in composition", and he reproduces 
it in full. The Declaration says men are "created equal", not that they 
remain equal; the only words in block capitals are "FREE and INDEPENDENT 
STATES". That Baxter was referring to the equality which man has as 
part of his personality and which needs expression as political rights 
rather than social equality is also suggested by his criticism of feudal 
society where "if a merchant or manufacturer rose by industry to a degree 
of opulence he found himself but more exposed to injuries, from the envy 
and avidity of nobles". The socially mobile were restricted by their loss 
of political rights. Baxter's view of equality is what has come to be 
called liberal, and is pre-socialistic. It is not easy to see how a 
proletarian ideology grew out of this kind of thing.
16. Baxter, History, 17, 28, 136-7.
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In fact, the Saxon Constitution was anything but completely
egalitarian. The Saxons, Baxter says, elected a "regal dignity" for
life. There were still "bishops, counts and judges" even though they
were all elected. The Saxon or English Constitution, then, even in the
Radical form, did show some respect for hierarchy but it is not quite
true, as Thompson says, that representation was "not of human rights but
of property rights". Property rights were represented only in so far as
17they formed part of human rights.
So, the English Constitution was founded in a theory of human 
rights. Paradoxically, these human rights owed their existence to the 
English past. Rights had to be made concrete by showing they existed in 
a variety of institutional forms either in the past or in the present. An 
elective monarchy is one such institution. The jury system is another.
A people's militia is yet another. The Constitution itself appears as a 
sort of patchwork built up over time. But it is less of a grand medieval 
edifice in the manner of Burke than it is a rambling Gothic ruin. Bits 
and pieces are intact; much of it is in sad decay. An important piece of 
patchwork or ruin already mentioned is the coronation oath. The oath had 
a deeply symbolic and an important practical meaning. The coronation oath 
of William the Bastard "was that administered to the Saxon kings and the 
laws which he swore to maintain are the Saxon laws". In great detail, 
Baxter describes how each monarch takes the same oath. The fact that 
William I, and many other Norman kings soon afterwards "threw off the 
mask and introduced that system of tyranny" is neither here nor there.
The swearing of the oath by itself shows its moral force. There were also 
plenty of moments in English history to show the coronation oath had 
a practical force. For a time, its conditions were implemented during 
Henry Ill's reign. When both the King and the nobles went back on 
their word, anarchy resulted.
The laws were part of institutional practice. Even more, the real 
strength of the laws lay in the fact they were founded in custom. Custom 
and memory reinforced by the written word formed the bedrock of independ­
ence and liberty. Yet, like Major Cartwright, Baxter recognises something 
even stronger than these forces. Edward I's campaign against the Scots 
showed that the "power of the sword was, however, more effectual than 
any records". Without a people's militia, there could be no absolute 
guarantee of a free constitution. Nevertheless, folk memory was
17. Baxter, History, 138, 789-91, 796, 454.
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particularly strong in England because there were a number of documents 
of liberty that had had an important practical effect on political 
institutions. The Magna Carta was a document (or documents) firmly 
embedded in English political culture. Baxter argues that its 
provisions have been constantly affirmed during the course of English 
history; he sees it as one of the cornerstones of English liberty and 
the constitution. "It is completely subversive of the ridiculous 
doctrine that the king can do no wrong." It gave the commons "a voice 
in parliament"; it protected the rights of free men against both king and 
nobles. Baxter reproduces the Magna Carta in full, but much of it he 
interprets anachronistically and mythically as if its provisions related 
to the 18th century polity. Before the end of the medieval period 
"Magna Carta was established never to be disputed again". Yet Baxter’s 
historical consciousness also comes into play. Basically, it is a 
feudal document. The Magna Carta does not provide for "a restoration of 
the Saxon laws".
Another document of liberty that had important institutional 
repercussions was the 1689 Bill of Rights. He appears to be less critical 
of this than of the Magna Carta. Perhaps because, among other things, 
the Bill of Rights refers to the right of the subject to petition the 
king, limits the king's power in relation to the laws, provides against 
keeping a standing army in time of peace, makes provisions for independ­
ent juries and frequent parliaments, and so on. Baxter also notes that 
the coronation oath was altered and "consisted in the following ...Will 
you ...govern the people ... according to the statutes of parliament ... 
and the laws and customs of the same ... maintain the laws of God, the 
true profession of the gospel". Generally speaking, though, the 
Revolution was not a good thing. It saw William III turning corruption 
into a system. Now that parliament was strong enough to resist the 
open will of the king, the king was forced to work through and corrupt 
the independence of parliament in order to get his way. During the 
struggles with Charles I, parliament appears in Baxter's mind as a sort 
of collective patriotic hero. Not least because they attempted to secure 
the constitution through the Petition of Right. This document "contained 
a confirmation and explanation of the ancient constitution, not any
infringement of the royal prerogative, or the acquisition of new liberties".
18It also confirmed the voice of the people as part of the constitution.
Baxter, History, 98, 126-134, 140, 143, 145, 178, 179, 187, 206, 401, 
403, 551.
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Baxter believed in a version of the 'Gothic balance'. He believed
that government ought to be, "according to the fundamental laws of the
kingdom" by "king, lords and commons". He was against the monarch's
encroachments on the nobles and vice versa. But as a working class
Radical, he gave greatest weight to the commons and was concerned that
the relationship of the commons' representatives with the people did not
involve "the prostitution of honour". One way of ensuring this was to
have frequent elections. Annual elections were not only a feature of the
Saxon system, they had been re-confirmed since. The barons' revolt of
1255 succeeded in obtaining annual parliaments. This "old law" is
referred to again and again and Baxter sees it as one of "the first
principles of the Constitution". Since the break-up of the feudal
polity, dating from Henry VII' s time, "the property of the commons increased
in England". Taxation affected all the people's property. This alone
made legitimate the Radical maxim that "what concerns all should be 
19assented by all".
Baxter's thought is enmeshed in the thick undergrowth of 18th 
century constitutionalist rhetoric, artisan style. This manner of thinking 
is 'pre-Painite' and pre-Jacobin in more ways than one. Any gestures 
that Baxter, and other Radicals like him, make in the direction of 
cosmopolitanism are undermined by the Englishness embedded, so to speak, 
in this way of thinking and speaking. Above all, the Constitution and the 
liberty it gives are English and history has ensured that the love of 
liberty has become part of an Englishman's nature. "Nature", Baxter writes, 
"seemed to have inspired our forefathers with the love of freedom; an 
indication, one might think that freedom should be the peculiar blessing 
and great characteristic of this country". Liberty is joined with 
patriotism, and reached right down into the lower orders of society: "Great 
Britain is an island renowned ... for that patriotism and love of liberty 
which has distinguished even many of its poorer subjects". The general 
spread of patriotism and liberty among the British had a divine origin 
and was linked to material wealth: "God has poured his bounty upon this
nation in such copious streams, that a small portion has reached the poor 
despite all that oppression could do to prevent it". Patriotism and the 
love of liberty were related to independence and therefore to the possess­
ion of property.
19. Baxter, History, 293, 311, 767.
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A number o f  modem commentators have a s s o c i a t e d  IS th  century-
20n o t i o n s  o f  p a t r i o t i s m  w i th  n a t i o n a l i s m ,  chauvin ism and even rac ism.
This i s ,  as  i t  were,  th e  o p p o s i t e  end o f  cosmopol i tan ism.  Tory 
v e r s i o n s  o f  p a t r i o t i s m ,  e s p e c i a l l y ,  d id  c o n t a i n  some elements  o f  chauv in ­
ism and so on. But 18th ce n tu ry  meanings o f  p a t r i o t i s m  a r e  q u i t e  t o r t u o u s ;  
and t h i s  i s  n o t  the  p la c e  to  go i n t o  them a l l .  ’Mock p a t r i o t '  and ’ f a l s e  
p a t r i o t '  were,  f o r  example,  terms o f  deep abuse and a re  connec ted  wi th  
a n o th e r  in v o lv ed  s e t  o f  meanings c e n t e r i n g  around the  n o t io n  o f  v i r t u e .
All  I want to  show here  i s  how B a x t e r ' s  id e a  o f  p a t r i o t i s m  i s  in  harmony 
wi th  a r e s i d u a l  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  p a t r i o t i s m  s e t  down by Huiz inga  some t ime 
ago and p l a c e s  Baxter  w i th i n  the  t r a d i t i o n  o f  18th c e n tu ry  ' m e r c a n t i l e '  
t h ough t ;  away from both  19th c e n t u ry  n a t i o n a l i s m  and J aco b in  cosm opo l i ta n ­
ism.
There i s  an a s s o c i a t i o n  between the  n e g a t i v e  s i d e  o f  B a x t e r ' s  view 
o f  l i b e r t y  and h i s  concep t ion  o f  p a t r i o t i s m .  R e s i s t a n c e  to  o p p re s s io n  
a p p l i e d  on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s c a l e  as w ell  as  on the  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  The 
c i t i z e n  had t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  to  defend  h i s  co u n t ry  i n  the  same way he was 
o b l ig e d  to  defend  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  Baxter  spoke o f  " t h e  r i g h t  o f  every  
n a t i o n  . . .  to  p r e s e r v e  i t s  own n e u t r a l i t y " .  From t h i s  i t  can be surmised  
Baxter  would have jo i n e d  wi th  R ad ica l s  l i k e  Major C a r tw r ig h t  and p re p a re d  
a g a i n s t  a French in v a s io n  r a t h e r  than  w i th  t h a t  s e c t i o n  o f  th e  London 
Corresponding  S o c i e ty  who su p p o r ted  one.  His f e e l i n g  a g a i n s t  in v a s io n  by 
a f o r e i g n  power i s  so s t r o n g  t h a t  he p r a i s e s  Queen E l i z a b e th  when she 
t h r e a t e n e d  the  i n h a b i t a n t s  on the  c o a s t  who " fo rsook  t h e i r  towns".  Baxter  
even goes so f a r  as  to  s u ppo r t  h e r  when she t h r e a t e n e d  to  "execu te  m a r t i a l  
law upon such cowards".  Independence was a s i g n  o f  the  moral i n t e g r i t y  o f  
a n a t i o n  a s  w ell  as  o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  a c o r p o r a t e  body l i k e  p a r l i a m e n t .  
Upon t h i s  was based  what Baxter  c a l l e d  " th e  law o f  n a t i o n s " .  Bax ter  i s  
a g a i n s t  war with  Spain because i t  was c o n t r a r y  to  the  law o f  n a t io n s  and 
" n e i t h e r  j u s t  no r  p o l i t i c " .  I t  i n t e r f e r e d  with  " th e  most v a l u a b le  branch  
o f  E n g l i s h  commerce". Yet commerce and a l l i a n c e  l e a d s  him to  s u p p o r t  what 
he sees  as a j u s t  war. When, i n  1739, the  Span ish  a t t a c k e d  the  Engl ish  
m erchan ts ,  Baxter  complains th e  m i n i s t e r s  " appea red  . . .  t im orous" ;  they  
d i s g r a c e d  " th e  honour o f  t h e i r  c o u n t ry " .  For,  " t h e  r i g h t  to  t r a d e  on the  
s e a s "  i s  " d e r iv e d  from God and n a t u r e " .  The subsequen t  peace  s t r u c k  a t  
E n g lan d ' s  " v i t a l s "  - commerce. None o f  t h i s  makes Baxter  a s imple a p o l o g i s t  
f o r  the  B r i t i s h  m e r c a n t i l e  i n t e r e s t .  He i s  n o t  a g a i n s t  th e  Dutch competing 
with  the  E ng l i sh  and e x t e n d in g  " t h e i r  commerce" i n  I n d i a ;  he i s  a l s o  a g a i n s t
An example i s  H.M. A th e r to n ,  P o l i t i c a l  P r i n t s  i n  the  Age 
o f  H o g a r th , (Oxford,  1974), 91,  105, $ p a s s i m .
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English interference with Dutch ships, ’’through the intrigue of a foreign 
connection". Commercial patriotism was behind his objection to foreign 
influence on the British monarchy. Government ought to be by "natural 
subjects", by native persons. Since foreigners were seen in some sense as 
unnatural, royal marriages to foreigners were seen as a form of moral 
pollution. They were unpatriotic marriages.
Despite this, Baxter’s patriotism does not turn into chauvinism.
In the area in which a chauvinistic attitude is most likely to be 
expressed, against France, he is not any unconditional supporter of England. 
He defends historical and natural rights wherever they exist. He defends 
the people of Anjou against Henry II's claims and the invasions of English 
monarchs. The French people were committing "no other crime than that 
of defending their habitations". Simon de Montefort, though "a foreigner 
himself" upheld English liberties. Baxter also welcomes "the useful 
industry" of the Huguenots, as fellow artisans. He only attacks the French, 
when they attempt to undermine the independence of another country.
Given the anti-Scottish sentiment prominent in some Radical circles 
in the 18th century, it is also of interest to examine Baxter's attitude 
on this question. The North Briton libelled the "whole nation of Scots", 
and was unjust and inhuman. Baxter praises the Scottish for "their mountains 
and valour". Yet, when they invade England, in keeping with his patriotism, 
he turns gainst them. The Irish are not treated in exactly the same way.
When Henry II, through "wanton ambition" invaded Ireland the result was the 
same as the Norman invasion of England: "the sufferings of the lower order 
among the Irish became great beyond description". The sin of the Irish 
seems to be that they embraced Catholicism. When in 1641 the Irish 
"papists" turned against the English colonists, they became "inhuman foes", 
even the women practiced "every cruelty" and the children, too, "were 
prompted to essay their feeble blows on the carcasses or defenceless 
children of the English". The cruelty of the Irish, real or imagined, seems 
to have come about because in the past, "being treated like wild beasts, 
they became such". Baxter’s general attitude is unfavourable. Speaking 
of Ireland in the 17th century Baxter calls it "a country uncivilised, 
uncultivated"...
Although against the general spirit of his patriotism, then,
Baxter's attitude does sometimes get tainted by a kind of racialism. We 
have seen he supports Negro rebellions as being in conformity with their 
natural rights. His attitude towards the Red Indians shows some 
ambivalence. When they sold the land they did not mean to deprive
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themselves o f  the  r i g h t s  o f  use  " o f  h u n t i n g  th e  w i ld  d e e r ,  o f  u s in g  a 
branch  o f  wood". This  echoes B a x t e r ' s  de fence  o f  f o r e s t  and common r i g h t s  
in  England.  The Red Ind ians  a r e  defended  a g a i n s t  t h e  Eng l ish  m erchan ts ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  Ohio company which en joyed  " e x c l u s i v e  monopoly".  But i n  
the  War o f  Independence ,  the  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  army i s  made worse 
by the  f a c t  t h a t  Germans and In d ia n s  were employed a g a i n s t  th e  s e t t l e r s .
The Ind ian  a u x i l i a r i e s  " e x c i t e d  t e r r o r "  and showed " i n d i s c r i m i n a t e  b a r b a r i t y " .  
The vengeance o f  the  p a t r i o t i c  s e t t l e r s  was t h e r e f o r e  " s e v e re  y e t  j u s t "  even 
though i t  d e s t r o y e d  the  I n d i a n s '  means o f  s u b s i s t e n c e .  When they  a t t a c k  
the  Eng l ish  t r a d e  t h a t  Bax te r  sees  as l e g i t i m a t e ,  he c a l l s  the  Ind ians  
" b a r b a r i a n s "  and " sa v ag es"  and says  t h e y  ought  to  " renounce  a l l  c la im s  
to the p o s t s  and f o r t s  p o s s e s s e d  by the  E n g l i s h  who should  be a t  l i b e r t y  
to e r e c t  as  many more as they  t h i n k  f i t " .  Even t h e  army 's  a c t i o n  o f  t a k in g  
h o s tag es  i s  "wise  and r e s o l u t e " .
This  l a s t  b i t ,  e s p e c i a l l y ,  might  seem to  s u g g e s t  a g g r e s s i v e
n a t i o n a l i s m  and im p e r i a l i s m .  But,  f o r  B a x te r ,  t h e  p o s t s  and f o r t s  a re
p u r e ly  d e f e n s i v e .  In I n d i a ,  a p a r t  from enco u ra g e in g  c o m p e t i t io n  from the
Dutch and o t h e r s ,  i t  was n e c e s s a r y  to  " p r e s e r v e  ou r  t e r r i t o r i a l  p o s s e s s i o n s "
bu t  a l s o  " t o  s e c u re  the  n a t i v e s  from i n j u s t i c e " .  The B r i t i s h  p a r l i a m e n t
could  n o t  p o s s i b l y  r e p r e s e n t  c o u n t r i e s  " w i th  whose s o i l ,  c l im a t e s  and
produce;  w i th  whose wants and advan tages  th e y  canno t  be th o ro u g h ly
a c q u a in t e d " .  The r a c i a l  e lement i s  u s u a l l y  s u g g e s t i v e  and h idden  r a t h e r
than consc ious  o r  open.  P a t r i o t i s m  i s  a c o s m o p o l i ta n  v a lu e  b u t  i t  i s
e s p e c i a l l y  connec ted  wi th  the  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  E n g l i s h  l i b e r t y  and the
o r i g i n s  o f  E ng l i sh  l i b e r t y  a r e  Saxon.  "The E n g l i s h " ,  Bax te r  s ays ,
" i n h e r i t e d  from t h e i r  Saxon a n c e s t o r s  a s t r o n g e r  a t t a c h m e n t  to  l i b e r t y
21than  t h e i r  ne ig h b o u rs  on the  C o n t i n e n t " .  But s i n c e  the  non-Saxon people 
in  England a r e  th e  a r i s t o c r a t s ,  t h e  p a t r i o t i c  myth o f  the  Saxon C o n s t i t ­
u t i o n  i s ,  i n  Radica l  hands ,  a l s o ,  i f  n o t  more,  a myth o f  c l a s s .  The 
Saxon h e ro e s  a re  p o p u l a r  f o lk  h e r o e s .
In B a x t e r ' s  h a g iog ra phy  t h e r e  a r e  h e ro e s  and h e r o e s .  A l f r e d  the  
Great  i s  seen  as a t r u l y  s e m i - d iv in e  h e ro  who s t a n d s  n e a r  to  God. A l f r e d  
was p robab ly  the  o n ly  pure h e r o .  He appea rs  as t h e  founding  hero  o r  
o r i g i n a t o r  common i n  th e  myths o f  p r e - i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t i e s .  He, " e s t a b ­
l i s h e d  a r e g u l a r  m i l i t i a " .  He was a l s o  t h e  fo u n d e r  o f  th e  E ng l ish  monarchy. 
All  subsequen t  monarchs were l e g a l l y  descended  from A l f r e d  th rough  the
2 1 . B axte r ,  H i s t o r y , 13, 98,  108, 194-5,  506,  679,  684,  732, 781.
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c o ro n a t io n  oa th  which conf irmed  Saxon law. A l f r e d  a l s o  i n s t i t u t e d  the
j u r y  system based  on the  hundreds .  During h i s  r e i g n  he " d iv i d e d  the  
kingdom i n t o  c o u n t i e s ,  which he s u b d iv id e d  i n t o  hundreds  and the  hundreds  
i n t o  t i t h i n g s  . . .  t e n  h o u s eh o ld e r s  formed a t i t h i n g " .  The t y t h i n g ,  upon 
which the  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  th e  London Correspond ing  S o c i e t y  was based ,  
was A l f r e d ’s g r e a t  i n n o v a t io n .  I t  was e s p e c i a l l y  E n g l i s h :  the  Saxons in  
Germany had n o t  had i t .  The t y t h i n g ,  e s p e c i a l l y ,  b u t  a l s o  th e  hundred ,  
" s e rv e d  as the  b a s i s  o f  Eng l ish  j u r i s p r u d e n c e " .  The c o u r t s  o f  t h e  t y t h i n g s  
and hundreds  made the  common law based  on th e  p e o p l e ’s cus toms.  A l f r e d  
" c o l l e c t e d  and r e v i s e d  t h e  a n c i e n t  Saxon cus tom s" ;  he was th e  c o d i f i e r  o f  
common law. He was the g r e a t  peace-maker  who " r e s t o r e d  t r a n q u i l l i t y  to 
England" ;  the  g r e a t  and d i v i n e  s a v i o u r  who e s t a b l i s h e d  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
m i l len ium .  "The Danes ravaged  th e  c o u n t ry " ;  " th e  Saxons robbed  and 
murdered each o t h e r  w ith  im pun i ty " .  But,  " i t  p l e a s e d  God to  r a i s e  up a 
d e l i v e r e r  i n  the  person  o f  ALFRED THE GREAT".
There were o t h e r ,  l e s s e r ,  h e r o e s ;  and,  o f  c o u r s e ,  p l e n t y  o f
v i l l a i n s .  An im p o r ta n t  one i s  Edward the  C o n fe s s o r .  In t h e  17th c e n t u r y
Edward i s  the  g r e a t  hero  o f  t h e  myth. There has been some puzzlement over
22why and how A l f r e d  go t  to  r e p l a c e  him. There a r e  e m p i r i c a l  r e a s o n s .
Since A l f r e d  e s t a b l i s h e d  peace he was a l s o  a b le  to  e s t a b l i s h  the  k ind  o f  
g e n e ra l  c u l t u r e  th e  R ad ica l s  wished to  r e - i n v e n t  i n  th e  18th c e n t u r y .  As 
a s c h o l a r  he encouraged  e d u c a t i o n ,  i n c l u d i n g  p o l i t i c a l  e d u c a t i o n ,  and 
a l s o  encouraged "manufac tu res ,  promoted n a v i g a t i o n  and commerce". A ga ins t  
t h i s ,  and a g a i n s t  what made him so a c c e p t a b l e  to  the  17th c e n t u r y ,  the  
u n w o r ld l in e s s  o f  Edward, " th e  p o p u la r  S a in t - K i n g " ,  made him u n a c c e p ta b l e .  
Baxter  c a l l s  Edward's  c e l i b a c y  " f r i g i d i t y " ,  acc use s  him o f  n o t  consummat­
ing h i s  m a rr i age  to  t h e  Saxon queen and o f  b e in g  c r u e l  towards  h i s  
d au g h te r .  Edward, Baxter  s a y s ,  was ed u c a te d  i n  Normandy, i n t r o d u c e d  too 
many Normans i n t o  th e  E n g l i s h  c o u r t ,  and showed " p a r t i a l i t y  towards  the  
Normans". Edward b rough t  England to  t h e  b r i n k  o f  c i v i l  war,  and was 
" w o r t h l e s s " ,  "weak" and " a r b i t r a r y " .  He o r i g i n a t e s  m a je s ty  and myste ry  
in  the  monarchy: he was th e  f i r s t  E n g l i s h  k ing  who " p r e t e n d e d  to  cu re"  
by touch " th e  k i n g ' s  e v i l " .  The C o n f e s s o r ' s  f a n a t i c a l  r e l i g i o s i t y  a l s o  
made him something o f  a s l a v e  t o  th e  C a t h o l i c  c h u rch .  For t h e  Saxon laws 
c o l l e c t e d  and r e i n f o r c e d  d u r in g  h i s  r e i g n ,  B ax te r  g iv e s  c r e d i t  to  Edward's  
r i v a l ,  th e  nob le  Godwin. Edward i n  f a c t  was a poo r  p a t r i o t  who f a i l e d  to  
l i v e  up to  the  "m an l ines s"  e t h i c .
2 2 .
C h r i s to p h e r  H i l l ,  "The Norman Yoke", l O l f f .
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Baxter's treatment of Edward was part of his general aim. Most 
history had been written by monks. Using the same categories, Baxter 
turned this history upside down. In many cases, heroes became villains 
and vice versa. The Earl of Leicester who rebelled against Henry III and 
"whose memory has been blackened", Baxter praises for his opposition to 
the Pope and for his attacks on the extension of the royal prerogative. 
Aristocrats could be great patriotic heroes. In both heroism and villainy 
personal moral character was important, aside from public actions, and 
was seen as influencing events and the moral state of the nation. Edward 
IV spent his life in "riot and debauchery" and never was the throne of 
England "disgraced by a greater monster". Baxter, despite his faith in 
the people, never deserts the belief in a deliverer or patriot king or 
great hero. This applies to figures in Baxter's own time as much as to 
the distant past. The Prince of Wales, who died in 1751, is described as 
"this excellent prince possessed of every amiable quality which could 
engage the affections of the people, disposed to assert the rights of
2'mankind and in general warmly attached to the interest of Great Britain". 
Baxter's uncritical attitude towards Fox as a Radical hero is even more 
surprising. He does not even raise a mild critical comment on Fox's 
coalition with Lord North in 1783 even though many of Fox's former 
supporters, both Whig and Radical, saw it as betrayal. Some historical 
figures Baxter does indeed see as part-hero, part-villain. But he rarely 
moves outside these types as explanations of events.
Villainy is the mover in corruption. Corruption is a process 
of moral decay that necessitates the political millenium. Moral decay 
brought about by a semi-divine or semi-magical retribution is a strong 
theme in the myth. Cause is a transcendental affair. It operates as a 
kind of providential punishment. Harold loses the Battle of Hastings 
because he went against majority advice to defer it. Edward I dies 
while preparing for war against the Scottish patriots. Political 
villainy, that is the corruption of the constituion, always results in 
millenial disaster which leads to more widespread corruption on the legal, 
moral, and economic levels. Within this general pattern, there are a wide 
variety of empirical causes. Political ambition, an evil motive in 
Radical political vocabulary, leads to war; war raises taxes; taxes prove 
a burden on the people and they get corrupted. In Baxter's historical 
fables and parables the ends of such an immoral war are never achieved.
23. Baxter, History, 62-3, 70-1, 114, 124, 166, 238, 498, 716, 801.
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The famines of Edward II’s time were brought about by "the wicked ambition 
of this king and his father to destroy the independence of Scotland". 
Interference with the law, especially attempts to widen the definition 
of treason, "has never failed to bring destruction on those who were 
concerned with it". Richard II lost his crown and life because he attempted 
to interfere with the treason laws. Disturbing the balance of the constit­
ution also leads to disaster. "The sufferings of the people" during the 
reign of Richard II were the result of the immoral character of the king 
and because he "packed parliament of his own creatures". His love of luxury 
was also a cause. The National Debt is a source of deep corruption; "a 
gulph that swallows up the industry of the people", gives "an undue weight 
to the executive government" and "must inevitably prove the overthrow of 
the nation". The National Debt originated during the reign of William III, 
and, "a greater curse could not have been inflicted upon this country ... 
the corruption of morals which it has produced are evils of perhaps a still 
more extensive nature". This corruption of morals,
necessarily produced a brood of usurers, brokers and 
stock-jobbers who preyed on the vitals of their 
country; and from this fruitful source, venality 
overspread the land; corruption ... was gradually 
formed into a system ... receiving the countenance of 
the whole legislature ... every individual began openly 
to buy and sell his interest in his country ... the 
sources of justice were ... grossly polluted by the 
partialityof party ••*24
At this point, Baxter’s millenial tone is just as high as that 
of the ’wilder’ Radicals like Thomas Evans. His condemnation of the 
political life and times of William III is total and almost ’hysterical’. 
England,
only exchanged one tyrant for another. The people 
were divided into three parties ... The practice of 
bribing a majority in parlaiament had a pernicious 
effect upon the morals of all ranks of people ... 
Public virtue became the object of ridicule, the 
whole kingdom was overspread with immorality and 
corruption. ... All principle was gradually banished, 
talent lay uncultivated, and the land was deluged 
with a tide of profligacy .... William involved these 
kingdoms in connexions, wars and debts which ... 
must end in universal calamity and ... almost ... 
destroy ... and debauch the manners of the whole 
people.25
Baxter, History, 605-6.24.
25. Baxter, History, 582, 605.
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George II's failure of duty led to neglect of the "internal
police of the nation". So that, "the peculiar depravity of the times was
visible even in the conduct of thieves and robbers, who now became more
desparate and savage than ever they had appeared since mankind were 
26civilised". Baxter's way out of this state of moral decay is simple 
and therefore millenial and pre-ideological: return to the people their 
lost rights, especially universal suffrage. The fact that Baxter appears 
to give his support to the deists rather than the millenarians in the 
English Civil War is a poor guide to his thought. Sometimes, as when 
he explains Henry VIII's lack of an heir being due to the fact that "the 
curse of being childless is the threatening contained in the Mosaic law 
against those who espouse their brother's widow", he passes beyond the 
mental state of lingering credulousness into the realm of superstition.
A religious metaphysic gives the form, and sometimes the content, to 
his 'political' beliefs.
At first sight this statement seems a bit odd. Baxter is keen to 
separate religion from politics and to establish the primacy of political 
institutions over religious ones. One of the few things Baxter praises 
Henry II for is that he "fully established the superiority of the 
legislature above all spiritual canons". But this does not mean religion 
ought to be dependent upon the state. "Nothing can be more absurd than to 
establish religion by law". And "good government has nothing to do with 
theology; it ought only to distinguish between a good and bad citizen, 
by cherishing virtue and punishing vice". He recommends religious 
toleration. Each person ought to be left to "worship his creator according 
to the dictates of his conscience, without prohibition or limitation".
But, commenting favourably on Quaker beliefs, Baxter also recommends 
"submission to the laws in all cases wherein conscience is not violated". 
This includes being involved in "any illicit trade". In this context, he 
specifically mentions smuggling as a social crime; he does not extract any 
romantic political meaning from this activity. Baxter particularly 
praises the Quaker "respect for order".
The subordinate role of religion in the institutional life of 
society does not mean its disappearance. He deplores William II's 
"irreligion" just as much as he denigrates Mahomet"s "pretended 
revolutions". Even worse was the atheism rife in Charles II's time.
26. Baxter, History,170, 187, 582, 605-6, 681, 688-9, 699.
172
One of the bad things about an established religion is it attracts "the 
infidel and the worthless". Baxter is most against the forms of "monkish 
superstition" he associates with Roman Catholicism. Among the attractions 
of the Quakers are that they have no professional clergy, "reject the 
major and mystical part of Christian ritual", and do not get entangled in 
theological disputes since they "are very tender of quittting scripture 
terms for those of the schoolmen". It is "to Christ alone" the Quakers 
"give the total Word of God, and not the scriptures, although they 
highly esteem these sacred writings". Following Christ, they do every­
thing "in a simple manner". The deistical beliefs of the Quakers show 
up "the primitive simplicity of the Christian religion" as well as its 
purity. This is how religion was in its origins.
Despite the fact Baxter wants to separate religion and politics 
at the level of institutions, there is a profound cognitive connection.
The logic or form of religion spilled over into the logic of politics.
There is a connection between the purity, simplicity and originality 
of religion and "the purity of parliament" and of the polity in general. 
Radical politics becomes sacred politics. The word "sacred" is common in 
Radical political vocabulary and is often used in an historical context 
with a religious content. Henry III was made to order "sentence of 
excommunication" against anyone "who should dare violate the sacred 
constitution". Although he despises most religious ritual, Baxter 
frequently invokes it when attempting to give legitimacy to his beliefs. 
When Henry swears to abide by the Magna Carta, the prelates and abbots 
who forced him into it symbolically "threw their tapers to the ground".
They also threatened to excommunicate anyone who violated the fundamental 
laws and cursed "the soul of everyone who incurs this sentence" to 
"stink and corrupt in hell!" The people are given grace or sacredness.
On one occasion, "the archbishops harangued the multitude on that 
celebrated maxim, 'the voice of the people is the voice of God"'. History 
becomes a series of sacred acts: a sacred history. The most sacred act 
is foundation. Just as Jesus is the founder of the Christian religion, 
so Alfred is the founder of the English polity. This can be so since 
the society of the ancient Britons was totally destroyed by the Saxon 
invaders. Even from a founder like Brutus, who Baxter recognises as at 
least a semi-fabulous figure, he can get some political capital. After 
he got rid of the giants Brutus "divided the land among the people"; and 
he certainly sees Brutus, the founder of "Albion", as a sort of libertarian 
figure against the despotic giants.
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As in all myth, the key relationship is between the present and 
the distant past, not the present and the recent past. When parliament 
gives an unlimited vote for credit, Baxter comments "our ancestors would 
have heard such a demand with hatred and rejected it with scorn". The 
custom of the people, "our ancestors", is at the bottom of legitimacy.
No matter how often that custom is broken by the wilful acts of kings, 
there remains a thread of continuity hidden beneath the surface of 
historical events. Yet this does not mean time is progressive. There 
is not even any sense of a steady progressive moral degeneration, as 
Thompson argues. History is the history of (comparative) liberty or 
of periods of light and darkness, good and evil. Using another sense of 
progress, Baxter speaks, in seemingly Enlightenment terms, of "the 
progress of reason" and a "revolution in sentiment". But reason can only 
progress back towards, and as far as, the Saxon liberty. Progress has 
limits. Revolution can only revolve towards a new point of the spiral 
which resembles the antique past far more than it represents anything new. 
Time gets squeezed out. Saxon kings and heroes seem to be determined 
less by lineage than by defence of the people’s rights. Baxter’s table 
of the kings and queens of England shows Henry II and other medieval 
monarchs as 'Saxons’. The Magna Carta is a charter which, in part, 
supports demands for present-day political rights. And the Saxon 
millenium is used in an even more evocative way to picture the dream 
of the ideal society. According to Baxter, the Saxon people were,
courteous to each other, sincere in their dealings, 
faithful to their word, and firm in their attachments. 
They were hospitable beyond all nations; and not 
only esteemed it dishonourable to deny admittance 
to a guest, but made it an object of punishment.
Nor was their care limited to their own nation; 
they extended it to travellers who might pass 
through their own country, setting aside a portion 
of the public grain for their entertainment. Mild 
in the treatment of criminals, they forgot not the 
moderation and equity which attended on liberty.
Their fierceness was corrected by humanity, and 
their generosity unfettered by the narrow boundary of 
exact justice. They neither indulged in a plurality 
of wives, nor prohibited their women to attend them to 
the field, to assist their councils and to be useful * 
and active in the different occupations which employed 
them. Gallantry had not turned sex from business or 
made it an object of criminal voluptuousness. Vice 
in those simple and virtuous times had not lifted 
her head to triumph over innocence. Ambition had not 
intruded into the place of modesty, nor were the poor 
crushed under the proud oppression of the rich. A 
precarious justice was not bought from corrupted
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tribunals of judges. The ignorance of crime was a 
firmer preservative to their manners, than to other 
nations the strictness of law and the knowledge of 
virtue ... Supreme power was vested in the community 
... The extreme liberty of the people made them two 
or three days in assembling on ordinary occasions '-'21
Like all golden ages, Baxter’s Saxon millenium reveals more of
the values and situation of its contemporary expression than it does of
history. Note, for example, in Baxter's picture, the silversmith's pride
in the fraternalist values of the tramping system of the trade clubs,
here seen as Saxon hospitality; the emphasis is on the law and political
ambition; on the role of women. See, also, his celebration of the
jury system. Also observe, despite Baxter's many disagreements with Burke,
that he has a Burkeian notion of the Englishness of the constitution. When
Baxter says "vice in those simple and virtuous times had not lifted
her head to triumph over innocence", he is plainly not referring to any
political or historical reality that ever existed. He is retracing the
steps back to a political and historical Eden. But it is important to
emphasise I am not saying that no kind of historical consciousness at all
can be perceived in Baxter's History. Besides dates and facts, he
also uses historical concepts. In several places, Baxter shows he has
absorbed the "feudal revolution" of 17th century historiography brilliantly
28analysed by J.G.A. Pocock. But what is glaringly missing is any
satisfactory notion of cause. In Baxter's hands, history becomes a
sort of patchwork of predestined psycho-drama. A part of early 18th
century history is glossed over since it "cannot be very interesting, as
it generally consists of proceedings in parliament". There are no battles;
no great heroes. There is only a mental gap in the manner of bricolage.
The mind of John Baxter, and probably even the general mentality
of the 18th century, has, in many respects, much more in common with
the states of mind found in pre-industrial societies than it does with
the 20th century. Support for this statement comes from the fairly
29 30 *elaborate and traditional symbols found in the History. *
Baxter, History, 26.
The Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law, (Cambridge, 1957), passim.
^  ’ Baxter, History, 84, 149, 266-7, 486-89.
Baxter, History, vi, 133-4.
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This in effect is what the language of luxury and corruption 
intimates, despite the fact that luxury and corruption were not merely 
ideas, not merely paradigmatic elements in a political language, but 
also material forces at work in 18th century English society. At the 
same time, study of the 'language' or code tells us something about 
the society in which the language was used. With this 'materialist' 
end in mind, it is finally worth analysing and describing the economic 
or, more accurately the political economic, aspect of John Baxter's 
mind. Some of the topics that follow have already been touched upon 
more lightly.
Baxter, like his brother Radicals, sees land as the significant 
form of property, and echoes the "general complaints against enclosures 
and oppressions from the gentry" and aristocracy. As a class, the 
aristocracy are not merely socially separate, they are also racially 
different. Unlike the people in general, they have no connection with 
the Saxon forefathers. The old Anglo-Saxon aristocracy "were deprived 
of their lands, which were divided among" William's "Norman followers" 
who "became if possible more oppressive than the king". The separation 
between the aristocracy and the king on the one hand and the people 
on the other seems to have been a Norman creation since "in all the laws
31and charters of the Norman kings, there is an inferior order mentioned". 
Baxter's and others' "new" and "impartial" history can also be seen in 
this light; Baxter sees himself writing a people's history, the people 
being everyone but the king, nobility and the clergy, and aristo­
cratic Radical heroes such as the Duke of Gloucester. If the mechanism 
for social, political and economic change was "political education" 
conceived in a millenial or mythic framework of thought, equally important 
was the existence of uncorrupted popular but aristocratic and royal 
heroes. Later, socialism brought in organisation and programme as 
alternative mechanisms of social change.
At the same time, Radical class consciousness was more sophisticated 
than the simple idea of people versus the church and/or the king and 
the aristocracy. These classes were not the only ones to benefit from 
exploitation of the people. For example, Baxter constantly defends •
"the traders" against the nobility and the monarchy. As he sees it,
"there is one great and eternal distinction arising from the nature 
of things" which cannnot be changed, and that is "the distinction between 
the landed and trading interests". It seems, like Locke, Baxter sees 
"these clashing interests" as the motor force in society, as the crucial
31. Baxter, History, 137.
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form of class conflict, although the word he uses is, significantly,
"rank”. In countries where there is no substantial trading interest,
where "the people have little trade", there "the landed gentry affect
the pomp of princes" and suppress "the peasantry" who are in "the most
abject want". The trading interest, then, which perhaps includes the
merchants and manufacturers in the broadest sense, are the guardians
of liberty. The trading interest needs "a fair and equal representation",
and the state by adopting a "sound policy" should "make every rank
happy". In the colonies, the behaviour of the merchants has contrasted
favourably with those who own land there. The latter have forced up
the price of land and engaged England in wars. But if "the true
commerce" of "our merchants" had been "left to themselves" free
"from exhorbitant taxes and imports" there would be "great advantages"
for all and the "improved ... happiness of every rank in the state".
Again, for this to happen the mercantile interest need independent
representation, suggesting rights, for Baxter, are not only founded in
landed property and that independence is not solely tied to the
ownership of land, even if land is the ultimate factor of production.
Yet the existing political system subordinated trade to land. In 1710,
the Tories ousted the Whigs, and passed legislation which required an
estate of £600 per year to represent a county in parliament. The aim
of the Bill, he says, "was to exclude trading people from the House
of Commons and to lodge the whole legislative power with the landholders".
Another Bill, of 1696, was designed "to open the way for government
contractors". As a rank, Baxter perceives the merchants have divisions,
while at the same time recognising a certain common identity between
some merchants and the landed interests. Nowadays, merchants wanting
to enter parliament will borrow a landed qualification while "the
mercantile one is seldom thought of". The political process has
created a class of big merchants. Before the accession of foreign
kings with their "continental connexions", government contracts and
loans did not amount to much. Continental wars created "contracts for
supplying prodigious armies" and have produced "immense fortunes to the
contractors". The contracts were not open to free bids, going to "the
cheapest offer" or "the lowest interest", but were given to the minister's 
32friends.
32. Baxter, History, 193, 195, 609, 639.
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There was one social group for whomtBaxter felt not the 
slightest sympathy. Allied with government contracts was the national 
debt started in the reign of William III. This was "the greatest curse" 
that could be inflicted upon a country and led to the general "corrupt­
ion of morals". It begat political corruption which "was gradually 
formed into a system" and led to a situation where "every individual 
began openly to buy and sell his interest in his country". It led to 
"the partiality of party" and to a situation where justice was "grossly 
polluted". Even more than Burke, Baxter rails against the harmful 
effects of "the monied interest". If by and large the Tories represented 
the landed classes, the monied interest "which prevailed in most of 
the corporations" were represented by "a great majority of Whigs". It 
was not private and entrepreneurial capital that was significant and 
pernicious, but mercantile or corporate. The spread of paper money 
increased the capital of the big corporations to such an extent that 
it gave them the power to "endanger the liberties of the nation". Their 
extensive fortunes enabled them to exert undue influence over the election 
of members of parliament. Baxter gives considerable space to the South 
Sea Bubble incident which he argues brings out the close connections 
between political corruption and financial capital. It shows, "the 
secret and corrupt influence which great commercial companies have over 
parliament and the administration". At the time of the South Sea 
scheme, "luxury, profligacy and vice increased to a shocking degree" and 
led to "the growth of atheism, profaneness and immorality". In the 
language of the moral economy paper capital is, as Pocock hints, a form 
of unreality; it produces an alienated phantasy world in which vice 
predominates. Baxter is a "bullionist"; for him paper money is 
not real money. "The fraudulent and pernicious practice of stock-
jobbing" has "diverted the genius of the people from industry", from
33a life of substance.
Some forms of property, then, were phantastical, as it were the 
product of an excess of culture, a form of property too far removed 
or alienated from nature to provide a basis for representation. If 
landed property holders ought not to have a monopoly over political 
rights and representation, then Baxter's ideas are sufficiently coloured 
by neo-Harringtonian thinking for him to believe land was a substantive 
form of property that guaranteed independence from the crown and the
33. Baxter, History, 605-6, 632, 666-67, 668, 677, 688, 689.
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executive power. Before the forty shilling Act was passed, when there
were a mass of small landholders, democracy was guaranteed since "every
freeholder had a vote for a knight of the shire". Luxury began when
"the gentry acquired a power of breaking the entails and of alienating
their estates". As the primary source of production, land is not a
thing to buy and sell and is a guarantee of political independence: once
again there is agreement with Burke, even if on the question of
distribution Baxter would violently oppose Burke. At the same time,
Baxter held to the sanctity of property in general, although here,
it would seem, in the wider ’Lockeian' sense. Property was enshrined in
the principles of the constitution. As he puts it, "the disposal of
their own property is the inherent right of freemen: that there can be no
property in that which another can, of right, take from them without
their consent". Natural rights, that is political liberty and suffrage,
were forms of property that could not be alienated. The arguments of
Thompson and similar critics are therefore misconceived. Human rights
are not subordinated to property rights but are in a sense identifiable
or integral; independence based on the people's right to a share in
landed wealth is a warranty that they will not be violated. The notion
of the Gothic balance was not only used for political analysis; it was
also used to describe an ideal state of the distribution of the property,
especially landed property. Although, this did not mean property
34obtained through trade and industry was altogether discounted.
In fact, as an object of Radical political economy, trade and 
commerce were given as much attention as land. Using words that might 
just as well have come from Samuel Bamford or a number of other artisan 
writers, Laxter describes how Britain "is a great commercial nation". 
Naturally so, since she is blessed with "convenient ports ... a temperate 
climate ... and ... fertile soil". The commodities which underpin this 
commercial greatness are com, coal and wool. Britain is a "commercial 
state", and this commerce is regulated by a body of law. But, like 
other law, commercial law is complex and owes too much to "the Latin 
tongue" and is "an unintelligible jargon" of professionals. "Simple 
cases" ought to be conducted by "the parties themselves". The law also 
protects monopolies. The monopoly system Baxter sees as stemming from the 
time of Elizabeth. She granted patents for monopolies as reward for 
service. But the patents were "sold to others who were therefore enabled
34. Baxter, History, 191, 258, 625.
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to raise commodities to what price they pleased, and who put invincible
restraints upon all commerce and industry and emulation in the arts".
Because they lead to high prices, monopolies fetter "every species of
domestic industry". In Charles I's time, "monopolies were revived" and
"tonnage and poundage continued to be levied by royal authority alone".
Monopolies thus gave undue power and influence to the crown. In
Baxter’s mind, as in many others, the monopoly position of the chartered
companies was linked to the system of corruption and was therefore
inimicable to liberty. In 1693, Baxter writes, "merchants, clothiers
and other dealers" presented addresses for the dissolution of the East
India Company. Among other things, the Company's action had led to "the
oppression of the people and the ruin of trade". In 1695, the East
India Company bribed members of parliament with <£90,000 in order to
obtain their seal. Linked to the monied interest and the national debt,
Baxter believed efforts must be made "towards diminishing the capital
of the several trading companies". This last statement gives us a feel
for the texture of John Baxter's economic thinking. If his ideas have
little to do with socialism, then they are not easily absorbed into
any laissez-faire or free market paradigm either. He does not seem to
think that capital accumulation is in itself a good thing. He does not
like "exorbitant profit" and implies a fair profit or a just price.
If he supports free trade, he also supports the setting up of the Bank
of England with certain monopoly powers. He does not believe in limited
liability for financial debt. And his support for the market and free
trade is less ideological than it may first appear. His advocacy of
free trade does not extend so far as to allow it to hurt the interests of
the artisans. Baxter describes how in May 1765, the journeymen silk
weavers assembled in Moorfields to complain about "the free use of French
and other foreign silks". He adds, with apparent approval, that "a bill
was afterwards passed, laying an additional duty on the importation of
all wrought silks and velvets". At the heart of the artisan opposition
35to taxation, there was something of a paradox.
Just as Radical political concepts do not break out of a 
'mercantile' framework of thought, so Baxter's economic concepts are 
developed in opposition but nevertheless within this framework. The 
quarrel with Burke was over the level and use of taxes, not over the role 
of tax as a central economic, political and even moral mechanism. While
35. Baxter, History, 194, 372, 689, 668, 760.
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for Burke government expenditure was a motor of production and a means
of redistributing income, for Baxter it was central to the exploitation
of the artisan and of the people in general. Foreign wars, the national
debt and the system of influence all produced a level of taxation well
above what was necessary for the good government of the country. Through
increasing taxation, to pay for the national debt parliament "was
beggaring the nation", and undermining "the independence of the people".
Economic measures had social and political repercussions. A proposed
excise tax on tobacco "would produce an additional swarm of excise
men ... who would swallow up part of the revenue, and multiply the
dependants on the crown in such a manner as to enable it still further
to influence elections". Consequently, since the problem was one of
politics, of the state, economic and social questions were subsumed by
the political. "That taxation and representation were inseperably united;
that God had joined them, and that no British parliament could put them
asunder . ..' it is an eternal law of God'”. High taxation was a sort of
political sin that demanded political salvation. Not unconnected with
this is the fact that, through war, taxes upon commodities fell heaviest
36"upon the poor labourers and manufacturers".
Research into John Baxter's ideas was done before anything was
very set in my mind, but it remains to say a little about his reading in
so far as we have indications of it. As an authority for the Brutus
myth, Baxter cites Geoffrey of Monmouth suggesting perhaps the 'archaic1
beliefs of this author had not declined as much as Keith Thomas would
have us believe. Of similar authenticity and mentality, probably, is
the late medieval historican Jean Froissart whom Baxter also uses as
an authority. A passage from David Hume is inserted as support for the
myth of the Anglo-Saxon constitution. There is mention of the works
of Lord Rochester "so gross that they cannot be named without giving
offence to the modest ear". In contrast, Baxter writes a longish and
favourable discourse on Bunyan, suggesting a fairly close familiarity
with his works. Significantly, Joseph Addison's "noble work" on "the
defence of the Christian religion" also gets a mention. There is a
reference to John Milton, and it would not be surprising if Baxter had
read at least some of his writings. This sketch is at most a starting
point. But, if nothing else, shows the mentality of John Baxter was 
37far from modern.
36 Baxter, History, 684, 767, 815; on Burke, see Reflections, footnote 
25, for his views on tax, property and class.
37 Baxter, History, 70, 196, 651.
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Despite the fact, then, that Baxter's History comes 
from the pen of an artisan, it has been shown that it is 
governed or structured by the same set of concepts found in the 
writings of more intellectual, and presumably therefore sophisticated 
figures such as John Cartwright and Sir William Jones. And Baxter, 
as we saw, is no more revolutionary and just as constitutionalist as 
these gentlemen. There is also no paradigm break between the 
History and the Resistance just as there is none between Cartwright's 
earlier and later writings. Both have been shown to contain the 
same set of concepts. As a pointer to the last shapter it is worth 
enumerating these concepts. I found in Baxter, an admiration for 
an elective monarchy or a patriotic king, rather than a republic 
on the French model. The History is a narrative of the doings 
heroes and villains, particularly monarchs. An elective or 
constitutional monarchy is also sensitive to the balance of powers 
and avoids excess. History is divided up into periods of light 
or reason and periods of passion or darkness. Church and King 
historians had drawn the veil of mystery and corruption over 
history. Reason was the weapon to be used to cast corruption 
aside. Reason was a tool for understanding libertarian documents, 
laws and customs. Reason was also a key unlocking the hidden 
secrets of natural rights. Yet this did not mean that Baxter is 
one of Pocock's "Lockean primitivists". Like others, it has been 
shown that Baxter's thinking shifts backwards and forwards between 
culture and nature. Saxon culture, intimating Baxter's mercantilist 
and artisan mentality, is preferred to either ancient Briton's 
primitivism or classical refinement or luxury. Natural rights, 
as for Burke, are transformed through the English experience into 
historical rights. Britain is the elect nation. Consequently, 
attention was drawn to Baxter's patriotism, but also to the role of 
corruption and to the militia, and to his use of virtue - to the 
more 'Machiavellian' elements in his thought. Yet keeping with 
Pocock's terms, strands of charismatic millenialism and deism are 
also woven into the fabric of his mind. On the individual level, 
his preference for Presbytarians and Quakers and his qualified 
dislike of the Irish was also noted.
Overall, then, a whole structure of concepts is revealed, 
similar to those found in Cartwright's more voluminous writings.
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Like Cartwright his class consciousness is smoothed down by his 
sense of community and English patriotism. The monied 
interest is reviled because it lives off taxes and has been 
brought into existence by a sort of excess of culture. But 
there is no general attack on property, least of all the property 
of a reformed gentry and aristocracy. Yet it has been indicated 
that Baxter's thought is not feudal or 'transitional'. Trade 
and commerce are natural to Britain as an island nation. They 
are the gifts of God. Lastly, I gave some idea of Baxter's 
reading, of his knowledge of mythological histories.
THOMAS EVANS
Thomas Evans, and the representative figures that follow 
present a greater challenge for the mode of analysis I have 
adopted. He came later, has been seen as a minor figure and is 
usually perceived as a socialist, as one of the first of the 
moderns. So it would be expected that there would be little or 
nothing on custom, patriotism, on the defence of private property, 
on millenialism, and perhaps on natural rights or an historical 
constitution, and certainly nothing on Alfred's free born Saxons 
or Providence. Harrington or Machiavelli should have faded away, 
and Burke should be nowhere. The analysis that follows is an 
attempt to see if these 'silences' do in fact exist.
The chances are that Baxter knew Evans. Early mention 
of Evans occurs when, on November 20, 1795, he is a member of the 
executive committee of the London Corresponding Society which 
co-operates with a delegation from Baxter's Friends of Liberty 
in organising a conference against a Bill before parliament.
Since Thomas Evans is hardly more well-known than John Baxter, 
it is useful to give a certain amount of biographical detail.*
It is known that Evans' Christian Policy was advertised 
through handbills, the most effective way of reaching the mass public,
*
See Appendix B.
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as containing the essence and most simplified and accessible 
version of Spencean political philosophy. Roberty Southey 
"derived his knowledge of Spenceanism from Evans' 'Christian 
Policy'", as well as from Spence's account of his own trial.
Southey thought well of some aspects of Spence's ideas;
T.R. Malthus also gained his knowledge of Spenceanism from Evans. 
Unlike Southey, Malthus is critical of the Spencean 
Philanthropists' ideas on grounds that the national income 
would be eaten up by Evans' allowances for the expenses of 
government, that there is no compensation given to holders of the 
national debt and that the real income of the state is over­
estimated. The net result, according to Malthus, is the division 
of rents under Evans' scheme is hardly more "than is sometimes 
given to individuals from the poor rates". Whatever, the 
accuracy of Evans' figures there is also the question of his 
'influence'. For Thompson, "Evans' agrarian socialism was more 
rational and seminal than Bentham's Felicific Calculus"; for Hill, 
Evans and Spence 'look forward to theories of socialism". This 
view, the view from the methodological perspective of traditions 
and rationalism, is shared by Henry Collins. How well it holds up
in the light of Evans' religion and from the theoretical perspectives
38of paradigmatic and ideological break is another question.
One of the ways through which Evans is absorbed into the 
socialist tradition is through his alleged Jacobinism and 
revolutionary tendencies, even though Thompson calls him "the 
mild Thomas Evans". His reputation as a revolutionary stems from 
his connections with the United Englishmen and United Irishmen. 
According to one historian, he was only "slightly involved" with 
these groups; for another he was involved "on the fringe" of these 
"insurrectionary" bodies. For yet another, Evans "wanted to 
establish a republic by means of a revolution", and through
3 8 Thompson, Working Class, 672; Hill, "Yoke", 111; Henry 
Collins, "Corresponding Society", 133; Rudkin, Spence, 141, 
145; T.R. Malthus, An Essay on the Principles of Population, 
(Everyman edn. London, 1914, orig. pub. 1798), Book II, 27; 
Carl B. Cone, The English Jacobins, (New York, 1968), 13.
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the United Englishmen "he was promoting a real revolutionary 
society". While with the Spenceans, it was reported by a government 
spy that Evans asserted reform was a farce and did not go far 
enough since "a revolution was necessary"; the Society as a whole 
"promoted atheism". It does seem possible that at one stage Evans 
was committed to violence, although again it is necessary to make 
sense of any attraction to violence through pointing to the 
ambiguities involved in the idea of revolution. One view has it 
that Evans was committed to violence during the last days of the 
London Corresponding Society but changed his view when involved 
with the Spenceans. But even as a member of the London Corresponding 
Society and the United Englishmen, Evans did not favour, as the 
United Irishmen did, getting French help to defeat the government.
For Evans, as for many other Radicals, the French rulers had 
turned themselves into a military despotism. He put forward the 
idea that the Corresponding Society ought to offer its services 
to prevent a French invasion, even suggesting that members should 
join the conservative Volunteers, and being accused of treacherous 
association with the government. This idea of the patriotic 
defence of your own country or nation comes out in the oath taken 
by the new members of the United Englishmen. The oath of the 
"True Britons" asked them "to defend my country should necessity 
require". A member should be prepared to learn the use of arms 
"in order that equal rights should be established and defended".
There is, that is, the 'Lockeian' idea that the government were 
the real rebels since they had trampled on traditional rights.
The current French government had done the same thing. As he put 
it later, "the Gallic Revolution/Pretended Restitution. But 
where's their distribution/On the Agrarian Plan", and as a member 
of the Spenceans he took care not to get involved with the plans 
of Thistlewood and others of "the revolutionary wing". Initially, 
then, Evans was only attracted to physical force in relation to a 
defence of country and lost rights. In form the revolution was a 
return; in content it was a right based on the idea of an "excess" 
or abuse of power by the king or oligarchy, not on the exploitation 
of the workers by a capitalist class. Also, rather than being 
something brought about by force, the revolution ^^7as a revolution 
in sentiment effected by the diffusion of religiously 
inspired political knowledge, rather than any kind
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of secular political ideology. As Robert Wedderburn put it, not force 
but argument "recommended by the Author of Christianity". The Spenceans 
were ready to encounter the landlords "in the field of disputation". As 
Evans himself puts it, the Radicals of 1798 incurred "much unjust odium 
and persecution as reformers, ’jacobins and levellers’". But their
39ideas were more traditional than this hostile labelling would suggest.
In an Address to the Irish, in 1798, Evans, as secretary of the 
London Corresponding Society warned that the voice of God was heard in 
"historic experience". The will of God was found in the charters of 
liberty. In this written form "these laws" were "preserved ... to this 
day through many changes and vicissitues". They make up "a CONSTITUTION 
... the only one England ever had" ... "the glorious constitution of 
OLD ENGLAND ... of third saviour of the world - ALFRED". If the latter 
part sounds like millenarian talk, it also signifies a dimension of 
political vocabulary that takes the notion of custom as its reference 
point. Like custom itself, Alfred’s constitution was second nature to 
Englishmen and "could never be forgotten". It was an "inheritance" which 
"the thinking people of England" had been tricked out of by the landlords. 
Yet through their historical struggles a part, a "very small part" of the 
constitution had been "recaptured ... from the conquest". Evans gives 
the idea of custom a 'materialist' twist when he writes that the 
enclosures, as well as the loss of political liberties, had cut the 
people off from "the inheritance of their fathers". Evans’ writing, 
then, offers another example of how the idea of custom could be used in a 
non-hegemonic fashion.^
A concept, associated with custom and also used in a non-hegemonic 
fashion, is patriotism. Evans' view of patriotism, in the light of his 
attitude towards a possible French invasion, was closer to Bewick and 
Cartwright than to Paine. This does not mean he accepted the chauvinistic 
idea rampant among some sections of the upper classes. There is in Evans 
mind the notion that patriotism was a principle of internal politics and 
associated with liberty. When Thomas Evans said "patriotism cannot be 
crushed in England", precisely this kind of sentiment was expressed. In
’ Thompson, Working Class, 886; Henry Collins,"Corresponding Society",
129; Carl B Cone, The English Jacobins, (New York, 1968), 131-2;
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Christian Policy, "the purest patriotic motives", referred to internal
and external patriotism. The men who were prosecuted with him were
41"men of intellect and ardent patriotism". Here he is probably point­
ing to the patriotism of internal liberty, but the other kind is also 
in his mind. The aim of his pamphlet,
Being a clear and concise examination into the 
causes that have produced the impending, unavoidable 
National Bankruptcy; And the Effects that must 
ensue, unless overted by the Adoption of this real 
and Desirable Remedy, which would elevate These 
Realms into a Pitch of Greatness hitherto unattained 
by any nation that ever existed.^
Looking at political affairs on the Continent, Evans concludes
that "all the present enlightenment of mankind emanates from this
small spot, this England, as from a divinity". He opposes Britain's
interference in the affairs of the Continent and says the army should be
brought back and only used for defensive purposes. Equally, he did not
43want "a foreigner" on the English throne.
Linked with the idea of patriotism was the notion of a patriot
king. At first sight, it looks as though Evans wants a republic on the
French model. Christianity was based on "the broadest republican
principles". Moses commanded "the establishment of a commonwealth and a
republic". But the king has a place in the republic, since "the thing
wanted by both the king and the people is a constitution". Without a
constitution the monarchy was in danger of being captured by the
aristocratic interest. The Court party really represented a section of
the ruling oligarchy and was "merely pretending to support the crown".
The expenses of the Court are small when "compared with the exaction of
the landlords"; they are "but a drop in the ocean". The crown and the
people have real interests in common, and in association should do to
44the landlords "exactly what they have done by the crown".
Evans comparative lack of interest in the luxury of the court 
is not symptomatic of the absence of 'Machiavellian' moments in his
Thompson, Working Class, 188; Place Papers, 27815; Evans, Christian 
Policy, iii.
Evans, Christian Policy, sub-title.
Evans, Christian Policy, 7, 8.
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thinking. By implication, a patriot king is a virtuous king. When he 
acts with the people for constitutional reform his virtue is most apparent. 
Like other Radicals, though, Evans' idea of virtue is as much, if not 
more, Christian as Machiavellian. He quotes St.Justin's words to the 
effect that "he that is virtuous is a Christian". Yet from one angle, 
the whole basis of Evans' political philosophy is predicated on the 
idea of landed independence, although once again it is clear the ideal 
of landed independence has a 'real' as well as an ideological origin.
The loss of land leads to a loss of political and social rights. "I have 
... witnessed", Evans says,
the effect of enclosure after enclosure, and tax 
after tax, expelling the cottager from gleaning 
the open fields, from the right of his common, 
from his cottage, his hovel once his own; robbing 
him of his little store, his pig, his fowls, his 
fuel; thereby reducing him to a pauper, a slave.^
Among other things to notice in this passage is the implied 
differentiation of labour. If land provided the basis of the ideal of 
the amateur in aristocratic consciousness, it did the same for the 
consciousness of the artisan, yet from within a radically different 
frame of experience so far as political attitudes were concerned.^0 
The same could be said for the common usage of the idea of natural law. 
Like many other Radicals, Thomas Evans derived his ideas about land­
sharing from natural law and rights at least as much as he did from the 
concept of virtue: 'Locke' is present too. As he puts it, "the
territory of a nation is the people's farm provided for them by their 
Creator". Government rested on a contract between the rulers and the 
people whereby the former were obliged to provide for the people's 
natural rights of life, liberty and property. Or,
All governments ... are but a committee or agency 
to do the business of the nation; and their para­
mount duty is ... to remove the obstacles to, and 
provide the means for, the exercise of the people's 
industry; to insure to them the means of being 
well-fed, well-clothed, well-lodged and well-defended; 
they are the people’s servants appointed to that 
end, and in proportion to their fulfillment of 
those duties will they be approved or condemned,
45 - •Evans, Christian Policy, 17.
46. Evans, Christian Policy, 9.
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supported or detested; but if on the contrary they 
assume to do what they please, to be the people’s 
masters, to neglect their welfare, to dissipate 
their property, impoverish them, take their 
substance by force, render them miserable ... such 
government is ... a band of conspirators and robbers, 
a scourge to the human race, a thousand times worse 
than the plague.47
The social groups Evans had in the front of his mind as the
recipients of basic rights were not so much Locke’s men of property and
substance as those who were struggling to attain and keep the basic
provisions of life. That natural rights rhetoric is somehow the mental
property of the bourgeoisie is a parody of reality. Since the origin of
the current English government was conquest, it followed the people's
48rights were not protected under the contemporary political system.
Custom, virtue and natural rights instead of being paradigmat-
ically distinct tended to be drawn together in association by a trope,
by the myth of the Anglo-Saxon constitution. Evans also places heavy
emphasis on the millenial language incorporated into the myth. There
had already been "three great eras from which to date the liberty of
the world, that of Moses, that of the Christian and that of Alfred",
although now "a new one has arrived". Since Evans is pro-Hebrew, he
rejects any classical model as the ideal form of polity. America, "the
only remaining barrier" against despotism, is less classical than
Alfredian and English. There is a danger of conquest by the forces of
despotism but this can be avoided by a redistribution of landed property,
49"as in the days of Alfred". King Alfred was at once a millenial 
saviour and originator and founder. He was not only "the very saviour of 
the liberties of the world", but also,
Alfred the Great, Alfred the Good, whose name 
will never be forgotten while that of Moses 
shall remain, not because he was king of England 
and subdued the Danes; but because he was a 
philosopher, a philanthropist, and lawgiver, who 
guided by justice, again established in this 
island the agrarian commonwealth, rooting out 
that enemy of mankind - paganism; by destroying
47.
48.
49.
Evans, Christian Policy, 20.
Evans, Christian Policy, 33.
Evans, Christian Policy, 8, 13, 14, 33.
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feudality in the soil ... and dividing the land 
among the people, assigning to every ten families 
a certain portion of inheritance for ever.^Q
Thomas Evans provides one of the most dramatic illustrations to 
support a modification of the view of Spenceans as a bunch of 
secularists and he offers an example of how if political radicalism 
and religious millenarianism are two opposing political strategies 
they still share certain cognitive similarities. The millenial element 
is very strong. A political act, land reform, was no more and no less 
than "the revealed will of God" or, "the divine laws" that were "promul­
gated through the interposition of Moses". Alfred's political millenium, 
"the most virtuous and happy state of society the world has ever experi­
enced" was based on the principle of the "Mosaic diffusion of the natural 
property of the nation".^ One passage, shrill in its millenial tone, 
which combines ideas about a patriot king and a hidden constitution with 
class antagonism towards landlords, would seem to give some support to 
the secularisation of the millenium thesis. "Landlords", Evans writes,
the remains of paganism, supersede the power of 
the Divinity - his laws - his commands. While 
they deny the majesty of the throne in the supp­
ort of this inheritance with them, for they 
make the king and his family their pensioners at 
so much a year, as though they were only agents 
for the execution of their abominable mandates; 
and for the needy, the widow and fatherless, they 
build prisons and call them workhouses; by which 
to dispose of their victims of misery and 
oppression. But the sacred records declare, that 
such establishments shall not endure in peace, 
and the awful visitations arising therefrom in 
our own days are evidence, that till we put away 
the abomination of desolation, paganism; and 
return to a just administration of that property 
which is equally the natural right of all, abol­
ishing lordship in the soil, the earth will be 
filled with violence, will continue to be deluged 
with blood. Christian policy would make this 
world a paradise, the prevailing pagan system 
constitutes it a hell: both are now fairly and 
truly before you, reader, choose for yourself.
The time has come that something must be done.^2
Evans, Christian Policy, 11-12.
Evans, Christian Policy, 8, 12. 
52. Evans, Christian Policy, 15.
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The millenial tone, style of speech, concepts and so on are also 
evident in another passage. Here, in his own mind, Evans makes a 
distinction between the political and the religious and takes the 
secularisation of the raillenium even further. It is again worth quoting 
at some length. If the policy of the founders of Christianity is 
adhered to, he emphasises, the people
will enjoy a millenium indeed; not that spiritual 
millenium expected by dreamers and fanatics, but a 
political millenium founded in natural justice, is 
more a political than a spiritual institution: the 
spiritual part being introduced as an auxiliary to 
effect the establishment of the political .. Christ­
ianity such as I have described it, (a system of 
policy by participation of the right in the gifts 
of nature) would produce that brotherhood and 
harmony in the world, so emphatically described 
by the simile of the lion laying down with the 
lamb, as kings would be harmless and people 
innocent.^
Significantly, the examples Evans gives of putting these principles 
into action, are the Christian sects of the Moravians and the Quakers. 
Despite Evans' emphasis on the political side of the millenium, his 
language is saturated with religious ideas, with biblical allusions, 
with mythic presuppositions and so forth. Only if we go in for 
historical nominalism, if for example we say Methodism can be absorbed 
into a socialist tradition, can this sort of thing be seen as part of 
the socialist genealogy. Neither, pertinent to what has just been 
written, is it especially secular. To use Weber's categories, 
millenialism was always a form of this-worldly religion; it always had a
ic
strong secular tinge. In his emphasis on the secular side, Evans is no 
more remarkable than some of his 17th century forerunners. The millenium, 
though, was not merely a heaven on earth: it was a right here in God's 
blessed Isle, in England. Joining together patriotism and millenarianism, 
he declares,
England ... that country that has till now been 
the champion of freedom, the polar star of
liberty; what could it not do? Let the govern­
ment of England proclaim Christian freedom to
JO’ Evans, Christian Policy, 11. *
See above, Chapter Two, 22.
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the world, the rights of mankind to all nations, 
and who shall tarnish its glory ... would this be 
a great and good work? All those that allow there 
is a God, and that he has revealed his will to 
mankind, cannot deny that it would be to do his 
will upon earth as it is done in heaven ... An act 
of this magnitude by our government, this, would 
harmonize all the Christian world - paralyze 
tyranny - destroy persecution, and place the 
majesty of these realms, in so commanding a 
situation, that it would even overlook the new 
Roman republic . ..^
If, for the sake of argument, there is a shift in content in the 
proclamation of a political rather than a religious millenium, the formal 
substructure of thought remains unchanged. A correspondent who wrote to 
Robert Wedderburn in 1817 was not far off the mark when he compared 
Wedderburn's or Spence’s political millenium with Joanna Southcott's 
religious millenium. Perceptively, he remarks how Wedderburn's out­
pourings are "like the sermons of Joanna Southcote, (sic) continually 
offering to our imaginations the promised Shiloh that is to provide so much 
happiness, but when or how, or by what means is entirely left out of 
the question". Wedderburn’s or Evans' politics, then, was very much a 
'politics' in the pre-industrial sense. And its oppositions were of 
a political rather than a conceptual nature. As the judge points out in 
Wedderburn's account of his own trial, it was not the sentiments expressed 
but rather the tone in which they were delivered that led to his pros­
ecution. If they had been delivered "in a cautious, decent guarded manner" 
and not "addressed to the lower orders", the prosecution would never have 
been tolerated.^
In what additional senses was Evans' thinking structured by a 
'religious', if not specifically Christian, metaphysic? One aspect is 
his use of the word "paganism". For Evans, paganism was the source of 
impurity in the world. Landlords were "the remains of paganism". As 
opposed to those who have merely been stigmatised with "the apellations
Evans, Christian Policy, 35.
"A Seeker" in The Axe Laid to the Root, No.3, 40, (ed.) Robert 
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of infidels, jacobins and atheists", and who are really "the only true 
Christians", all despots and the supporters of despots are pagans. They 
are the real atheists since they believe in or worship profane power; 
in their origins and in their "total disregard and denial" of God's 
will they are the source of profanity and pollution. Again there is 
the idea that origins determine purity and sacredness. "Courts, 
kings, and lords, and landlords, and slaves, and oppression and war, and 
priests and ignorance" are all "pagan in their origin". All these forces 
and institutions are breeding grounds of professionalism and corruption.
The "founders of Christianity" were truly founders of the world" and 
the millenial 'policy' was "the policy of the first Christians". Alfred's 
constitution was the same thing. Politics, the political struggle, was no 
more than a search for a return, for "its re-attainment", for its 
"restoration". There was nothing novel or new on the horizon. In Evans' 
mind, time was a cyclical struggle between the two opposing principles 
of liberty (purity) and despotism (sin, pollution). These are basic factors 
at work in 'historical' causation.^
It follows that enlightenment comes not so much from reason itself 
as from a contemplation and knowledge of those events and artefacts in 
history that are signs or representations of purity and virtue. At bottom 
this is what the phrases "political education" and "enlightenment" 
mean. So, too, the uncritical attitude towards the written word as found 
in certain "documents of liberty", the written word being the concrete 
expression of liberty. This is what is meant by the fetishism of liberty. 
.'Reason' was in fact a form of unreason. For example, since Alfred's 
constitution "was a written one", it "could never be forgotten". 
Nevertheless, it was also hidden or veiled in aristocratic mystery or 
complexity and, like God's divine Providence, was in need of interpretation, 
if not revelation, by a band of political virtuosos or saints. Thomas 
Evans' position as librarian of the Spencean society is probably indicat­
ive of this attitude. "Ignorance", especially ignorance of the constit­
ution, is "that magic spell" through which paganism binds nations, 
although it "is fast dissolving before the bright rays of knowledge".
But ignorance is not ignorance of the laws of progress, of a secular and 
open-ended future; it is ignorance of the cyclical laws of history 
or nations, of the Gothic balance, of the laws of God. The categories 
of light and darkness are also basically religious where darkness refers
56. Evans, Christian Policy, 11, 14, 15, 22.
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more to the forces of evil and corruption than to a lack of secular 
knowledge.^
It remains to analyse Evans' political economy. Given some
interpretations of his ideas, it is necessary to bear certain things in
mind. He puts heavy emphasis on the land problem and in more than one
place writes that all the troubles of the times are due to "the land
monopolists". His emphasis, in other words, is said to be economic
rather than political; land reform rather than political rights is the
central object of analysis. Yet, in some respects, his 'economic'
discourse is unexceptional. "The causes of all the evils" are the
national debt and taxation; they have "put the empire in jeopardy".
The abolition of the national debt and taxation would not only "produce
a written constitution", it "would establish for ever the fame and
glory of the government". At least in part, the causes of the present
evils are the monied interest, an over-burdened state and the lack of
constitutional reform. In this much there is very little disagreement
between Evans and, say, John Cartwright or other writers of a similar
ilk. At most, it would seem, it is the mechanism - economic rather
than political - or the means rather than the ends where any difference
lies. This tends to be borne out by further analysis. Evans, for
example, does not go much on monopolies. Yet the com trade is "this
productive monopoly" suggesting no deep-rooted ideological opposition
to monopoly or to its internal logic. And besides land, there were
additional forms of property Evans wanted to 'nationalise'. As with
other believers in the Anglo-Saxon myth, it is also likely he stood
"for state intervention in the market against laissez faire". More to
the point, given the social and economic structure of the period, the
item was hardly likely to be high on his political or ideological
agenda. But it is certain the state had an important role to play in
society; it is also certain that, like others, Evans did not focus
his attention on productive relations. The problem was how to "promote
consumption". Quoting the ditty "for forms of government let fools
58contest", he implies the answer is economic rather than political.
This does not mean Evans ought to be taken at his face value,
Evans, Christian Policy, 14, 32.57.
58. Evans, Christian Policy, 23, 28, 29ff, 4, viii; Hill, "Yoke" 120.
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that is understood in a modern sense, any more than should his statements 
about property be interpreted in the light of modern preoccupations.
The way to increase and shift consumption, he says, is not a different 
form of government but through the return of property "into the hands 
of the people". Not government but "property, and property alone ... 
gives power and influence, and wherever people are deprived of it 
they are slaves". Not universal suffrage but property gives people 
their liberty and independence. "The government", he says, "should 
secure property to every individual: this is clearly demonstrated by 
France and America" since "America cannot be conquered" because "every 
man's house was his own to fight for". When reading these words what 
needs to be kept in mind is not only the wide rather than the narrow 
conception of property but also the mythic underpinnings of his 
thought. There is a difference betwen "natural property" and other 
'cultural' types of property. Evans looked for no more than an 
"agrarian commonwealth". This is what attracted Robert Southey. Unlike 
many of his contemporaries although he vilifies them Southey does not 
totally despise the Spenceans since their scheme "is that the soil belongs 
to the state and that individuals should rent their land ... from their 
parishes". They permit, he adds, "every kind of private property except 
in land". Private property in general was, Evans says, in a sense sacred;
subjects had a right to rebel against governments who "dissipate their
+ „ 59 property".
Regardless of differences over the ways and means of reforming
society, then, Evans' central concern with land as the original source
of wealth was not fundamentally at variance with the opinions of
other Radicals. Land was original in two senses. Land was original
in that it was the first or primary force of production and consumption
It was also original in the sense that it emanated from God who was
"the proprietor of the earth". He gave to the people "a possession in
60land for ever"; the land is "the People's Farm". From this premiss 
it followed land differed from other forms of property because it was 
sacred. Rights in land were therefore natural rights as was political 
liberty upon which the re-possession of the land also depended. The 
people would only be free when they had regained the land. To effect 
this Evans called for "a national partnership, beginning with the
Evans, Christian Policy, viii, 12, 20, 31.
Evans, Christian Policy, 8, 14.
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parishes". Taking statements of this kind as a key to Evans' thinking, 
not only socialist historiography has put him among the founders of 
socialism. Yet close reading shows the idea of a national partnership 
has some surprising elements in it. "A national parnership of territory, 
allottedby nature to the people", involves
dividing profits as rents among all the people, 
like the profits of a trading company to all 
the partners; or the dividends of the interest 
of money lent, like the subscribers to the nat­
ional debt; or the dividends of the East India 
company, which are on this principle..
Dividing "the rent or produce of the land" was better than 
dividing the land itself into small plots. This idea of land 
'nationalisation' or municipalisation makes Evans a suitable candidate 
for inclusion in the socialist hagiography. That he has more than a 
few blemishes or shortcomings is plain from the analogies he uses.
The idea of a partnership and analogies taken from trading companies 
and joint-stock companies are scattered throughout his writing. A 
modern day socialist would hardly dare use such examples. For Evans, 
writing in 1816, in a completely different mental, social and economic 
environment the ideological reverberations were faint. Under the pre­
factory system, trade and manufacture was largely carried on through 
"purely personal business ownership through private firms and partner­
ships". Until 1825, joint stock companies were, strictly speaking, 
illegal "except by means of separate private Acts of Parliament".
Only in Queen Victoria's first year of reigning was "a tentative step" 
taken towards "more general recognition of the joint stock system". 
Limited liability in Evans' day was non-existent; and so on. What also 
follows is that neither can Evans be absorbed into any middle class 
or 'bourgeois' tradition in the way Paine sometimes is. It follows too 
from the fact that not only did "the principles and policy of the 
first Christians" demand that "real or permanent property be held in 
common" as in a "partnership" or "a joint-stock company" but the 18th 
century church also held their "lands and buildings" in common and "not 
of individuals". If anything, Evans held to a kind of religious 
corporatism, or at most co-operation or co-ownership. Real property was 
not only the land and the buildings that stood upon it but also grain, 
clothing production and the mines. In short, all the articles of 
consumption closely connected with subsistence and with agrarian rather
61. Evans, Christian Policy, 21.
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than industrial production.
Since the aristocracy have sequestered landed property it follows
the biggest sinners are the aristocracy. They are singled out for special
attention. "Landlords ... and landlords only are the oppressors of the
people", although it seems later this statement is modified. The
landlord is "a robber ... a monopoliser of the earth" who "dispossesses
his brothers" and "seizes on the gift of the common Father". Blame for
the disorders that have disturbed English society during the last fifty
years is given to "the accumulation of about three hundred families,
who have engrossed nearly all the land and houses of the three kingdoms".
Unable to spend this wealth rationally, the aristrocracy have promoted
wars "to extend the system of funding". While in obvious political
disagreement with Burke, Evans shares his concern regarding the
structure of consumption and the key role the aristocracy play in this.
At times, though, the mercantile interest are associated with the
aristocracy’s social and economic sins. The monarchy opened the
political system by including people with "property from industry"
to balance the influence of the crown against that "of the feudal lords".
Evans seems to be referring to the merchant interest; and in the long
term the move does not seem to have paid off. For it is "the avarice of
our landholders and merchants", not manufacturers, who have suffered
from the recent wars, who are condemned. Evans also seems to separate the
6 3aristocracy from "gentlemen and freeholders" or gentry.
Given this vilification, it is surprising to find Evans thinks 
his millenium can come about and abolition of the national debt and 
taxation "would not disturb the relative classes". As he quotes,
"orders and degrees jar not with liberty but well consist". The 
aristocracy have a clear role:"let them retain their rank, and be put 
in their proper place under the crown and be paid for their services".
The monarchy is also safe since "the head of state would be preserved 
in the proper place and order". Under the new agrarian commonwealth, 
the nobility and the monarchy are to get sums out of the public revenue. 
The crown gets £20 million; the nobility and the clergy £5 millions 
each and there is a sum of £20 million set aside for compensation as well
6 2 Evans, Christian Policy, 14; Cole and Postgate, Common People, 292- 
294.
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197
as other expenses. The generosity of this provision can be guaged from
the fact that the "balance remaining" to be divided among the people
amounts to £75 million. The other balance that remains is obviously
64the political or Gothic balance or constituion.
This table is reprinted in a pamphlet called Christian Policy 
in Full Practice Among the People of Harmony, published in 1818 where he 
develops further some of his ideas on political economy. In this piece, 
there is hardly any reference to the Alfredian myth, but given the dates 
of publication and composition, and given what was said about John 
Baxter's publications, there is no reason to suppose any radical break 
with the ideas expressed in the 'previous' work, in his Salvation 
pamphlet. At the time when Evans wrote, Harmony was a town in 
Pennsylvania inhabited by a Lutheran sect who had emigrated from 
Germany after splitting off from the main body of Lutherans. They held 
their land and goods in common and Evans feels they provide a good 
example of how Spencean principles can be put into practice. He takes 
his information from two writers who had published accounts of their 
visits and sojourns to Harmony.
'Natural' or agrarian economies have different levels of devel­
opment and it is clear, despite the small population, that the agrarian 
commonwealth prevailing among the people of Harmony is of the complex 
variety. By 1811, the population was eight hundred persons. Their 
constitution was "grounded on Acts iv, 32", which read, "and the multitude 
of them that believed were of one heart, and of one soul; neither said 
any of them that aught to the things he possessed was his own, BUT THEY 
HAD ALL THINGS IN COMMON". In the case of Harmony, this went far beyond 
ownership of the land and seems to have included the whole of the means 
of production and consumption. There was an inn, a huge barn, an oil- 
mill, a blue-dyers shop, a tannery, a saw-mill, a store-house, a brewery, 
stables, a fulling-mill, a hemp-mill, a grist-mill, a warehouse, a 
winery and, of course, a church or "meeting house". The Harmonites also 
owned a wool-carding machine and six spinning jennies, and "in the 
weaving house sixteen looms were at work, besides several warpers and 
winders". In the "spinning house" were "two roving billies and six 
spinning jennies" operated by young girls who sang church music as they
64. Evans, Christian Policy, 25, 29, 33.
198
performed their tasks. Also mentioned is "the soap and candle-works; 
the dye-works.; the turners, carpenters and machine-makers". A "Labyrinth" 
or "elegant flower garden" and a "Botanic Garden" get mentioned, suggest­
ing that not only should nature be used but also appreciated and 
studied.^ The scope and complexity of the economy is further revealed 
in the list of occupations. The Harmony community’s "operative members" 
are made up of,
one hundred farmers, three shepherds, ten masons, 
three stone-cutters, three brick-makers, ten carp­
enters, two sawyers, ten smiths, two waggon-makers, 
three turners, two nailors, seven coopers, three 
rope-makers, ten shoe-makers, two saddlers, three 
tanners, seven taylors, one soap-boiler, one brewer, 
four distillers, one gardener, two grist-millers, 
two oil-millers, one butcher, six joiners, six 
dyers, dressers, shearers, §c, one fuller, two 
hatters, two potters, two warpers, seventeen weavers, 
two carders, eight spinners, one rover, one 
minister of religion, one schoolmaster, one doctor, 
one store-keeper with two assistants, and one tavern
keeper with one assistant...oo
Clearly, the political millenium with its hatters, is very far
from being a return to a primitive past where only the simplest of
occupations and the minimum of culture prevails. If still in some
sense a 'natural economy' it is of mercantile complexity. Myth only
uses the past to recreate the present and the simple is only opposed
to aristocratic complexity and their "excess" of culture. This gives
milleniums and millenial ideas their rationality, and even their appeal.
In a sense, they merely purify existing society. "The Harmonites", we are
told, know nothing "of balls, masquerades, and expensive dissipation -
of horse-racing, cock-fighting, and every species of gaming, 'swearing.
lying and debauchery'". The "simple and devout" people of Harmony are
ignorant of these activities "in which the 'higher orders' of Europe
are so thoroughly skilled". The Harmonites approach something like
moral perfection; they live "securely and abundantly, without jails,
6 7workhouses, or courts of law".
Thomas Evans, Christian Policy in Full Practice among the People of 
Harmony..., (London, 1818), 2, 3, 5.
Evans, Harmony, 8.
6 7 Evans, Harmony, 8, 12.
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The key to this is the common ownership of land and its division 
into "joint stock-farms in which all are equal partners of the benefits 
produced by their own labour". There is "common exertion and common 
right in the benefits of nature. In detail, this means,
The town is subdivided into lots of a quarter
of an acre each, and every family has its own
house and lot, with a couple of milch cows,
and as many hogs and poultry as they choose to
keep. The rest of their provisions, and their
clothing, is furnished by the Society; in
return their labour falls into the common stock.
Hence every family is, in effect, independent
within itself, as far as domestic arrangements
are concerned; and they are all united at the
same time, in a body, the joint effect of whose
is irresistible.,,.-------------  oy
This passage needs to be studied with great care. First, with 
regard to the question of hegemony it is important to note independence 
is far removed from its aristocratic and gentry ideal and is related 
to the common ownership but private use of land. There is a domestic 
or private economy and there is a public economy. Something vaguely 
like an idealised version of the Bolshevik's N.E.P. - also the product 
of a semi-industrial society - but with different ideological under­
pinnings. The family, as an illustration of the latter point, far from 
being a bourgeois blot upon society is given Christian-mythic pride of 
place. Another aspect that needs to be interpreted with care are 
Evans' statements concerning labour's share of the product. He develops 
the few cursory remarks made in his earlier pamphlet. Under the regime
of the Harmonites, "industry" gets "the just possession of the fruits of 
70its own labour". He has, then, something like a labour theory of
value, although it would be a mistake to label it "socialist". Once 
again we are in the realm of "germs" and "traces", and it is dangerous 
and misleading to centre too much attention on a single concept or 
idea without placing it in relation to other ideas and statements with 
which it appears, that is without seeing it as part of a paradigm - some 
sort of totality. Initially, Evans labour theory of value, if it deserves 
to be credited with that title, has to be seen in relation to the ideas
63.
65.
70.
Evans, 
Evans,
Harmony, 13. 
Harmony, 8.
Evans, Harmony, 8, note.
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mentioned above, to a particular idea of independence, of property, of 
the family and so on. Also, the property to which it is related is either 
landed property or property with an agrarian origin or dependence. And 
what robs "industry" of the fruits of its labour is not profit but tax; 
taxation is the source of exploitation. This is the only possible 
reading in the light of his statements in the earlier tract. The 
significance of the ’silences' must also be grasped. Apart from the 
omission of any discussion of profits, there is nothing on the factory 
system as a problem, on industrial capital, on a class of entrepreneurs - 
Mai thus is only an apologist for the landholders - on surplus value in 
relation to production.
Connected with some of the points just made is the question of 
Evans' 'materialism'. One of Evan's travellers reports that the basis 
of the Harmony Society "is religion". The principles which bind the 
Society together, he says, are "LOVE TO GOD; GOODWILL TOWARDS MEN; PURITY 
OF LIFE; AND A COMMUNITY OF GOODS". Evans comments that he is "palpably 
in error". The Harmonites purity and perfection are based on their "mode 
of holding ... property". Their "morality, happiness, and religious 
devotion ... arise altogether from the ease with which their wants are 
supplied from their common farm". What Evans is referring to is the 
mechanism of social change and the basis of social institutions. In this 
sense he is a kind of materialist, yet it is a mistake to then go on to 
point to his modernity and his secular frame of mind since his categories 
of thought, are fundamentally mythico-religious and 'pre-industrial'.
This comes out even more clearly in his "Spence's Plan or 
Agrarian Fellowship", attached as a sort of appendix to the Harmony 
pamphlet. Evans begins by reaffirming that a plan of agrarian fellowship 
would leave "the established forms or administration of a country" 
undisturbed "either in church or state, provided it be Christian". But 
in the next sentence he declares "all permanent property ... held by 
feudal tenure" should be transformed into "the common farm of the 
people". Included are "the whole territory of land, waters, houses, 
mines, fisheries, canals, bridges". This list is not too different, in 
its exclusion of moveable property, from land plans of Henry George who 
wrote in the late 19th century and who was more liberal than socialist. 
There are other resemblances, too. Evans reasserts his belief that 
landholding should be run by small communities on the parish model and 
have the status of "a body corporate". What George seems to have taken 
from the Spenceans is the idea that the land be let privately "on leases".
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Each leaseholder is "allowed to let to tenants at will". Generously,
for the nobility, "present occupiers" would have "preference where they
choose to retain possession". In return for leasing the property from
the state, the leaseholders would pay a rent. Although Evans says
taxes would be abolished, and this seems to be true so far as direct
taxes on commodities go, it is clear the rent is no more than a property
tax in disguise, and it will fall only on land, not on other forms of
property. There is to be a written constitution which among other
things will contain provisions for making secure "persons and properties".
It is also clear the expenses of the state will not be small. A fair
amount of the surplus got from the rents will go towards administering
public property and to "national affairs", that is "individuals should be
awarded salaries or pensions according to their rank ... and support of
their quality, like the dignitaries of the church". In addition there
are to be "parish charges" for repairs to the buildings and so forth
and there would be social welfare payments to the poor. Monies are also
needed for courts, universities, schools, judges, clergy, the army, the
navy and so on and so on. It could almost be said civil society dissolves
into the state rather than the other way around and this puts Evans closer
71to Burke than to any kinds of 19th century liberalism.
Another aspect more consciously expressed in "Spence's Plan" is
Evans' deism. There is, he says, "one universal church of God". This,
"the love of the Deity" was revealed to the world "first through the laws
of Moses" and then through "the gospel". Deism, the principle of "one
God", one church, one community and so on is pitted against "the gates
of hell or the pagan system". Private property in land is part of the
latter since it is a form of individualism or plurality. Agrarian
fellowship or holding the land in common is a form of one-ness or
unity since what is communal is not fragmented or individual, it is not
partible. Agrarian fellowship is also Providential since it is "the
express will of God as declared in the Scriptures". Unlike the present
pagan system it is "original" and not "polluted". Intermingled with all
this 'religious' talk, is a language of "luxury", vice and so forth.
"Harrington and Spence" appear side by side with references to Moses and 
72Adam.
71.
72.
Evans, "Spence's Plan of Agrarian Fellowship" in Harmony, 14. 
Evans, Harmony, 15-16.
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Before I leave Evans, it is perhaps worth trying to reinforce
an argument made earlier. In the "Plan", Evans draws attention to
the "excessive labour" of the working classes, low wages and the
hardships resulting from the Combination Laws. But again, it is
not a class of employers who are responsible. Taxation and the
national debt, the fact that the working classes "pay away their
„ 73last farthing in taxes , is to blame.
Yet again we have found less of a Frenchified revolutionary 
and more of the English constitutionalist, in terms of political 
ideas. The constitution is an inheritance handed down from 
Alfred's Saxons. Glimpses have been found in Evans and perhaps 
they are more than that, of how the notions of custom and 
patriotism could be turned against the ruling classes, could 
be anti-hegemonic. In the two publications examined, the millenial 
concept or theme is perhaps the strongest. Yet is has been shown 
that the millenium is a strictly English affair brought about by a 
patriot king. Heroes and villains abound in Evans' writing.
A strong theme in both pamphlets is land redistribution. 
Evans arguments on redistribution, as we saw, rest on natural 
rights, but also on virtue and custom. His 'problematic' is still 
the pattern of land ownership, luxury and taxation. Yet his 
criticism of the gentry is qualified and he wants a reformed 
aristocracy rather than having it done away with altogether.
The reformed society is also to be carried out by a benevolent 
state with a wide-ranging social welfare policy. His analysis 
generally is still more 'political' than 'economic'. Further, it 
has been shown that the analysis of political society is under­
pinned by a 'religious' metaphysic of purity and pollution and 
by a mythological language of a golden Saxon past, of origins 
and revelation.
THOMAS SPENCE
Thomas Spence would seem to be an odd choice to include 
in a thesis that is ostensibly about the myth of the Anglo-Saxon
73 . Evans, Harmony, 16.
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constitution. He barely mentions it, and a number of writers have 
also drawn attention to his secular cast of mind. So the questions 
put to Spence are similar to those asked of Evans. Is he a 
modern; is his thought secular; is his analysis 'economic'; 
is he a socialist? Is he modern in his thought rather than 
Gothic? What role, if any, do the 'mercantilist' concepts of 
virtue, natural rights, custom and so on play in his thinking?
What role, if any, do the mythological concepts of purity/ 
pollution, culture/nature, origins and so on play in his thought?
Although there are obvious differences in the ideas of Evans 
and Spence, not least in Spence's rejection of the myth of the Anglo-Saxon 
constitution, similarities are more significant and many opaque or 
elliptical expressions in Evans are given greater clarity in Spence's 
more prolific writing. Even though Spence rejected the Anglo-Saxon 
myth, it is pertinent to paraphrase Pocock's comment on Paine and say 
that the manner of Spence's rejection is paradoxical in that some kind 
of 'acceptance', some common mode of discourse and thought is also 
involved. Related to this question is the general drift of scholarly 
comment and criticism on Spence; his alleged modernity, his allegiance 
to this or that interest or social group. Evaluation of the historio­
graphical literature will bring out the effects of my methodology. Unlike 
the other writers or ideologues so far considered, there is in what 
follows no attempt at a really close analysis and reading of Spence's 
writings.
Given these intentions and concerns, little needs to be said 
concerning Spence's background or biography. Spence is somewhat better 
known than the other figures appearing in this chapter and has been the 
subject of Olive Rudkin's biographically-based work, as well as receiving 
attention in histories of this or that aspect of Radicalism, Despite 
the fact that he has vaguely lower "middling" origins, Spence's own 
later work experience establishes his artisan credentials. Regarding 
an audience, "his writings were not intended for scholars" or for any 
others from a 'refihed' social background. His own reading, however, 
gives the appearance of being fairly wide-ranging.^
74.
On Spence's background, personality and ideas, apart from Olive Rudkin, 
see e.g. E.P. Thompson, Working Class, Cole and Postgate, Common 
People and Place Papers for contemporary views of Spence.
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The significance of what Spence read and thought is best 
understood in the light of historiographical interpretation. For 
Christopher Hill, "Spence's view of the origin of property ... has a 
strong affinity to the Norman Yoke", although it is through his idea 
"of the parish as a unit of self-government" that his debt to the 
tradition is strongest. The most careful Marxian commentary on Spence 
comes from P.M. Kemp-Ashraf and it is worth considering her arguments 
in some detail. She plainly states that Spence "uses the word 'rent' 
in the sense of 'profit"'. Since Spence wrote during the beginnings of 
industrial capitalism he is best seen as a transitional figure. While 
following in the footsteps of the 17th century Radicals, he also departs 
from their ways and manners of thinking. Crucially for Spence, land is 
"the means of industry", meaning agrarian capitalism, while he is said 
to speak more often of labourers than of tenants. Not only does he abhor 
exploitation through the ownership of land; he also hates "commercial 
avarice generally". Consequently, "the intention is to make the sources 
of wealth, as well as all primary subsistence, common property ... 
unlike most land reformers". She alleges, "Spence's scheme confiscated 
all industrial establishments and their major equipment". For support, 
she leans on Spence's statement that the mines "and many other great 
Concerns" could be "enjoyed in Partnership". He is also said to have 
been even more modern than this in his ideas. Large-scale industry 
was to become "public property" and "if not managed by the Parish as a 
whole, to be run by 'corporations' of workers collectively". Land 
collectivism encompassed "these large industries intimately associated 
with land tenure but already long-established on capitalist lines". From 
this "there is not a great step to the concept of workers' ownership of 
the means of production". Had Spence been able to foresee "the further 
results of the industrial revolution" he would have developed these 
ideas more fully. Regarding Spence's ship allegory in Description of 
Spensonia, we are told that "the ship is not only an allegory for the 
general partnership in land" but since it takes the place of nature is "a 
model for any enterprise involving a more complex division of labour". 
Spence, moreover, "was not opposed to the division of labour". And the 
"dividend" paid out of rent income "stresses the conception of the 
parish as a joint stock corporation which was a common enough idea in 
later workers' co-operatives". We are informed that "private property 
is abolished" and that Spence showed "no desire to restore the old 
peasantry". To a large extent he turned his back on the 17th century 
Radicals and "gave the land question a new content". Unlike the Levellers,
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he did not attack feudalism but rural capitalism; his critique was 
against "mixed government or the bourgeois republic". Consequently 
he has a relatively modern perception of social class. Using Spence’s 
statement that "all Riches come from Society, I mean the Labouring Part 
of it", he gets credited with a labour theory of value in which only 
the working class "is socially creative". Spence alone, among the 
British Radicals, grasped "the economic basis of society" in "its full 
significance"; although he "did not define capitalism nor see its 
existence with the clarity of the next generation". There is also 
Spence the political revolutionary. He was opposed to the idea that 
reform "could be realised through any of the recognised constitutional 
procedures". He is said to have "vacillated between the idea of a revol­
utionary elite ... and the spontaneous uprising of the people". He is an 
egalitarian and a 'leveller', although, strangely, he is said to have had 
"more regard for the Republicans - Milton, Harrington, Sidney, Vane". 
Spence's "appearance" is to be connected not only with "the problems of 
the age" but also "our own". Another writer, Olive Rudkin, sees Spence as 
following "French fashions" in "drawing up constitutions"; his Spensonia 
aimed at "greater definiteness and exactitude" in his political thinking. 
She also sees logical connections between the ideas of Spence and Robert 
Owen; the latter 'develops' Spence's doctrines. For another writer, 
it was through the publication of Evans and Spence that "the French 
Revolution was finally 'naturalised' and anglicised"; at this time English 
Radical ideology "acquires ... a certain universalism from French example". 
In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels label Spence a communist in 
company with other English communists or socialists such as Owen and 
Thompson. This view is repeated by Patricia Hollis. "For the Spenceans", 
she says, "property was theft ... private property was the enemy and land 
nationalisation the remedy". Spenceanism gets "woven into the Cobbett 
historiography of land stolen by feudal lords", although the followers 
of Spence were basically, ahistorical and did not discuss "how the system 
originated". In place of a critical Radicalism that "described the poor 
as poor because the Government exploited them as consumers" the Spenceans 
attributed poverty to the fact that "the poor ... as producers had been 
dispossessed of the land"; while the land plans of Spence were "more nearly 
communitarian". Another author finds in Spence an "anti-capitalist bias" 
and fearful of "the spread of commercial relations into rural society".
On religion, Christopher Hill discovers Spence's "secularisation" of
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"Winstanley1s demand for a heaven on earth".
The general drift of critical commentary on Spence is clear; it 
is not a case of attacking straw men. The first task is to produce a 
counter-argument. My initial assertion or proposition is that if he is 
against "commercial avarice" he is certainly not against commercial 
relations as such. He is not so much against private profit but rather 
against commercial greed or an 'excess' on the grounds of a Christian- 
inspired ethics, not because of any economic theory. Exploitation is 
related to land ownership, not to the ownership of industry which he plans 
to leave virtually untouched. Regarding the land itself, the idea of 
a partnership is ambiguous as it must be at this state of economic 
development; the idea is drawn from business as much from anywhere else. 
Even the collective partnership in land does not seem to extend beyond 
the parish; this tends to make it 'corporative' rather than communistic.
Any suggestion of the large-scale nationalisation of industry and workers' 
control is pure anachronism and speculation. All the quotations that 
Kemp-Ashraf uses to back up these claims are taken from later writers.
Her reference to "small independent producers and little capitalists" 
is more to the point. Perhaps even more than the labourer it is these 
sorts of people that Spence had in mind in his plans; in most instances the 
labourer would become transformed into one of these types. An alternative 
interpretation of Spence's ship allegory tends to confirm these proposit­
ions. The ship itself is only land. In Spence's description there is 
nothing comparable to it in terms of fixed assets so it does not provide 
a model for any enterprise. Also, the organisation of labour on board 
certainly does not posit "a classless society of working people". As 
Kemp-Ashraf herself puts it, the dividend paid by the parish is only a 
way of "partially" levelling income differences. And, as she perceptively 
writes, in contrast to most other commentators, "to call Spence a land 
nationaliser assumes too much". In keeping with this is his limited
Hill, "Yoke", 61, 109-110; P.M. Kemp-Ashraf, "Selected Writings of 
Thomas Spence" in Essays in Honour of William Gallacher, (Berlin,
1966), (eds.) P.M. Kemp-Ashraf § Jack Mitchell, 271, 272, 273, 274,
275, 276, 280, 282-3, 291; J. Ann Hone, "William Hone", also sees 
Spence as a political revolutionary; Olive Rudkin, Spence, 74, 178, 
191-3, 196; Williams, Artisans, 108; Patricia Hollis, The Pauper 
Press, (Oxford U.P., 1970), 212, 213, 214; P. Robilliard, "The Works 
of Ogilvie, Spence and Paine on the Agrarian Question...", Hons. Thesis 
A.N.U., 1977, 96, 98-99. See also, more recently, Prothero, Artisans 
and Politics, 88, where "his advocacy of the common ownership of land" 
still "guarantees him a place in 'the history of socialism"'. But, 
Thomas Knox, "Thomas Spence: The Trumpet of Jubilee" in Past and 
Present, No.76, August 1977, 75-98 esp. 79ff is one of the few writers 
to itake an attempt to come to grips with Spence's religious ideas.
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criticism of "rural capitalism". He got no further than a critique of 
mercantile capital, and even here great care is needed in exegesis.
Spence's statement that "All Riches come from Society, I mean the 
Labouring Part", definitely does not refer to a proletariat; or, come to 
that, even exclusively to artisans, journeymen and so on. A farmer or an 
entrepreneur might equally belong to "the Labouring Part". Spence 
did not go along with Locke in agreeing that the labourer was "an 
extension of the proprietor's person". But, on the whole, his theory 
of value, such as it is, was much closer to Locke's conceptual framework 
and experience than it was, say, to Marx's. He is much more a critic of 
mercantile 'capitalism' and its political system of Old Corruption than 
of modern capitalism. From this angle, he can neither represent "a 
consciously working class point of view" nor reject the new "liberalism" if 
only because, as Kemp-Ashraf says, his ideas were "often expressed as 
condemnation of the old order". The vocabulary of "reason, enlightenment 
and independence" can hardly be construed purely in terms of the separation 
of the working class from all other classes, as an expression of freedom 
from the obligations that went with a low social status. If this is 
involved in the ideal of independence, there is usually much more at 
issue not least the relationship to 'property'. More acceptable, is 
Kemp-Ashraf's suggestion that Spence took as a model for independence or 
"self-government and economic planning" the "well-attested experience of 
the common people in organising their numerous clubs and benefit societies". 
It was at this level the working classes expressed themselves, but if 
Spence is to be given credit for "first bringing the labourer onto the 
scene as an active class-conscious political force", it must still be 
asked against whom or what class antagonism it was directed. It was 
against the aristocracy and rich merchant; not against the small 
industrialist. Similarly, if it is true that Spence considered "the form 
of government less important than property relations",it still needs 
to be heavily qualified. At one point, Kemp-Ashraf says she wants to 
"connect his appearance with the problems of his age and sometimes 
with our own". Both these exercises are valid but it has been my argument 
that the former have been miscast, that the contemporary problems which 
Spence faced have been miscast. In part this has been because the 
problems of the present have interfered with interpretations of the 
past. Spence's "appearance" or ideas are relevant to the present time, 
but not in the way imagined. To understand their proper connection it 
is vital to start from the principle of difference rather than a 
metaphysic of sameness.
* See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, (London 1972),
136, 142-44, 151, 161, 306":
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This metaphysic does not seem to have interfered with the 
historical sensitivity of P.A. Brown who again has perceptive things 
to say on the subject, if only in a very general way. He assigns to 
Spence "something near to socialistic doctrine" on the grounds that 
national prosperity depended upon the poor "who do all the work, while the 
rich enjoy all the benefit". But as he recognises, this was far 
removed from what came later. "There is", he writes, "a gulf, wide and 
deep, between such hazy views and the doctrine which the theoretical 
Socialists of the early nineteenth century adopted from Ricardo". There 
was no attack on property by the reformers of Spence's generation and 
Spence himself "deliberately rejected more general schemes of socialisation, 
arguing that they involved rigid equalisation". The Radicals of this time 
centred their criticism on "high prices, rents and taxes" and had no 
"general theory" either "cause or cure". Reform was not related to the 
social and economic structure or environment but "lies through politics"
- even for Spence. The break occurs with Charles Hall and the Ricardian 
socialists and Lovett and Bronterre O'Brien, who had read Rousseau, 
Robespierre and Babeuf, and are of a different cast of mind, stressing 
economic reforms, the labour theory of value and class antagonism between 
"the worker and his masters". Another way of putting this is to say 
it is a shift in focus from the state to civil society reflecting the 
very real change that had taken place in the balance of classes and 
economic development. The most that could be claimed for Spence as part 
of this shift, for Spence the 'socialist', is to see him as some kind of 
co-operator. If Jones took the trade club as his political model,
Spence and Evans took the benefit societies as their economic model. 
According to Olive Rudkin, the parishes were to operate as a "federated 
group of benefit societies whose directors were to be elected from and 
by shareholders". While this is close to the ideals and practice of the 
co-operative movement, it might also go some way to explaining why 
Spence was reluctant to make many inroads into industrial property.
Another reason, though, is that Spence saw private industrial property 
as moveable property and therefore as something socially fluid. It is on 
this question, as well as on industry in general that Spence's thought 
is to be distinguished from Robert Owen's ideas. It is the significance 
of property in land that Patricia Hollis seems to miss. Property in 
general was not theft because it was only agrarian private property that 
was to be 'nationalised'. Also, to take the argument further, it is 
necessary to specify what Spence and others meant by land nationalisation. 
It was to be based on the parish. And the parish was to own the land 
as a partnership or joint-stock company through which the parishioners
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would receive a dividend from the rents or taxes paid by the users of 
the land. This is a far cry from modem socialist schemes of land 
nationalisation. If there is a communitarian element in Spence it is 
based on parish government and trade club and friendly society organisation. 
There are similar problems in placing Spenceanism in relation to the
ic1830s model rather than in relation to the older 1819 paradigm. First, 
Spenceanism was part of the '1819' scene. Second, Spence's own model 
was, to a large extent of the '1819' type. Third, if Spence's explanat­
ion related the theft of land to origin and to history it was not an 
explanation of the Anglo-Saxon myth type. Fourth, both Spence and '1819' 
saw land as a source of exploitation; both saw taxation as a form of 
exploitation. Fifth, Spence did not, as a later Spencean Allen Daven­
port did, explain taxation in terms of a labour theory of value 
pertaining to land ownership and capital. Sixth, the '1819' ideology, 
drawing as it did on trade club traditions, was not purely individualistic 
yet at the same time Spence's thinking contained elements of individual­
ism. And, to deal with criticism from another source, neither do we 
find any deep-seated anti-industrial or anti-capitalist feeling or fear 
of the spread of commercial relations into the countryside. Despite his 
agrarian bias, Spence is not a primitivist. Neither is he a modern; as 
has been said of his trying to ape the new French Constitution, he is
copying a scheme "which he does not understand"; he is observing it
76through the darkened glass of English political conceptions. Not all 
of the historiographical points raised have been countered or answered; 
for example, those dealing with Spence's attitude towards revolutionary 
violence and his religious beliefs. These and others will be raised 
again in examining parts of Spence's ideas and language. So far only 
counter-propositions and hypothesis had been advanced. Evidence and 
illustration are also needed.
A recent writer finds Locke at the core of Spence's beliefs.
Showing again how Locke could be made to turn intellectual somersaults 
to suit the whims of his audience, Spence is said to have "invoked 
Locke's theories of property to justify the end of the existing property 
structure". Unless there is an attempt to elicit contradictions, this 
is perhaps suggestive again that the Locke versus Harrington paradigms
P.A. Brown, The French Revolution in English History, (London, 1918), 
202, 203, 204, 205; Rudkin, Spence, 68-9, 178; Hollis, Press,
212ff, 252.
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break down at the level of popular ideology. There is evidence that
Spence had read both writers. At his trial Spence cited a very long
piece from Harrington's own defence at his trial, and one writer puts
Spence's land bias down to "the influence of Harrington and the
Physiocrats"; Harrington was "the one writer who had a real influence
on Spence". Spence's publication, Pig's Meat, is said to contain more
extracts from Harrington's writings, from Oceana and Political Aphorisms,
than from any other author. Spence himself called Harringon's writings
"a valuable collection of general political principles, or fundamental
truths in government". Yet the 'influence' or relationship is complex.
Spence's belief in the ballot box, in a property qualification for voters,
in paid members of parliament, in the 'Gothic' balance between competing
social forces are all put down to Spence's reading of Harrington. At
the same time, it is argued "the trend of Harrington's thought was
77political" while Spence's was "economic".
But there is evidence which suggests Spence was also thoroughly 
acquainted with the doctrines of Locke and somehow managed to merge or 
blend the two writers' political thinking into some sort of coherent 
whole. Ironically, he not only sold Burke's publications from his stall 
but when arrested Spence had in his pocket "a book of extracts from Locke". 
He once said, "Locke's Essay on Government and many other eminent works 
as well as the Bible have contributed to strengthen my confidence in this 
my Millenial Form of Government". The sting is in the tail of this 
remark. Both Locke and God, Spence says, and by God he means the Book 
of Revelation, prove men have natural rights which cannot be taken away 
from them. Added, then, to Harrington and Locke is Spence's deep reading 
of the Bible, something we know he did from early childhood. With the 
exception of the Revelation which he "had studied", it appears his 
reading was of the Old Testament writers. His ideas were certainly 
inspired by Biblical prophecy, Moses being the favourite. His belief 
that land originated in common was also traced back to this source.
He also used the reports of travellers who had been among the Eskimos 
and the Red Indians to validate and illustrate his arguments. Robinson 
Crusoe, was an obvious influence as well. This back to natural origins,
John Dunn, "The Politics of Locke in England and America in the 
Eighteenth Century" in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, 
(Cambridge U.P., 1969), (ed.) John Yolton, 68-9; Olive Rudkin, 
Spence, 19-20;
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or ’primitivism’ was no doubt reinforced in Spence's mind by the books
and pamphlets of writers like Paine and Volney. The latter seems to have
been a particular favourite. Selections from Volney appear in Pig’s Meat
and in Spence's Letter to Ralph Hodge. His first prosecution occurred
because he was selling Paine's pamphlets, although Spence always claimed
he formed his ideas and coined the phrase "rights of man" long before 
78reading Paine.
All this is but a part of Spence's reading, and Volney and Paine 
have been mentioned in particular since they point to Spence's basically 
anti-historical frame of mind even though we know he read a number 
of historical works. The monopoly in land, Spence says, cannot be 
justified by historical tradition or customary right" "this right 
ancestors are not supposed to have over posterity". Natural rights 
are what count. Yet it is not a purely logical argument he goes in for. 
There is also a clear indication he is speaking of rights which have been 
usurped in the dim and distant past. The people needed to take 
possession of their "long lost rights". Civilisation "is founded on 
conquest" and conquest gives rise to private property in land. On more 
than one occasion he specifically mentions "William the Bastardite" and 
refers to "a Banditti". Yet there is no sense in which Spence appropriated 
the Anglo-Saxon myth as a whole and it is true he "never spoke of Saxon 
liberties like Major Cartwright ... or Thomas Evans". Like Paine, he 
rejects the positive side of the Gothic mind. Like John Baxter, Spence 
sees the Saxons as the illegitimate conquerors of the ancient Britons 
but unlike Baxter he does not then go on to point to the degeneration of 
the Britons' polity or describe in glowing terms the laws enacted by 
Alfred. More significantly, the Saxons and the Spartans' polity, among 
others, are rejected as models since they operated a system of petty- 
freeholding. Rents or taxes from commonly-held land hold the answer to 
the present troubles. The division of land into small privately-owned 
plots is ineffectual since presumably the land can be bought and sold and 
some of the little plots will be turned into big holdings. At the same 
time Spence accepts other Gothic conventions of argument such as that the 
system of Old Corruption established itself as a system at the time of
A.W. Waters, The Political Works of Thomas Spence, (Leamington Spa) 
67; Olive Rudkin, Spence, 16, 18, 79, 80, 85, 235; The Giant Killer 
or Anti-Landlord, No.2, August 13 1814, 10; Pig's Meat, Vol.I, 69.
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79the 1688 Revolution.
In fact, Spence’s general political language or vocabulary, like 
Paine's, is replete with mercantilist assumptions. It also contains 
the assumptions or ideas characteristic of a mythical mode of expression. 
In harmony with a society where industry and economic relations were 
dependent on the natural or agrarian cycle, Spence organises his thinking 
around the dialectic which exists between culture and nature. As with 
other Radical writers, these categories are plastic - as they are in pre­
literate myth. He is no unmitigated 'primitivist’. Yet, like others, 
much in his writing favours nature over culture and the country over the 
city, although this does not make Spence's ideas anti-capitalist or anti­
commercial. "The Savages in Greenland, America and the Cape of Good 
Hope" are better off than most men are under civilisation. Culture and 
civilisation were bad, or rather imperfect, since "in proportion, as the 
comforts of life encreased by Man's Labour and ingenuity, so did the 
rapacity of Men encrease to rob each other". This leads Spence on to a 
criticism of luxury and the aristocracy. "All from Noah to Abraham were 
Architects of Nobility, that is of powerful Impiety, Confusion ... 
Warfare, Hunting". His millenial polity, "Spensonia", is agrarian rather 
than urban. He refers to the "beauty of the countryside" and it has 
"the air of a garden". Spensonia is a series of "gardens and orchards". 
In the same work, Spence argues for racial equality and the rights of the 
American Indians. But while the Indian had "his native independence" 
he also "sighed for the domestic happiness of a civilised life". Again, 
there is ambivalence towards civilisation; again it can only be resolved 
or explained by resorting to the 'Machiavellian' or mercantilist idea of 
excess. "Reading", he says, "promotes refinement and sensibility, and 
Taste for Elegance in Clothes, Furniture and Every Department in Life". 
Reading, then, produced a desire for the Georgian "good life"; there is 
no simple antithesis between, say, aesthetic Radicals and epicurean 
Whigs or Tories. And given the desires that reading created, "Trade, 
Manufactures, and the Arts must needs be greatly encouraged" for "all
Nations ... have naturally a taste and strong desire for foreign
80productions and luxuries".
Rudkin, Spence, 38, 76; Place Papers , 27808; T. Spence, The jlook 
of Bobs: being a serious caution to the Pensioned Tribe of Albo, 
(London, n.d.); Kemp-Ashraf, "Selected Writings", 276.
Place Papers , 27808; T. Spence, The Restorer of Society to Its 
Natural State, (London, 1801), 10, 24; T. Spence, "Description of 
Spensonia"in Thomas Spence (ed.) Waters, 53, 84, 89.
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Paradoxically, even luxuries had to be natural; they had to conform
to the rules of natural beauty; they had to have a certain simplicity
about them. The correspondence between the natural and the simple appears
yet again. An interesting illustration of this comes in the form of a
fragment from Henry Fielding's Amelia, in praise of innocence, which
Spence quotes in the Giant Killer. Innocence, a Christian virtue, is
said to be close to purity; it is also close to simplicity. In religious
or mythical terms, all these values are brought together and related to
nature in the fable of the Garden of Eden to which Spence often referred.
Above all, the Garden of Eden myth is about innocence, simplicity and
purity and their association with nature. Spence modelled his "Spensonia"
on Eden which, like the former, was a "millenium on earth", a "system of
simplicity". Since Spensonia was also a system of government, it followed,
millenial-like, that government and its mechanism should be ordered by the
principle of simplicity. There would, he wrote, be "one simple tax":
a land tax. What is also noticeable is the association of simplicity with
unity or one-ness. An illustration from Spence's simplified alphabet
reads "the Lord our God is one God". The sentiments of one-ness and
simplicity connected together religion, politics and language. The
aristocracy, aristocratic complexity, dated from Ham, the son of Noah,
and he was also responsible for "the confusion of languages". It was said
in a review of Olive Rudkin's book on Spence, in 1927, that Spence's land
reform and his ideas on spelling reform and language were "very diverse"
81measures. In fact, they were all of a piece. Language, religion and 
politics all had to conform to the laws of nature. The law of nature was 
not merely a logical device but rooted in the everyday world of 
experience. "While I was in the wood ... agathering of nuts", he writes,
the Forester popped through the bushes upon
me to ask what I did there. I answered, gathering
nuts. Gathering nuts, said he, and dare you say so?
Yes, said I, why not? Would you question a monkey 
or a squirrel about such business? And am I to be 
treated as inferior to one of those creatures? or 
have I a less right? But who are you, continued 
I, that thus take it upon you to interrupt me? I'll 
let you know that, said he, when I lay you fast 
for trespassing here. Indeed, answered I, but how 
can I trespass here where no man ever planted or 
cultivated? For these nuts are the spontaneous 
gifts of nature ordained alike for the sustinence 
of man and beast that chuse to gather them and 
therefore they are common. I tell you said he,
Spence, Giant Killer, No.2 5; No. 1, August 6 1814, 3; Times Liter­
ary Supplement, June 9 1927.
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this wood is not common. It belongs to the Duke 
of Portland. Oh! my service to the Duke of 
Portland, said I. Nature knows no more of him 
than of me. Therefore as in Nature's store-house 
the rule is 'First come, first served', so the 
Duke of Portland must look sharp if he wants any 
nuts.g2
The question to put, in the light of historiographical
interpretation, is does Spence, like Volney, have a relatively secular
idea of nature. There is also the further question of the character
and significance of his religious attitudes in general. Some indication
of this has already been given. In his early days Spence attended the
meetings of a religious sect known as the Glassites. They "hold the
theory of the community of goods" in which "everyone was to consider that
all he had in his possession was liable to the calls of the poor of
their church". Belonging to the Dissenting tradition, their religious
practice was highly ritualised. At one time the Spence family was
also a part of the congregation of John Murray whose Sermons for Asses
8 3was one of Spence's favourite texts.
His plan, he said, would bring "political salvation" or "the 
millenium". The Revelation and the words of the prophets "figuratively" 
described the coming of the millenium and therefore the scriptures had to 
be contemplated or interpreted to discover how a "New Heaven or New 
Earth" would arise. One interpretation was that God had given the land to 
mankind "in common", and that this would be returned when the millenium 
arrived. Acting the part of the political saint, Spence declared that 
"the Millenium" would arise "from my poor Cranium". Spence emphasises, 
though, that he does not "in the old-fashioned manner attempt to preach 
and pray the World into Justice and tenderheartedness". Instead, he 
seeks "good laws and Constitutions". These can only be achieved by 
"rational Creatures" using God's help. It has rightly been pointed out 
how Benbow's National Holiday echoes Spence's "millenarian tone". There 
are certain 'forward-looking' or utopian elements in Spence's thinking. 
But unlike later, more socialistic, ideas there is no notion of a 
programme or strategy, to say nothing of the fact that his ideal society 
is sanctioned by God's will. His belief in the immediacy of his 'plans'
Cited in Rudkin, Spence, 44.
A. W. Waters, Political Works, 1; Rudkin, Spence, 21-22; Thompson, 
Working Class, 39.
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is strikingly millenial. The public mind would be suitably prepared "by
reading my little Tracts". The "New Republic" would "instantaneously
arise in full vigour". It was the same as God saying "let there be
light and it shall be so"; the people had only to say "let the land be
ours" and it would be so. This quotation also points to another sense
in which the formal characteristics of Spence's thinking differed
paradigmatically from what came later, or had been earlier in France.
His 'enlightenment' was not the unaided reason of the human mind but
84"the glorious light of Revelation spread more universally".
Similarly, his views of the family suggest a pre-socialist and 
perhaps a pre-modern frame of mind. The family has an important role to 
play in production and is a sacred institution. The Spensonian 
Commonwealth "encourages filial piety". In Spence's millenium there is 
little adultery or promiscuity. Significantly, rights in land use are 
passed from father to son. Spence's only measure to foreshadow later 
developments in this area is his proposal for easier divorce. But the 
main point to notice is that rights and laws in general, the total 
constitution that is, are divine. Rights such as "Equality, Liberty,
Safety and Property, natural and acquired" are "sacred rights" in the 
literal sense.^
Property rights were, of course, not to the fore in later Left- 
wing thinking neither were they associated with the more radical elements 
in the French Revolution or Jacobinism. But if the simple equation 
between violence and Jacobinism is made, then there are signs that Spence 
at one time leaned towards the violent overthrow of government. In 
The End of Oppression he calls for the people "to take immediate possession 
of the whole of Landed Property". One of his publications refers to the 
"French Constitution". Yet too much cannot be read into this. Soon 
after the Oppression pamphlet, Spence issued his Recantation in which he 
played down his suggestions of violence. In any event, the inspiration for 
his ideas on "Insurrection", once "the Government violates the rights of 
the people" can be seen in Locke just as his millenium draws its inspiration 
from Harrington and Thomas More rather than from any French example. He
84 Waters, Political Works, 65; Spence, 47, 48, 78, 90, 109, page numbers 
refer to Description of Spensonia, The Constitution of Spensonia; 
Kemp-Ashraf, "Selected Writings", 286-7; Spence, Restored, 32. see
also John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, (Blackwells 
edn. Oxford 1956), 11, 105-6, 109-111, 113 for Locke's views on 
revolution. See too, Vernon Snow, "The Concept of Revolution in 
Seventeenth Century England", in The Historical Journal, Vo 1.2,
1962, 173-4 which is suggestive of how paradoxically, Lockeian language 
has its own "Machiavellian moment".
Kemp-Ashraf, "Selected Writings", 305.85.
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wants "no massacre, no warhoop for an ignorant Rabble". His revolution is
to be brought about by "the irresistible force of Reason". Like John
Baxter, and many other Radicals, Spence "only contemplates civil war as a
last resort". Or, as one of his contemporaries wrote, Spence’s ideas and
plans were formed and in some cases published "before the French
Revolution". Consequently, "it is not true", as it is often alleged, that
86Spence took his doctrines "from the theorists of that time".
Spence is also a patriot in both meanings of the word. He does
not believe in any universal ownership of land; land is to be held on
a national basis. The principle of defence and non-interference is also
proposed. The "Spensonian Commonwealth" does not interfere with the
government of other nations and it "does not suffer other nations to
interfere in its own". All the English colonies would be declared
independent states but still get "the protection the Mother Country
can afford". Insisting that he is not a Jacobin, Spence points out that
the Jacobins have "no Country, they arose like a Mob". For Spence, as
8 7for other Radicals, England is the chosen country.
The degeneration of the French Revolution into Bonapartism had 
tended to suggest that the type of government did not matter much as 
far as virtue and justice went. "What does it signify whether the Form of 
a Government be Monarchical or Republican while Estates can be acquired", 
Spence argued. "Private property in land" was the source of corruption.
But if Spence broke with other Radicals who looked to land-sharing on a 
petty-bourgeois basis as the answer to the world’s problems, it cannot be 
argued he gave no weight to traditional constitutionalist arguments and 
solutions. Laws and a constitution were needed to maintain the balance of a 
good society. The two "Guardian Angels" of the Spensonian constitution 
were "Voting by Ballot" and "The Universal Use of Arms". Neither did 
Spence believe in cheap government as an ideological precept. Implement­
ation of his plans would lead to "the National Government to provide for, 
next the Provincial, and lastly the Parochial, before anything could be 
divided". He is also preoccupied with the National Debt. His ’problematic’ 
is the existence of high taxes out of which pensions and the whole system
Spence, The End of Oppression ,.., (London, n.d.); Spence, Spence's 
Recantation of the End of Oppression, (London, n.d.); Waters, (.
Political Works, 48, 98 , 115; Place Papers,27808, folio 304.
Spence, Constitution of Spensonia, 90, 109; Spence, Giant Killer,
No.7, 14.
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of corruption and state power is supported.
Tax is still central. "My Commonwealth", Spence writes, is 
"supported by one simple Tax which is the Land Tax". Things such as 
"stamps and duties" go against "the kind intentions of the deity".
With "one simple tax", the government "would have no occasion to raise 
any Revenue Trade", and there would be no customs offices. It cannot 
be emphasised too strongly that taxation, land and consumption remain 
central to an understanding of Spence's thinking. He insists he makes 
no claim against property in the form of cattle, merchandise and the 
like. "For we have nothing to do with anything but the land", 
he says. "Not only personal and hereditary Lordship", which gives 
political rights or dominance, must be destroyed - and this was all that 
some Radicals wanted - but also "the cause of them, which is Private 
Property in Land", which gives economic rights or dominance. The latter 
is "the Pillar that supports the Temple of the Aristocracy". Yet Spence's 
paradigm break, if it is that, is minor rather than major. Suggesting 
that we are still within the realm of some sense of natural economy, 
his argument runs that private property in land is wrong. The accumul­
ation of land by some, by the few rather than the many, means others are 
deprived of the fruits of nature and thereby of the means of subsistence. 
Private ownership of land threatens the right to life. Since life is 
the gift of God private ownership of land is more than a political 
misdemeanour, it is a sin. In any event, in a natural economy the 
produce of the land depends upon "the fruitful seasons" and these are sent 
by "God-Almighty". And giving subsistence, land also provides the 
basis for independence: there is further evidence of 'Harringtonian'
or are they 'Lockeian' elements in Spence's mentality. Rights in land 
give independence and therefore are also the source of political 
personality. This is brought out through an event which happens in 
Crusonia . The idyll is disrupted because of population pressure which 
creates a shortage of land. Independence is threatened and political 
society replaces the previous natural society. Government is necessary "to 
keep the Peace, and to determine what people might call their own", 
that is to fix their property rights. As mentioned before, rights in land 
use could be passed on from father to son. In return Spence believes 
high rents should be charged by the parish to farmers. This would prevent 
large farms and monopoly in land. He seems to believe in free competition 
among the farmers as a safeguard against the exploitation of consumers
Waters, Political Works, 40; Spence, A Letter to Ralph Hodge from 
His Cousin Thomas Bull, (1795).
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through high prices. But it is not very helpful to read any ideological
commitment to the free market principle in this. Similarly, any nods
he makes in the direction of a labour theory of value must be treated with
caution. Attacking Paine's Agrarian Justice, he argues that "the labouring
classes first produces provision, and then the demand of their families
creates a market for them". They create consumption: "consumption
created by the mouths, and backs, of the poor despised multitude". Tax
and consumption rather than profits and production are the main targets.
Honest profit and capital, or what might be called natural profit and
capital, are legitimate. Spence is, typically, against "the traffic in
Stocks" but for "honest Trade and Manufactures"; but against "the
Monopoly of foreign Trade" and "monopolizing Companies". There should be
89free competition in foreign trade both within and between countries.
The exact nature of Spence's views on land, capital, government and 
culture are brought out nicely in an exchange of views between Spence 
and Charles Hall, also often described as an early English socialist. 
Spence, writing in 1807, points out how, under Hall's scheme,
the great Farms would be broke down into 
small allotments ... You seem to be sliding into 
the system of Sir Thomas More's 'Utopia' wherein 
he makes every kind of property the property of 
the nation and the People obliged to work under 
gang-masters ... a state of Barbarism and Slavery ...
Would you have us all become Goths and Vandals and 
give up every elegant comfort of life. But we may 
rest contented that this may never be without 
another universal Deluge . ..^
Once again, Spence is rejecting 'primitivism*. He is also 
simultaneously rejecting the division of land into small private plots 
and the take-over of all forms of capital and property by the state.
Hall replies that he wants "to go back a good way towards our natural 
state" and only wants to keep "the coarser arts" and "certain sciences". 
Unlike Spence, Hall believes property in land should be equal. Under 
Spence's plans, "farms are let by auction for the highest Rent they will 
bring". Given he does not want to interfere with personal or industrial 
wealth this implies the more efficient and wealthy farmer would get 
richer. Hall sees this and argues that Spence's land plans are not as
Waters, Political Works, 40; Spence, The Real Rights of Man,(Newcastle, 
1775, reprinted 1795, 1796), 297-307; Spence, Crusonia, 305.
Rudkin, Spence, cited 132-34.
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radical as they at first seem. We must go back to primitive equality,
"we must return as being the most natural and simple" ...
Your plan seems to me too complicated ... you 
mean to establish an equality as to the real 
property ... You leave all personal property 
untouched and consequently, if my suspicions 
are just, the landed property is only 
partially divided.^
The validity of this criticism, when compared with previous
historiographical interpretation, can be guaged by a close look at
Spence's general views on class and society. In that Spence has a class
enemy, it is the aristocracy. Added to them are the other 'classes' or
ranks connected with the system of Old Corruption and living off
aristocratic exploitation. Like Evans and other Radicals, Spence is
happy to keep the monarchy, if in a different form from the reigning
Georgian monarchy. "We know that Kings existed in Sparta for many
centuries in company with Iron Money and small divisions of Lands". So,
"let not Royalty despair". And the "Revolution" will spare the aristocracy
and gentry "their Lives, and also their Money, Plate, Jewels, Furniture,
Apparel, Cattle and moveable Effects of Every Kind", and even extends to
those things directly connected with land. The aristocracy can keep its
"corn and cattle" and will still be "the richest part of the community".
But they could no longer collect their rents. The landlords compared
themselves "to manufacturers" but while this kind of profit was legitimate, 
92rents were not. As Spence saw it there were "four classes", so-called, 
who would be "thrown out of employ" by his "Constitution". They were,
First, Landlords and Stockholders, who subsist 
luxuriously on Revenues ... and are called Quality 
and Gentry ... Secondly, Lawyers, Attorneys §c who 
subsist almost entirely by conveying Landed Prop­
erty ... Thirdly, Gentleman's Servants. Lastly,
Soldiers and Sailors, employed in War.^
There is no bourgeoisie in sight. Neither is there anything in the 
form of class consciousness or a conception of equality that is recognisably
Rudkin, Spence, cited 132-34.
92 Waters, Political Works, 47, 54; Rudkin, Spence, 39.
93 Spence, Restorer, 26.
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socialist. The "General Forces of the Commonwealth", for example, "are 
to be composed of the whole people" but similar to Cartwright's proposals, 
there is to be a "difference of ranks". Yet opportunity is equal. In 
Crusonia, there are "all Degrees of People" but "you may frequently hear 
a fond Mother carressing her Darling Boy and crying he will be an Admiral, 
General, Senator or any great Officer she pleases and yet none will 
contradict it ... if his Merit be sufficient". Spence's concept of 
liberty, like his concept of equality, also seems to be pre-socialist. 
Liberty is not so much something positive, or the means to self-fulfill­
ment, it is "that power which belongs to a Man of doing everything that 
does not hurt another", defined by the maxim "'do not to another what 
you would not wish done unto yourself"'. Similarly, he does not go 
beyond the idea of the "people" as a vehicle of liberation and the 
reorganisation of English society. It would be an act of anachronism 
to stick the label 'liberal' on all this, as well as being a mis-reading 
of the ideological context. Leftwards, the most that can be claimed for 
his beliefs is a sort of vague pre-industrial or agrarian socialism. 
Despite his attack upon Hall, Spence wanted to go backwards - he wanted 
a return and a restoration. Like other Radicals of his generation, he 
wanted a return to a 'neo-Harringtonian' position of a land-based 
independence. "No little masters to be seen now", in 1795 that is,
"no medium; but very great and very little; very rich and very poor". 
Before the enclosures, "when you had your cow, and your sheep, and your 
geese, §c. you had then little occasion for money"; that is "you had 
little rent, and little taxes to pay, you could speak like an honest 
man what you thought without losing your situation". To regain this lost 
independence and liberty Spence pleads for "a repossession of our 
former common". Probably nothing could be more anachronistic than to
describe this situation as a form of land nationalisation and to attach
94socialist connotations to it.
The point, then, was not to turn proletarians into communists, 
but to turn them back into petty 'capitalists'. This comes out clearly 
in Spence's allegory about a ship. Aboard the ship, even the ordinary 
seamen are petty capitalists. They are sort of sub-contractors who rent 
"a portion of Stowage Room for their goods". Turned into independent 
men, sailors would "become quite another set of people than they are 
at present". From a "desperate careless and reprobate character ...
94 . Spence, Crusonia, in Kemp-Ashraf, 305, 324; Waters, Political Works, 
96.
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they would become provident and sober ... in short Citizen". There
would still be ranks. Those who sail in the ship elect "one fit
to be captain, another to be a mate, another a carpenter 8»c". Each
is to get his reward "according to station and agreement". The
'rent'or "net profit of the voyage" is "shared equally among you
all \>?ithout respect to any office". But each person receives
"the wages of his station". Spence also obviously does not think
in terms of a shared austerity since he tells us in dishing out the
net profit or rent "they shared very considerable dividends". Again,
though, the idea of co-operation, the co-operative movement that is,
comes to mind more than any suggestion of an ideological defence
of capitalism, despite the fact he wants to reward effort and promote
free trade. But there are always limitations. His general
'philosophy' is perhaps summed up in his "Crusonian Creed". It
reads, "All Men to Land, may lay an equal Claim/But Goods, and
Gold, unequal Portions frame,/The first because all Men on Land
must live;/The Second's the reward industry ought to give". In
Spence's ideal society "trade is perfectly free". Yet in Spensonia,
although free trade "has been established" the Spensonians have
satisfied their wants and do not go "scrambling and fighting"
after foreign trade in the manner of an expansionist Empire. Of
equal interest, in this light, is the fact that Spence, unlike
other Radicals,supports the "Old Culture" against the Protestant
rulers who "are always preaching up Temperance, Labour, Patience
and Submission". A careful reading will find no Protestant ethic,
no unmitigated defence of free trade and the market principle,
but equally no defence of the socialisation of private property,
only a 'symptomatic' use of the labour theory of value, no concept
of class consciousness or equality that can be called socialist
and yet no unalloyed pro-agrarianism. What can be found are a set
95of assumptions and concepts that can be called mercantilist.
Lastly, then, and perhaps even moreso than with the other 
writers this 'case study' has attempted to put Spence back in his 
intellectual and ideological context by emphasising the old 
fashioned or archaic elements in his thinking. Through an 
examination of his reading both Locke and Harrington are suggested
95. Waters, Political Works, 54, 82-3 (Description of Spensonia).
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as important influences in shaping his thought, and even, perhaps 
Burke. But so is the Bible. So, though I have found a 
problematic concerned with land and commerce and natural law 
and excess, Spence's religious background and a mythological 
substructure of culture/nature is crucial in understanding his 
mind. And, as I hope I have made clear, all these things stand 
in the way of seeing him as any kind of socialist. Millenialism, 
including England as the chosen spot, tax and the reluctance to 
interfere with the private ownership of industrial property have 
all been shown to undermine attempts to see Spence as one of the 
first socialists. But then it was also shown that there is a 
'silence' or absence of concepts that could relate his views to 
modern liberal ideology. He is simply not a modern in any of 
these senses.
GRAVENOR HENSON
The last organic intellectual or representative figure, 
whose ideas are worth close analysis, is Gravenor Henson. Historical 
writing on Henson has been concerned with the question of whether 
or not he was a Luddite. When his ideas have been considered, it 
has been mostly with this question in mind. Either his ideas are 
radical and Luddite, pace Thompson and others, or they are 'liberal' 
in that they foreshadow collective bargaining as in Church and 
Chapman and Thomis. Again, my interest is in paradigms rather 
than politics. What follows is another 'interrogation'or 
questioning of Henson's two main books or texts in terms of virtue, 
natural law, custom, and mythological concepts of origin, heroes 
etc. and the nature of his political economy and his religious ideas.
Henson left prison at the same time as Thomas Evans and 
was earlier said to be connected with Luddism, a movement that 
in some areas arose "out of a crisis between paternalism", 
that is mercantilism, "and laissez faire". There is not sufficient 
space to do full justice to Henson's ideas, or to go into his 
biography and background or to raise the question of his 
involvement with Luddism. His artisan credentials are well- 
established and his connection with Luddism unresolved or
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a matter of controversy. The thing to note, for present purposes, is
that Lockeian precept would allow constitutionalism to incorporate the
right of violent resistance to the established order in defence of the
people's liberties and customs. Luddism was a movement that sought its
legitimacy in the past; a constant harking back to the past is also
a feature of Gravenor Henson's writings. General Ludd's Triumph called
for "full-fashioned work at the old fashioned price ... established
by Custom and Law". Ludd did not threaten "the honest man's life 
96and Estate".
On the face of it, Henson's writings would seem to belong to a 
later period when the myth of the Anglo-Saxon constitution had become 
the mental property of the middle class and assumed a different 
historical role. A Few Remarks on the State of the Laws, an investigation 
into labour law written with George White, a clerk at the House of 
Commons, at times sounds a modern or a least 1830s style 'socialist' note. 
Yet much in this book refers back to the time of Elizabeth to buttress 
arguments the authors put forward. In Henson's other book, The Civil, 
Political and Mechanical History of the Framework Knitters, a labour 
theory of value is not so evident and although there is in both works 
a vein of class consciousness similar to, say, Cobbett's, many statements 
the History could have been taken from the political pamphlets of the 
latter part of the 18th century or the early 1800s. Although first 
published in 1831, there is an earlier manuscript draft dated 1829 and as 
Stanley Chapman says Henson's ideas were set around the turn of the 
century and "form the foundation" of his History. It would seem, then,
Thompson, Working Class, 583-4, 591, The debate on Henson's 
political position and his connection with Luddism, together with 
material on Henson's background is in this work. For additional 
biography and an opposing view on Henson's connection with Luddism 
see R.A. Church and S.D. Chapman, "Gravenor Henson and the Making 
of the English Working Class" in Land, Labour and Population in the 
Industrial Revolution, (eds.) E.L. Jones and G.E. Mingay, (London, 
1967). See also, Malcolm Thomis, The Luddites, (Newton Abbot, 1970), 
esp. 137.
224
by th e  1830s Henson i s  no lo n g e r  a " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f i g u r e "  s in c e  h i s  
id e a s  a re  more t y p i c a l  o f  e a r l i e r  y e a r s .  Yet he i s  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  
t h i s  e a r l i e r  tim e and even by the  1830s h i s  id e a s  have a b i t  more v a lue  
than  m erely  " s u r v i v a l s " .  S im i l a r l y ,  h i s  G othic  language i s  more than  
merely symptomatic b u t  i s  a moment o r  "an a c t i v e  and c o n s t i t u e n t  
p r i n c i p l e "  in  h i s  th o u g h t .  For th e se  rea so n s  Henson i s  in c lu d e d  h e r e .  
What i s  g iven  i s  m erely  a sm all sample o f  h i s  i d e a s .  I t  does n o t  do 
j u s t i c e  to  the  h i s t o r i c a l  o r  p h i l o l o g i c a l  i n t r i c a c i e s  in v o lv e d  in  h i s  
la n g u ag e . ^
So f a r  as my re a d in g  o f  H enson 's  w r i t i n g s  have gone, any Lockeian 
o r  M a c h ia v e l l ia n  language , t h a t  i s  to  say a v o c a b u la ry  o f  n a t u r a l  law 
and v i r t u e ,  comes th rough  in  th e  form o f  a ssum ptions  r a t h e r  than  b e in g  
e x p l i c i t .  I f  th e r e  i s  any dominant 'p a rad ig m ' i t  i s  custom. L i b e r t i e s  
and laws a r e  ro o te d  in  custom r a t h e r  than c r e a t e d  by a c t s  o f  v i r t u e  
o r  s a n c t i f i e d  by n a t u r a l  law. H enson 's  w r i t i n g s  show th e  id e a  o f  custom 
cou ld  be used  n o t  to  su p p o r t  a r i s t o c r a t i c  hegemony b u t  to  c h a l le n g e  i t .  
Henson seems to  have b e l ie v e d  in  e v e ry th in g  Burke b e l i e v e d  in  even, 
u n l ik e  P a in e ,  championing th e  c h a r t e r e d  r i g h t s  o f  th e  towns and companies 
bu t he saw in  t h e i r  o ld  documents o r  c h a r t e r s  te s ta m e n ts  o f  l i b e r t y  
r a t h e r  than  rank and h ie r a r c h y .
But good laws r e q u i r e d  " g en iu s"  o r  " v i r t u e "  to  frame them, and 
what p a t r i o t  monarchs such as E l iz a b e th  and A lf re d  had , b u t  was 
la c k in g  in  l e s s e r  k ings  and s ta te sm e n .  In a p assag e  o f  B urkeian s e n s ib ­
i l i t y ,  Henson r e l a t e s  how E l i z a b e t h ' s  " s t a t u t e  o f  s e r v a n t s " ,  l i k e  the  
Anglo-Saxon c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  i s  "a m a g n if ic e n t  r u i n ,  p a tc h e d  and deformed" 
b u t  l i k e  A l f r e d ' s  c o n s t i t u t i o n  founded on v i r t u e ,  i t s  s p i r i t  h idden  
by th e se  d e f o r m i t ie s  from th e  eyes o f  th e  p e o p le .  The e x i s t i n g  law 
and c o n s t i t u t i o n  was m erely  the  s u p e r s t r u c t u r e  h id in g  th e  r e a l  o r  
"genu ine"  a r t i c l e  from th e  p o p u la c e .  S im i l a r l y ,  i n  th e  same c o g n i t iv e  
mode t h a t  i s ,  lu x u ry  c o r r u p ts  th e  framework k n i t t e r s '  company and 
b r in g s  abou t i t s  d o w n fa ll .  "Pomp" and "a  sumptuous f e a s t "  and o th e r  
a r i s t o c r a t i c  v ic e s  le a d  to  i t s  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n .  A lso , l i k e  Spence, 
a l though  l e s s  a r t i c u l a t e d ,  Henson seems to  have a n o t io n  o f  a Mosaic 
o r  n a t u r a l  law in  which land  was h e ld  in  common o r  in  sm all  p l o t s ,  b u t
S ta n le y  Chapman " I n t r o d u c t i o n "  to  Gravenor H enson 's  The C iv i l  
P o l i t i c a l  $ M echanical H is to ry  o f  th e  Framework K n i t t e r s  in  Europe 
and A m erica, (N ottingham , 1831, r e p r i n t e d  w ith  new I n t r o d u c t io n  
Newton Abbot, 1970), x - x i ,  xv.
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on th e  whole H enson 's  argument i s  conducted  in  term s o f  laws which e x i s t
98in  E n g l ish  h i s t o r y  and a re  custom ary .
Yet i f  a p a r t i c u l a r  n o t io n  o f  p r o p e r ty  and independence a re  
a l s o  supposed ly  a s s o c ia t e d  w ith  M a c h ia v e l l i  and Locke, th en  th e r e  a re  
o th e r  s ig n s  t h a t  H enson 's  id e a s  a r e  s t i l l  r e f l e c t i v e  o f  a s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  
which a l s o  fed  th e  th o u g h ts  o f  th e s e  two w r i t e r s .  Henson uses  th e  id e a s  
o f  p ro p e r ty  and independence to  champion th e  a r t i s a n s  a g a i n s t  the  
p r e te n s io n s  to  hegemony o f  th e  r u l e r s .  For Henson, th e  a r t i s a n ' s  
p ro p e r ty  and th e  b a s i s  o f  h i s  r i g h t s  were h i s  to o l s  and h i s  t r a d e .  "A 
workman", he w r i t e s ,
i s ,  g e n e r a l ly  s p eak in g ,  a man w ith o u t  c a p i t a l ; 
h i s  t o o l s ,  though n o t  h i s  own p r o p e r ty ,  he 
c o n s id e r s  in  g r e a t  measure h i s  e s t a t e , when he 
has a p p l ie d  any in v e n t io n  to  them; and he f e e l s ,  
when d ep r iv e d  o f  h i s  t o o l s  and h i s  improvement, 
th e  same b i t t e r  pang as a nobleman would, shou ld  
h i s  e s t a t e  be overwhelmed by th e  s e a ,  o r  swallowed 
up by an ea r th q u ak e
A workman re g a rd e d  h i s  t o o l s  and h i s  s k i l l s  and th e  knowledge 
t h a t  accompanied t h e i r  use as p a r t  o f  h i s  p e r s o n a l i t y  o r  p r o p e r ty .
S ince Henson uses  th e  word " e s t a t e " ,  th e s e  gave him n o t o n ly  p ro p e r ty  
r i g h t s  in  h i s  job  b u t  in  s o c i e t y ,  j u s t  as  th e  a r i s t o c r a t ' s  e s t a t e  
gave him s o c i a l  r i g h t s  and s t a t u s .  At th e  same t im e , Henson r e a l i s e s  
independence cou ld  n o t  be g u a ra n te e d  u n le s s  th e  working c l a s s e s  had 
some acc ess  to  lan d .  A f te r  Queen E l iz a b e th  had subdued th e  a r i s t o c r a c y ,  
th e  lower c l a s s e s  " d e s t ro y e d  th e  e n c lo s u re s  and d e c la r e d  th e  lan d  should  
be one common" and from t h i s  tim e th e y  were c o n s id e re d  "as  men having  
r i g h t s " .  Before th e  Norman Conquest,  th e  la n d  was h e ld  " in  sm all l o t s "  
and from tim e to  time th e  working c l a s s e s  had r e g a in e d  t h e i r  r i g h t s  to  
th e  land  in  one form o r  a n o th e r .
I f  th e  a r t i s a n  c l a s s e s  had a s ta k e  in  th e  co u n try  i t  would 
promote p a t r i o t i s m .  The v a lu e  o f  a commodity " a r i s e s  from the  la b o u r  
o r  s k i l l  bestow ed upon i t " ,  and , " th e  s p i r i t  and p a t r i o t i s m  o f  th e  
i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  a c o u n try  w i l l  be in  p r o p o r t i o n  to  th e  l i b e r t y  and means 
o f  s u b s i s te n c e  which th e  m a s te r  and s e r v a n t  e n jo y s " .  Good law s, laws
Henson, H i s to r y , 35, 69, 91 -2 .
Gravenor Henson and G. W hite, A Few Remarks on th e  S ta t e  o f  the  
Laws a t  P re s e n t  in  E x is te n c e  f o r  R e g u la t in g  M asters  and Workpeople, 
(London, 1823), 73.
1 0 0 . Henson § White, A Few Remarks, 47-48; Henson, H i s t o r y , 68, 75.
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which protect the trade, form"a national character” . The protection of
the trade evoked the strongest patriotic sentiments in Henson. With
apparent approval, he cites old laws through which "it is enacted that
no person shall wear cloth not made in England”, and demand that "foreign
merchants shall not import cloth under pain of forfeiture of cloth
and imprisonment". Henson himself was involved in getting Queen Adelaide
to wear a dress of "Nottingham machine-wrought bobbin net silk lace".
This act of "distinguished patronage" would promote aristocratic
consumption, it would introduce the native craft "to the notice of the
nobility and gentry" and "their patriotism migh induce them to prefer
a British wrought article in preference to foreign". The export of
machinery was an especial anathema, so much so that Henson relates with
approbation a law of 1719 which included severe penalties for this
offence including the loss of English citizenship, property and so on.
The rivalry with the French on this question is very intense. English
artisans working in France were "traitors" and "the French smiths were
the worst of all possible", while Frenchmen generally have "not common
genius in mechanical matters". Yet too much should not be read into
his anti-Gallicisra, since Henson welcomed "the Protestant Hugonots" (sic)
and the English artisans of an earlier period "were glad to accept them
as neighbours". Like Thomas Paine, he is critical of William of Orange
who introduced the system of corruption, ’,rwas ignorant of the laws and
customs of England" and "inaccessible to the working classes of England
whose language he did not understand". But patriotism blunted Henson’s
class consciousness. "'We are'", he writes, "'all embarked on the
same boat (our country) and we must sink or swim together'". Allied
with preceding Radical writers, he saw patriotism as a matter of internal
liberties and external defence, as the basis of a morality or "moral
economy” with only slight leanings towards any expression of cosmopolit- 
101anism.
In Henson's mind, this moral economy was based on the laws and 
customs embedded in English history, to which all Englishmen could 
subscribe. A fair "system of legislation" would give "the rich man full 
enjoyment of his wealth" and "the poor man a just and equitable price 
for his labour". In framing new labour law it was necessary to look
101. Henson § White, A Few Remarks, 25, 141; Henson, History, 89, 97-98, 
151, 436, xviii.
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to the past for assistance; such a system of cu£omary law would improve 
the moral health of the people as a whole, another sense in which Henson 
uses the term "national character". He relates how "by ancient law, a 
person must serve seven years apprenticeship”. The laws governing 
apprenticeship are crucial to "the morals of the country" and the 
"education and restraint of youth". Like other Radicals, Henson disting­
uishes between law as it exists in its corrupted form and law as it was 
and ought to be. Like Cartwright and company he has no time for lawyers 
and the complexity they give to law. He recounts the case of a group 
of workmen who took a lace manufacturer to court only to find "a series 
of legal appeals and delays" whereby "the case became entangled in a web 
of statutes and judicial machinery". The legal costs of industrial 
relations, "obstruct justice". Party or interest also prevent justice. 
"The same men" are "at once legislators, justices and landholders".
Lawyers are professionals in their pay. "To frame Acts of Parliament", 
then, there is a need for amateurs or "practical men ... who are aware 
of all the quirks which designing men take to evade the laws". Again in 
common with other Radicals, Henson distinguishes between the encrustations 
or corruptions of the spirit or original purity of the law, or between 
real and "genuine" or false and complex or mysterious law. "The 5th Eliz. 
Cap. 4th. is now the foundation of the laws of England respecting masters 
and servants" but, "from a change of time and their circumstances" the 
act has got "patched" and needs radical revision. Many of its numerous 
amendments alter its original spirit of intentions and tip the balance 
in favour of the masters. Wanting radical reform of the law, Henson also 
believes the original law was true law. Similar to Cartwright referring 
back to medieval voting procedures, he cites a law which "fixed ... the 
number of dishes to be served up at each baron's §c table and the value 
of them", and, he declares, "this is the law now". These original laws 
were the real basis of the constitution. As he says, concerning the old 
charters, "these charters were conceived in English law as the foundation 
of all written law, very little attention being paid to Parliaments, only 
to confirm them". The charters were, "venerated by the English and 
regarded as the cornerstones of their liberty and of their trade".
He adds, in a passage echoed by Bewick and Cobbett, that possession of 
these laws and charters has cultural consequences. The freedom of the 
English workingman is symbolised by what he consumes. If the free market 
system casts aside the charters he will find himself, like the Continental 
workman, swallowing "black bread and soup maigre instead of roast beef
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and plum pudding and good a l e " .  L a i s sez  f a i r e  has  a l r e a d y  made b ig
in ro a d s  and s in c e  the  Engl ish  workingman has  ga ined  h i s  freedom b u t  l o s t
h i s  l i b e r t i e s  a s l a v e  was b e t t e r  o f f .  At l e a s t  i n  s l a v e  s o c i e t i e s
t h e r e  were g e n e r a l l y  ’’laws which r e g u l a t e d  th e  food o f  s l a v e s  and t h e i r
t r e a t m e n t " .  Henson d e p lo re s  " t h e  ig n o ran c e  o f  the  laws which pervades
102t h e  working c l a s s e s "  and im p l i e s  a programme o f  p o l i t i c a l  e d u c a t io n .
The p h r a s e  "working c l a s s e s "  i s  common in  Henson’s v o cab u la ry  
and i t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  in  t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  p l a c i n g  o f  h i s  t h o u g h t .  His 
own l i f e  s u g g e s t s  some o f  the  problems in v o lv ed  i n  i n t e r p r e t i n g  h i s  ideas  
and h i g h l i g h t s  some o f  the  pa rad o x e s .  He was as  one t ime a p p r e n t i c e ,  
a r t i s a n ,  t r a d e  union l e a d e r ,  employer o f  e l ev en  journeymen,  and,  l a t t e r l y ,  
workhouse inmate .  One view s ees  i n  t h i s  exp e r i e n c e  Henson the  b e l i e v e r  
i n  e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p  and e n t e r p r i s e ,  w h i le  v i l i f y i n g  the  f r e e  market  
p r i n c i p l e ,  and wanting  to use  t h e  s t a t e  to  m o l l i f y  c l a s s  an tagon ism s .
He i s  seen  as a s o r t  o f  l a t e r  19th c e n t u r y  l i b e r a l  l i v i n g  b e f o r e  h i s  
t im e .  Yet i t  i s  r e a l l y  very  d i f f i c u l t  t o  make r a t i o n a l  h i s  b e l i e f  in  
e n t e r p r i s e ,  o r ,  b e t t e r ,  e f f i c i e n c y , and h i s  t o t a l  o p p o s i t i o n  to  a market  
economy. I t  makes more sense  to  pu t  Henson’s th ough t  and id e a s  in  a 
p r e - e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  c a p i t a l i s t  o r  m e r c a n t i l i s t  framework.  Both m as te r  
and s e r v a n t  had a common i n t e r e s t  i n  promot ing  e n t e r p r i s e  n o t  mere ly  
because  i t  would i n c r e a s e  wages and p r o f i t s  and g ive  a b i g g e r  s h a re  to  
competing i n t e r e s t s  bu t  r a t h e r  because  i t  would have an e f f e c t  on the  
consumption p a t t e r n  o f  the  g e n t r y  and a r i s t o c r a c y .  His aim was to  
promote t h e  w e l l - b e i n g  o f  t h e  whole t r a d e ,  the  t r a d e  b e in g  a k ind  o f  
o rg a n ic  o r  moral  community. The Nott ingham A r t i s a n ’s Chamber o f  Commerce 
- Henson was a l e a d in g  f i g u r e  in  i t s  fo rm a t ion  - i n c lu d e d  m a s te r  framework 
k n i t t e r s  as  w ell  as  journeymen.  The k in d  o f  e n t e r p r i s e  Henson p r a i s e d  was 
a r t i s a n  i n v e n t i o n  and ' e n t e r p r i s e '  i n  te rms o f  a r t i s a n  o r  smal l  m a s te r  
in d e p e n d e n c e . His c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  g e n e ra l  t r a d e  un ions  te nded  towards 
t h e i r  i n f r i n g e m e n t  o f  independence and l i b e r t y ,  n o t  t h e i r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
on p r o f i t .  The independence and l i b e r t y  o f  t h e  a r t i s a n  and smal l  
m a s te r  c o u l d  be gua ran teed  by a b e n e v o le n t  and c o r p o r a t i s t  s t a t e .  Henson 
was c r i t i c a l  o f  bo th  the f r e e  market  s c h o o l ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  " P h i l o s o p h i c a l  
R a d i c a l s " ,  and the  r a d i c a l  working c l a s s  movements. His com pla in t  a g a i n s t
Henson and White,  A Few Remarks, l l f f ,  40 -1 ,  4 9 f f ,  62,  104, 138, 157; 
Henson,  H i s t o r y ,  78-79,  89,  102, 104, 112, 148-9;  Church and Chapman, 
"Gravenor  Henson",  157.
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the  C h a r t i s t s  was t h a t  they  f o r g o t  to  mention th e  "laws and r e g u l a t i o n s "
103or  customs t h a t  "we are to  have from the  C h a r t e r " .
But i f  Gravenor Henson 's  c l a s s  c o n s c io u s n e s s  i s  b l u n t e d ,  i t  i s  
s t i l l  s i m i l a r  in  k ind  to t h a t  h e l d  by John B ax te r ,  Thomas Evans o r  
W ill iam Cobbe t t .  He f r e q u e n t l y  t a l k s  o f  the  j o i n t  i n t e r e s t  o f  m a s te r s  
and men. But,  " th e  law i s  now t o t a l l y  in  favou r  o f  th e  m a s t e r ,  and the  
end o f  i t  i s  t h a t  the maste r  i s  g r i n d i n g  down th e  workman". Yet he 
d e p lo re s  m achine-break ing  and says  th e  m a s t e r s  ought  to  r e c e i v e  p r o t e c t i o n  
from th e  law. At th e  same t ime he commonly e x p r e s s e s  a c e r t a i n  c l a s s  
c o n s c io u s n e s s  a g a i n s t  the  " m a s t e r s " .  As he s a y s ,  "why s u f f e r  maste rs  
a lo n e  t o  t ake  d i s h o n e s t  advan tages  o f  t h e  v e ry  fo u n d a t i o n  o f  S o c ie ty ,  the  
o p e r a t i v e  l a b o u r e r s " .  Not too  much s h o u ld  be a n t i c i p a t e d  i n  the  way o f  
a l a b o u r  t h e o ry  o f  va lue  h e r e ,  a t  l e a s t  in  i t s  s o c i a l i s t  g a rb ,  s in c e  
Henson u l t i m a t e l y  b e l i e v e s  i n  a s o c i e t y  o f  o r d e r s  o r  r a n k s ,  an o rg an ic  
whole in  which t h e r e  a re  "common i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  sh o u ld  b in d  man and 
man in  one r e g u l a r  g r a d a t io n  o f  s o c i e t y " ,  cemented by a system o f  
l e g i s l a t i o n  t h a t  would p r t e c t  th e  p r o p e r t y  o f  r i c h  and poor  a l i k e .
Yet ,  as  f o r  o t h e r  Radical  w r i t e r s ,  b e l i e f  i n  a s o c i e t y  o f  o rd e r s  o r  
ranks  i s  n o t  incom pa t ib le  w i th  an a c u t e  b u t  a m b iv a le n t  c l a s s  
co n s c io u s n e s s  a g a i n s t  the  a r i s t o c r a c y .  S ince  t h e y ,  r a t h e r  than  the  
b o u rg e o is  o r  middle c l a s s ,  a r e  seen  as t h e  r e a l  r u l e r s  o f  s o c i e t y ,  they  
a r e  t h e  main o b j e c t  o f  a t t a c k .  Henson i s  aware t h a t  t h e  con temporary  
a r i s t o c r a c y  i s  no t  a feuda l  a r i s t o c r a c y  s in c e  Henry VII " p u t  the  
f i n i s h i n g  s t r o k e  to  the  power o f  th e  b a ro n s  by a b o l i s h i n g  t h e i r  r e t i n u e s " .  
But w i th  the  d e f e a t  o f  the  p l e b e i a n  f o r c e s  in  th e  C i v i l  War, " th e  l a n d ­
h o l d e r s  . . .  now in  t h e i r  t u r n  became th e  r u l i n g  power" .  T h e i r  ascendancy 
i s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  the  l o s s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  o r  c h a r t e r e d  r i g h t s  by the  
p e o p l e ,  and th e  people became d i v i d e d  by t h e  p o l i c i e s  o f  the  new 
a r i s t o c r a c y .  "They a c t e d " ,  Henson a r g u e s ,  "upon t h e  p o l i c y  to  s e p a r a t e  
the  i n t e r e s t s  o f  the  m a n u fa c tu re r  and workman, and th e  f a rm e r  and the 
l a b o u r e r " .  To some e x t e n t  th e y  were s t i l l  a r a c e  a p a r t  s i n c e  " th e  l a n d ­
h o l d e r s  . . .  were p r i n c i p a l l y  o f  Norman o r  French o r i g i n " .  U l t i m a t e ly ,  
though,  the  a r i s t o c r a c y  and g e n t ry  were n e c e s s a r y  b eca use  o f  t h e i r  
consp icuous  consumpt ion.  The E n g l i s h  n o b i l i t y  have l e f t  " t h e  mighty 
engine  o f  f a s h io n  e n t i r e l y  a t  t h e  d i s p o s a l  o f  th e  p e t i t  m a i t r e s  o f  P a r i s " .
1 0 3 . Church and Chapman, "Gravenor  Henson",  148, 154, 157, 159;
DNB, "Gravenor  Henson",  589-90;  Chapman, " I n t r o d u c t i o n " ,  x iv .
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He urges the journeymen to induce nthe nobility, gentry and other public 
figures to encourage fashions which would benefit the Nottingham 
trades". Once again, there is the notion that paternalism is a two-way 
affair, a morality or additional sense of moral economy, based on a 
system of exchange.
It has been said Henson used the term "working classes", an 
essentially 'pre-industrial* form of phrasing, as part of his social 
analysis. Although the idea is based on craft, or rather trade, much more 
than simple craft consciousness is at issue. The trade itself is said 
to have genteel origins. Framework knitting, like the other trades, 
was an "art or mystery" - a kind of personal property - that could only 
be learned after seven years long apprenticeship. In the past, through 
their charters, the trades "managed their own concerns"; they were indep­
endent. Traditionally, the trade or craft was a family concern handed 
down from father to son. The old statutes required that an apprentice 
was "the son of any freeman", someone "not occupied in husbandry, or 
being a labourer". Labourers were men without property or independence, 
virtually another social class altogether. The outcasts, "vagabonds" 
and the like, were yet another class, a class for whom Henson has very 
little sympathy. Like Radical writers of an earlier period, Henson
dates the ascendancy of the post-feudal aristocracy, their alliance 
with the monied classes and the establishment of corruption as a system 
from the reign of William of Orange. This coincided with the enormous 
increase and shift in the burden of taxation. "In former ages", he says, 
"the wealthy had paid all the taxes", but
A new plan was now devised, which had a tremendous 
effect upon the working classes: this was that 
the wealthy, instead of paying the money to the 
state, should only lend it ...
Henson's 'problematic', then, still centres upon the aristocracy 
and the monied interest, upon the system of Old Corruption and taxation. 
The system of society and economy he is analysing is still in many 
senses pre-modem. He differs from the earlier Radicals in the extent 
to which a laissez-faire economy was a part of his world. In the 
History, he states the free market economy started in the 1750s, but still 
looks back, rather than forward, to an earlier period when trade was 
regulated. In this respect, his thinking is 'pre-industrial'. He sees
Henson and White, A Few Remarks, ii, 44, 59, 109, 151-52; Henson, 
History, 101, 113, 114.
Henson, History, 48, 79, 84, 117.
Henson, History, 110.
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that modem capitalism is a world economy where "the Westminister clique" 
are "'citizens of the world' to benefit foreign artisans at the expense 
of their suffering countrymen". Smith and Hume wanted to bring in "more 
foreigners", while McCulloch, Malthus and Place were contributing to 
"the taming of English workmen by bringing them to the Continental level 
in wages". And given the demand for labour in recent years, and the 
poverty of many artisans, there is no reason why "by his own common 
agreement" the artisan may not "sell or hire himself for life" and 
"become the property of his master". Consequently, "the idea of 
throwing the trade entirely open displays ... a field for consummate 
villainy". Nowhere was this more true than in the area of wages. If 
Henson was not class conscious in a modem sense then neither did he 
believe in "class-co-operation" if collective bargaining can be 
taken as an example of this. Both interpretations miss the paradigmatic 
nuances of his statements. Like Thomas Paine, Henson recognised that 
legally-fixed wage rates could sometimes result in low wages, as they 
did "from 1349 to the aera of Cromwell" and did, too, under the Elizabethan 
law which through being "patched" had strayed from its original 
intention. But he does not agree that through joint collective bargaining 
"masters and servants" ought to be allowd "to make their own agreement and 
that the law ought not to interfere". He does not agree with the 
proposition that "provided a man agrees to any contract he cannot be 
oppressed or injured" since there is "an immense difference between 
masters and servants". In a similar vein, he supports the clubs and 
societies that defend the workingman's interest but also promote their 
moral well-being.
In an earlier age, the clubs and societies and the chartered 
companies were able to order things very differently. Henson did not want 
the ruins of the old laws replaced by no laws; he wanted new laws built 
on the old, Gothic, foundations. This mental pre-disposition can be 
called mercantilist. Through the old "Guilds and Fraternities ... now 
called Companies", Henson writes, production was controlled "by dint of 
law". The apprenticeship system, the quality and cheapness of the goods 
and so on were all under the regulation of the companies charters.
Foreign merchants were allowed "in large corporated towns" to prevent the
Church and Chapman, "Gravenor Henson", 146, 152; Chapman, 
"Introduction", xi; Henson § White, A Few Remarks, 108-9, 
52, 53ff, 106,; Henson, History, 28-9; Malcolm Thomis, 
"Gravenor Henson", DRB, 220.
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Companies "becoming monopolies". Yet, in the time of Edward III and after, 
there were laws which, at least in theory, limited the employment of 
foreigners, curbed foreign merchants, fixed the price of meat, prevented 
the "monopoly of farms and sheep", as well as laws which were supposed 
to enforce people to wear certain dress, although they coincided with low 
wages and a low level of employment. Elizabeth abolished the restrictions 
on wages; regulation was wanted but not a return to the fetters associated 
with feudalism. Although, a law of Edward which "prevented the interest 
of money" and thereby compelled "persons to employ their money in trade" 
is applauded. In company with such diverse figures as Burke and Spence, 
Henson sees money employed in the making of money as a sort of social and 
economic phantasy. And if Henson wanted wages to be freed, in the hope 
of a general increase, other proposals he made were incompatible with 
the coming liberal capitalism. Nightwork is prohibited since it "destroys 
the most robust constitution", while his reforming Bill includes a clause 
in which "masters holding Letters Patent" can "compel their servants to 
remain with them during the time of the Patent". Yet, "no Servant or work­
man shall be discharged before the term of his hiring is expired without 
his consent". Time and time again, Henson refers to laws which enforce 
the consumption of English-made clothing, the prohibition of machinery 
and men for export, the curtailment of monopolies, and the regulation of 
apprentices. This system of law and economy, "these regualtions", 
if against "modern received notions of trade and commerce" made England 
"in less than two hundred years ... a great exporting nation". Without 
wanting to be too precise, it can be said Henson was, like his brother 
Radicals, against the free market but not against a 'free' but regulated 
trade. It was trade, rather than industry, trade uninhibited by 
aristocratic or big merchant monopoly, and especially foreign trade", 
that was the basis of wealth. Like patriotism, with which it was linked, 
trade had an internal and external significance. Stopping the exportation 
of machinery abroad would keep framework-knitting "as an English manufacture, 
exclusively to this country, for the benefit of the commonwealth". Using 
a common mercantilist argument, Henson connects trade with the trade. If 
trade was not protected "parents would not put out their children to the 
trade, for fear that it should leave the country". In other words, the 
trade would go into decline through lack of manpower. Output would fall;
and so would consumption. If consumption fell, England would cease to be
108a powerful nation. Economy was, after all, at the root of politics.
Henson $ White, A Few Remarks, 40-1, 42-3, 64, 116, 117, 121, 123, 
124ff; Henson, History,12, 22-3, 28-9, 44, 54, 56, 57.
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P le n ty  o f  Henson's s ta te m e n ts  le a d  back to  the  problem o f  
consum ption . Consumption i s  c e n t r a l .  He i s  f u l l  o f  p r a i s e  f o r  an 
E l iz a b e th a n  s t a t u t e  which in c o r p o r a t e s ,
th e  fo r e ig n  a r t i s a n  w ith  th e  E n g l is h ,  which was 
th e  o b je c t  o f  the  d e c re e ,  and chus adds a d d i t i o n a l  
im pulse to  i n d u s t r y ,  by employing the  E n g l is h ,  
which le d  them to consume, and th u s  to  march 
on s t e a d i l y  by t h e i r  own consumption to  employ 
th e m s e lv e s .
This  economic o b je c t  was, in  t u r n ,  l in k e d  w ith  a p o l i t i c a l  aim. 
With in c re a s e d  consumption " th e  p o p u la t io n  might be doubled and the  
U nited  Empire j o i n  th e  b le s s in g s  o f  a r e a l l y  f r e e  c o n s t i t u t i o n " .  In 
o rd e r  f o r  bo th  th e s e  th in g s  to  happen, th e  a r t i s a n  had to  g e t  a f a i r  
r e t u r n  f o r  h i s  la b o u r .  Henson d id  n o t  ask f o r  " th e  r i g h t  to  th e  whole 
p roduce o f  la b o u r" .  N e i th e r  must i t  be f o r g o t t e n  t h a t  h i s  la b o u r  th e o ry  
o f  v a lu e  i s  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  co nnec ted  w ith  th e s e  two th i n g s ,  w ith  the  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  and consumption. He d e n ie s ,
th e  e rroneous  im press ion  t h a t  th e  more th e  
la b o u re r  o b ta in e d  f o r  h i s  work th e  l e s s  remained 
f o r  th e  la n d lo rd  and c a p i t a l i s t  . . .  th e  grand 
problem o f  p o l i t i c a l  economy i s ,  t h a t  where 
e i t h e r  th e  s t a t e ,  th e  church , l a n d lo r d ,  th e  
m a s te r ,  o r  any o th e r  means ta k e s  from the  
la b o u re r  th e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  h i s  wages, as soon 
as  i t  i s  ea rned ,  p re v e n t s  him from c i r c u l a t i n g  
such wages to  employ a n o th e r  la b o u r ,  and 
c o n se q u e n t ly ,  the  employment i n s t e a d  o f  in c r e a s in g  
th rough  th e  means o f  exchange o f  la b o u r  i s  
d e r iv e d  from the  u n p ro d u c t iv e  p e rso n  a lo n e ;  th u s  
th e r e  w i l l  be found in  a l l  poor s t a t e s  a number 
o f  pe rso n s  unemployed because  th e  p o p u la t io n  
cannot employ each o th e r ,  a r i s i n g  from money 
b e in g  consumed b e fo re  i t  has o b ta in e d  due 
c i r c u l a t i o n  . . .  , 1A
I t  would no t do to  r e a d  an y th in g  l i k e  a modem under-consum ption  
th e o ry  in t o  t h i s .  N e i th e r  i s  th e r e  any d i r e c t  a t t a c k  on p r o f i t s  o r  
c a p i t a l ,  even l e s s  on a c l a s s  o f  c a p i t a l i s t s .  H enson 's  language , h i s  
s o c i a l  c a t e g o r i e s ,  h i s  o th e r  assum ptions  made e lsew here  co ncern ing  
t a x a t i o n  and so f o r t h ,  a l s o  have to  be taken  i n t o  acc o u n t;  a t  most a 
minor b reak  in  though t cou ld  be c o n s id e re d .  Not l e a s t  because  o f  h i s
Henson, H is to ry ,  35.109.
1 1 0 . Henson § W hite, A Few Remarks, 38-9 .
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long looks and musings on the past. In Cromwell's time, for example, 
the laws left "the labouring and productive classes" free to demand 
"their own price". Against the modem "scramble" of the free market 
"our forefathers" were governed by good laws and regulation. Consider, 
Henson writes, what the free market "is making of old England" and 
recollect "these new doctrines are ... from France".
In taking up this strategy, in using certain tropes and 
rhetorical devices, Henson was placing his thinking within a certain 
cognitive framework, he was producing a certain kind of 'knowledge' 
effect. His constant references to history and myth, for example, 
asserted the Englishness of his manners of thinking and denied or toned 
down any assumptions which involved the notion of man as a cosmic or 
cosmopolitan figure or any class of men in a fraternal union stretching 
across nations. Paraphrasing Burke a little, it can be said Henson 
started out from the family, linked this with the trade and the company 
and then on to the people or the nation. If for Burke the centre of 
community was the landed estate, for Henson it was the trade. Knowledge 
of the trade, of its laws and regulations, of its customs and practices 
and its mysteries, was historical; it was, therefore, English. There 
seems to be at least a correspondence between political knowledge, 
popular magic and knowledge of the trade, in this case of "the art, 
mystery or trade of framework-knitting". Since each form of knowing was 
hidden and mysterious, each was sacred and set apart awaiting revelation. 
It followed that sacredness was endowed by recourse to some kind of 
purity of origins. In modern Indonesia, the founder of a genealogy 
who is also the legitimiser of a trade and the possessor of 'religious' 
knowledge, is usually of genteel birth: his social status, as it were, 
puts the matter beyond dispute. So, for Gravenor Henson, "the first 
stocking-maker's apprentice was a knight, and eldest son to a lord, who 
was of blood royal". The old aristocracy turned their hands to "even 
the common trades", and a law existed setting aside the trades for 
"persons of property". At one time, Alfred the Great was "compelled to 
go into service as a neat-herd and to watch cattle for his livelihood".
He "learnt experimental wisdom in adversity". Consequently, any taint or 
impurity that might be attached to manual or, rather, skilled labour is 
removed. An artisan possesses as much moral worth and personality, so it
Henson § White, A Few Remarks, 65, 159, see also Burke, Reflections 
29-32, 44, 143, 210, 212, 311-14 for how Burke generally relates 
'kinship terminology' to political inheritance.
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would seem, as his 'betters'. A close study of Henson's text elicits 
other statements in keeping with this mentality or outlook. For example, 
just as for Cobbett appropriation of monastic wealth led to a Providential 
and untimely end, so the export of machinery and skills to France or any 
other foreign country meets with misfortune. "Jones met with a tragical 
end: the plague broke out ... and he, with all his workmen and family, 
fell victims to its fury; the frames became useless", while "two men 
who had been left in France made no progress whatever, one had died" 
and so on. Crossing the Channel, and taking the trade with you, leads you 
to the fountain of impurity or pollution. The same question, the same 
mental attitude or turn of mind, comes into play when writing about the 
virtues and vices of kingship. The patriot king or queen gained virtue 
and purity through upholding or restoring the laws and customs of the 
people. Upon such popular actions, "Henry the Great" was "this benevolent 
Monarch ... the darling of the French nation, particularly the working 
classes".
In England, the two most virtuous patriot monarchs were Elizabeth 
and Alfred. Elizabeth and Alfred were the darlings, the virtuous yet 
consummate lovers of the English people. Before they had learned the 
unromantic arts of self-reliance and organisation, semi-mythical heroes 
transformed the misery and suffering of the English working classes into 
a dream-time of plenty and prosperity. Just such a time, Henson says, 
was "the golden days of good Queen Bess". Even harsh laws which enact 
"that all vagabonds shall be greviously whipped, and burned through the 
gristle of the right ear an inch, and being above eighteen shall suffer 
death as a felon", are praised. Except for the fact that a lot more is, 
of course, involved, it could be said: so much for the foundations of the 
making of the English working class. But Elizabeth is also praised for 
"fixing an equitable and moderate rate of wages". She is said to have 
reduced the rate of crime considerably, something always used as a measure 
of charismatic and patriotic virtue. On the material side, she promoted 
consumption and gave the artisan his independence; she discouraged 
monopolies, refusing to grant them if there was a danger of impoverishing 
her subjects. Yet Elizabeth does not quite reach that point of apotheosis 
reserved for Alfred. Her reign is flawed. She caressed the people but 
they were only allowed a passive response; their active liberties had been
112. Henson, History, 46, 51, 54-55, 76.
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compromised by the c rown 's  growing p r e r o g a t i v e .
The p u r e r  o r i g i n  was A l f r e d  the  G rea t ,  and c o n s i d e r i n g  the  l a t e
da te  o f  Henson 's  w r i t i n g s  and th e  pregnancy o f  p a r t i c u l a r  p a s s a g e s ,  i t
i s  f r u i t f u l  t o  reproduce  some o f  them i n  f u l l .  They a r e  no mere
" r h e t o r i c a l  f l o u r i s h e s " ,  r e f e r e n c e s  to  th e  myth o f  th e  Anglo-Saxon
c o n s t i t u t i o n  o c c u r r i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n  bo th  books.  In th e  e a r l i e r  one,
i t  i s  i n  A l f r e d ' s  t ime t h a t  a r t i s a n s  and workingmen were f i r s t  g r a n t e d
r i g h t s ,  an im p o r ta n t  A l f r e d i a n  i n n o v a t i o n  b e in g  a l s o  the  g iv in g  o f
freedom to  th e  towns to  "chuse t h e i r  own m a g i s t r a t e s " ,  t h a t  i s  t h e i r
p o l i t i c a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  The c h a r t e r s  g r a n t i n g  th e s e  l i b e r t i e s  " a r e
ve ry  a n c i e n t "  be ing  " t h e  Saxon laws which were b ro u g h t  ove r  from
Germany" and which " a r e  founded upon the  p r i n c i p l e  o f  community,
r e s p o n s i b l e  as a body f o r  the  a c t i o n s  o f  each i n d i v i d u a l " .  Read, i n  t h i s ,
the  f r a t e r n a l  p r i n c i p l e  o f  the  t r a d e  c lu b .  A l f r e d  appea rs  y e t  a g a i n  as
the  l i b e r a t o r  o f  England and d u r in g  t h i s  p e r i o d  he mixed and worked
a l o n g s i d e  the  common p e o p le .  Henson goes on to  d e s c r i b e  A l f r e d ' s
system o f  government,  th e  Anglo-Saxon c o n s t i t u t i o n .  He d e s c r i b e s  i n
d e t a i l ,  the  t y t h i n g  system and the  hundreds  t y p i c a l l y  d e p i c t e d  as a
system o f  d i r e c t  democracy on the  Rousseauan model,  a l th o u g h  i t  i s
im p o r ta n t  to  add t h e r e  i s  no d i r e c t  c o n n e c t io n .  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a r e
chosen "by the  community" who a r e  d i r e c t l y  assembled .  They a l s o  choose
o r  e l e c t  j u r i e s ,  t h e  j u r y  system once ag a in  o r i g i n a t i n g  w i th  A l f r e d .
There i s  an o r d e r  o f  ranks  i n  which th e  k in g  a p p o i n t s  t h e  e a r l s ,  b u t
the  r e l i g i o u s  o r d e r s  and th e  s h e r r i f f  a r e  a p p o in te d  by th e  l o c a l  p eop le .
"This  system o f  j u r i s p r u d e n c e " ,  Henson d e c l a r e s ,  " i s  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n
o f  England",  the  r e a l  o r  genuine c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  h idden  from the  peop le  by
114a r i s t o c r a t i c  m ys te ry .  Under t h i s  system,  th rough  c h a r t e r s  o b t a in e d  
from a p a t r i o t i c  King,
each c o r p o r a t e  town became a community making i t s  
own r e g u l a t i o n s ,  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  g e n e ra l  law o f  the  
land .  In . . .  s e v e r a l  l a r g e  towns,  where p a r t i c u l a r  
m anufac tu res  were c a r r i e d  on,  th e  m a s te r s  and work­
men met,  and governed t h e i r  own c o n c e rn s ,  p r i n c i p a l l y  
by custom, (which was r e g a r d e d  by th e  Saxons as the  
s t r o n g e s t  o f  a l l  la w s , )  and in  many i n s t a n c e s  c h a r t e r .
Almost a l l  the  laws o f  th e  Saxons,  made i n  a d d i t i o n  
to  t h e i r  g e n e ra l  w r i t t e n  code,  were by c h a r t e r ,  
which were s ig n e d  n o t  on ly  by King,  b u t  a l s o  by
Henson § White,  A Few Remarks, 38, 63-4 ;  Henson,  H i s t o r y ,  29,  35, 
45, 67.
1 1 4 . Henson § White,  A Few Remarks, 2 6 f f ;  Henson,  H i s t o r y , 72-73.
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numbers of the nobility, bishops, and sheriffs, as 
witnesses: nothing could be more solemn than the 
granting a charter ... Each community regarded these 
charters as their birthright, being solemn contracts 
or grants.^
The political language, code or vocabulary is the same as Burke's; 
the purposes, the 'hegemonic' implications, different. These statements 
are also mythic in the proper anthropological sense of the word. Founding 
heroes, themes of purity and pollution, the disregard of historical 
time, the transcendence of a particular interest through the sanction 
of community origins and so on, are all evident or implicit. The 
implied ideal independence, of concern for the artisan, intimates the past 
masquerading as the 18th century present. Another important passage, 
brings this point out even more clearly. "At the conquest, in 1066", 
Henson writes,
William, at the head of the Normans, Flemings, 
and others, whom he had hired from various 
parts of France, after swearing to maintain the 
Saxon laws and immunities, and so causing him­
self to be acknowledged King, after the dreadful 
battle of Hastings, upon the pretext that 
the people had rebelled, redeemed his pledge to 
his mercenary followers, and seized upon the 
whole of the lands of the English, which were 
held in small lots ... a right to carry arms ... 
was denied to the English ... As a necessary 
consequence to this total loss of their property, 
by which they became servants, the whole system 
of their laws was abrogated; every copy was 
destroyed ... each baron administered justice .. . 
by holding courts ... from which the natives were 
excluded, yet the trade companies, or guilds, 
still held together, and set the Norman author­
ities at defiance, by their secret combinations.
The weavers' guilds... are mentioned in history, 
within thirty years of the conquest ... During the 
reigns of the two Williams, the guilds ... met in 
secret, and had their signs and secret method of 
knowing each other ... Henry I ... granted a charter 
to the kingdom, confirming the Saxon laws; but the 
Normans being then strong in power, the charters 
were little abided by.-^ 26
Henson goes on to mention the Robin Hood myth, Magna Charta, "which 
confirmed ancient liberties and free customs", the precedence of charters
Henson, History, 73-74.115.
116. Henson, History, 74-76.
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over "the authority of Parliament" and so forth. Through the 
coronation oath, then, the Anglo-Saxon constitution has (hidden) 
continuity. William the Bastard's seizure of power was illegitimate 
since the people were not rebelling against their legal king; land 
was owned in small plots; William originated the institution of a paid 
standing army and denied "the militus", the right to bear arms, to the 
English. Losing their land and property, the English who are here 
identified the common people, with artisans or "servants", also lose 
their independence. They lose it with the loss of their laws or 
customary liberties which are codified in written charters. In origin, 
the aristocracy is foreign and their property illegitimately acquired.
The guilds, especially the weavers' guild although others are mentioned 
later, are of great antiquity. So, too, are their practices: their 
oath-taking (now illegal), their rituals, their underground tradition.
For guilds, then, read 18th century trade clubs. Read, that is, a whole 
structure of '18th century' assumptions, and remember this piece of 
mytho-logic was written in the 1830s. There is quite a bit more in this 
manner, in the mythical use of history to justify a contemporary situation. 
For example, we are told "the English craftsmen had been long inured to 
secret combinations, by the oppressions of the first Normans", and that 
charters were "nearly coeval with the Saxon Constitution". In many ways, 
the 'histories' of John Baxter and Gravenor Henson, rather than Thomas 
Evans' pamphlet, make up "the magnificent culmination of the myth".
Their "political testaments", reveal not only, as Henson puts it,
"the political state and condition of England" and "the true and real 
course of the present convulsed state of the western world", they also 
open the windows on a significant but misunderstood aspect of 18th 
century mentality.
This analysis of Henson's writings has again indicated the 
structure of that mentality. In one sense, in Henson that structure 
is, as in William Cobbett, founded on the concept of custom rather 
than virtue and natural law. Like Cobbett, Henson's ideas 
illustrate a proximity to Burke; from a paradigmatic point of view 
meaning is more revealing than politics. Custom is not necessarily 
a word denoting gentry or aristocratic hegemony. Yet it has 
also been made clear that assumptions based on the ideas of virtue
117. Henson, History, 76, 77, 78, 79, 90, 119.
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and natural law are never very far from the surface. Patterns of 
landholding (virtue) and the natural rights (Locke) associated 
with labour and personality are also central preoccupations 
for Henson. But labour and tools are also inherited as part of 
the artisans' estate (Burke).
This idea of an inheritance led down to a, perhaps, 
'deeper structure' embedded in Henson's mind; one that I have 
argued is built around concepts of origins, purity and pollution, 
moral community, of heroes and villains and of a 'pre-industrial' 
patriotism. In all this, Alfred's Anglo-Saxon polity was the 
model of trope against which to measure everything else. Alfred, 
as I have shown was the ultimate hero incorporating undefiled 
virtue and patriotism. And this mythological language also 
formed the moral basis for Henson's statements about the economy. 
Patriotism, for example, was shown explicitly in my analysis to 
be linked to consumption and to other mercantilist problems of 
trade, land and tax. The laissez-faire economy existed and was 
rejected but was not to be contemplated as part of this artisan's 
mental outlook, even in the 1830s.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MOMENT AND PARADIGM
Invention ... does not consist in creating out of a 
void, but out of chaos; the materials must ... be 
afforded: it can give form to dark shapeless 
substances, but cannot bring into being the 
substance itself ... Invention consists in the 
capacity of seizing on the capabilities of a 
subject, and in the power of moulding and 
fashioning ideas suggested to it.
Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
In the three preceding chapters, discussion of the myth of the 
Anglo-Saxon constitution as a moment or strategy in an overall pattern 
of thinking has suggested a particular paradigm, either explicit or 
implicit. This paradigm, or semantic field, or system of meaning, or 
value-system, which can be characterised as the 'Gothicist' or 'Country' 
or 'Whig-Radical' dialectic now needs to be given a degree of 
explicitness not found in the writings of any single author or 
representative figure considered so far. The dialectic or paradigm 
can be put in the form of a rough diagram like this:
'Epistemological' or Moral Values
axiomatic structure Plus Minus
'Environment' Country
(Countryman, Community 
Corporate values, 
Manliness)
City 
(City 'type' 
Society, Effemin­
acy)
'National Health' or 
Models, including 
heroes and villains
Anglo-Saxon Const­
itution, Greeks, 
America, Alfred &c
French Absolutism, 
Romans, Turks &c 
Napoleon &c
Institutions Republic, Constitution 
or Polity; People, 
Militia, Navy,
Patriot King
Monarchy, Court, 
Aristocracy, 
Standing Army, 
Party
Action Patriotism 
(Patriot)
Ambition or 
Venality (Courtier)
Political Ideals Liberty and Democracy
and Equality
(Many)
Despotism and
Oligarchy
(Few)
Moral State Virtue
(Purity)
Corruption-Luxury 
(Vice)
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Mental State Enlightenment, Darkness, Ignorance,
('Political') Knowledge 
Perfection
Error
'Material' State Independence Patronage
(Amateur, 'Property') (Place, Profession, 
Tax)
Sentiments Simplicity Complexity
(Harmony/Balance) (Excess)
Epistemic Foundation Nature (One) Culture (Many)
(Natural Law, Deism, (Legal Institutions,
Millenarianism, Will and Custom
Reason and Custom 
Origins)
Party)
The diagram is no more than a guide to aid understanding; it does 
not pretend to any great degree of precision. Neither are the 
oppositions as rigid as they would seem to be here, either in content 
or form. The monarchy in the guise of a patriot king could take on a 
positive value; the formal categories of the one and the many could 
take on a positive or a negative guise. In religion, deism postulated 
there was one true religion of nature, while the dissenting tradition 
allowed for freedom of conscience and sectarianism. In politics, the 
people as the embodiment of the many were positively regarded, while 
the principle of party was rejected in favour of patriotic unity.
Other categories are less plastic, although they could envelop a 
variety of different meanings and assumptions some of which now need 
to be stated more fully.
Country vs City
The myth of the free Anglo-Saxon polity was incorporated as 
strategem into 'Country* language for what looks like a variety of 
intrinsic reasons. Saxon liberty comes out of a rural environment.
This is the theme of numerous poems, including Thomson's Liberty.
It was also part of the myth, taken over by Engels, that rural vigour, 
and the moral virtue that emanated from it, enabled the Goths to 
overcome and destroy effete Roman civilisation and bring about a 
rejuvenation of the world. "Gar-man etymology", suggestive of 
"German manliness" was a significant feature of 18th century linguistic 
enquiry. The distinction between "ger-man", meaning "courageous man", 
and "guerre-man", meaning "belligerent man" is important for an 
understanding of the Gothic conception of patriotism. There was, in
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English mercantilist political culture, a tendency to reject any
purely primitive leanings. "Country” signified nature had to some
degree been cultivated or "balanced". Humphrey Repton expressed
the general sentiment of the time when he wrote that the English
garden, unlike the French, was not over-done such that culture
suppressed nature. It represented "the happy medium betwixt the
liberty of savages and the restraint of art" in the same way as
"the English constitution is the happy medium betwixt the wildness
1 * of nature and the stiffness of despotic government".
Political language spilled over into other areas of discourse 
since political language reflected a wider social reality. Industry 
and rural or agrarian existence if not always in harmony, were 
closely related. The putting out system enabled the merchant "to 
give work to the villagers and yet not move them from the village". 
Even in the 1820s, at harvest time many woolcombers would "lay 
aside" the woolcomb and "take up" the scythe. Before the arrival 
of the factory system, semi-rural existence gave to the weaver a 
varied and independent or ’amateur' work pattern. In general, "the 
urban culture of the eighteenth century was more ’rural’... than we 
often suppose", and "most of the new industrial towns did not so much 
displace the countryside as grow over it". By 1811, most of the 
population and most industry was still in the countryside; many of 
those living in towns had a country outlook. Gravenor Henson's 
framework-knitting industry was still "preponderantly rural".
Popular culture in general was "intimately involved in the seasonal 
rhythms of agricultural life". A view of Birmingham dated 1796 shows 
"how even in a town of small industries of long standing, the 
immediate surroundings were still rural". The same is true for London 
and Manchester, where rural surroundings symbolised liberty and 
independence. William Lovett vividly describes how the fields around 
London were a place for sport, political meetings and so forth.
■*" * Samuel Kliger, The Goths in England, (Cambridge Mass, 1952), 
6,31,33-4,72.
* See also Appendix A
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Francis Place would often escape the drudgery of work and run out
into the fields which were "all around London", an expression of
2independence denied to the later factory worker.
The country is often blessed with a kind of purity and holy 
quality lacking in the urban environment. "God made the country 
and man made the town". Luxury, the source of all evil, fed and 
festered in the town or city. Pastoral poetry was used "to 
criticise the corruptions of an over-sophisticated society", of 
which luxury was a symptom, and to celebrate purity and simplicity 
of character. Yet since industry in the widest sense also occurs 
in the country, and since country life is not without its harsher 
realities, the opposition between town and country is not always as 
sharp as it would seem at first sight. A distinction has been made 
between "the Georgic rural" and the pastoral where in the former "a 
sort of balance" is evident which avoids "the idyllic and sentimental" 
but does not present "the harsh and the ugly" as normal. There is a 
degree of romanticism but it does not lapse into the over-sentimental.
In Radical ideological poetry, there is a connection between the two 
modes since the loss of a type of production is also connected with 
a change in a certain kind of landscape. If it is true the weaver-poet, 
Samuel Law, struggles "with an alien mode", that is the pastoral, his 
choice of topic, the seasons and the countryside, are close to his own 
personal and working experience and reflect some of the harsh reality 
of lower class rural existence. "All the terror cruel Winter brings" 
when hard frosts and icy snows "pierce my windows" and "every corner 
of my dwelling find". The snow blocks up roads and starves the sheep 
and is followed by heavy rains and floods which drown men and cattle. 
Even when spring arrives and the language of the rural idyll takes
over, there is still "labourious work __ pruning the hedge, or tilling
barren ground". Either in Law or in, say, Bewick, there is very little
2 . Peter Laslett, The World We have Lost, (2nd. edn., London, 1971 
orig. pub. 1965), 12,17; E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English 
Working Class, (Pelican edn., 1968), 312-3, 338-9, 445-6;
F.O. Darvall, Popular Disturbances in Regency England, (Oxford, 
1969 edn., orig. pub. 1934), 12,13,17,27-8; R.W. Malcolmson, 
Popular Recreations in English Society 1700-1850, (Cambridge U.P., 
1973), 24; G.M. Trevelyan, Illustrated English Social History:
Vol .3, (London, 1949-52), 297; G.S. Veitch, The Genesis of 
Parliamentary Reform, (London, 1965 orig.pub. 1916), 20; William 
Lovett, The Life and Struggles of William Lovett...(London, 1876), 
32; Francis Place, Autobiography, (Cambridge, 1972), xii ed. Mary 
Thale; Carl Cone, The English Jacobins, (New York, 1968), 20.
244
illusion about the harsh realities of country existence, yet it is
still preferred to the corruptions associated with town life. The
material basis of pastoral or Georgic poetry was the separation
or alienation occurring between rural and urban life which, as
Marx saw, reflects the division of labour within society. With
the growth of towns and the increasing division of labour, the
material foundation of independence was disappearing so that
'pastoral' politics and poetry took on an increasingly nostalgic
air as city life lost its contact and dominance over the country.
It is useful to distinguish, as Gramsci does, between urban and
industrial. All cities and towns are urban but they are not all
industrial in the modern sense. In the late 18th century, the 'old'
urbanism was giving way to the 'new' urbanism in the form of a modern
industrialisation that was irreversible. Modern industrialisation
"destroyed the old partnership between industry and agriculture",
even if that partnership often involved antagonisms. Under the old
mercantilist mode, then, the opposition between 'Country' and 'Court'
language is less significant than the more fundamental break which
occurred later and is expressed in the realm of ideas and ideology
3or mentality in the development of socialist and liberal thought.
Both town and country relations expressed a sense of community 
that got eroded in the new entrepreneurial order. Both involved "a 
world of face to face contacts" where "people's social relationships 
stemmed mostly from the ties of family... of neighbourhood... and... 
work". Many festive occasions revolved around family, locality and 
trade. This included even "out-work manufacturing" which was 
"intensely local, with working cottagers living round the employer's 
family and known to them over the years". In the towns, workmen and 
employers and their families lived and slept together in the same 
building where the floor or room occupied would be related to "the 
tenant's status or daily wage". The patronage and hierarchy of town
3 P.A. Brown, The French Revolution in English History, (London, 
1918), 6; Christopher Hill, "The Norman Yoke" in Puritanism 
and Revolution, (London, 1958), 62; Robert Southey, Letters 
from England by Don Manuel Alvarez, (London, 1808, 2nd.edn.) 
375,379; Samuel Law, A Domestic Winter Piece...(2nd.edn. 
Todmorden, orig.pub. Leeds, 1772), 20-1,24,26-8,47; Antonio 
Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, (London, 1971), 
91, eds. Q. Hoare § G. Nowell Smith; Karl Marx 5 Frederich 
Engels, The German Ideology, (International Publishers edn. New 
York, 1947), 8,55,57; Darvall, Disturbances, 17.
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and trade was modelled on the patronage system of the countryside.^ 
Culture vs Nature
From one angle, the Country and Court dialectic is only a more 
empirical expression of the abstract categories of culture and 
nature the formal characteristics of which were discussed in chapter 
two. These categories were used to manipulate and comprehend 18th 
century social reality: in content they carry distinct historical 
meanings. Synonymously with the notion of country in all its forms, 
there was a pre-disposition to favour nature against culture. Yet 
the opposition was not always as clear cut as it at first seems since 
if nature was unified and sacred, God had given man the propensity to 
make culture. Paradoxically some of men’s institutions and customs 
could harmonise or be founded upon the law of nature. Human nature 
was part of the law of nature. Work was natural for humans, and 
through work, or, more abstractly, production and consumption, the 
natural world got transformed into culture or civilisation. From 
this point of view, nature is seen as matter; culture as form. Man 
makes nature (matter) into culture through ’’art" (form). J.G.A. Pocock 
has argued that in Augustan neo-’Machiavellian' thought "commerce and 
culture were incompatible with virtue and liberty”; liberty and virtue 
opposed culture or commerce, commerce being "the active form of 
culture itself".^ Yet, given the ’mixed’ nature of mercantile 
society, and the way in which the concept of the Georgic could be 
used to express the application of industry to nature, more ambiguously, 
"the plunge into nature could be described simultaneously in pastoral 
and industrial terms". Consequently, a garden, a farm, any type of 
agrarian industry, any type of industry that had close relations with 
the natural world, could all be seen as sources of virtue. Throughout 
this thesis, the term "natural economy" has been used because of the 
closeness of the 18th century economy with nature. A list of products 
manufactured by Georgian industry, "silks, lace, furs, jewels, 
furniture, sugar, rum", and so on, shows an industrial process 
directly connected with nature. This, so to speak, provides the 
material basis for the culture-nature nexus found in political language,
Malcolmson, Recreations, 52-3,83; John Foster, Class Struggle in 
the Industrial Revolution, (London, 1974), 25; Thompson, Working 
Class, 76; George Rude, Paris and London in the 18th Century, 
(London, 1970), 51.
4
5 . J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, (Princeton, 1975), 431.
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and it is an economy different in kind from 19th and 20th century 
economies which if not always divorced from nature are at least 
almost invariably at one remove from it. Besides the proximity, 
and therefore identity, of industry (culture) with nature, there 
is also the Radical and sometimes Whiggish or Tory notion of 
’natural' commerce involving again the idea of excess. "Commerce", 
wrote Tobias Smollett,
is undoubtedly a blessing, while restrained within 
its proper channels; but a glut of wealth brings 
along with it a glut of evils: it brings false 
taste, false appetite, false wants, profusion, 
venality, contempt of order, engendering a 
spirit of licentiousness, insolence, and 
faction, that keeps the community in continual 
ferment....
In other terms, the triumph of passion over reason which could 
be remedied "by proper regulations", that is the state, so that 
"commerce may produce every national benefit". Besides commerce 
and economic activity, custom and law were other areas of human 
endeavour that produced ambiguity or identity in the relationship 
between culture and nature. If natural law was the source of man's 
natural propensities custom nurtured the things that were his "second 
nature". Custom,
as the origin of second nature, served as the best 
means of explaining what made a people and its 
laws uniquely and autonomously themselves; and 
wherever we read that a people must be governed 
by laws suited to its nature, second nature and 
customary law are primarily intended. A claim 
to uniqueness was a claim to autonomy... the 
claim that the English possessed a historical 
and immemorial sovereignty over themselves.^
What starts off as an epistemological proposition soon gets made into
a political assertion. The author of this passage, J.G.A. Pocock,
Tobias Smollett, Humphrey Clinker, (Penguin edn.1967, orig. pub. 
1771), 319.
^’ Pocock, Moment, 209-10,213,214-5,220-1.
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argues the notion of experience is the irreducible concept upon 
which custom rests. For Pocock, there are at least three distinct 
strands or paradigms of political thought evident in the 18th 
century and experience gives the epistemic root to custom. Custom 
is personified in Burke, natural law founded in pure reason or 
rationalism in Locke, and Anglo-Saxonism founded in an admixture 
of charisma, reason and virtue is carried around in the minds of 
the Georgian Radicals. The Burkeian idea of the ancient English 
constitution is said to contain three assumptions: first, that 
"all law in England might be properly termed common law", second 
that common law emanated from "common custom originating in the 
usages of the people" and third that custom "was by definition 
immemorial". It followed that this kind of law and custom itself 
"was constantly being subjected to the test of experience" and "was 
ultimately rooted in nothing but experience". English custom and 
common law were an accretion of particular events and experiences 
which "cannot be reduced to general principles or scientific laws" 
since they are made up of "’one emergency following upon another 
as wave follows wave'". Because each event or experience is 
unique, '"there can be no generalisations'". In practice, and 
therefore in thought, the distinction between Anglo-Saxonism and 
the common law paradigm is not as clear cut as it would seem from 
Pocock's initial remarks. Accretion involved "adapting old precedents 
to new situations" such that over a period of time "the old precedent 
became, by degrees, and generally insensibly, both refined and enlarged 
until it took on a new meaning beyond anything those who first 
established it could have intended". Remembering Henson, Baxter and 
other Gothicists, this is precisely one of their key assumptions.
The corruption of the constitution was a process of accretion or 
encrustation. Using the same categories, Gothic Radicalism seeks the 
pure and original constitution; simply, what for Burke is progress and
g
irreversibility is for them corruption and return.
Up to a point, Pocock acknowledges the two languages or codes 
are intertwined. The crucial point or difference, for him, is whether 
or not the constitution is stipulated to be immemorial or is knowable;
J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time, (New York, 1971), 
209-10, 213, 214-5, 220-1.
8 .
the crucial conceptual question is that of time. As he puts it 
Georgian Radicalism offered,
a partial rationalisation of the traditional 
common law doctrine. There exists an ancient 
constitution, it said, whose claim upon us 
lies largely in its antiquity; but this const­
itution was founded upon principles which can 
be known, and we are therefore able to know it 
has degenerated from them and to restore it to 
them. This Burke denied. He was, therefore, 
faced not only with a rationalist doctrine based 
on a Lockean theory of natural rights, but also 
with a modified form of seventeenth century 
'ancient constitution'
This latter, despite the fact "English common law traditionalism 
repeatedly denied that the origins of tradition could be found at any 
specific moment", which, Gothicism with the charismatic figure of 
Alfred and the paraphernalia of tythings and so on, asserted. The 
Georgian Radicals sought "the original principles of the 
constitution". They "abridged the constitution into the Polybian- 
Machiavellian 'science' of mixed government, according to which 
every stable constitution must be founded on certain principles".
It could "degenerate" from these principles and should then be 
"restored". This form of legitimation "did not belong to the common 
law"; authority was "no longer located in the stream of transmission" 
but depended on the "charismatic or rational" for "its validity".
The outcome is that "the strategist of return... cannot invest the 
past in which he believes with the authority of tradition". Yet, 
ambiguously, the Gothic mind or moment, "borrows elements of 
charismatic or rational authority from the tradition it is 
criticising", since "the stream of transmission" already carries 
within it "elements of charisma or rationality"; therefore the 
Radical dips into the "stream of transmission". Pocock's way out 
of this difficulty is to argue that the Radical or Gothic mode "is 
obliged to create a new past and invest it with authority which easily 
abolishes the necessity of referring to the past at all." So, "the
9. Pocock, Politics, 229-30.
249
radical, the rationalist or antiquarian... assert that the past can 
be known by means that do not presume its continuity with the 
present". Unlike the conservative, the Radical "reconstructs the 
past in order to authorise the future; he historises the present 
in order to deprive it of authority". Yet in doing this, "in re­
arranging concepts about the past" the Radicals also "form a pattern" 
of ideas which contain "much that is acceptable and even dear to 
conservatives" even if they end up "seeming to authorise in the 
present only a set of arrangements other than those that actually 
exist". Even more significantly, there were "doubtless many occasions 
on which the two", Gothicism and common law theory, "were blithely 
combined and confused by persons unaware of the foundations on which 
each rested".^
A number of questions come to mind. First, there is the question 
of whether or not the two, or even three, stratagems or manners of 
thought rest on different structural or epistemological foundations 
or whether the differences are largely functional. Second, there is 
the empirical question of whether in fact Radical ideology did get 
rid of the need to refer to the past at all. Third, there is the 
question of why the three or two conceptions of time needed to exist; 
to what did they relate? What specific social or intellectual need 
did they fulfil? Taking the second question first, the empirical 
analysis of artisan thinking presented here would deny charismatic 
and rational criteria dispensed with the need to refer back to the 
past. John Baxter's and Gravenor Henson's elaborate histories speak 
otherwise. On the first question, it was hinted that Burke's thought, for 
example, took over many of the basic assumptions or ideas involved
1cin the 'languages' of natural law and virtue. This in itself does 
not disprove Pocock's contentions, but it does suggest a certain 
conceptual fluidity or, perhaps, a common core of assumptions.
Explaining it away in terms of ignorance and "confusion", as many 
other writers besides Pocock have done, is not only slightly condescending 
but avoids rather than settles the problem. It is at least equally 
plausible to argue that the important point is not whether custom is a 
good thing or a valid mode of argument, for both Radical and 
conservative agree that it is; but what is crucial to them is the
Pocock, Politics, 251-2, 260-1, 263, 265; J.G.A. Pocock, The 
Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, (Cambridge, 1957), 57.
* On Burke's use of natural law, see Reflections, 32, 38, 44, 46-7, 
56-8; on virtue as a moment in his ideas see Reflections, 38, 
94-5, 113, 143, 159, 199, 223.
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function or interpretation of a particular custom or law. The 
difference is political rather than conceptual. Only this would 
explain why Radicals could use the language of Burke to deny Burke.
It is extremely important not to forget the 18th century understanding 
of reason in which reason was at one time experience and at another 
time principle. Historical experience, say Alfred’s sacred polity, 
was merely the embodiment of natural law principles. Put another 
way, experience is culture, while reason is nature. Both are 
comprehensible in terms of sacred or divine origins suggesting that 
from a certain angle 18th century reason can be properly described 
as mythological. Additionally, regardless of how the past is re­
arranged, the ultimate significance lies in the fact that the past 
is referred to as the origin of authority and legitimation simply 
because the past is closest to God. From this point of view, perhaps 
the time question dissolves itself once it is realised, as it is 
being argued here, that we are dealing with a single paradigm of 
thinking materialised through its relationship to a quasi-agrarian 
mercantile society in which perceptions of time are still tied to 
the non-progressive rhythms of nature.
In a later work, Pocock does not always make such paradigm 
distinctions. "The cult of customary antiquity" becomes "a peculiarly 
English brand of legal humanism", or, "a mode of civic consciousness" that 
has certain affinities with "civic humanism in the republican and 
Florentine sense". Liberty, including Radical and Whiggish liberty, so 
it would seem, is "rooted in the fabric of immemorial custom". My 
contention is that the identity is clear if it is realised natural law, 
too, is without memory; as is virtue. Virtuous custom, so to speak, is 
seen as "a mode of civic consciousness particularly appropriate to a 
gentry asserting itself in parliament, in litigation, and in the local 
administration of common law". A close reading of popular political 
tracts and books shows virtue and natural law were the measure of custom 
but another measure was also that a practice was "age-old" or time out 
of mind. What counted, in John Baxter’s words, were "free customs".
Or, in the same conceptual complex, another measure was the deistical 
one of truth and error, of genuine custom and erroneous custom or law."^
11. Pocock, Moment, 341.
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That th e  p o l i t i c a l  language o f  " l e g a l  humanism" was n o t  w holly
owned by th e  g e n t ry  has  been dem onstra ted  in  th e  body o f  th e  t h e s i s .
S ev e ra l  w r i t e r s ,  in c lu d in g  Pocock, b u t  more r e c e n t l y ,  on an
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  b a s i s  E .P . Thompson and h i s  f o l lo w e r s ,  have s t a t e d
th e  law had "an unusua l p re -em in en ce"  in  th e  18th c e n tu r y .  I t
d i s p la c e d  " th e  r e l i g i o u s  a u t h o r i t y  and s a n c t io n s  o f  p re v io u s  c e n t u r i e s "
and made way f o r  "economic s a n c t io n s  . . .  th e  ideo lo g y  o f  th e  f r e e
m arke t"  and th e  " p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r a l i s m "  o f  th e  n in e t e e n t h  c e n tu r y .
The q u e s t io n  i s  why, and I would p o in t  n o t  on ly  to  th e  dominance o f
th e  g e n t ry  bu t a l s o  t o  th e  mode o f  p ro d u c t io n ;  law because  o f  s t a t e
and t a x a t i o n  as  th e  c e n t r a l  means o f  a p p r o p r i a t i o n .  I t  i s  a s  much
from t h i s  f a c t ,  p e rh a p s ,  as  i t  i s  because  o f  g e n t r y - a r i s t o c r a c y
hegemony, t h a t  th e  law has  a d eg ree  o f  u n iv e r s a l i s m ;  t h a t ,  as  Thompson
a rg u e s ,  th e  law i s  more th a n  id e o lo g y  in  t h i s  p e r io d .  Custom and th e
laws were an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  a r t i s a n  c o n s c io u s n e s s .  T h is  ought to
have been made c l e a r  in  th e  l a s t  few c h a p t e r s ;  some more exam ples
w i l l  add to  th e  p i c t u r e .  Samuel Bamford in  h i s  memoirs re p ro d u c e s
a p ie c e  c a l l e d  "The Union Hymn" sung by h im s e l f  and h i s  f e l lo w
p r i s o n e r s  w h ile  "ag o n ised  by v i s i o n s  o f  th e  s c a f f o l d " .  R e l ig io n ,
l i b e r t y ,  p a t r i o t i s m ,  a r u r a l  and p a s t o r a l  s e t t i n g ,  th e  n o t io n  o f  a
d e l i v e r e r  o r  p a t r i o t  k ing  a re  a l l  mixed in  to g e th e r  and th e  Hymn
c o n ta in s  l i n e s  about "ou r  f a t h e r ’ s r i g h t s ;  our f a t h e r ’s law s" ,
making "Old England f r e e "  and so f o r t h .  Some a r t i s a n  v e r s e s  from
a s im i l a r  p e r io d ,  which a re  an a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  Gravenor H enson’s
s e n t im e n ts ,  speak o f  Queen E l i z a b e th ,  " o f  workmen's r i g h t s  s h e ' s
s t i l l  a g u a ra n te e "  a g a i n s t  " in n o v a t in g  f o o l s " ;  "journeym en" a re
" s h e l t e r e d  by h e r  law s” . U n t i l  about 1814, many t r a d e  c lu b s  "employed
12an a t to r n e y  to  conduct p r o s e c u t io n s  in  th e  law c o u r t s " .
E q u a l ly ,  though , th e  word ' l a w '  in  a r t i s a n  p o l i t i c a l  v o c a b u la ry  
cou ld  r e f e r  to  th e  laws o f  n a t u r e .  N a tu ra l  law must be co n ce iv ed  as 
en tw ined  in  n a t u r e - c u l t u r e  d i a l e c t i c ;  as  p a r t  o f  a m y th o lo g ic a l  mode 
o f  e x p re s s io n .  Yet a l th o u g h  t h e r e  i s  a c e r t a i n  i d e n t i t y  s in c e  "human
12 ’ E .P . Thompson, Whigs and H u n te r s , (London, 1975), 263; Samuel 
Bamford, Passages  in  th e  L i fe  o f  a R a d ic a l , (2nd edn . Heywood, 
1839-41),  2 v o l s . ,  V o l . l ,  100-111; E .P . Thompson, " E n g l ish  
Trade Unions and o th e r  Labour Movements b e fo re  1790", in  
B u l l e t i n  o f  th e  S o c ie ty  f o r  th e  Study o f  Labour H i s t o r y , N o .17, 
1968, 23; Bamford, P a s s a g e s , (London edn. 1967), 7, ed .
W.H. C ha lenor .
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laws may be simply the translation of the commands of natural law
into the formalised commands or rules of a particular kingdom*',
there is also a separateness since human law is particular or
national as well as sometimes being rational or universal. In
one sense, the universalism of natural law is inherently radical,
and provides a tool with which to criticise customary and contemporary
political arrangements; it is based on the assumption that "there is
a reason or law ... which runs through all change and under-lies all
existence". An unalloyed version of this was typical of Paine; it
was not of Gothic Radicalism. In the myth of the Anglo-Saxon
constitution, "natural rights ... became almost merged into historical
ones". According to the Westminster sub-committee in 1780, "equal
representation of the people...annual elections, and the universal
right of suffrage" came from "the natural feelings of mankind".
But,"were substantially enjoyed in the times of the immortal Alfred,
and, form the grand palladium of the nation ... they are the birthright
of Englishmen". This last phrase, "the birthright of Englishmen",
used again and again in the literature points to the paradoxical
nature of the language, of the merging of culture and nature. As
Pocock himself has written, in seeming contradiction to other
statements, in the American context "the pursuit of nature ... can
be readily expressed in the rhetoric of virtue and corruption". Yet
it is something of an anachronism to see this as a linking of "Christian
theology, English empiricism and European rationalism", if only because
English empiricism had not yet come about. As Catherine Macaulay
argued both "the grounds of experience" and "the principles of a rational
belief" substantiate belief "in the omnipotence of God". English reason
13had two sides to it.
The last sentence was a point of emphasis, and emphasis and 
elaboration needs to be given to other points touched on earlier. 
Catherine Macaulay, supposedly one of the more rationalist of the 
Whiggish Radicals, indicates how far removed natural law assumptions 
could be from secularism. It was one thing to conceive of the universe
13 Herbert Butterfield, George III, Lord North and the People, 
(London, 1949), 348; Pocock, Moment, 553, 527, but see also 
p.370; Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 
(Williamsburg, 1969), 7, 9, 10; Catherine Macaulay, A Treatise 
on the Immutability of Moral Truth, (London, 1783), vi; George 
Sabine, A History of Political Thought, (3rd.edn., London, 1963), 
319; Kliger, Goths, 286.
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as Ma great clock ... left to be governed mechanically by the wheels
which the Creator had set in motion"; it was another to deny "the
miracles of the Bible and the role of providence in daily life".
While he presented a ’demystification’ of the Bible, Paine is a good
example of the way in which 'rationalists' were slow to shed many of
their basic religious assumptions. Yet frequently natural law has
been connected with the secularisation of political thought. Combined
with Machiavelli it is said to free men "from the need to refer to
divine will or to history to justify political activity". Natural
law presuppositions "were accepted as self-evident without further
theological or prescriptive justification". While this may have been
true in some circles, it is a naive assumption that "such secular,
rationalist ideas 'as the rights of man' and other products of the
Enlightenment would, when they gripped the common people, necessarily
serve as an antidote to religion". The extent to which they were ever
coloured by the Enlightenment in the English context is a moot point,
especially if we recall Joseph Priestley's shocked reaction to the
14extent of unbelief in France.
But, in order to get a proper paradigmatic understanding of what 
was going on in the history of ideas, the flowing tide of rationalism 
and secularisation cannot be completely ignored. A more complete 
view can be gained by looking both backwards and forwards. During 
the medieval period, the institutional setting of natural law theory 
ought not to be overlooked. Natural law ideas were contextually 
related to the corporate existence of the Catholic church. Conciliar 
theory, for example, held "the whole body of the church, the 
congregation of the faithful is the source of its own law". Natural 
law bolstered this assertion of the autonomy of the church against 
the state. In the 18th century, the conception of a mixed constitution 
did not include the church. Natural law theory in the earlier period 
can only be properly understood, as with Thomas Aquinas, in relation 
to a whole complex or totality of ideas. Natural law was only 
comprehensible in relation to other concepts such as eternal law and
’ Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, (London, 1971), 
92-3; Sonya Jowett, "The Role of Language and the Development 
of English Political Ideas" ....^University of Manchester Ph.D. 
thesis, 1976, 46-8; George Rude, The Crowd in History, (London, 
1964), 23; Ira Brown ed., Joseph Priestley: selections from 
his writings, (Pennsylvania, 1962).
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divine law. Despite what has been written earlier, there is a
degree of secularism and individualism in natural law ideas in the
18th century that seems to be absent in the earlier period. The
relationship with God is often more indirect. The right of self- •
defence is not immediately that life is holy but man, by use of his
own individual reason, will act in his own self-interest. Volney,
paraphrasing Hobbes, tells us "self-love, the desire of happiness,
and an aversion to pain are the essential and primary laws that
nature ... imposed on man". Volney also stresses individual choice
whereby "man is become the artificer of his own fate". But within
the idea of natural rights and laws a more collective orientation
could exist. By nature, Volney wrote, there is inherent in man
"the tie of their reciprocal connections". Since a man ought not
to "do that which is destructive of his own life", it followed for
the Radicals, he ought not to do that which threatened to destroy
the lives of other men. The way this could be ensured was through
collective responsibility; through the pre-medieval institution of
the tythings, through communal local government. It is frequently
and strongly argued by Marxists and others that natural law theory
is pre-eminently bourgeois and individualist, but the Georgian
Radicals transformed the 'bourgeois’ individualism inherent in
modernised natural law and looked back to community; although the
social reality from which this was constructed was vastly different
from the medieval social world. If there is some formal element
in natural law theory that stretches across the classical, medieval
and mercantilist worlds, it is because all three are, albeit in
different senses and with different social content, "natural societies".^
With Spence, and other plebeian writers, it was shown how natural 
law ideas suited their natural and social environment. The two elements 
cannot be separated, and natural law cannot be adequately understood 
outside of these twin contexts; it is not a purely intellectual 
construct. "The simple Deistical and Republican system of Jesus" 
was, according to Robert Wedderburn, the natural form of government.
Sabine, History, 247, 257, 320-1, 465; C.F. Volney, The Ruins 
or a Survey of the Revolutions of Empires, (London, 1795), 35-6; 
on the question of natural rights as bourgeois apologetics, 
besides Continental Marx;-in writers, see for example Basil 
Willey, The Eighteenth .tury Background, (Pelican edn. 1972), 
24; "natural law, sanctioning liberty and progress, [and 
property],was to be the basis of the modern liberal bourgeois 
state" §c.
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"Those gaudy appendages, those trumpery additions" of modern 
government and society had "conspired to corrupt its native purity, 
its original simplicity". Singled out for special mention are 
"the game laws - the right of primogeniture", measures which are 
"unjust infringements' of the law of nature"; laws which attack 
agrarian property rights, the rights of the small producer. It 
was a common assumption during this period that "nature manifested 
itself most clearly in those who were untouched by the artifices of 
civilisation". The Radicals felt "the peasant living in the 
country and on the land", and "the working man living on a small 
income were both able to get along without luxuries, like the 
noble savage". Despite modern expressions, it is essential to grasp 
that natural law all but died out in the 19th and 20th centuries 
because its supporting social structure and physical environment 
had disappeared. Natural law was the mental product of agrarian 
and semi-agrarian society, and it became more and more anachronistic 
to argue from nature. But the process of change was slow. "Post 
war radicalism", according to one writer, "was for the most part 
confined within the social and political categories of the eighteenth 
century ... attack on the aristocratic constitution". Only after 1819 
was there a "gradual transformation". It is argued "the primary social 
category of the ideology was 'the People'", not "the 'working class' 
or 'working man"', and was cast in terms of "'the rights of all men'" 
instead of class. In the light of my investigations, what follows 
is that the category of "the people" in this period has a set of 
meanings which mark it off from modern connotations. The concept of 
the people in the 18th century is only properly comprehensible in 
relation to other concepts such as virtue and natural and common 
law. In the last instance these ideas need to be linked to men's 
relationship to their natural environment and, to 'deeper' social 
categories. The notion of Providence has been defined as "the course 
of worldly events ... seen as the working out of God's judgements". 
This was "but a refinement of the more basic assumption", also a 
natural law assumption, "that the material environment responded to 
man's moral behaviour". A belief in Providence could exist side by 
side with a belief in science or natural causes since it did not so 
much spring from ignorance concerning the workings of nature as from 
"the ancient belief that there was an ultimate relationship between 
man's moral behaviour and the apparent caprices of his environment".
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And as Keith Thomas says, "the same belief underlay the providential 
view of history, in which the rise and fall of nations appeared as 
the expression of God's unsearchable purposes". Virtue, as a moral 
and 'historical' process, rests on the same set of cognitive 
assumptions, and if a more secular idea in its Machiavellian form, 
was never completely distinguished as such in Radical ideology.
Perhaps linking both to less political and more popular belief is 
the idea of fortune and misfortune which was also a central idea in 
the explanation of witchcraft.16
Simplicity vs Complexity
The analysis of nature and culture is far from complete since 
no extended attention has been given to the question of nature and 
natural law as either a hierarchical or a more or less egalitarian 
ordering of things. The social group to which you ascribed virtue, 
varied according to this initial 'epistemological' conception. One 
concrete extention of this was the English garden, but no analysis 
of this can be presented. Neither has there been any further, more 
'contextual' analysis of millenarianism, deism or the idea of origins. 
Some treatment was given to these in earlier chapters; what are 
considered next are those parts of the paradigm which have so far 
only been looked at within the framework of a particular writer's 
thinking.
One of the most basic yet generally overlooked words and ideas 
in 18th century political vocabulary is "simplicity". It had a great 
variety of meanings and associations. There is, perhaps, something 
paradoxical in the idea of "noble simplicity", a notion by and large 
appropriated by the upper classes. Put in this form, in architecture, 
in poetry and in painting the idea of the simple is very stylised.
The countryside is conceived as a landscape; something to be looked at 
and admired from a distance, a thing that has an excess of culture laid 
upon it. The Radical idea was often very different. When Thomas Spence
’ Robert Wedderburn, The Address of the Rev. Robert Wedderburn, 
(London, 1820), 12; Franz Boas, The History of Ideas, (New York, 
1969), 179-80; Trygve Tholfsen, Working Class Radicalism in Mid- 
Victorian England, (London, 1976), 50; Thomas, Religion and 
Magic, 103, 106, 696. The shift is frequently characterised as 
a move from medieval natural law to 18th century natural rights; 
see for example Willey Background, 23.
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spoke o f  " s i m p l i c i t y "  a s  " th e  Rule o f  H eaven 's  A r t" ,  he had in  mind
a v i s i o n  o f  s o c i e t y  t o t a l l y  opposed to  B u rk e 's .  He meant " th e
s i m p l i c i t y  o f  a r e p u b l i c " ,  w h ile  a l s o  a s s o c i a t i n g  s i m p l i c i t y  w ith
p a t r i o t i s m .  A l f r e d ' s  system , a c c o rd in g  to  John C a r tw r ig h t ,
p o s s e s s e d  " s i m p l i c i t y ,  u n i f o r m i ty  and e x a c t  p r o p o r t i o n s " .  There
i s  " s im p le  h o n e s ty " ;  t r u t h  was alw ays h e ld  to  be s im p le .  C a r tw r ig h t ,
l i k e  many o th e r  R a d ic a ls ,  opposed s i m p l i c i t y  to  "m ystery"  and " to
c o n fu s io n  and d a rk n e s s " .  Samuel Bamford w rote  o f  " th e  s i m p l i c i t y  o f
an u n c o r ru p te d  mind". E l in o r  Dashwood in  Jane  A u s t i n ' s  Sense and
S e n s i b i l i t y , speaks o f  "manly, u n s tu d ie d  s i m p l i c i t y " .  Apart from th e
a s s o c i a t i o n  between m a n lin ess  and s i m p l i c i t y ,  and th e  d i s s o c i a t i o n
o f  s i m p l i c i t y  from fem in ine  m y s te ry ,  th e  id e a  c a r r i e d  h e re  i s  t h a t
s in c e  th e  s im ple  i s  u n s tu d ie d  i t  i s  a l s o  spon taneous  o r  ' n a t u r a l ' .
George Boas w r i t e s  o f  an 18th  c e n tu ry  " t r a d i t i o n "  which f e l t  t h a t
" th e  o ld e r  a th in g  was th e  b e t t e r " .  So " p r im i t iv e  C h r i s t i a n i t y "  and
" p r i m i t i v e  s im p l i c i t y "  were te rm s  o f  a p p ro b a t io n  . Again th e r e  i s
th e  id e a  o f  a r e t u r n  to  o r i g i n s .  The s im ple  was a l s o  th e  o r i g i n a l .
"Some o f  th e  cus tom s" , s a id  John Brand, "have been o r i g i n a l l y  good,
though a t  th e  p r e s e n t  day th e y  r e t a i n  l i t t l e  o f  t h e i r  p r i m i t i v e
p u r i t y " .  The measure o f  custom was how c l o s e l y  i t  s t i l l  conformed
17to  i t s  o r i g i n a l  s i m p l i c i t y  and p u r i t y .
"S im p le" ,  in  th e  S h o r te r  Oxford E n g l ish  D ic t io n a r y ,  i s  a s s o c ia t e d  
w ith  a la c k  o f  d u p l i c i t y  and g u i l e ;  i t  means " in n o c e n t  and h a rm le s s ,  
u n d e s ig n in g ,  h o n e s t ,  open and s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d " .  A d d i t i o n a l ly  i t  means 
" f r e e  from, devo id  o f ,  p r i d e ,  o s t e n t a t i o n "  and so on. Another meaning 
r e f e r s  t o  freedom from " e l a b o r a t i o n  o r  a r t i f i c i a l i t y ,  a r t l e s s ,  
u n a f f e c t e d ,  p l a i n ,  unado rned" .  And, " o f  p e r s o n s " ,  a 1794 meaning, 
co n n o tes  " u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d  and u n s p o i l e d " .  Of d r e s s ,  i t  r e f e r s  to  a 
form o f  c l o th in g  "no t marked by any e le g a n c e  o r  g ran d eu r"  and i s  
" v e ry  p l a i n  o r  hom ely". T h is  c a r r i e s  o v e r  to  l i v i n g ,  d i e t  and abode.
A n e g a t iv e  c o n n o ta t io n  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  "n o t  complex in  r e s p e c t  o f  p a r t s  
o r  s t r u c t u r e " .  Of s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  i s  t h a t  s im ple  a l s o  r e f e r s  to  
" p e rs o n s  in  a humble o r d in a r y  c o n d i t io n  o f  l i f e "  and "a  p l a n t  o r  herb  
concoc ted  f o r  m edical p u rp o s e s " ,  and, "a  s in g l e  uncompounded o r  unmixed 
t h i n g ,  a su b s ta n c e  f r e e  from f o r e ig n  e le m e n ts " .  Perhaps j u s t  as
* Boas, I d e a s , 141-2; John Brand, O b se rv a t io n s  on P opu la r  
A n t i q u i t i e s ,  (London, 1810),  x i .
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interesting is a use of simple taken from weaving. "Simplicity” 
contains many identical meanings to simple and includes a reference 
to "rusticity" and "freedom" from useless accessories. Another 
Oxford dictionary describes "the simple life" as the practice "of 
doing without servants and luxuries" and an "attempt to return to 
more primitive conditions". This view, involving the idea of a 
return to an original condition can be contrasted with the 19th 
century evolutionist idea where the simple was the lowest form in 
the history of evolution and progress. All the associations and 
synonyms listed, were contained within 18th century Radical 
vocabulary and ideology. Not least, is there a suggestion of an 
overlap or spill from artisan herbalism into artisan politics, such 
as in the writings of Samuel Bamford.
"The mind begins to reason", wrote one Radical propagandist,
"until ... it can determine and point out the most plainest and 
simple plan". Through the idea of simplicity, this quotation points 
to an association the Radicals often made between politics, language 
and reason with simplicity weaving the connecting thread. It has 
been said of Paine that "his style", his "simplicity and lucidity" 
embodies "his political and moral values". According to another 
author, his arguments "were stripped of refinements and qualifications" 
so that "everything was reduced to its simplest terms". This style 
is in contrast "to the complexity and subtlety of Burke". It is 
also typical of Radical writing in general. Part of Joanna Southcott’s 
appeal, according to William Sharp, the engraver, rested on her 
"simplicity ... of language, drawn from nature" understood "by every 
capacity ... for these effects of nature ... may be understood by 
illiterate men of every nation". Ignore the learning of the ancients, 
Robert Wedderburn declared since "reason informs and admonishes us" 
to follow "the simple Truth". Since truth was simple it was capable 
of being understood by all men and best expressed through simple 
language. Samuel Bamford gives a glowing description of his uncle 
"a Christian patriot of the old simple and unpretending class" who 
was not gifted "with a multiplicity of words". He "gave lessons by 
example" which was, so to speak, reason incarnate. Mention has already 
been made that reason itself was seen as simple. In reasoning, it was 
a basic methodological principle of the age that true knowledge could 
only be gained through "discovering that which is simplest, then that 
what is next simplest" so "one can progress inevitably to the most
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complex things of all". You started from the present or the most 
complex and went backwards to find true knowledge; you did not 
regard the complex present as the zenith of man's development and 
mental progress. A recent work in linguistic philosophy describes 
simplicity as "informativeness". Simpler theories, it says, "are 
more likely to be true than complex ones". This was precisely the 
position of the Georgian Radicals and in their view there was a symmetry 
between the order of the mind and the order of society. In both, 
simplicity held the key to the truth. William Hazlitt describes 
the method of Horne Tooke's philological researches in which he did 
not attempt to explain "the obscure by the more obscure but the 
difficult by the plain, the complex by the simple". Inevitably Tooke 
found that many modern words were "a corruption of the old Saxon" 
just as the modern constitution was a corruption of the old Anglo- 
Saxon constitution. Simplicity as informativeness and as common 18sense also lay underneath the Radical shibboleth of political education.
For Paine, and others, simplicity in politics led to a small amount 
of government, or so it would seem. He also justified independence for 
America on the grounds that it is "a SINGLE SIMPLE LINE". Reconciliation, 
like partial reform, was "perplexed and complicated". The "grand system 
of reform", urged Allen Davenport, "is so simple". The 'metaphysic' 
of simplicity is clearly seen in the millenial attitude towards political 
reform, where radical reform is to be carried out immediately or "done 
in a day". Radical reform or revolution was more likely to succeed 
because it was so simple and therefore could be done quickly. Partial 
reform was by nature complicated and slow and uncertain in its outcome. 
"Simplicity, order and facility of execution, are the distinguishing 
characteristics of Radical Reform", wrote one Radical journal. It went
18 J.T. Boulton, The Language of Politics in the Age of Wilkes and 
Burke, (London, 1963), 145-6; Cone, Jacobins, 102; W.S. Baker, 
William Sharp Engraver, (Philadelphia, 1875), 13; Robert 
Wedderburn, Address, 7-8; Samuel Bamford, Early Days, (London, 
1849), 100; Michael Foucault, The Order of Things, (London, 1970), 
53; Elliot Sober, Simplicity, (Oxford, 1975), 161, 166, 168; 
William Hazlitt, Spirit of the Age, (Oxford U.P., 1904; orig. 
pub. 1825), 81-2.
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on to  c la im  r a d i c a l  re fo rm  " i s  a l re a d y  n e a r e r  p r a c t i c e  th a n  m oderate
19re fo rm  f o r  m i l l i o n s  a re  in  favou r  o f  th e  fo rm er" .
E a r l i e r  some a t tem p t was made to  e l i c i t  Thomas S p e n c e 's
m i l l e n i a l i s m ;  s im p l i c i t y  was "Heaven’s A r t" .  Yet s i m p l i c i t y  has  a
w ider r e l i g i o u s  v a lu e  th an  t h i s ;  i t  i s  a key v a lu e  in  th e  D is s e n t in g
t r a d i t i o n .  I t  has  been c a l l e d  a c e n t r a l  f e a t u r e  o f  " C a lv i n i s t
a e t h e t i c s " .  P r o te s t a n t i s m ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  th e  v a r i e t i e s  o f
P u r i ta n is m  in  th e  B r i t i s h  c o n te x t ,  d e f in e d  i t s e l f  a g a in s t  th e
c o m p le x i t i e s  o f  b e l i e f  and r i t u a l  o f  th e  C a th o l ic  chu rch .  W ithout
to o  much d i f f i c u l t y ,  t h i s  was t r a n s f e r r e d  over  to  p o l i t i c s  where th e
s i m p l i c i t y  o f  R ad ica l b e l i e f s  and c u l t u r e  were c o n t r a s t e d  w ith  th e
c o m p le x i t ie s  o f  a r i s t o c r a t i c  p o l i t i c s .  Although th e  E n g l is h  g e n t ry
and a r i s t o c r a c y  would o f t e n  e x to l  t h e i r  own hom eliness  and s i m p l i c i t y
a g a i n s t  f o r e ig n  c o u n t e r p a r t s ,  i t  was an easy  m a t te r  f o r  th e  R a d ic a ls
to  e q u a te  th e  a r i s t o c r a c y  w ith  com plex ity  g iven  th e  way th e y  aped th e
French C a th o l ic  a r i s t o c r a c y  and g iven  t h e i r  a l l e g e d  o r i g i n s .  As one
w r i t e r  has  s a id ,  "a long  w ith  th e  c u l t  o f  p l a i n - n e s s  went a v e ry  g e n e ra l
contempt f o r  w hatever was m e d iev a l" ,  th e  a r i s t o c r a c y  b e in g  th e  epitom y
o f  m e d ie v a ln e s s .  In th e  R ad ica l mind, s i m p l i c i t y ,  a r e l i g i o u s  concep t
20in  o r i g i n ,  i s  a l s o  g iven th e  g lo s s  o f  s o c i a l  c l a s s .
A part from be ing  a s s o c ia t e d  in  ' r e l i g i o u s '  t h in k in g  w ith  th e  one 
r a t h e r  th a n  th e  many, w ith  u n i t y  r a t h e r  th a n  p l u r a l i t y  o r  co m p lex i ty ,  
th e  a t tach m en t  to  th e  s im ple i s  a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  th e  s o c i a l  c i rc u m s ta n c e s  
o f  th e  a r t i s a n s  and lower g e n t ry .  I t  has  a l r e a d y  been m entioned  how i t  
was f e l t  th e  lower o rd e r s  l i v e d  a more n a t u r a l  l i f e  th a n  th e  upper c l a s s e s .  
I t  fo l lo w ed  th e y  a l s o  le d  a more sim ple l i f e .  Volney c a l l e d  p le b e ia n s  
" c h i l d r e n  o f  s im p l i c i t y "  and "sim ple  men". As he p u ts  i t ,  in  d ia lo g u e  
form:
19 A lla n  D avenport,  The L i f e ,  W rit in g s  and P r i n c i p l e s  o f  Thomas 
Spence, (London, 1836), 11-12; The R ad ica l  Reformer, N o.5, 
V o l . l ,  38.
20 Donald Davie, The Times L i t e r a r y  Supplem ent, November 26, 1976, 
1492; R.W. G reaves, On th e  R e l ig io u s  C lim ate  o f  H anoverian  
E ng land , (London, 1963), 10, pamp.
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Q. You have classed among the social virtues, 
simplicity of manners; what do you mean by that 
expression? A. I mean the confining of our 
wants and desires to what is really useful for 
the existence of the individual and his family: 
that is to say, the man with simple manners has 
few wants, and is content with little.^-^
Volney shows how this individual virtue or moral value is 
connected with the collective health of the economy. Since,
if this virtue of simplicity be extended to a 
whole people, it secured abundance to them; 
everything that they do not immediately consume 
becomes a source of trade and commerce to a 
very great extent; they labour, they manufacture, 
and sell their productions to a greater extent 
than others; and attain the summit both of 
external and internal prosperity
The opposite vice to this virtue is "cupidity and luxury". Again,
then, there is the example of personal and moral health leading to
public and economic health: a truly moral economy. Thomas Holcroft
remarked how "every man in Nottingham gentle or simple", supported a
particular measure. "Such ideas of difference between gentle and
simple", reported a farmer-artisan in 18th century America, "were, I
believe, universal among all of my rank and age". Simple and
simplicity were words which conveyed a sense of class consciousness,
a positive evaluation, an anti-'hegemonic' evaluation of your own
class. Thomas Spence frequently referred to the aristocracy as
giants, and there is perhaps some echo of John Baxter's account of
the Brutus myth. Spence makes the not unwarranted association, given
physical differences, of class with size. Small is beautiful also in
that the artisan, small businessman and master is preferred over
monopoly which is, of course, associated with aristocratic wealth
23and politics. The small is, of course, the simple as well.
21 * C.F. Volney, The Law of Nature, (Pioneer Press edn., 1921; orig. 
pub. Philadelphia and London, 1796), 173.
Volney, Law, 173-4.
23 * Thomas Holcroft, Memoirs of the Late Thomas Holcroft...(London, 
1816), 3 vols.; Rhys Isaac, "Preachers and Patriots: Popular 
Culture in Revolutionary Virginia" in The American Revolution: 
Explorations in the History of American Radicalism, (North 
Illinois U.P., 1976), 130, ed. Alfred Young; Thomas Spence,
The Giant-Killer or Anti-Landlord... No.l, 4.
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The dictionary defined simple in contradistinction to the 
aristocratic virtues of grandeur, ostentation, elegance and so on and 
a life-style of luxury. In this sense, simplicity can be related to 
the idea or concept of excess. A recent statement argues that while 
the Radicals used the language of a balanced constitution, they also 
used it as a sort of black propaganda to disguise "the novelty of 
their ideas". Enough example has been given from the Radicals 
themselves, for instance from Thomas Evans and from John Cartwright, 
upon whom the critic rests her argument, to suggest a different 
interpretation. If the cry was the people's sovereignty, the people 
were only to rule in partnership with a reconstituted aristocracy and 
monarchy. As Bernard Bailyn has put it, "it was not assumed that each 
estate would singly dominate ... the branches of government". The 
fact that the Radicals still adhered to a notion of excess prevented 
their approval of one element governing alone, which, anyway, they 
would have regarded as a version of monopoly. This idea of a 
political or constitutional balance also had a much wider resonance. 
According to Bailyn, a balanced or popular government required 
"spartan self-denying virtue on the part of all the people" and would 
only survive "where poverty made upright behaviour necessary". But 
the words of Volney, and others like him should not be interpreted 
too easily or casually. Neither should the association between the 
simple life and rustic living be taken at its face value. "Simplicity 
is the Mean between Ostentation and Rusticity", said Alexander Pope.
John Bull, a common Radical symbol, was used to represent rural 
simplicity or honesty but not idiocy. He does sometimes show 
gullibility but this only means that his honesty and simplicity have 
been taken advantage of. The simple was what was according to 
nature's laws; it did not necessarily imply anything about rural 
poverty or total asceticism. Rousseau believed children ought to 
be brought up "in their first simplicity", according to natural reason; 
he also believed this would best be done close to the natural world but 
he did not recommend they be free of some of the benefits of civilisation. 
Once again we come back to the proposition that only an excess of a 
thing is wrong or bad. Since Saxon times the simplicity of reason and 
custom had given way to the excesses of lawyer's law. The "more homely 
and more sensible manners of the Saxons", John Baxter wrote, were 
exchanged for the excesses "of chivalry, and the subtleties of school 
philosophy". In Don Quixote, a passage extols the simple life in which
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th e  n e c e s s a r i e s  o f  e x i s t e n c e  a r e  ta k e n  "from th e  s tu rd y  oak" and
from mother e a r t h .  But, by and l a r g e ,  i t  would be a m is tak e  to
24a t t r i b u t e  t h i s  s o r t  o f  p r im i t iv i s m  to  th e  R a d ic a ls .  To some 
e x te n t  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n ,  t h e i r  view o f  th e  s im ple l i f e ,  i s  s t a t e d  
by a c h a r a c t e r  in  one o f  W illiam  Godwin's n o v e l s .  "Though I love 
th e  s ig h t  o f  p e a s a n t s " ,  she s a y s ,  " I  would n o t  be a p e a s a n t " ,
I would have a l a r g e r  s to c k  o f  id e a s  and a w ider 
f i e l d  o f  a c t i v i t y  . . .  I would n o t  s a c r i f i c e  . . .  
th e  b e s t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  my n a t u r e .  I p u t  in  
my c la im  f o r  r e f in e m e n ts  and l u x u r i e s ,  b u t  th e y  
a r e  th e  r e f in e m e n ts  and p u r i f y i n g  o f  th e  i n t e l l e c t ,  
and th e  l u x u r i e s  o f  u n c o s t l y ,  s im ple  t a s t e . ^
A nother w r i t i n g ,  by an a lo g y ,  b r in g s  o u t  th e  'G o th ic '  p o s i t i o n  even 
b e t t e r .  " C i v i l i s a t i o n " ,  i t  i s  s a i d ,
i s  l i k e  cook ing . When you see  l i g h t ,  h e a l th y  and
we11-p re p a re d  food on th e  t a b l e  you a re  v e ry
p le a s e d  to  r e a l i s e  t h a t  cooking has  become an
a r t ;  b u t  when we see j u i c e s ,  j e l l i e s  and p a t e s
w ith  t r u f f l e s  we c u r s e  th e  cooks and t h e i r  a r t
f o r  p ro d u c in g  such w re tched  r e s u l t s . - ,
26
T his  a p p ro x im a te ly  i s  how th e  R a d ic a ls  f e l t .  They r e j e c t e d  th e  
e l a b o r a t e  d e s s e r t s :  th e y  were th e  overdone o r  ' e x c e s s i v e '  o r  co m plica ted  
p a r t  o f  c i v i l i s a t i o n ,  o r  c u l t u r e  o r  a r t .  They r e j e c t e d  th e  e f f e m in a te ,  
over-done  and s u p e r f lu o u s ,  even n a u s e a t in g ,  c u l t u r e  o f  th e  a r i s t o c r a c y  
and o f  th e  French  a r i s t o c r a c y  in  p a r t i c u l a r .  The Anglo-Saxon p o l i t y  
was n a t u r a l  b u t  a ' n a t u r a l '  c i v i l i s a t i o n  r a t h e r  th an  sim ply  b e in g  
n a t u r a l  in  th e  Q u ix o t ian  s e n s e ;  i t  was th e  o r i g i n a l  c i v i l i s a t i o n .  I t  
was c i v i l i s a t i o n  w ith o u t  to o  many f r i l l s .  Or, in  th e  German co n c e p t io n ,
24 J o w e t t ,  "Language", 167-8 , 181; Bernard  B a i ly n ,  The I d e o lo g ic a l  
O r ig in s  o f  th e  American R e v o lu t io n , (Cambridge M ass . ,  1967), 65, 
71; J e a n - J a c q u e s  R ousseau, "The New H e lo ise "  in  The Minor 
E d u c a t io n a l  W r i t in g s  o f  J e a n -J a c q u e s  R ousseau , (New York, 1910), 
73, ed .  W illiam  Boyd; The Cap o f  L i b e r t y , N o.2, 87; John B ax te r ,  
A New and I m p a r t i a l  H is to ry  o f  England . . .  (London, 1796), 114; 
Miguel de C e rv a n te s ,  Don Q u ix o te ,  (Everyman edn. 1906 o r i g .  pub. 
1613), V o l . l ,  65-66 .
^ ’ W illiam  Godwin in  W illey ,  Background, 222.
C ite d  in  Lucien Febvre , " C i v i l i s a t i o n : e v o lu t io n  o f  a word and a 
group o f  id e a s "  in  A New Kind o f  H is to ry :  from th e  W rit in g s  o f  
Lucien F e b v re , (London, 1973),  234, ed .  P e te r  Burke.
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the Anglo-Saxons had culture but not civilization.
Virtue vs Corruption-Luxury
Paired with the opposites of simplicity and complexity was the 
ideological opposition between virtue and corruption. There is also 
the association between simplicity and virtue. Both were related 
to the problem of excess through the question of luxury. Luxury 
gave rise to complication; it also originated corruption. John Jebb 
spoke of ’’the slumbering virtue of the people", implying its 
connections with past polities and with popular government. Lord 
Hillborough said, in 1780, that the people were "mad from virtue" 
and "were bent on reforming the government", implying from a 
conservative or Whiggish point of view there could be an excess of 
virtue. On a personal level, the opposite of virtue was not 
corruption but vice; on a public but still personal level, venality. 
Corruption is, as it were, a collective system, whereas venality 
refers to personal or family gain on the political level; it refers 
to that which can be bought and sold as against virtue for which there 
is no price. "Let no man", said Thomas Spence, "think of aggrandising 
his family at the expense of public welfare". At his trial, Henry 
'Redhead' Yorke declared "the sacred lessons of virtue" were "the 
foundations of all human polity" and were allied with love of country 
or patriotism. Being a partially political thing, virtue was also a 
public act which involved an active principle.
"Innocence is not virtue", argued William Godwin, "virtue demands 
the active employment of an ardent mind in the promotion of the 
general good". For Godwin, as for many other Radicals, virtue could 
be gained from "knowledge and wisdom" thereby giving us another 
indication of the depth of the idea of political education. Virtue 
provided the active principle in freedom or liberty since freedom 
was "animated by virtue". Liberty, Rousseau declared, cannot exist 
without virtue. "Gothic freedom and virtue" was a common phrase on 
the lips of Radicals and others. "Our Saxon ancestors" established 
"constitutional freedom ... wisdom and virtue". Alfred was always
"virtuous Alfred".
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As Richard Brothers, among many others puts it, ’’virtue animates
the hero"; vice or venality motivated the villain or anti-hero.
Like patriotism and other ideas in the complex or paradigm, it was
necessary to distinguish between false and "genuine virtue".
Rousseau held that "even virtue is discredited in the mouth of one
who does not practice it". For one poet, virtue was "all that life
can give", suggesting the significance and pervasiveness of the
idea in 18th century mentality. He called for "active virtue and
patriotic exertions" leading to "political salvation". The
association of "religion and virtue" was made frequently. There
was also "rustic virtue" and "domestic virtue", the latter sometimes
signifying English rather than purely personal virtuous behaviour.
Like simplicity, virtue was associated with harmony and balance; in
the prints of the time, the idea of disharmony whether expressed
through ill-fitting clothes or things turned upside down and so on,
27seems to imply a loss or lack of virtue. This idea is partly 
contained in the Shorter Oxford's definition of virtue, which is 
also of more general interest in the light of later discussion. 
Virtue is,
1. The power or operative influence inherent in 
a scriptural or divine being, c. An act of super­
human or divine power; a 'mighty work'; a miracle 
(1526) 2. Conformity of life and conduct with the 
principle of morality; voluntary observance of the 
recognised moral laws or standards of right conduct. 
M.E. b. Chastity, sexual purity esp. in women 
3. A particular moral excellence; a special 
manifestation of the influence of moral principles 
in life or conduct ... 5. Physical strength, force
or energy 6. The possession or display of manly 
qualities ... manliness, valour.
Virtue then, is connected with a divine origin, provides a moral 
underpinning to public conduct, is a kind of energy or action, is 
something women have and do not have and is a form of purity or 
integrity. What follows is largely an articulation and a critical
* Henry ’Redhead' Yorke, "The Trial of Henry 'Redhead' Yorke" 
in Trials for Treason, (London, 1794), 11; Ingrid Kuczynski, 
"Pastoral Romance and Political Justice" in Essays in Honour 
of William Gallacher, (Berlin, 1966); John Cartwright,
England's Aegis, (London, 1804), 150-1.
28 * Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, (Oxford U.P. 1964 edn.) Cp. 
this with Bernard Crick's discussion of virtue in Niccolo 
Machiavelli, The Discourses, (Pelican edn.1974), "Introduction", 
57-8. --------------
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assessment of these meanings. What is missing in the dictionary 
definition is the historical question. "Virtue” is a word not 
often used nowadays, especially in political speech. Why? What 
is it about virtue that makes it a word and idea peculiar to a 
pre-industrial or semi-industrial setting? "The decline of 
virtue", writes J.G.A. Pocock, "has as its logical corollary the 
rise of interest". Put another way, it could be said that part 
replaces whole; representation (a coalition of interests) replaces 
delegation and participation (a community of interests). Or, if you 
like, a capitalist ethic replaced a mercantilist one in politics.
Yet this only tells us what happened; it does not suggest why.
Pocock tells us the "theses and antitheses of virtue and corruption 
is the central element in ’Machiavellian* thought". Given the 
importance Pocock places on the "Machiavellian moment" in the history 
of 18th century ideas it is useful to examine the ramifications of 
this assertion more closely.
For, Pocock has been the most prominent figure in a minor 
revolution in the study of 18th century thought. Before, natural law 
and rights held sway; but largely thanks to Pocock, virtue is now seen 
as the central concept in political thought and ideology. Great minds 
think alike, and a number of the ideas and conclusions expressed here 
were reached independently of his MachiaveIlian Moment, a book 
published while this thesis was in progress. At the same time, he 
has expressed these ideas at a far greater level of sophistication 
and articulation than I have been able to do here. My own use of 
the book should be clear by now. But there are also considerable 
divergencies and disagreements. My analysis has been more detailed 
in many areas or writers where Pocock has naturally offered only 
general remarks. Overall, the analysis has been directed at a very 
different content, at popular ideology. The use of the idea of a 
paradigm, the attempt to specify the relationship of the ideas to 
their social structure and so on, all show a divergence from Pocock.
Having done with this minor digression, what then has he to say 
about virtue as a central organising concept in 18th century ideas?
In an earlier work, he stresses the universalist or cosmopolitan 
nature of the idea and consequently the problems faced by English 
political writers in applying it to an English context. The analysis
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of John Cartwright and other pamphleteers has suggested what in
fact happened was that the universalist element was considerably
watered down: the humanist republic became the English republic.
Contrary to this, Pocock argues 18th century thought was
fundamentally classical and secular. It was "the most classical-
minded of English centuries". Whereas "Tudor political thought is
Christian, medieval, and slightly Machiavellian", and "Puritan
political thought is a battle-ground between the apocalyptic and
the secular", the 18th century "needed a new vision of itself in
radically secular terms". Apparently, part of the reason for this
secular twist in Georgian political thinking was an "increased
awareness of the role of commerce and finance as historical
determinants", and, as sources of corruption rather than as agents
of fortune. As he interestingly remarks, "a Marxist might say that
this was a mercantilist rather than an entrepreneurial consciousness,
29if that were not revisionism".
His later work shows some modification of these views, although 
it might only be amplification since Pocock's general and original 
conclusions still seem to stand. In the classical tradition, stemming 
from Aristotle and running through to Machiavelli and others,
"citizenship was a universal activity". Besides the universalism, 
the secularisation process is also re-stated. "During the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ... Western political and social 
thought passed from its post-medieval to its early modern stage". 
Generally, historical explanations replaced religious ones. "The 
antithesis of virtue ceased to be fortuna, but became corruption 
instead" and "the habit of presenting English politics in terms of 
grace and apocalyptic underwent after 1660 a rather sharp decline".
The cause was the integration of history, that is classical thought, 
with Christian eschatology; a rejection of Augustine's down-grading 
of secular life and a recognition of a Christian commonwealth 
wherein a measure of salvation might be achieved. "Prophetic history 
... served as a means of politicising grace and re-sacralising politics". 
History could then be read as the history of virtue, or its opposite,
29. Pocock, Politics, 99, 127-8, 140.
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and in "the later Christian centuries" the "political apocalyptic"
was an index of the tensions between the sacred and the profane or
church and society. Alternatively, Pocock describes this as "the
politicisation of virtue" where the maintenance of virtue depended
upon "the maintenance of the polis" or constitution. Also, whereas
before virtue was a private relationship with an external force,
now it was public since a virtuous republic rendered the individual's
virtue "dependent on the virtue of others". Virtue developed three
meanings which were carried "down to the end of Old Western thinking".
Virtue is first a form of power which allows "the individual or group
to act effectively in a civic context"; second it was an "essential
property" of the personality; third it was a "moral goodness". As
a type of power or action, Machiavelli saw virtue as an "innovative
force". It also gave legitimacy to the innovatory acts of heroes,
"the classical legislators in the strictest possible sense of state
founders", or "the divine or divinely aided beings who could create
societies because their virtu was such that it did not need the social
frame which was a pre-condition in ordinary men". They were, "gods
... with a little of the beast in them"; mythological creatures close
to nature and origins, although this is not a point Pocock makes or
stresses. "The innovator must be a legislator" who imposes form or
virtue on matters of fortune, and we think in this context of Alfred
and the codification of the Saxon laws. There are, then, two types
of virtue: charismatic virtue performed in a state of grace, say
Alfred; and the more everyday political virtue as in the fight for
freedom of the press. Charismatic virtue provides the inspiration
and foundation for political virtue. It might be thought at this
point the secular basis of virtue is undermined but Pocock argues
that for Machiavelli "virtuous republics" could make war on each
other and "for this reason the Christian virtues and the civic could
never coincide", although there is really no thoroughgoing examination
of the alleged conceptual discreteness between Christian and
'Machiavellian' virtue, still less an attempt to study it in the
30realm of practical ideology.
Pocock also insists on the separation or opposition of virtue and 
grace against custom and prudence, the latter is "an antithesis to
30, Pocock, Moment, 37, 42-3, 44, 62, 74, 76, 166-68, 213, 329,
401-2, 402-3.
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what M a c h ia v e l l i  had to  say " ,  an a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  language
o r  parad igm . " M a c h ia v e l l i ' s in d iv id u a l  i s  a r u l e r  s eek in g  to
shape e v e n ts  th rough  v i r t u  in  th e  sense  o f  a u d a c i ty ,  G u i c c i a r d i n i ’s
a p a t r i c i a n  seek ing  to  adap t h im s e l f  to  e v e n ts  th ro u g h  p ru d e n c e ."
Yet s in c e  v i r t u e  i s  seen as a k ind  o f  power and moral s a n c t io n ,
p r u d e n t i a l  a c t i o n s  would sometimes g e t  endowed w ith  v i r t u e  and
Pocock a d m its ,  i f  t h a t  i s  th e  r i g h t  word, t h a t  in  G u ic c i a r d in i
p rudence  (custom) and v i r t u e  ( reason )  a re  o f t e n  i d e n t i f i e d .
Pocock a l s o  says v i r t u e  and re a so n  form a p a i r  in  18th  c e n tu ry
’M a c h ia v e l l ia n is m ' s in c e  v i r t u e  (form) as  c o n t ro l  o ve r  f o r tu n e
(m a t te r )  co rresp o n d s  to  rea so n  (form) as  c o n t ro l  over  p a s s io n
( m a t t e r ) .  But, g iven  th e  way he wants to  d i s t i n g u i s h  and d e f in e
h i s  pa rad igm s, what Pocock o v e r lo o k s  i s  t h a t  r e a so n  cou ld  a l s o  be
i d e n t i f i e d  w ith  n a t u r a l  law and t h a t  law o r  re a so n  as  form cou ld
a l s o  c o n t ro l  c u l t u r e  as  p a s s io n .  The a m b ig u i t ie s  in v o lv ed  in  th e
id e a  o f  re a so n  meant t h a t  many co n n ec t in g  l i n k s  cou ld  be made between
31v i r t u e ,  n a t u r a l  law and custom.
A part from drawing a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  im p o rtan t  meaning v i r t u e  
has  in  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  m i l i t i a ,  a n o th e r  a s p e c t  o f  v i r t u e  Pocock 
deve lops  i s  t h a t  d e a l in g  w ith  p o l i t i c a l  economy. I n i t i a l l y ,  t h i s  
p ro v id e s  support  f o r  th e  s ta te m e n t  about co n n ec t in g  l i n k s  and 
r e i n f o r c e s  my own r e s e a r c h e s  and s tu d y .  During th e  e a r l y  18th 
c e n tu ry ,  he s a y s ,  " th e  a g r a r i a n  v a lu e s  o f  independence and v i r t u e  
rem ain  a c o n s ta n t  in  t h i s  p e r i o d ' s  s o c i a l  p e r c e p t io n s " .  Land i s  th e  
source  o f  bo th  independence and v i r t u e ,  and t h i s  was a c c e p te d  by a l l :  
C ountry  and Tory; Court and Whig. "The Augustan d e b a te "  n ever  p u t  
a g r a r i a n  a g a in s t  " e n t r e p r e u n e r i a l  i n t e r e s t s " ;  i t  was n o t  land  v e r s u s  
t r a d e ,  bu t land  and t r a d e  a g a in s t  c r e d i t .  "No w r i t e r  o f  e i t h e r  p a r ty  
presumed to  defend  s to c k - jo b b in g ,  th e  s p e c u la t iv e  m a n ip u la t io n  o f  th e  
m arket v a lu e  o f  s h a re s  in  th e  p u b l i c  d e b t " .  The monied i n t e r e s t  
s t r o v e  to  in c re a s e  " th rough  war, th e  e x t e n t  o f  th e  p u b l i c  d e b t " ,  and 
so t h r e a te n e d  l i b e r t y .  "Augustan n e o -M ach iav e l l ian ism "  c a r r y in g  
w i th in  i t  " A r i s t o t e l i a n  and c i v i c  hum anist c a t e g o r i e s " ,  i n s i s t e d  
w ith  M a c h ia v e l l i  t h a t  v i r t u e  depended upon arms or th e  m i l i t i a  and
3 1 . Pocock, Moment, 238, 243, 253, 269.
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with Harrington upon property. Virtue, liberty and independence
were founded on ’’real or landed property which was inheritable
rather than marketable”. This was defended by ancient
institutions and sometimes by common law. This civil structure
brought with it "membership of the related structures of the
militia and the parliamentary electorate, thus guaranteeing civic
virtue". Around 1675, a new "rentier class", based on parliamentary
patronage and a professional army, came into being. This new class
threatened "the balance between estates" or the ancient constitution,
and, subsisting on pensions, offices, credit, and dependent upon the
executive power was "incapable of virtue". This, as it were, is the
32negative side of "the Machiavellian moment". Paradoxically, it also 
involved a perception of society and government "founded in the order 
of nature" and based upon real property.
Such a government would tend to be a common­
wealth (with a monarch) of independent 
proprietors with a balanced and ancient 
constitution,fortified by immemorial customs 
which helped keep the parts independent and 
in place; it would be patriotic in defence, 
but would avoid war and empire. But the 
ambivalences of the neo-Harringtonian posture 
reveal that those who took this direction could 
no longer present history in terms of unin­
terrupted continuity ... Change had occurred, 
they were looking into the past and seeking to 
defend virtue against innovative forces, 
symbolised as trading empire, standing armies 
and credit ... Their attitude to change was 
therefore negative • • • 3 3
Custom and nature are, then, part of the Machiavellian paradigm, 
but it is a different custom and nature from Burkeian custom and 
Lockeian nature. This, "Machiavellian vocabulary of virtu and fortuna" 
is opposed to the Lockeian language of natural law which was used as 
an apologetic for the new urban capitalism based on moveable property. 
But there are problems. Both Locke and Burke could use the language 
of virtue and balance and Locke's attitude towards property was far from
Pocock, Moment, 199, 203, 302, 448, 450. 
Pocock, Moment, 458-9.
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unambiguous or anti-traditional; and there is certainly no conscious
rejection of the language of virtue by him.*  The extent to which the
monied interest, so called, is outside the traditional order of things
is also problematical. A similar problem arises when Pocock finds
Ma ’ Protestant ethic* of frugality, self-denial and re-investment" and
trade within the 'pre-industrial' vocabulary of virtue. My view would
be that such ideas do not constitute an 'ethic', that they have only a
symptomatic existence within a mercantilist ideological framework of
which virtue is one aspect. Paradigmatically, trade needs to be
separated from investment; consumption, as we have shown throughout,
34ought to be brought into the picture.
Though unintentionally, Pocock at one point tells us why it was, 
on an intellectual level, the slogan of manhood suffrage and annual 
parliamentswas so significant in Radical ideology. The passage also 
shows how, again, the idea of the people in the 18th century differed 
from the idea of the people in later centuries. In 'Machiavellian' 
politics,
The implication was that the people, being 
propertied and independent, were by definition 
virtuous, but that their representatives were 
constantly exposed to the temptations of power 
and corruption; it was therefore necessary that 
the representation should return regularly to 
the represented to have virtue renewed ...
Virtue was an active principle, and in the 
election of a new parliament the people displayed 
virtue...
This idea was no different from Locke's who called for frequent 
elections in order to prevent corruption. The requirement of 
propertied independence could be used by Burke to deny that the common 
people had virtue.** Lacking this, they had no right to take part in 
elections or the political process except in a very attenuated way. 
Pocock himself argues the language of virtue was peculiarly suited 
to the gentry. The problem that confronted the Radicals was to extend 
the notions of property and independence and virtue so that they 
covered all of the people, and this was done, it has been argued,
34 * Pocock, Moment, 464, 470 ff; on Burke, see footnote, p223; on
Locke, see Second Treatise, (Blackwells edn.) 54, 57-59, 66, 71, 
73, 77, 80, 84, 105, 107, 109.
33 ’ Pocock, Moment, 519.
* Locke, Second Treatise, 78, 108, 122.
* * Burke, see footnote, p249.
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without fundamentally altering the concepts of virtue etc. My 
argument has also been that the artisan Radicals and their 
’representatives’ took from Locke the idea of property and from 
’neo-Machiavellianism' the notion of virtue. All along, the 
question has been less one of influence, though something like it 
has also been involved, than one of ’fit’ with the artisans’ social 
and economic environment. Both Locke and Harrington were influenced 
by and shaped ideas that had a common social currency.
How common is shown by referring to a few examples that illust­
rate the extent to which the idea of virtue was taken up by different 
members of the social spectrum. George Berkeley, like John Cartwright, 
took a close interest in public sport as a means of promoting virtue.
In the classical manner, he suggests that "triumphal arches, columns, 
statutes, and like monuments of public services, have, in former times, 
been found great incentives to virtue". He wanted closer regulation 
of the popular sports and pastimes which he felt "corrupt our morals". 
Like Cartwright, he took his example from the Greeks and said public 
works of this sort would "discourage private luxury". The aim would 
be "to recover a sense of public spirit", since the English were a 
people "broken and corrupt by luxury". Through virtue and unity, 
Berkeley condemns the principle of party; patriotism would be promoted. 
Whigs and Tories should forget their petty bickering, their "little 
womanish passions and obstinacy" and instead, "steadily promote the true 
interests of the country". Immorality, the pursuit of "private ends" 
would "necessarily ruin the state". But the classical, secular and 
’Machiavellian’ or universalist elements in Berkeley's thinking lose 
their strength or impact for two reasons. First, virtue is a return, 
it is necessary to "restore" the "public spirit", but it is a return 
located in the Anglo-Saxon past rather that a classical past. "Free 
governments", he writes, "were planted by the Goths", the implication 
being that in classical times governments were not free. Second, 
through the "portentous villainies" of the present, "we have long
been preparing for some great catastrophe"; in Berkeley's mind, the
36political apocalyptic was still very much alive.
George Berkeley, "An Essay Towards Preventing the Ruin of Great 
Britain", (1721) part of Miscellaneous Works in Works, ed. 
Alexander Campbell Fraser, (Oxford, 1871), Vol.III, 204-6, 
208-9, 210-11.
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From what he says about popular sports, it is clear Berkeley 
would have agreed with Fielding that the term "mob" meant, among 
other things, "persons without virtue". This was true as a kind of 
political or ideational tautology. Since the 18th century political 
system only allowed political participation to the few, and not to 
the many, by definition the common people lacked the means of 
gaining virtue, or at least political virtue. This is the moral 
impulse behind Radicalism although it was still held by many Radicals 
and others that the ordinary people could gain virtue by their simple 
habits. To some extent, they held to the view expressed in Don Quixote 
that "nobility is inherited, but virtue acquired" and that "virtue is 
worth more in itself, than nobleness of birth". The plebs had their 
own heroes or political saints who acquired virtue and nobility 
through their "moral courage". Thomas Hardy, for example, who 
"fear’d his God but had no other fear", was "a man and a Christian", 
a "true patriot" who "followed those immortal heroes, an Alfred and 
a Wallace". From his life it can be learned that "virtue is true 
nobility". Disputing Burke's version of virtue, Francis Place 
argued that poor men, "journeymen, labourers or servants" had at 
least a kind of social virtue which consisted of their stoicism in 
the face of poverty. Dissoluteness, held by the upper classes to be 
the reason for their lack of virtue, was not the only reason for 
their poverty. Samuel Bamford also spoke of the poor having virtue; 
they lean to "virtue's side", he said. Again, what he had in mind 
here seems to be social rather than political virtue; social rectitude, 
not political propriety. Yet it is clear Bamford's own thinking 
was imbued with 'Machiavellian' assumptions. Expressing a cyclical 
view of history where governments "change from the despotic to the 
anarchical" and back again he argues that there can only be "redemption 
for the masses" if it arises "from their own virtue and knowledge". 
Since he undoubtedly means 'political' knowledge it is not at all clear 
here that he separates political from social virtue. The joining 
together of the two ideas seems to be confirmed in another passage, 
where in words similar to those used by Thomas Evans and others he 
proclaims "a virtuous and enlightened people could not be enslaved" 
and talks again in millenial terms. Another millenialist who denied 
virtue to the upper classes was Joseph Priestley. He attributed virtue 
to "the middling sort of people", as they were called. Recalling the 
time he spent with Lord Shelburne, Priestley insinuates a lack of 
virtue among the aristocracy. In "the middle classes of life" who
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37are ’’above fear and want” there is the ’’most virtue”.
In effect Priestley denies there can be virtue where there 
is excess. It has been said "those who embraced Shaftesburian 
Virtue” were also those who "did much to destroy the Virtue they 
... desired and loved”. They engaged, that is, in trade and 
industry. Again, though, it was not so much trade and industry in 
themselves but an excess which corrupted the moral fibre of the 
nation. Ultimately, virtue resided in the ownership of land rather 
than other forms of property. Daniel Defoe in Moll Flanders has one 
of his characters saying "virtue alone is an estate", but as the rest 
of the book makes plain an estate alone is virtue. Estates, or 
rural property, are the basis of independence and therefore of 
virtue. In a very real sense virtue is, then, the 'mental property' 
of the landowning classes. "Land and inheritance remained essential 
to virtue”, Pocock writes, and "the function of property was to 
affirm and maintain the reality of personal autonomy”. Yet it is 
important to remember Locke would not have disagreed with this; there 
are passages in his writing where he supports it. The artisans did 
not bother to distinguish between the two writers, and though they 
attempted to extend the idea of virtue to personality and occupation, 
ultimately they too placed virtue in the ownership of land. Almost 
every single pamphlet has something to say about the redistribution of 
land. But, in the light of Pocock, this gives some indication of the 
changes that had taken place in the 'classical' concept of virtue. 
Despite certain important formal resemblances, in content virtue now 
referred to the people as a nation, its expression was related to the 
impact of modern capitalist relations and through the myth of the 
Anglo-Saxon constitution it referred to the cultural and historical 
experience of the English people, to their contemporary political 
institutions and so on.3**
37 Cervantes, Quixote, Vol.II, 269; MacPherson, "Advertisement" to 
Thomas Hardy, Memoir of Thomas Hardy, (London, 1832); Place, 
Autobiography, 127-8; Bamford, Early Days, 73; Bamford, 
Passages, Vol.I., 154, 281; Priestley, Selections, 49-50.
38 R.S. Neale, The Wealth of Nations or, Private Vices, Public 
Benefits, (The University of New England, N.S.W., 1976), 15; 
Daniel Defoe, Moll Flanders, (Pan edn., 1965 orig. pub. 1772), 
85; Pocock, Moment, 463; Eric Foner, "Tom Paine's Republic: 
Radical Ideology and Social Change" in The American Revolution: 
Explorations in the History of American Radicalism, (DeKalb, 
1976), 212; Locke, Second Treatise, 18, 21, 24, 37, 43, 48, 50, 
63, 70-1, 88, 110.
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On the conceptual or intellectual level, it is difficult to
separate a Christian meaning of virtue from any classical semantics,
thereby undermining the argument that wants to see 18th century
versions of virtue firmly "rooted in the classical world". The
virtuous person, said Thomas Bentley, should "declare his sentiments
of the present state of the Nation ... as a Man - an Englishman -
above all as a believer and rejoicer in the Missions of Moses and
Jesus Christ". Lord Shaftesbury, for whom the classical elements
are held to be so important, saw virtue’s origins "in the state of
nature" and saw its collective or public aspect deriving "from the
effective or herding impulse" which "had its origin in God". Virtue,
according to a popular American pamphlet "was the law of our nature
and the law of our nature was the law of God", a sentiment that would
have suited Locke more than Machiavelli. Nirad C. Chaudhuri is surely
right when he labels virtue, Jane Austen's keyword, "an inheritance
from the Christian- Classical tradition", although it is also much
more than this if only because virtue is also an important idea in
popular magic and mentality. Catherine Macaulay argued it was not
sufficient to fix "the principles of morals and virtue" on any form
of utility; virtue "includes all the relative duties which a man owes
to his Creator and to his fellow creatures". If political virtue was
distinct from its other forms, it was still seen as having religious
origins, though it is possible perhaps to distinguish between the more
active and the passive forms of virtue here. The Protestant elements
in 18th century virtue would also seem to be intimated. "Shaftsburian
Virtue" postulated that a vicious act which produced public benefits
was still not a virtuous act; "actions were only to be considered
good if they arose from an intent to achieve the public good". Or,
as William Sharp put it, "no person can be praised for an act of
virtue, if its appearance proceeds from compulsion or force", for
"it then can only be appearance but not reality". Virtuous acts
had to be conscious and proceed from a purity of heart, from a pure
39Christian conscience.
39. Neale, Wealth, 14-15; Thomas Bentley, Poor Man’s Answer to the 
Rich Associators, (London, 1793); Wood, Republic, 69;
Macaulay, Treatise, vii; William Sharp, An Answer to the World, 
(London, 1806), 23; see Voltaire’s discussion and opposition to 
this idea and his support of the more secular concept in his 
Philosophical Dictionary, (Penguin edn. 1971, orig. pub. 1764), 
398-400.
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From what has been said in the last paragraph or so, it would 
also seem the distinction between private and public virtue, as a 
way of walling off Machiavellian virtue from other types is hard to 
maintain. In Roman thought, not only was there nothing that 
approximated to corruption in the 18th century institutional 
sense, or anything like the Christian religion, but a virtue that 
was not exercised in public was "no virtue at all". In the 18th 
century conception, private and public virtue were dialectically 
related. William Hone was fairly typical when he argued, in one 
of his pamphlets, that "men of virtue and moderation seldom, if 
ever, turn tyrants", while "despostic rule gives reins to lust, 
and makes the errors of government, and the crimes of life mix 
together". Listing the five principal private virtues, Volney 
even went so far as to relate cleanliness to political virtue.
Also, "the very essence of virtue consists in it being a voluntary 
act of choice "by the private individual'.' Identifying virtue with 
patriotism, the Radical Reformer stated the "public spirit consists 
in sacrificing personal gratification to the public good"; and the 
basis of patriotism or public virtue is "private virtue" in family 
relations "ensuring domestic felicity". Beyond this, virtue had 
wider connotations and broader foundations. Ebenezer Sibly,
associated "the mercy of God" with "the reward of good 
and virtuous actions"; corruption brought plague and famine. But if 
purity of mind and action led to political purity and virtue, then 
public or political virtue was analogous with nature. Like foreign 
kings, foreign herbs lost their virtue on English soil. The 'archaism' 
of virtue, its 'pre-industrial character' can best be defined by 
pursuing this line of research; by establishing the connections which 
exist between political virtue and virtue as a manifestation of a 
natural economy.
The same goes for the notion usually held to be in antithesis 
to virtue, the idea of corruption. It is useful, again, to start with 
Pocock. The change from fortune to corruption, he says, is part of the
Henry Tudor, Political Myth, (London, 1972), 75; William Hone, 
The Right Divine of Kings to Govern Wrong, (London, 1821), 23; 
Volney, Ruins, esp. 76ff; Radical Reformer, No.9, Nov.10, 1819, 
74; Ebenezer Sibly, A Key to the Physic and Occult Sciences 
(London 1814, 5th edn.), 7.
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process of secularisation in thought. The key element in this 
process is the role of property. Corruption occurs when independent 
property gets undermined; the result is to pervert government "from 
a public authority into a private interest", through the sale of 
offices, places and so on. Corruption, a variety of excess, is 
"the only cause of change in political systems" in the Machiavelli- 
Harringtonian scheme of things; and is "a moral as well as a 
political phenomenon". Degeneration or corruption also has the 
effect of disturbing the balance of the constitution. Consequently, 
in the 18th century the term "corruption" is, we are told, "very 
often being used in its Machiavellian sense, as well as in the vulgar 
sense of bribery". In other words, "it is used to denote a 
disturbance of the balance of the constitution, with the demoralisation 
of individuals and the public that is supposed to go with it". The 
constitution is defined as "an ideal balance between the powers of 
the Crown and those of Parliament, which stands for property and 
independence". It is "the replacement by private relationships" of 
public relationships" which Pocock emphasises as "the salient meaning" 
of corruption in his later work. The way out is "a return to first 
principles" which he sees as "a classical attempt to locate all value 
in a particular period", such as Alfred's England. The tendency to 
make corruption more secular in conception is reformulated as 
Harrington's inclination to "discount Machiavelli's emphasis on 
strictly moral corruption" and to relate corruption to the imbalance 
between "political authority" and "the distribution of property that 
should determine it". Or, it is said, "Harrington emphasises less 
the moral than the material bases of personality". Specifically,
"there is less about the moral degradation involved in corruption 
than there was in the sixteenth or was to be again in the eighteenth" 
centuries. In 'Country' ideology, virtue and independence emanated 
from property, from "their freeholds". Opposing this was "place and 
pension" as another "species of property" or livelihood. With this 
shift, "the language of 'balanced government' and the 'separation of 
powers' took on a new meaning", in which "the key term is 'corruption"'. 
This "marks a further stage in the assimilation of English constitutional 
theory to the categories and vocabulary of civic republicanism". The 
operative word here is "assimilation" which is more appropriate to the 
methodology of traditions than the paradigm method. But to continue, 
the political language of corruption "was an attack on modern government",
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whereas the defenders of modern government "enlisted the services 
41of Locke".
Similar to virtue, then, there is an emphasis on the political 
and secular nature of the concept of corruption and its incompatibility 
with the Lockeian frame of mind. A fairly recent critic has stated 
that in the work of Thomas Northcote the idea of corruption has a 
Christian foundation and is evidence against Pocock's contention that 
there was a major movement of Country ideas into "the radical-democratic" 
tradition. Pocock insists virtue and corruption take their most 
political and secular form in the 18th century, but provides no 
detailed evidence to show how Harringtonian politics was transformed 
back into Machiavellian morality; something that is fairly crucial 
given the Radicals were still using the idea of corruption rather 
than fortune in the late 18th century. Previous chapters have also 
shown how not only artisans but also for example John Cartwright's 
political language was tied up with Christian-mythological ideas.
Equally, it would not do to see Cartwright and others using a purely 
Christian logic; Machiavellian and Christian ideas about corruption 
do in fact happily intermingle or integrate, at least up to a point, 
in that they have a common 'mythological' core. Pocock's mistake is 
to confound a shift from the moral to the material with a shift from 
the moral to the secular.
It will help things along again to look at a few definitions or 
meanings. Frequently, in the pamphlet and periodical literature, 
the phrase "systematic corruption" is used suggesting, pace Pocock, 
that a political system is being referred to and corruption as a 
political and social system did not exist prior to 1688 even though 
elements of corruption can be traced back to William the Conqueror.
But this system of corruption "this ministerial bureaucracy and a 
warlike state as an economic power" generated debate "about the 
nature of society and government", and "arguments about government 
and society were also arguments about human nature". So that it was 
just as easy, if not easier, to take your arguments about personality 
as property, if you were a Radical, from Locke but without dropping 
all that 'Machiavellian' stuff about a democratic militia, a balanced
Pocock, Politics, 93, 128-9, 131; Pocock, Moment, 54-6, 93, 
390, 420, 422.
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government etc. Neither did you forget natural law and corruption
had religious connotations. As one contemporary pamphleteer put it,
Mwe have the right to resist corruption wherever we find it lurking;
it is our duty both divine and human". The Biblical epigraph to
William Sharp's An Answer to the World asserts "corruption shall
be overcome, and the Truth, which hath been so long without fruit,
shall be declared". A statement from another pamphlet makes the
connection between the political and moral, if not strictly religious,
meaning clear; it also points to some of the more subterranean meanings
involved in the 18th century idea of corruption. The "excellence"
or "original purity" of the English constitution was "poisoned by
foreign invaders" and it is therefore necessary "to expel the corrupt
and the heterogeneous". This meaning pertains to that which is real
or genuine or original or pure or perfect and is a meaning that has
no necessary or invariable connection with either Machiavellian or
42Christian concepts of corruption.
Before these last couple of points are discussed and illustrated 
further, it is useful to look at the question of political corruption 
as a discrete object in 18th century political speech, being aware of 
what Pocock says regarding a return to the idea of more moral 
corruption during this period, but also of what he says about bribery 
as against ’conceptual' or Machiavellian corruption. What is at 
issue here, to some extent, is the question of social structure 
versus the transmission of ideas or the "assimilation" to a tradition, 
however much Pocock wants to phrase it in terms of paradigms. For 
Henry 'Redhead' Yorke, to take an example, corruption in the House 
of Commons referred to "the corruption of many of its members ... it 
relates to the general venality", he said, and "only of a part of 
its members". But it could not be isolated. Corruption in the House 
was "an engine employed to corrupt the people". Venality and bribery 
was very much intended. Berkeley many years earlier wrote of "that 
most infamous practice of Bribery" in which "every one who takes a 
bribe plainly owns that he prefers his private interest to that of 
his country". Worse, corruption in the narrow sense has "infected
42 . Jowett, Language", 174; Neale, Wealth, 12-13; Sharp, Answer, 
epigraph.
280
the lowest as well as the highest among us". Taking the opposite
view, Bishop Tillotson told his congregation there was no evil
"in riches, places or profits". Good Christians, he affirmed,
could be certain "of a place in Heaven". But for "the pioneers
of ’Country’ ideology", according to Pocock, the essentially
political aspects of corruption are crucial; "dependence was worse,
because more lasting than mere venality". Yet, in actual political
speech the "vulgar" or moral sense of corruption is difficult to
43separate from the political sense and was used just as freely.
Closely connected with the "vulgar sense" is the cognate idea 
of luxury. Late 18th century Radicalism did have a notion of 
political corruption to some extent inspired by Harrington 
('property') and Machiavelli (cycles, balance) but at the moral level 
it is necessary to go beyond Machiavelli to Christianity and myth. 
Certainly there is no real separation between the political and 
non-political forms. Saying all this, it is also important to note 
the idea is related to a post-Machiavellian, post-Harringtonian set 
of social institutions known as "Old Corruption". It is also necessary 
to examine the 'silences' in the Machiavellian paradigm. Not only is 
there an absence of corruption as a total system there is an historical 
silence about luxury as a problem. By contrast, the idea of luxury 
is central to late 18th century English 'intellectual' context.
Whether luxury is caused by the political system or acts as the agent 
of corruption in the political system is a moot point. What is clear 
is that a social and moral concept is being looked at and in an 
important sense it has, initially at least, nothing to do with 
politics. Luxury is pre-eminently connected with trade. Another 
absence in Machiavelli, again something central in the English 
ideological configuration, is any concept of trade. According to 
Isaac Kramnick, what he describes as the economic revolution of 
1690 to 1740 consisted of a number of institutions. He lists these 
as the birth of the Bank of England, the National Debt, the growth 
of joint-stock companies, the East India company and the South Sea 
company and stock-jobbing. None of these pertained to Machiavelli's 
world. Corruption does get materialised, and this gets carried through
* Yorke, "Trial", 93; Berkeley, "Essay", 209; Tillotson cited 
in J.H. Plumb, In the Light of History, (London, 1972), 12; 
Pocock, Moment, 407.
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to the late 18th century as well but is far from being non-moral 
and non-'religious' despite this.
The language of luxury is, then, concerned with trade and its 
effects on social life, although it has obvious less immediate 
connections with politics. With "frugality of manners", said 
Berkeley, goes "the strength and nourishment of the bodies politic", 
although any idea of frugality associated with the Protestant ethic 
was remote from his mind. Consumption was only wrong in so far as 
it was a type of excess, in so far as it was luxury. Luxury had 
never been "at so great a height". In women especially "luxury of 
Dress" was "the source of great corruptions". More important, loss 
of moral integrity leads to loss of bodily integrity. Berkeley 
quotes from Isaiah a passage which ends with the assertion "that 
instead of sweet smell there shall be stink ... instead of well-set 
hair, baldness ... and burning instead of beauty". Millenially,
"war, famine or pestilence" are the result of luxury. This language, 
this metaphor - which is more than a metaphor - was still used later 
in the century. Basically, it is the language of purity and pollution. 
"Those who have first deflowered the constitution", Henry 'Redhead'
Yorke declaimed, have "afterwards prostituted it for sale". Men who 
were "enervated by luxury" were "soft beings". Luxury was an excess 
of culture, too; "a deluding picture of elegant manners, gay society, 
a fancied emancipation from all the sorrows of life". On this level, 
the opposite of corruption is not virtue but integrity or wholesomeness. 
Luxury destroyed "original purity" not only in politics but also in 
social and individual life, or, as the London Corresponding Society 
Journal put it "natural power depraved by Indolence, Luxury and 
Flattery will degenerate into contemptible weakness or brutal 
sensuality". This way of speaking about luxury or corruption has 
a fairly loud 'Christian' resonance. William Sharp accused the clergy 
of pretending to "heal the nation over, while they continue in their 
sins and in their blood, without searching their wounds to the 
bottom". Without, that is, "first drawing out the corruption that 
is originally from the devil". Yet this sort of thing could easily 
lead back to politics. Evil or vice was complicated and luxury and 
corruption being based on these two things were also complicated.
Luxury is associated with the aristocracy and all their doings; 
therefore evil is also associated with the aristocratic class.
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But since luxury was connected with the devil, it could also be
associated with God's natural laws. "Exquisite pleasures produce
satiety, moderate ones acquire force" this is "the law of nature",
said one pamphleteer. Luxury, then, is un-natural; it shows an
excess of culture, although once recognising it in these terms we
move outside of a purely Christian frame of mind. "Commerce" said
Catherine Macaulay, was "superior to every other cause" in "spreading
the contagion of a lagatious luxury". Yet this did not lead to a
complete rejection of culture. Commerce also softened "that barbarous
fierceness which want of means or the want of incentives towards a
general communication produced in the manners of our ancestors".
Similar sentiments were expressed by the astrologer and herbalist,
Ebenezer Sibly, who stated "nature is content with little; but luxury
knew no bounds". Whether in the body, social life or politics excess
44leads to "fever" and "poisoning" of the system.
That there is some sense of totality involved in the notions of 
luxury and corruption is perhaps brought out best by Volney in his 
small book entitled The Law of Nature. Volney thinks luxury is a 
vice which includes within itself the seeds of all the other vices.
A man and a society committed to luxury can never find his or their 
own wants satisfied. And he, or they, can never find enough money 
to buy sufficient luxuries, a theme that runs through 18th century 
literature. A man who has the craze for luxuries, "begins by 
borrowing ... then swindles, robs, plunders, becomes bankrupt, is 
at war with mankind, ruins others, and is himself ruined". In a 
nation, the effects are even worse. Luxury as a system of economy 
has disastrous political effects. Total consumption, as it were, 
means a nation "is poor in the midst of abundance; it has nothing 
to sell to the foreigner ... it loses its respectability, its means 
of defence and preservation at home and abroad". And, "at home 
... all its citizens being greedy after enjoyments are perpetually 
struggling with each other for the attainment of them; all are either 
inflicting injuries or have the disposition to do so". There exists 
"moral corruption or intestine war between members of the same society"; 
and "from luxury are derived the corruption of the judge, the venality
44. Berkeley, "Essay", 200-1, 202-4; Pocock, Moment, 430-1, 493;
Sharp, Answer, 67; Rousseau, Writings, 73*] Macaulay, Treatise, 10.
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of the witness, the dishonesty of the husband, the prostitution
of the wife, parental cruelty", in fact "all the disorders which
destroy society". Such are the costs of luxury; and such is its
45centrality to 18th century political thinking.
Through the ideas of luxury and trade, then, corruption in
the late 18th century is not an essentially Machiavellian way of
talking about politics through moral precepts, although the
Machiavellian bit cannot be entirely discounted. It is. a moral
language, although there is another 'material' source of luxury
and corruption also absent in Machiavelli. Besides being an
economic measure, taxes had moral consequences. They were linked
with luxury and corruption. Luxury and corruption, Volney says
in his famous pamphlet, bring about economic collapse because high
taxes necessary for the consumption of luxuries led to the loss of
incentive. "The merchant seeing himself robbed took a disgust to
industry". High taxes also led to the centralisation of land-
holding and a sharp social division into rich and poor. This led
to a loss of interest by the majority of the people in the safety
of the state. The people become "enfeebled and ignorant". Early
empires when reaching this point were easily over-run by barbarians.
Taxes hit the poor through the necessaries of life. "Was not their
loaf taxed? Was not their beer taxed? Were not their shirts taxed?",
declaimed 'Orator' Hunt to a large crowd. It was at the point of
economic impact the artisans entered the language of corruption and
luxury. "The government in almost every state", wrote "A Citizen of
London", are "apt to oppress the people for their private advantage".
With similar rhetoric, a Radical journal in 1816 asked "what was the
cause of unemployment? Taxation. What was the cause of taxation?
46Corruption"; and so on.
In the minds of Radical artisans, the moral side of the 
corruption question was always to the forefront. After Peterloo, 
Samuel Bamford was still speaking in a poem of "corruption's throne"
45 Volney, Law, 174-75.
46 Volney, Ruins, 71, 72-3; Henry 'Orator' Hunt in Henry Jephson, 
The Platform, (London, 1892), Vol.l, 385; "A Citizen of 
London", The Rights and Duties of Man United ...,(London, 1792), 
1; The Examiner cited in Thompson, Working Class, 661.
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and "the gallant Sydney", but also of the moral corruption of
the people. The same moral-political-mythical language is as
evident in the writings of artisans as in Bishop Berkeley. Bamford
records his friend Healey's remarks that "bribery and corruption"
had "produced a political gangrene in the state", needing an
"amputation of the corrupting influence". The mixture of 'Lockeian*
with 'Machiavellian' language is brought out by The Radical Reformer
which declared as its aims the promotion of "the NATURAL RIGHTS OF
MAN" and "the genuine principles of the Constitution" against "the
corruptions of government". Its campaign would aim to spread moral
and political ‘"purity". It called for "a return to Nature"; "cease
from contemplating the future", it said. Nature would punish
"voluptuousness, intemperance and excess". The voluptuous had
"prodigated health". Bodily purity, moral purity and political
purity are all of a piece; it did not require an astrologer and
herbalist like Sibly to speak this language. Even further, corruption
ruined commerce and was unpatriotic. All this was still connected
with the "undeniable rights of every Englishman" for which "their •
47forefathers had fought and bled".
Independence vs Patronage
Perhaps these rights are best made more solid or 'material' 
through the idea of independence. Without independence there would 
always be corruption and a loss of rights. Independence is another 
term or idea absent in Machiavelli, although it is evident in 
Harrington and other English political theorists. Like corruption, 
and its fellows, it has meanings which are not at first apparent.
No other word or idea could better illustrate Tom Paine's remarks 
about different "habits of thinking" being peculiar to "different 
conditions", to different historical moments and social groups.
Yet there was an element of common usage and meaning in the idea of 
independence which pointed to an area of social consensus or agreement.
In the 18th century, as now, this agreement was based on a joint 
misunderstanding which the ambiguities of the political vocabulary 
allowed. When King George III spoke of the "defence of our CONSTITUTION,
Bamford, Passages, Vol.l, 154, 245, 254; Vol.2, 150; The 
Radical Reformer or People's Advocate, No.l, Vol.l, Sept,15, 
1819, 5; No.2, Vol.l, Sept,22, 1819, 9; No.5, Vol.l, 59-40, 
No.7, Vol.l, 54.
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our RELIGION, our LAWS, and INDEPENDENCE", Cartwright commented
the King had shown that he and his subjects "have a COMMON INTEREST
and make a COMMON CAUSE". Cartwright was right to some extent.
But when he went on to say the king's words "were not lightly
chosen" since they were "words which conveyed to those who
employed them the same 'distinct ideas' of things expressed as
they convey to all others", he was a bit wrong. A clue to the
source of the misunderstanding is in Cartwright's own diction
where he refers yet again to "the recent patriot declaration of
HIM WHOSE VEINS THE BLOOD OF ALFRED FLOWS". The myth of the
Anglo-Saxon constitution concealed the conservative intentions
of one and the radical interpretations of the other. They could
both agree that in some minimal sense independence meant the
independence of England from foreign aggression. When, however,
the Cap of Liberty wrote of "the badge of our NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE,
THE CAP OF LIBERTY", it was taking national sovereignty in a direction
that would hardly have met with royal approval. Another conservative
meaning of independence concerned the independence of the member of
parliament. Unlike the Radical view, the more Whiggish idea saw the
member as independent of both crown and people; he must not be a
"creature" of either. "I glory in my independence", said Henry
'Redhead' Yorke, referring to his independence from "pecuniary
assistance", and hence attachment to any sort of party. If you could
not be bought you retained your independence since you kept your
integrity. Part of you was not bought off by any special interest.
You were still a whole man. The idea of independence is connected
with the ideal of the amateur, of the person who remains whole or is
a generalist, not committed to any particular end. "He was a man
of too honest, and too independent a turn of mind", Thomas Holcroft
remarked, "to lend himself as a tool to the violence of any party".
Yet another sense of independence concerned the independence of the
various parts of the constitution from each other. "An House of
Commons free and independent of the Crown", and similar kinds of
48phrases, were common in the political speech of the time.
But these more or less political meanings of independence, not
48. Cartwright, Aegis, 144-5; Holcroft, Memoirs, 122.
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all of which have been covered, rested on a sociological and economic 
idea of independence. Without material independence there could be no 
moral and political independence. Sometimes, statements about 
material independence do not seem to be directly connected to any 
ideological construct, Harringtonian or otherwise, but merely 
relate to the question of a private income or means. In one of 
his speeches, Yorke spoke of how he had "enough to keep me in ease 
and independence". Yet, quoting Beccaria, he went on to refer to 
"the natural state of independence" depending on "the fruits of my 
cottage and industry", an ideal expressed in the writings of most 
Radical ideologues - even Spence. If, for the gentry, land was 
source of independence, for the artisans the matter was a bit more 
complicated.
Above all, the value of independence as part of artisan mentality 
is part of a general movement of loss and change. The "ideology of 
economic 'independence* and sturdy political individualism" is said 
to have fitted the experience of many groups of artisans "like a 
glove". Even if he was living on "the edge of famine", the independent 
weaver and others like him would often display more freedom of thought 
and action than the new factory workers. While "the semi-employed 
weavers and artisans might take time off to tramp many miles" to 
address reform meetings, this kind of activity was"not open to the 
adult cotton spinner". Both factory wage-labour and unemployment 
which resulted in help from charity or the parish were regarded as 
relations of dependence. "The cardinal sin (corresponding to the 
cardinal virtue of independence) was reliance upon the parish for 
support". It has been argued that, especially in the domestic 
system, "the once-vaunted independence was often an illusion".
The outworker more often than not was heavily in debt to the merchant 
who sold him his supplies and bought his products. If the worker 
or artisan worked in his own time this often meant "periods of 
furious work alternating with periods of idleness". When there 
was nothing to do, earnings were often dissipated "in the local 
ale-house". There is a lot of truth in all this but it is far from 
the complete picture. The elements of independence cannot be 
dismissed as total illusion and were sufficient to inspire the 
collective memory to look back to when times had been better, 
while for some trades and occupations loss of skill and a worsening 
of conditions was a contemporary fact resulting from new production
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methods. In this context, as well as others, Mthe value of
independence" acted as "a lever of social change". If Radicalism,
of the old type, was a compound of "nostalgia for loss of status
and the assertion of new found rights", the former sentiment
structured the political language of the time and demanded that
new rights were in fact old ones. Besides wanting a return to
a 'Machiavellian* balance in the constitution, the London
Corresponding Society called to "restore" the working man "to that
Independence and that rank of society to which he is entitled".
If "early industrialisation" created "'dependent' artisans who
controlled neither the supply of raw materials nor the finished
products of their trade", it remains true that before 1800 and in
many cases afterwards, many of them owned or controlled at least
part of the means of production. Their sense of loss reflected
49a present as well as a past reality.
It was also reinforced by the rural environment which surrounded 
the towns and industrial villages and in the working conditions of 
the trade. The rural surroundings provided a place of freedom and 
play, away from the cares of employment, and also at least a partial 
means of independent livelihood. Here, the romantic symbol of 
agrarian independence is Robin Hood, and there are in fact many 
parallels between Robin Hood and Alfred. Both were seen as 
"champions of justice" who operated outside an oppressive legal 
system. Robin Hood, in attempted mirror-image of the artisan and 
yeoman, is often described as "proud, independent and free".
There are many references to him in artisan literature. After causing 
a stir at a theatre in Manchester, an incident which in itself demon­
strates their lack of deference and their independence, Bamford 
describes how he and his fellow artisans "went laughing and singing 
to the merry woods again". Later, the "sweet cool air of the fields"
49 Thompson, Working Class, 455, 580, 707, 710; N.J. Smelser, 
Social Change in the Industrial Revolution, (London, 1959), 
211-12; D.C. Coleman, The Domestic System in Industry, 
(Historical Assoc. Pamp., London, 1960), 11; Place Papers, 
27815; F.K. Donnelly, "Ideology and Early Working Class 
History: Edward Thompson and His Critics" in Social History, 
No.2, May, 1976, 221; Darvall, Disturbances, 30.
288
meant freedom as "we jumped up from our looms" to go drilling.
Another side to the artisan's freedom of movement is the tramping 
system referred to earlier. With the irregularity of the work, 
it aided the independence of the craftsman. The Framework-knitters 
Society provided for "houses of call ... a central fund for the 
letting of frames, travel grants for the unemployed, and relief 
payments to the infirm and aged". The friendly society, it was said, 
could ensure it would not be necessary to live on the parish funds 
or die in the parish workhouse. As one contemporary pamphleteer 
put it, a "proud spirit of lofty independence" could be kept up.
The "effects of Friendly Benefit Societies are like the glorious 
light of sun-beams bursting forth on animated nature" and were 
sanctioned by God's will or Providence. They also ensured 
independence from the clergy and the state.^
The prospect of becoming independent through being self-employed 
and perhaps employing others was probably greater in the 18th century 
than to-day. According to E.P. Thompson, "the line between the 
journeymen and the small masters was often crossed" and "the line 
between the artisan of independent status and the small shopkeeper 
or tradesman was even fainter". Samuel Bamford reveals how easy it 
was to cross these lines. After quarreling with his employer, 
he took up weaving expressing his preference "of a country residence 
with domestic employment, which consigned me at once to a life of 
independence with alternate ease, exigency and poverty". But at 
the time he first became a weaver trade was good. "Work was readily 
obtainable", he "purchased looms" and "bespoke work" for himself and 
his wife. George Holyoake describes how his mother had a horn button 
business with a "workshop attached to the house". She ran the 
business herself "employing several hands" and had owned it before 
her marriage. "It was", Holyoake says, "a peculiarity of Birmingham 
that numerous small trades existed" and this gave many of the working 
people "independence" and, depending upon trade, either fortune or
Maurice Keen, "Robin Hood - Peasant or Gentleman?" in Past and 
Present, No.19, April 1961, 7-15; Bamford, Passages, Vol.l, 
176, 178; E.J. Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, (London, 1968), 50; 
Anon., A Vindication of the London Corresponding Society, 
(London, 1795), 9, 19, 62.
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misfortune. "The condition of mechanics who worked in little 
workshops on their own was bad". They were at the beck and call 
of the merchants who kept them hanging about their warehouses 
"until nine, ten, and often eleven o ’clock on Saturday night, 
before they were paid their money". But in the foundry where 
Holyoake was a wage-earner, "there was continual resentment, 
sullenness and disgust, but no independence, or self-dependence".
He also avers that "there is more independence in the pursuits of 
handicraft, and more time for original thought than in clerkship 
or business". His "mechanical days" gave him a strong and continuing 
"sense of independence". Even as an apprentice, the artisan had a 
degree of freedom and independence not experienced by other workers. 
Francis Place recounts how he worked "at least twelve consecutive 
hours six days a week, with only three holidays at Easter Whitsuntide 
and Christmas", when apprenticed to "the art and mystery of Leather 
Breeches making". Yet, he adds, "during the whole of my apprenticeship 
I was under no control so long as the work expected of me was done" 
and "I might go whenever I pleased and do as I liked and this was the 
case with many other apprentices". Describing his trade club and 
conditions of work, Thomas Carter remarks how he put his name to 
"the call-book of a tailors trade club". This was "more respectable 
and more profitable than ... waiting upon masters to ask for work". 
William Lovett recounts an incident which shows the high degree of 
social control the trade club could exercise not only over individual 
members but conditions of work in general, thereby exhibiting the 
amount of independence from the employer’s authority. He describes 
the lengthy and elaborate rituals of a shop meeting which took place 
in the employer's time."^ This is an example of the "collective 
independence" about which Thompson makes so much. An even more 
interesting instance comes from lead miners in Scotland. Their value 
of "independence and self-help" were based on their work organisation.
Thompson, Working Class, 23; Bamford, Early Days, 307-8; George 
Jacob Holyoake, Sixty Years of an Agitator's Life, Vol.l, 10-11, 
21, 22; Place, Autobiography, 71, 72-3; Thomas Carter,
Memoirs of a Working Man, (London, 1845), 122-24; Lovett,
Life, 30-1.
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"In the Lowther Hills",
Lead was mined on a 'bargain* system, with 
rights in particular areas being let to groups 
or 'partnerships' of miners, numbering on 
average five or six men. Each partnership 
worked for six hours in every twenty-four, and 
the closeness of these partnerships extended to 
much more than a simple working arrangement.
If one of the number died ... his share in the 
partnership was passed on to his widow.^
Here is the social basis, so to speak, of the political theory 
of parish government, resting on partnership, propounded by Spence 
and Evans. The term "petty-bourgeois" is too simple-minded to 
describe this, if only because the Lowther miners, like other 
artisans had their friendly society and trade club. And if the 
trade unions and friendly societies helped to maintain working 
class independence against middle class hegemony, as one historian 
has recently characterised the situation, then the language is 
opaque and ambiguous since the middle classes also used the same 
language of "independence, self-reliance and self-respect". It is 
not always easy to separate the speech and writings of those working 
men who meant "genuine independence" from those who "simply conformed 
to the image prescribed by ... superiors". It becomes particularly 
problematical, and Thomas Bewick is a good example here, when looking 
at the upper levels of the working classes who were at one and the 
same time "the most articulate exponents of radical values" yet 
"the most susceptible to the social pressure to separate themselves 
from the mass below" and to identify themselves with those who were 
immediately 'above'. In fact there was no full assimilation of 
independence and related virtues until "the newer patterns of middle 
class hegemony" came about in mid-Victorian England. By that time, 
as part of a different ideological configuration or paradigm, independence, 
self-help and so on were associated with the 'spirit' of modern capitalism 
and signified middle class domination. Although spoken in a later 
period, the words of Robert Lowry, the Chartist are apt to the type of
52. Peter Keating, "A Miner's Library" in The Times Literary 
Supplement, 6 January, 1978, 6.
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mentality I am attempting to describe. The working people, he 
said, could put up with poverty "and exclusion from the ranks of
the wealthy" but they could not "bear insult". Again, it is useful
to draw from literature in order to amplify. George Eliot's portrayal
of Adam Bede brings out both the deference and the independence of
the artisan nature. Adam's attitude towards the gentry is generally
that of deference. Until, that is, they encroach on his independence.
The two occasions when he rebels against the gentry's overbearance or
'insults' are significant. The first is when he charges what he
considers a just price for a piece of craftsmanship which he has
worked on for the squire's sister. The squire intervenes, tries to
bait Adam down, with the consequence that he refused to accept any
payment at all. The second is when his manhood and again his
integrity are called into question. The squire's grandson, Adam's
friend, tries to take his girl. This example is interesting for
while Adam is asserting that what belongs to him should not be
stolen away, in fact he gives the squire's grandson a bloody nose,
the artisan is at the same time accepting that part of the social
code which is based upon deference. The grandson ought not to
trifle with the affections of a girl so obviously below him in
social station; marriage to her is out of the question. It is
implicit it would not even enter Adam's mind that an artisan like
himself could or should or perhaps would even want to be allowed to
53marry a girl from gentry circles.
For artisan and gentry alike, independence could only truly exist 
if your livelihood was obtained from more than one source. No-one 
would then have a monopoly over your income. To be tied to an 
occupation narrowed your outlook on life, made you susceptible to 
"influence" by a single 'party' and therefore made you unfit for 
citizenship and government. Barrington Moore has characterised this 
attitude as "the aristocratic conception of the amateur", as against 
the professional view of life. As he says, it is hardly possible to 
speak of "an amateur businessman or an amateur lawyer except as a 
derogatory epithet". The aristocratic "ideal of the amateur" consists 
of a "cluster of ideas" the "main features" of which are as follows.
Tholfsen, Radicalism, 248, 264; George Eliot, Adam Bede, 
(Airmont Classics edn., 1966), passim.
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Because aristocratic status was supposed to 
indicate a qualitatively superior form of being 
whose qualities were hereditary rather than the 
fruit of individually acquired merits, the 
aristocrat was not expected to put forth too 
prolonged or too earnest an effort in any single 
direction. He might excel, but not just in one 
activity as a consequence of prolonged training; 
that would be plebeian. The hereditary aspect 
... is not completely decisive ... the 'real' 
ruler-gentleman was a qualitatively distinct 
form of humanity ... the aristocrat was expected 
to do all things very well, but none of them, 
not even making love, too well... such ideas 
... are in substantial measure due to the 
persistence of an independent aristocracy.^
The ideal of the amateur has political and economic ramifications 
that go beyond this. That the notion of the amateur was not the 
exclusive mental property of the aristocracy and gentry was implicit 
in earlier analysis. Aristocratic amateurism cannot be put up 
against plebeian professionalism. Amateurism was intrinsic to 18th 
century society. Much has been said already about the way in which 
artisans, especially those in country areas, could supplement their 
income at harvest time and at other times of the year. The domestic 
or household economy supported a great variety of tasks or pursuits.
In the army it was a "long-standing practice" to let soldiers who 
were off-duty "take civilian employment". On the political level,
"the great mass of country independents" who made up the body of 
the parliamentary opposition would not usually be in attendance 
"save between January and the Easter recess". At other times "fox­
hunting, gardening, planting or indifference" kept them at home.
It was felt parliamentary representatives should meet for a short 
period to modify and enact legislation but should then quickly 
return to private life "to experience the consequences of their 
actions along with other members of the society". There is a passage 
in Locke that explicitly expresses this sentiment although Pocock puts 
the idea down to the more 'Machiavellian* notion that "specialisation 
was the prime cause of corruption". It was "only the citizen as 
amateur, propertied and independent" who "could be said to practice
Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy, (Peregrine edn. London, 1969), 488-90.
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v i r t u e " . ^  Yet no t  on ly  t h e  g e n t ry  scorned  p r o f e s s i o n a l  p o l i t i c s .  
A f te r  d e s c r i b i n g  how he got  p a i d  fo u r  s h i l l i n g s  f o r  a t t e n d i n g  a 
mee t ing ,  Samuel Bamford comments,
. . .  I was e n t i t l e d  t o  i t  having  l o s t  work to
t h a t  v a lu e  a t  home. But I n e v e r ,  excep t  on
t h i s  o c c a s i o n ,  took  money o r  any o t h e r
renum e ra t ion  f o r  a t t e n d i n g  re fo rm  m ee t ings .
I c o n s id e r e d  i t  a mean t h i n g ,  though the
p r a c t i c e  was coming i n t o  u s e ,  and s e v e r a l  o f
my f r i e n d s  w i th o u t  any s c r u p le  con t inued  to
do so u n t i l  ' t h e i r  o c c u p a t i o n '  was gone! I t
was a bad p r a c t i c e ,  and gave r i s e  to  a s e t  o f
o r a t o r s  who made a t r a d e  o f  s p e e c h i f y in g .
These p e r s o n s  . . .  l e f t  t h e i r  work o r  b u s i n e s s ,
f o r  a more p r o f i t a b l e  and f l a t t e r i n g  employment
. . .  a t  t h e  expense  o f  th e  s imple and c redu lous
m u l t i t u d e s . r , bo
P r o f e s s i o n a l  p o l i t i c i a n  o r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  s o l d i e r ,  i t  made no
d i f f e r e n c e .  An a r t i c l e  "On S tand ing  Armies" in  th e  Radica l  Reformer ,
quo t ing  from Godwin, d e c l a r e d  " th e  man t h a t  i s  merely a s o l d i e r  ceases
t o  be,  in  the  same sense  as h i s  ne ighbours  a c i t i z e n :  he i s  cu t  o f f
57from th e  r e s t  o f  th e  community".
N o n - s p e c i a l i s a t i o n ,  th e  e x i s t e n t i a l  b a s i s  o f  independence ,  was 
on ly  p o s s i b l e  i f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  had some k ind  o f  p r o p e r t y ;  in  the  
M ach ia v e l l i an  paradigm t h i s  meant landed  p r o p e r t y .  Land was 
" e s s e n t i a l  to  v i r t u e " .  The monied i n t e r e s t ,  owning on ly  l i q u i d  or  
moveable p r o p e r t y  " c a r e d  l i t t l e  f o r  th e  commonwealth" s in c e  "no 
t a n g i b l e  p a r t  o f  i t  was t h e i r  own". In f a c t ,  the y  were a t h r e a t  
to  the  commonwealth. They were beh ind  th e  n a t i o n a l  deb t  and s ince  
the  debt  funded th e  Eas t  I n d i a  Company and the  i n t e r e s t  t h a t  the  
Company p a i d  to  t h e i r  s h a r e h o l d e r s  and f o r  t h e i r  borrowings  led  
t o  h igh t a x e s  on la n d ,  c a p i t a l  as  money pu t  t h e  "commonwealth in
John Owen, The P a t t e r n  o f  P o l i t i c s  in  E ig h te e n th  Century  England , 
(London, 1962),  13; J e s s e  Lemisch,  "The Rad ica l i sm  o f  th e  
I n a r t i c u l a t e :  Merchant Seamen in t h e  P o l i t i c s  o f  R evo lu t iona ry  
America" in  D is s e n t :  E x p l o r a t i o n s  in  th e  H is to ry  o f  American 
R a d i c a l i s m , (DeKalb, I l l i n o i s ,  1968),  53 ed .  A l f r e d  Young;
Wood, Repub l ic ,  26; Pocock,  Moment, 499.
Bamford, P a s s a g e s , V o l . l ,  35-6 .
57 . Radica l  Reformer No.6,  V o l . l ,  44.
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d an g e r" .  Small l a n d h o ld e r s  were a l s o  be ing  t h r e a t e n e d  by th e  l a rg e  
e s t a t e  owners who cou ld  a f f o r d  to  pay t a x e s  and absorb  th o s e  sm a l l e r  
landowners who had got  i n t o  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  Worse, independence was 
doubly t h r e a t e n e d  because  f o r e i g n e r s  had a l a rg e  i n t e r e s t  in  th e  
n a t i o n a l  d e b t .  And s in c e  t a x e s  p a i d  f o r  the  d e b t ,  th e  d e b t - h o l d e r s  
s u p p o r te d  th e  government.  Yet in  Country ideo logy  " th e  f u n c t i o n  o f  
p r o p e r t y  i s  t o  g u a ra n t e e  th e  c i t i z e n  h i s  independence" ;  o b v io u s ly  
on ly  la nd  cou ld  do t h i s .  Real p r o p e r t y ,  th e n ,  gave independence 
and in  " n e o -H a r r in g to n  hands" ,  th e  E ng l i sh  c o n s t i t u t i o n  was h e ld  
t o  be founded on a " g o th i c  b a l a n c e "  which p r o t e c t e d  p r o p e r t y  and 
independence .  But i f  in  t h i s  scheme o f  t h i n g s ,  th e  monied man i s  
the  r e a l  v i l l a i n  s in c e  th e  merchant  "was not  invo lved  in  h i s  exchange 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  in  p o l i t i c a l  s u b o r d i n a t i o n " ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  see 
why th e  merchant  and,  s t i l l  l e s s ,  th e  a r t i s a n  should  t a k e  up a s e t  o f
5ii d e a s  which p re - s u p p o s e d  landed  p r o p e r t y  as th e  source  o f  a l l  v i r t u e .
For Pocock i n s i s t s  t h a t  C a r tw r ig h t  and o t h e r  Georgian R a d ica l s  
a re  " n e o - H a r r i n g t o n i a n s "  b e l i e v i n g  in th e  r i g h t s  e n s h r in e d  in  th e  
a n c i e n t  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  I f  t h e  o b j e c t i o n  i s  t h a t  C a r tw r ig h t  comes from 
the  lower g e n t r y ,  s u f f i c i e n t  example has  been given  in th e  e a r l i e r  
c h a p t e r s  t o  show h i s  b e l i e f s  were shared  by a number o f  a r t i s a n s .  
R e c e n t ly ,  an a l t e r n a t i v e  and oppos ing view to  P ocock 's  has  been p u t .  
This  a rg u es  t h a t  t h e  Radica l  demand f o r  manhood s u f f r a g e  r e p r e s e n t e d  
something o f  a b reak  wi th  t h e  o l d e r  Gothic language;  i t  invo lved  a 
s h i f t  from landed p r o p e r t y  t o  p e r s o n a l i t y  as th e  b a s i s  o f  th e  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  From t h i s  p o i n t  o f  view, James Burgh, t o  t a k e  but  
one example,  i s  a " p o l i t i c a l  r a t i o n a l i s t "  pace Locke r a t h e r  th a n  a 
n e o - H a r r in g t o n ia n  d e s p i t e  the  f a c t  h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n s  a re  f u l l  o f  s t u f f  
about  t h e  Anglo-Saxon c o n s t i t u t i o n .  S uppor t ing  t h i s  i s  a passage  
from Burgh s t a t i n g  t h a t  every  man 's  " u n a l i e n a b l e  p r o p e r t y "  i s  h i s  
" l i f e ,  p e r s o n a l  l i b e r t y ,  a c h a r a c t e r ,  t h e  r i g h t  t o  h i s  e a r n i n g s ,  a 
r i g h t  t o  a r e l i g i o u s  p r o f e s s i o n "  or  b e l i e f .  Yet ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  a b reak ,  
i t  i s  pe rh ap s  on ly  minor s in c e  a l l  t h i s ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  th e  b i t  about 
e a r n i n g s  has  t o  be r e l a t e d  t o  a m e r c a n t i l i s t  p r o b l e m a t i c .  E a rn ings ,
Pocock, Moment, 463; I s a a c  Kramnick, Bolingbroke  and h i s  C i r c l e , 
(Cambridge,  M ass . ,  1968),  43,  59, 70, 210; Pocock,  P o l i t i c s ,
92,  94,  124-5,  131.
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that is, have connections with ideas about under-consumption and
high taxation. Generally, in the political language of the time,
there is little to suggest voting rights ought to rest on
personality or natural rights alone, or that natural rights were
a sufficient guarantee the voting public would not get corrupted.
Yet it cannot be denied natural rights, and Locke, played an important
part in artisan ideas. But there were senses of property held by
artisans which, properly speaking, were neither derived from Locke
or Harrington; they had more to do with the artisans' social
and economic conditions. Their "wage was a 'selling price'"; their
"property was labour" and their values centred around the idea of
"earned independence". Virtually "the entire skill or 'mystery' of
the trade was conveyed by precept and example in the workshop" and
"the artisans regarded this 'mystery' as their property". John
Thelwall "voiced the claim of the artisan for an independent
livelihood by moderate labour" but while he avoided "remote schemes
of land nationalisation", he still attacked the "land monopoly",
enclosures and so on. Beyond this, rights based on "craftsmanship
and skill" were regarded as fundamental, as natural rights, since
they were "inseparable from the ordinary man because essential for
his existence and necessary for the work which it was God's will
that he should do". This was the artisans "sanctity of property"
and was expressed as a bundle of rights including legal rights
which were not only in accord with nature and the constitution but
59also protected by common law and custom.
It can be deduced that a tax on articles of consumption was 
seen as more than a merely economic measure. High taxation threatened 
the artisans property, his means of subsistence. It also infringed 
his liberty. He might have not much more than a "wretched hovel" but 
"still the king could not enter" even though legislation for a beer 
tax and a window tax provided for this. "According to the true 
principles of the English constitution", Sir Francis Burdett said,
Jowett, "Language", 86, 91; Thompson, Working Class, 175-6, 279; 
Gwyn A. Williams, Artisans and Sans-Culottes, (London, 1968), 114; 
J.W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English History, (London, 1955), 54.
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"every man is entitled to participate in the power of making —  
laws" and electing those "who dispose of his liberty, his property, 
his life". Quoting, he added "that the people of England have a 
property in their own goods, which are not to be taken without 
their own consent". Burdett vacillated between manhood suffrage 
based on personality and household suffrage. Many artisans favoured 
rate-payer suffrage and excluded "the right of paupers and household 
servants to vote" or followed Sir William Jones in giving voting 
rights to all who were "not dependent upon the parish". Political 
rights, if they included personality, and they did, also often 
included some sense of propertied independence even if one that does 
not fit snugly with the gentry interpretation of that idea.60
Patriotism vs Ambition
Linking independence with patriotism, even Godwin spoke of 
"this chosen seat of patriotism, independence and generous virtue". 
Patriotism was unlikely without independence and some form of 
property. Patriotism was the active principle in virtue; this 
"fine and lively feeling", as Rousseau calls it. In the mind of one 
anonymous pamphleteer, a patriot was a representative of the people; 
"patriot" coming from the word "people". Private interest, being 
partial, is contrasted with patriotic sentiment since the former 
attacks the people as a "body" as an integral whole or unity. 
Patriotism, that is, has cognitive roots which suggest a deep 
historical meaning; it is not merely synonymous with national 
feeling. Besides an association with virtue and independence, 
patriotism was connected with reason. "For the honour of his country", 
John Cartwright wrote, the English soldier in battle should keep "his 
reason and his intellectual ability" and should only fight when "his 
reason is most clear". He should not be intoxicated by "the use of 
Turkish opium or French brandy". Other associations in my paradigm 
were with simplicity as in the patriotic figure of Britannia. Through 
Britannia, patriotism was also linked with liberty, justice, religion, 
plenty and so on.* 6^
S. Maccoby, English Radicalism 1762-1785, (London, 1955), 596;
Jephson, Platform, Vol.l, 468; John Osborne, John Cartwright,
(Cambridge, 1972), 25; Sir William Jones in Cone, Jacobins, 8.
6^‘ Rousseau in Sabine, History, 586; "Citizen" Rights, 3;
Cartwright, Aegis, 21; H.M. Atherton, Political Prints in the 
Age of Hogarth, (Oxford, 1974), 93, 107.
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One of the most thoughtful pieces on the meaning of the idea 
of patriotism is still Johan Huizinga's essay. The main purpose 
of the essay is to distinguish, as is still not often done, between 
patriotism and nationalism. The difference is in,
patriotism, the will to maintain and defend what
is one's own and cherished ... nationalism ... the
powerful drive to dominate, the urge to have one's
own nation ... assert itself above, over and at the
cost of others ... In practice ... the line
dividing them is often very difficult to trace.,„oz
Huizinga's last statement obviously has a lot of truth in it, 
although in what follows there is at attempt to trace or uncover that 
line. For now, it is important to notice that patriotism, Huizinga 
finds, is an 18th century word. In English the oldest use of the word 
nationalism "dates from 1836" and has "a theological significance" 
suggesting "that certain nations have been chosen by God". Later 
uses are more secular. Generally, "national consciousness is a 
product of the modern period" but "initially such feelings did not 
have a great deal to do with the state and statecraft". Nationalism 
is associated with the growth of the modern state. Originally, the 
idea of the patriot is associated with the Dutch struggle for 
independence and meant "countryman"; soon the meaning of "lover of 
one's fatherland" got attached to it. But in England, patriot took 
on the additional significance of "friend of freedom". It signified 
"an appeal to the personal authority of the king and the spirit of 
the people against the ... aristocracy". What will be shown is that 
"the term 'patriot'" was not "quickly ridiculed and worn threadbare" 
in the English political context. Even so, Huizinga says, "this 
English usage" was carried into France. And he detects a shift, 
rather than an interconnection, from the old meaning of "an affection­
ate attachment to the fatherland" to "a political struggle for popular 
freedom, equality before the law, reformation of the state" and so on. 
Huizinga also throws in the interesting observation that "as soon as 
one sets out to formulate the rights of man, the state appears to be 
required as the framework for his society". Whereas patriotism
62. Johan Huizinga, Men and Ideas, (London, 1970), 97, 99.
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has no firm link with free trade, "the theory of economic freedom 
concealed in itself the seeds of an unbridled expansion of capitalism... 
and ... of an unavoidable imperialism of the more powerful states and 
nations". The term "jingoism" was coined by the British "around 1878" 
to express the idea of this "overweening nationalism". While patriot­
ism is associated with subjectivity and "affection", nationalism is 
objective and "flourishes almost entirely in the sphere of compet­
ition and opposition". Patriotic feeling is perhaps best expressed 
by Grimm who wrote of the place "’where one has wore all the roads 
and paths bare ever since childhood"' and "'where you believe you 
can hear voices from the graves of your forefathers encouraging and 
admonishing you'". This is certainly very close to English plebeian 
sentiments about patriotism; it is, of course, also very close to 
Burke . ^
Unfortunately, historians have tended to overlook this point 
and have also failed to grasp the full significance of the kind of 
distinctions drawn up by Huizinga. By far the greater part of 
historical criticism has found a vital nationalistic or even chauvinistic 
element in 18th century mentality and in artisan mentality in particular. 
Where the English conception of patriot as friend of the people has been 
noticed, the nature of its relationship to other uses of patriotism has 
not been spelt out or have been misconceived. D.P. Crook states 
"radicals ... historically have been lukewarm patriots" since "their 
faith has been in mankind rather than the nation". P.M. Kemp-Ashraf 
says that during the Napoleonic Wars the ruling classes were able to 
"enflame a patriotic passion among the common feeling". Patricia 
Hollis finds a "xenophobic note ... always latent in English working 
men". Referring to "patriotic gore", J.H. Plumb remarks on "the 
alienation that took place between radicalism and patriotism" during 
the American and French Revolutions. More extensively, H.M. Atherton 
discovers "exhuberant nationalism" throughout the "Georgian era".
Still worse, on the evidence of many "alien observers" the Englishman's 
hatred of foreigners was a product of his "haughty nativism and 
insularity". Britannia is associated with "aggressive nationalism
63. Huizinga, Men and Ideas, (London, 1970), 97, 99.
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and empire". One reason is that she possesses a spear and a shield.
George Rude, too, finds evidence of "chauvinism, or hostility to
foreigners - particularly though by no means exclusively from
Catholic countries". Elsewhere,Rude goes further and argues
generally for "a popular xenophobia of chauvinism ... in the
eighteenth century" and adds this was related to the notion of
"a free-born Englishman". Henry Collins endorses Rude's earlier
statement speaking of the English and "their propensity to chauvinism,
particularly against France". E.P. Thompson's position is more
complex and to a large extent he goes against the grain of criticism,
yet does not make use of the kind of insights and understanding found
in Huizinga's essay. He recognises the connections in plebeian
Radical ideology between patriotism and the rhetoric of liberty.
And since, for Thompson, the shibboleth of the free-born Englishman
is a form of Jacobinism, English Jacobinism or "the old Jacobin
heritage" contained important elements of internationalism, seemingly
of the kind that can be carried on to make up a socialist tradition.
In his later postscript he admits he may have over-emphasised this
spirit of internationalism and not paid enough attention to the
"flag-saluting Englishman" or "the anti-Gallican broadside"'s
audience. Even in the body of the book, he detects, for example
between 1802 and 1806, upsurges of "popular patriotic feeling"
which he seems to identify with the kind of chauvinism mentioned in
his postscript. As he says, "former Jacobins became patriots",
seeming to suggest they became imbued with nationalistic fervour.
Thompson not excluded, part of the problem seems to lie in the
mis-use of language; patriotism is sometimes used when nationalism
or chauvinism is intended. But much more is at issue, not least the
64nature of patriotism as a moment in language and consciousness.
It would be foolish to deny, probably, there was not a 
chauvinistic element in the English consciousness during this period. 
Yet the character of this consciousness is misunderstood if every time 
the word patriot is used, even in relation to other nations, it is
P.M. Kemp-Ashraf, "The Vernacular Poet Faces Reality" in 
Gallacher, 124; J.H. Plumb, Light, 86-7; Atherton, Prints, 
85, 91, 94-5, 96, 105, 168; Rude, Paris, 310-11, 315;
Rude, Crowd, 229; Thompson, Working Class, 496-7, 911.
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taken as evidence of some kind of chauvinistic feeling. Parent­
hetically, it is worth recalling John Cartwright's defence of 
England during the early 1800s which, if he is understood 
conceptually, made him no less a 'Jacobin' or Radical. It is 
also worth remembering the complexity of Gravenor Henson's attitude 
towards the French; to describe it as chauvinist is simply parody.
So, too, is Atherton’s interpretation of Britannia which can be 
taken as an example of the general slant of the historiographical 
criticism. Generally, in the 18th century neither Britannia nor 
John Bull can be taken as "images of British nationalism" simply 
because it is anachronistic to do so. Radical patriots could sing 
"Rule Britannia" since for them the key line told of Britons never 
being slaves. Defensive items, "the lance, shield and olive twig" 
were, as Atherton says, Britannia's "standard attributes" and it was 
only in the reigns of George IV and Queen Victoria the more 
imperialistic appendages of "the trident, plumed helmet and 
lighthouse" were added. Also, as the prints show, if she represents 
national feeling it is in the non-expansionist form of love of 
country, and she is equally prominent as defender and symbol of 
patriotic liberty. Friend or guardian of "true patriots", she 
"embodied Virtue" and was often shown as the "avowed enemy of 
corruption". If in some non-aggressive sense she represents 
"martial strength", she is also frequently presented as "persecuted 
innocence". Similarly, the attitude towards the French is not, as 
Atherton would have it, "one of unqualified prejudice and dislike", 
but specific and qualified, and in accordance with natural law and 
'excess'. The same persons who supported the French people in 
Revolution condemned not French things in general but French luxury 
and all the vices that went with it: effeminacy, foppery, complexity 
and so on. In common with their English counterparts, the French 
aristocracy were condemned for their "Garniture" or excessive culture; 
through this they distort nature and "Burlesque God's images".
This kind of imagery was virtually absent in the 19th century.
As Pocock puts it, "the concept of the citizen or patriot was anti­
thetical to that of economic man, multiplying his satisfactions and 
transforming his culture". The 19th century intellectual environment 
of nationalism was evolutionism which pre-supposed "mankind was 
engaged in a struggle that would eliminate the inferior and elevate 
the superior nations and races". Racism was "wedded" to "the doctrine
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of struggle". Perhaps another way of drawing out the difference is
in a statement referring to developing countries where nationalism
is described as "the modernising passion of the nation that wants
to catch up" and patriotism as "the custodian of a country's past".
It is not suggested, then, that patriotism disappeared in the 19th
century. The seamen of around 1850 were described as "intensely
patriotic as well as being strong Nationalists and Imperialists".
A recent interpretation has drawn attention to Robert Blatchford's
"patriotic version of socialism" but points to his condemnation of
"'jingoist' sentiment" and insists on his "defencism". He was
"for the defence of Empire but against Imperialism" which he saw
as "'economically motivated piracy crudely tarted up as Christian
hypocrisies'". In all this, Blatchford was not far removed from
6 5the 18th century view.
Even the idea of empire was late to crystallise. In Chatham's 
time, empire "in the sense of vast colonial possessions" was alien 
to the mentality of the era. "Islands and forts at strategic focal 
points to trade were desirable but not more, unless necessity 
compelled it as in Canada". Under the Treaty of Paris, "nearly all" 
that Chatham had won "was returned", something unthinkable in later 
centuries. It was thought by many that the economic benefits of 
colonial possessions were doubtful to say the least, and there was 
a considerable literature which argued in this vein. Hugh, Lord 
Sempill argued that "Dr. Smith's book Colonies are commercially 
useless as well as politically mischievious" was vindicated by the 
American Revolution. Colonies meant consumption instead of 
stimulating domestic industry could be directed at "purchasing the 
manufactured commodities of other countries for export to America". 
Since American independence this no longer happened; for, "the 
capital which had been forced by the monopoly, into colony trade, 
returned to its natural channel, and is now employed in manufactures 
at home". In this manner, home production had increased tenfold. 
Trade rather than possessions was the economic motif in patriotism. 
The strength of kingdom, was "exhausted by foreign acquisitions".
Pocock, Politics, 90; Richard Sale, The Guardian Weekly, 25 
Sept., 1977, 18; John Gorman, Banner Bright, (London, 1973), 33.
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In the Machiavellian tradition "normal usage" distinguished
"between republic and empire" and if there was some sense of
"Machiavelli's 'commonwealth for expansion'" through the "exercise
of ... virtu", some sense of protection of the liberties of
conquered peoples, it was also true empire was seen as the source
of corruption through high taxes, standing armies, political
66authoritarianism and so forth.
But perhaps a more important area of correspondence or agreement 
between Blatchford and the 18th century comes from "defencism". The 
idea of defence is at the heart of 18th century patriotism. For most, 
it even had priority over wars of liberation if they were conducted 
by an invading force. When English emigres in France were countenancing 
an invasion of England by French revolutionary forces, Henry Yorke, 
among others, spoke out against it. "You have no more right", he said,
"to cannonade men out of what you call slavery, than they have to 
cannonade Frenchmen out of what they call freedom". If they carried 
on with their plans he would go home and meet them "at Dover" with 
arms in his hands. The basis of defensive patriotism was non-inter­
ference in the internal affairs of other nations and, Lord Sempill 
said, it was derived from natural law, from "the right which every 
people derive from nature, to frame a government for themselves".
The nationalist attitude, "stirring up ... nation against nation" 
was "the true spirit of the devil". But in order to defend yourself 
against foreign invasion you had to be strong. Since defence included 
trade as well as defence of the home soil, this implied the existence 
of a powerful navy, although the reasons why a navy was preferred over 
an army are as much ideological as pragmatic. It is a mistake to see 
what has been aptly called this system of "offensive defence" in terms 
of a "militant and isolationist" and "insular patriotism". Glorification 
of the navy and criticism of a standing army was related to an ideological 
complex which put standing armies together with corruption, placemen, 
taxes and so on and was identified with "the old Country Interest".
If there is some truth in it, it is a parody to say the "patriot scheme" 
approved of naval war because it was cheap and appealed to a "deep- 
seated xenophobia". As Halevy points out, despite the fact at the end
J.H. Plumb, Men and Places, (London, 1966), 126; Hugh, Lord 
Sempill, A Short Address to the Public on the Practice of 
Cashiering Military Officers Without Trial, (London, 1793), 
27-8; Atherton, Prints, 168; Pocock, Moment, 510.
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o f  th e  wars with  Napoleon " th e  navy c o s t  ve ry  d e a r "  t h e r e  was no
h ig h  f e e l i n g  a g a i n s t  th e  navy s in c e  "a f l e e t  cou ld  n e i t h e r  defend
t h e  government a g a i n s t  r e b e l l i o n ,  nor  cause  a r e v o l u t i o n ,  nor
e f f e c t  a coup d ' e t a t " .  Cheapness was a l s o  more a s s o c i a t e d  wi th
t h e  n a t i o n a l  deb t  and " i t s  consequent  c o r r u p t i o n s " ;  u n l i k e  the
6 7army, i t  was f e l t  t h e  navy would no t  i n c r e a s e  t h e  d e b t .
This  a t t i t u d e  o r  f e e l i n g  was sha red  by a l l  c l a s s e s .  The non- 
a g g r e s s i v e  n a t u r e  o f  p a t r i o t i s m  comes ou t  in  B u rk e ' s  words when he 
speaks  o f  b r i n g i n g  " th e  d i s p o s i t i o n s  t h a t  a re  l o v e l y  in  p r i v a t e  l i f e  
i n t o  th e  s e r v i c e  and conduct  o f  t h e  commonwealth, so t o  be p a t r i o t s ,  
a s  no t  t o  f o r g e t  we a r e  gen t lem en" .  I f  i t  i s  o b j e c t e d  t h a t  t h i s  was 
f a r  from l i v e d  up t o ,  then  i t  i s  im por tan t  to  emphasise  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  
i d e a l s  a re  be ing  a n a l y s e d .  One o f  th e  most e l a b o r a t e  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  
th e  p a t r i o t i c  i d e a l  was penned by George Berkeley  in  h i s  "Maxims 
Concern ing P a t r i o t i s m "  w r i t t e n  in  1750. In i t  he l i s t s  t h e  d e s i d e r a t a  
o f  a p a t r i o t .  To be e i t h e r  f o r  or  a g a i n s t  t h e  Court  p a r t y  i s ,  he says ,  
no gu a ra n t e e  o f  p a t r i o t i s m .  A p a s s io n  f o r  money and an a p p e t i t e  f o r  
power i s  an o b s t a c l e  t o  p a t r i o t i s m .  A lso ,  "a n a t i v e  t h a n  a f o r e i g n e r ,  
a m a r r i ed  man th a n  a b a c h e l o r ,  a b e l i e v e r  th a n  an i n f i d e l  has  a b e t t e r  
chance o f  be ing  a p a t r i o t " .  E p i c u re s ,  " g a m e s t e r s ,  f o p s ,  r a k e s ,  b u l l i e s ,  
s t o c k j o b b e r s "  and th o s e  w i thou t  r e l i g i o n  would no t  make genuine p a t r i o t s .  
"To make a t r u e  p a t r i o t  t h e r e  must be an inward sense o f  duty  and 
c o n s c i e n c e " .  Consequen t ly ,  "a p a t r i o t  w i l l  n ev e r  b a r t e r  t h e  p u b l i c  
money f o r  h i s  p r i v a t e  g a i n " .  The p a t r i o t  c o n s id e r e d  t h e  p u b l i c  
i n t e r e s t  as  a whole and was no t  t i e d  t o  p a r t y  so t h a t  " th e  fawning 
c o u r t i e r  and th e  s u r l y  s q u i r e  o f t e n  mean t h e  t h e  same t h i n g ,  each in 
t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t " .  I t  i s  c l e a r  p a t r i o t i s m  was t i e d  up w i th  a 
r e l i g i o n ,  and was bound up with  bo th  defence  and love o f  co u n t ry  in 
p r e f e r e n c e  t o  o t h e r s  and with  concern  over  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  i n t e r n a l  
m o r a l i t y .  I t  i s  i m p l i c i t ,  t o o ,  t h a t  p a t r i o t i s m  i s  a v e ry  p l a s t i c  
t e rm  used  by a l l  s o r t s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  t e n d e n c i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  th e  Cour t ,  
as  i s  im p l ied  in  Dr. J o h n s o n ' s  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  p a t r i o t i s m  i s  t h e  l a s t  
r e f u g e  o f  a s c o u n d r e l ,  a l th o u g h  t o  say i t  i s  a c an t  word does no t  mean 
p a t r i o t i s m  was devoid  o f  meaning o r  e f f e c t .  Q u i te  t h e  c o n t r a r y  i s  t r u e .  
S ince  i t  was an i d e a  b a s i c  t o  18th c e n t u ry  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  e x i s t e n c e ,  
p a t r i o t i s m  was a v a lu e  h e l d  by a l l  k inds  o f  p e o p l e .  The Rad ica l  view 
s h a red  much in  common wi th  Tory and Whig v e r s i o n s .  Volney d e f in e d
Yorke,  " T r i a l " ;  S em p i l l ,  A d d res s , 28; N ea le ,  W ea l th , 127; 
A th e r to n ,  P r i n t s , 106-7,  180; E l i e  Halevy,  England in  1815, 
(London, 1949),  47; Pocock,  Moment, 442.
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country as a community of citizens "united by fraternal sentiments
and reciprocal wants" who united their individual forces "for the
purpose of general security". Using words similar to Burke, Volney
says that "in a country" the people "constitute a family of tender
attachments by means of which charity and love of our neighbour are
extended to the whole nation". The idea of patriotism seems to
give further evidence of a "moral consensus" later replaced by the
68language of class, race and nation.
None of this is to say that artisans did not give patriotism 
their own gloss and turn its rhetoric against the dominant classes.
In the Declaration of the Derby Society of Political Information, a 
mainly working class organisation, internal patriotic sentiment is 
pitted against a seemingly aggressive nationalism. The interests of 
the poor would "never be promoted by the accession of territory".
A large army was unnecessary when "we have a well-regulated militia". 
The saving in tax could be used to comfort "the peasantry" by 
"promoting agriculture and manufactories". Instead, "we see the 
continuation of oppressive game laws and destructive monopolies" 
and, equally as bad, "excise laws". So it is asked, "are we in 
England? Have our forefathers fought and bled and conquered for 
liberty?"; and, have not "the fruits of their patriotism" been 
squandered. The pages of the London Corresponding Society journal 
are full of similar patriotic language. "We claim the Privilege and 
Glory in the Character of Britons", it declares. Although the 
Society's members spoke of themselves as "Friends to Civil Liberty" 
and "Natural Equality" and declared these were "Rights of Mankind", 
any cosmopolitan or internationalist edge was blunted. Still, in 
1797, they were speaking of themselves as "Independent Britons ... 
reclaiming the Rightful Constitution of their Country". Neither is 
there any strong tinge of chauvinism since they claimed "that every 
nation has an inalienable right to choose the mode in which it will 
be governed". Outside interference was "tyranny and oppression". 
This was one of their "patriotic motions" addressed to "brother 
patriots". During the last executive debate in 1798, Evans wanted 
everyone to join the Volunteers. Others were against this move and
Boulton, Language, 54; Berkeley, "Maxims Concerning Patriotism" 
in Miscellaneous Works; Volney, Law, 175.
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while they did not want to join the French, neither did they wish
to defend "the bad against the worse". Much later, Evans’ friend,
Allen Davenport, pleading for a Spencean commonwealth, asserted
that if "such a commonwealth were adopted", England could never be
conquered. Under "Agrarian equality", the people would defend their
country since "all self would be lost in the glorious blaze of 
69social love". Even at the 'crudest' level libertarian patriotism 
rather than authoritarian chauvinism is often the predominant 
sentiment. Said a framework knitter,
if ever that bulwark is broke down of every 
english mans hous being his Castil then that 
strong barrier is for iver broke that so many 
of our ancesters have bled for in vain.^
Earthy artisan sentiment of this kind explains why Anglo-Saxon 
rather than Venice or Greek myth had the greater linguistic resonance 
in the 18th century. The artisan took pride in his 'historical' 
liberties and perhaps a more vicarious pride in England's wealth and 
power. It was not, as earlier for the gentry, the classical Brutus 
who was the destroyer of tryants; the English Brutus myth was used to 
legitimate tyrannicide or the destruction of 'giants'.
The Cap of Liberty, which started publishing in 1819, was full 
of the old rhetoric. The journal saw itself as defender of "the 
Constitution of England" held up as "the admiration of the world"; 
only those in power "want to change it". The journal spoke with 
"the heart of a true patriot". Clearly identifying patriotism with 
internal libertarianism it refers to the "patriotism" of "a Jury of 
our Countrymen". They defended the historical liberties won by heroes 
like Hampden who "stemmed the torrent of corruption" with "the glow 
of patriotic ardour". The connection of all this with self-defence 
and the Christian ethic is also made clear. Since Peterloo, the
69 Declaration of the Derby Society of Political Information, (1792) in 
Cone, Jacobins, 225-28; Place Papers 27812; Williams, Artisans, 
102; Davenport, Spence, 15-16.
70 Cited in Thompson, Working Class, 89 from Records of the Borough 
of Nottingham VIII, (1952), 152.
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"du ty  t o  God, p o i n t  ou t  . . .  th e  moral o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n
and co n se q u e n t ly  o f  s e l f - d e f e n c e "  and "du ty  t o  . . .  c o u n t ry ,  o f  be ing
p re p a re d  t o  d ie  in  defence o f  i t s  l i b e r t i e s " .  Not,  t h a t  i s ,  in
conques t  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .  As i f  to  conf i rm  t h i s ,  t h e  Cap makes
an appea l  t o  t h e  sem i-m yth ica l  f i g u r e  o f  a p a t r i o t  p r i n c e .  The
P r in c e  o f  Wales i s  looked upon as a l a w - g iv e r ,  a de fende r  o f
Eng l ishm an 's  r i g h t s ,  o f  " th e  Laws and C o n s t i t u t i o n " .  A s i m i l a r
ou t lo o k  i s  e v i d e n t  in  t h e  Radica l  Reformer , p u b l i s h e d  d u r ing  the
same p e r i o d .  Augusta,  th e  P r in ce  o f  Wales'  daugh te r  had d ie d  and
was now "wi th  h e r  murdered p e o p l e " ,  v i c t i m s  o f  P e t e r l o o .  With he r
dea th  "every  r o y a l  v i r t u e "  had gone and th e  p o l i t i c a l  m a r ty r s  and
t h e  p r i n c e s s  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d  wi th  th e  E n g l i sh  p a t r i o t i c  he roes
"Hampden, R u s s e l l ,  T y le r  and Sydney".  D e c la r in g  i t s  defence  o f
p r o p e r t y  and condemning " N a t io n a l  Debt and T axa t ion"  as  Egyptian
bondage,  a l e t t e r  from "Female Rad ica l  Reformers" in C a r l i s l e  asks
" B r i t o n s "  t o  mourn th e  " P a t r i o t i c  b rav e"  who had l o s t  t h e i r  l i v e s
in  the  defence  o f  l i b e r t y .  Like many o t h e r s ,  t h e  Reformer a l s o
l i n k s  up p a t r i o t i s m  o r  v i r t u e  and " p u b l i c  s p i r i t "  with  " p r i v a t e
71v i r t u e "  in  f a m i ly  r e l a t i o n s .
Besides  th e  j o u r n a l s ,  a r t i s a n s '  memoirs a l s o  e x h i b i t  th e  language 
o f  p a t r i o t i s m ,  and aga in  i t  i s  a language l a r g e l y  devo id  o f  19th 
c e n t u ry  g r a n d e u r .  Samuel Bamford's  eye i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  good a t  
drawing ou t  t h e  f i n e  t e x t u r e  o f  E n g l i s h  a r t i s a n  p a t r i o t i s m .  Bamford's  
o b s e r v a t i o n s  t a k e  us i n t o  th e  h e a r t  as  w ell  as  t h e  mind o f  t h e  a r t i s a n .  
He t e l l s  us o f  a hymn w r i t t e n  by h i s  f a t h e r  in  1793 c a l l e d  "God he lp  
th e  Poor",  f u l l  o f  s t u f f  about  Old C o r ru p t io n  and freedom f o r  the  
E ng l i sh  poor  a i d e d  by God 's  hand.  His un c l e  he c a l l s  "a  c h r i s t i a n -  
p a t r i o t " .  Buying cheap and s e l l i n g  d e a r ,  pay ing  wages a t  l e s s  than 
s u b s i s t e n c e  l e v e l  i s  " no t  C h r i s t i a n - l i k e "  and th e  laws o f  supply  and 
demand a re  u n p a t r i o t i c .  Bamford i s  w r i t i n g  in  and o f  e a r l y  V i c t o r i a n  
t im es  h e r e ,  and he i n s i s t s  t h a t  in  h i s  f a t h e r ' s  and g r a n d f a t h e r ' s  
t im e ,  under  m e r c a n t i l i s m ,  t h i n g s  were more p a t r i o t i c  and more in 
accord  with  " J e s u s  C h r i s t ' s  r u l e " .  E conom y,re l ig ion  and p a t r i o t i s m
The Cap o f  L i b e r t y ,  S e p t . 8, 1819, N o . l ,  v i i ,  x ,  14, 29; No.6, 
94, 96; No .15, Dec. 15, 1819, 237-9;  N o .16, 242; The Radical  
Reformer,  No.8, V o l-1 ,  62-3;  No.9, V o l . l ,  69,  74.
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were all linked together. Bamford also reminds us of the tie up 
between herbalism, magic and patriotism in his portrait of Dr.
Healey whom he describes as a reformer, a cunning man and "a self­
devoting patriot". A friend called Bill is "a specimen of dogged
72straight-forward John Bullishness ... as ever left England".
The shape and colour of English patriotism was in the character
of the English people, then. It was also in their material life.
While on the run from the authorities, Bamford describes his feeling
for his home in which are’treasures'. That is, his wife, child,
possessions and religious sentiment which "have made into a palace
'the lowest shed that ever rose on England's plain'". A fair bit
of his furniture is made from oak and "above the fire-place is
hung a rusty basket hilted sword" symbol of defence of the home and
hearth. Patriotism is also associated with the countryside as well
as the home. After leaving Lincoln gaol, Bamford and his wife took
a "short and very agreeable walk through rural country with pretty
English cottages embowered in gardens and fruit trees". The
association of town with fleas is put against the purity of the
"green lanes" and the "sweet country air". There is also another
association between English natural beauty and God since while there
it was appropriate for Bamford and his wife to "adore the Creator".
Hospitality, one of the factors in creating national sentiment, and
transmitted through the Anglo-Saxon myth, is another element in this
'material' relationship. When calling at a village blacksmith's
house and asking for "a draught of water", they were given "with good
old English hospitality" a "jug of good brown ale" and "pressed to
sit down and partake the family dinner of hot potato pie". So, "be
it ever so humble", quotes Bamford, "there's no place like home",
or, correspondingly, England. For even in greeting, when "the weaver
and the collier would reciprocate their good wishes", this was better,
"more manly, and more in the old English way ... than the vaunted
73French mode of fraternisation."
Yet it would not do to take this expression of national or 
cultural prejudice at its face value. The discussion of prejudice,
Bamford, Early Days, 9-10, 100, 122, 123-4; Bamford, Passages, 
Vol.l, 46-50.
Bamford, Passages, Vol.l, 74-77; Vol.2, 220, 222-3, 226, 
227-28, 230; Bamford, Early Days, 136.
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not only in the literature of sociology, has suffered from too 
much emotional commitment and simple-mindedness. We should at least 
start from Burke and look at the relationship between prejudice and 
experience and tradition. When "the nation was to be invaded by a 
French army from Boulougne, and the whole kingdom was bristling with 
volunteer bayonets", Bamford enlisted. For his efforts he got a 
lecture from his aunt "who said it was the first time a cockade 
had ever been worn by one of their family and that I was in the 
way to perdition". Anti-standing army sentiments, internal patriot­
ism, outweighed any anti-Gallicism. Bamford's own patriotism was 
limited to defensive organisation and tinged with a consciousness 
of the rights of his own class, which was, in a sense, more cultural 
than political. "The hardest workers", he writes, will "always be 
the hardest and best fighters" in defence of England. The workers 
ought to be "cherished" since "they are the strength and defence of 
our country, and of everything within it which is worth defending".
They therefore ought to get "all comfortable requisites - whatever 
other class is stinted". They are "the noblest in God’s High Court" 
and all over the wise world there has never been "such another race 
as that which guards the shores, and labours on the fields and in 
the manufactories of Old England". Not only is "race" used in a pre- 
19th century sense, labour is seen as God's elect. This tends to 
turn patriotism inwards. At the end of the wars with Napoleon, 
the upper classes are shattered while "the artisans and labourers" 
of England, "struggling through adversity, and directed by an 
extraordinary genius, are pealing the shouts of Liberty! LibertylV 
In prison in Lancaster Castle, Bamford composed a poem. Among its 
lines were "still for England's service ready" and words about "cruel 
tyrants" whose persecutions of the working populace would only make 
them more united. This verse, he says proudly, "afterwards became 
of some celebrity among the Lancashire reformers". Significantly, 
service of country is identified as service for reform and liberty. 
Patriotism gets identified with the artisan interest or the interest 
of the people in general. Still using the old rhetoric, Bamford 
exclaims "THE NATION - That is the only party I will serve". The 
monarchy is "the sport of faction"; the aristocracy clutch at "their 
rents"; the clergy lusts after "worldly gain". Only "the land-tillers" 
and "the manufacturers" who are "striving for cheap bread" have any 
public virtue. Ultimately, though, and under threat from overseas 
trade and manufacture, all classes must pull together "as a family".
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Under a Radical programme of cheap government, the aristocracy, 
clergy etc would be reformed rather than abolished. There would 
be a closer relationship between the classes; a return to community, 
a return to our "grandfathers'* simple way of life.^
Bamford was not an isolated figure; on the contrary, he has been
chosen because his language is 'representative'. Also, some of the
points made can be clarified by referring briefly to the writings
of other artisans. Thomas Holcroft, who went to Ireland for a
while found, on occasions, "a shocking depravity of manners among
the Irish". But he also found them "warm and generous". Ultimately,
there is no condemnation of the Irish as a nation or race in the 19th
century sense since their lack of moral rectitude is put down to
"the laws". It is "the legislature which forms the manners of the
nation". Similar things are said by Thomas Carter. He tells of
his friendship with an Irish tailor, "a member of the Roman Catholic
Church". There are many Catholics among his shop-mates and he found
them "far better men" than "the avowed sceptics", atheists and
"nominal Protestants". Early in 1814 when some Italian tailors,
prisoners of war, arrive at the shop they are "far from being good
tailors" but "were not lazy men". They sang a lot, and relations
with the other tailors were good. When England was at war with other
nations, opinion was split; there was no blanket chauvinism or
jingoism. On the question of Napoleon, "occasionally a debate would
ensue between sturdy John Bullites and those who were dazzled by
the exploits of the French Emperor". War with America produced a
similar division. "My fellow workmen", Carter says, "took their
respective sides according to the tenor of their political opinions".
Some supported the Americans; others "felt concerned for the honour
and well-being of their countrymen". But nearly all seemed to regret 
75the war itself.
Samuel Bamford's apotheosis of the people and of the working 
classes in particular has suggested the language of patriotism was 
coloured or fired with millenial feeling. We are Britons, John Gale
Bamford, Early Days, 175-6; Bamford, Passages, Vol.l, 5-6; 
Vol.2, 10, 236, 239-40.
Holcroft, Memoirs, 200; Carter, Memoirs, 155-6, 170, 172-3, 
182.
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Jones declared, "and liberty is our birthright". To regain it, he
said, "men may perish" but "the holy blood of Patriotism, streaming
from the severing axe shall carry with it the seeds of Liberty".
The human rights Jones first spoke of got transformed into English
rights. William Sharp, while acknowledging divine knowledge would
spread across the whole world, found "the English nation will be
first redeemed". Even Thomas Spence embraced "with Christian zeal,
whate'er is friendly to my race". Ironically, given the general drift
of interpretation on his writings, perhaps no one better illustrates
Pocock's comment regarding "Milton's much-quoted but quite un-John
Bullish remark that God revealed himself ... 'first to his Englishmen'".
But, unlike Spence, many gentry and artisans thought their "radical and
chiliastic reformation must be endorsed and legitimised by the ancient
liberties of England". Or, as Christopher Hill has put it, "the
patriotic theory of the Norman Yoke reinforced ... the Puritan sense
of destiny". But it cannot be agreed it did this "upon a civil
account", neither can it be agreed with Pocock that somehow patriotism
was especially secular or Machiavellian. The political language of
76people like Bamford and Sharp would deny this.
Which brings me to the question of how patriotism fits in with 
culture and nature, with experience, custom and history on the one hand 
and natural law on the other; with Machiavelli, with Burke or with 
Locke. Typically, Lord Sempill calls himself "a citizen of the world" 
but then goes on to talk about his rights "as a Briton". Or, as the 
plebeian Black Dwarf said, "slavery characterises the Asiatics". But 
if England or the English were part of the pattern of millenarian 
eschatology, it was not so much because they were English, not that 
is because of any biological peculiarity, but rather because "the 
uniqueness of England ... could ... be defined in terms of its antiquity 
as a community of custom". Not only were the aristocracy a French ruling 
class, they were also a Norman ruling class. The English were the chosen 
people because of their laws and customs. Through custom, rather than 
race, they had inherited Gothic freedoms. Just as "Gothic energy and
John Gale Jones in Jephson, Platform, Vol.l, 242-3; William Sharp, 
footnote to Joanna Southcott's, The Divine and Spiritual 
Communications ... (London, 1809), 28; Spence, Giant-Killer,
No.2, 16; Pocock, Moment, 337, 344; Hill, "Norman Yoke", 74.
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p u r i t y ” had tr iumphed  over "Roman t o r p o r  and d e p r a v i t y " ,  so p o p u la r
energy  and p u r i t y  would win a g a i n s t  a r i s t o c r a t i c  t o r p o r  and
d e p r a v i t y ,  though t h e r e  was no s u g g e s t io n  o f  any g e n e t i c  i n h e r i t a n c e .
Bes ides  th e  idea  o f  custom, some s o r t  o f  " n e o - H a r r in g to n i a n "  n o t i o n s
a l s o  c o lo u re d  th e  concep t ion  o f  p a t r i o t i s m .  P a t r i o t i s m  was a te rm
"which had c a r r i e d  'Country* and 'commonwealth'  c o n n o t a t i o n s  s in c e
t h e  s e v e n te e n th  c e n t u r y " .  Again,  though ,  t h e r e  i s  a c o n c r e t e  r e a l i t y
beh ind  th e  p o l i t i c a l  id e a .  There i s  an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  between th e
s i m p l i c i t y  and " rugged v i r t u e "  o f  p r o v i n c i a l  o r  co u n t ry  l i f e  and
p a t r i o t i s m ,  symboli shed by the  E ng l i sh  b u l ld o g  which o f t e n  " t a k e s
upon i t s e l f  a r u s t i c  f l a v o u r " .  At t h e  same t i m e ,  th e  p r e c e p t
o f  defence  a t  t h e  co re o f  p a t r i o t i s m  was based  on n a t u r a l  law o r ,  as
Sancho Panza pu t  t h e  m a t t e r ,  " a l l  laws,  whe ther  o f  God o r  man, a l low
one t o  s t a n d  in  h i s  own de fence" .  Here,  o f  c o u r s e ,  n a t u r a l  law and
human law a re  seen as one,  and what Thompson and o t h e r s  have te nded
t o  d i s c o u n t  i s  t h a t  in  18th c en tu ry  p o l i t i c a l  r h e t o r i c  t h e  p h ra s e
" t r u e  b red"  i s  j u s t  as  l i k e l y  to  accompany t h e  word "Engli shman"  as
77th e  p h ra s e  " f r e e  b o rn " .
Enough has  been w r i t t e n  to  show th e  co n c e p t s  l i s t e d  a t  t h e  s t a r t  
o f  t h e  c h a p t e r  form some s o r t  o f  u n i t y  o r  parad igm.  N a tu ra l  law, 
custom, v i r t u e  and so on i f  to  some e x t e n t  p a r a d i g m a t i c a l l y  d i s t i n c t  
can a l s o  be c o l l a p s e d  in t o  each o t h e r .  Each concep t  e n t a i l s  o t h e r s .  
P a t r i o t i s m  e n t a i l s  s i m p l i c i t y ,  s i m p l i c i t y  e n t a i l s  i d e a s  about  n a t u r a l  
law, n a t u r a l  law g e t s  i d e n t i f i e d  with  custom; and so can v i r t u e  and 
custom and so on and so on,  in a s o r t  o f  ch a in  o r  c i r c u l a r  form o f  
r e a s o n in g  t h a t  makes up a whole o r  ' t o t a l i t y ' .  Th is  t o t a l i t y  o f  
i d e a s ,  o r  m e n t a l i t y ,  i s  bu t  a r e f l e c t i o n  o r  p r o j e c t i o n  o r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
o f  a more c o n c r e t e  s o c i a l  r e a l i t y .  U nder ly ing  d i s c u s s i o n  o r  use o f  the  
conce p ts  o r  id e a s  i s  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  c u l t u r e  o r  n a t u r e  and th e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h i s  d i a l e c t i c  e x e r c i s e s  some k ind  o f  d e t e rm in in g  o r  o r g a n i s i n g  
in f l u e n c e  i s ,  u l t i m a t e l y ,  a s ign  o f  a l e v e l  o f  s o c i a l  and economic 
development.  I t  i s  a s ign  the  s o c i e t y  under  a n a l y s i s  i s  s t i l l  t o  some 
e x t e n t  under  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  n a t u r e  and i t s  dominant  modes o f  though t  a re  
t h e r e f o r e  no t  e n t i r e l y  s e c u l a r  or  r a t i o n a l i s e d .
S e m p i l l ,  A d d res s , 46; Pocock,  Moment, 345; K l i g e r ,  G o ths , 3; 
A th e r to n ,  P r i n t s ,  117; C e rv an te s ,  Q u i x o t e , V o l . I I ,  49.
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Constitution or Polity
But there is another source of paradigm unity that can almost 
be called the symbol of the spirit of the age; the notion of the 
constitution; the word constitution is also virtually interchangeable 
with the words "polity" and "commonwealth". But their conceptual 
resonance, as it were, has not been properly investigated. This 
has had certain repercussions in the critical or historiographical 
literature. The 'gap' or omission is either the consequence or 
cause of adopting the critical rather than the sympathetic approach.
For example, George Sabine is critical of Burke for not drawing 
"a clear line" between "society at large and the state". Burke is 
guilty of "a serious confusion of words", since "society, the state, 
and government have certainly very different meanings". Because of 
the failure to make such distinctions, he tended to idealize the 
state "by making it the bearer of all that has the highest value for 
civilisation". The key as to why Burke thought and wrote in this 
apparently indiscriminate way is brought out in another criticism, 
a common one made of Radical ideology in general. The Radicals, 
we are told, thought reform "lies through politics" and consequently 
their idea lacked any theory of social cause regarding the structure 
and ills of society. The same sort of thing is implied by Bernard 
Bailyn. Since they were not 19th or 20th century Radicals, he 
writes, the agitators of Georgian times advocated political "not 
social and economic reforms". They hoped to eliminate corruption 
through politics and not "recast the social order". And according 
to Gordon Wood, Burke’s misconceptions must have been general since 
"eighteenth century Englishmen had not yet made any clear distinction 
between state and society". The "only meaningful kind of power" in 
most of the thinking of the time "was political"; it was not based on 
class but political divisions within the state. John Osborne, like 
many others,sees this emphasis on politics as a definite short-coming. 
At the same time "the general anti-state attitudes of the radicals" 
are usually remarked upon and like their liberal utilitarian 
successors they are lumbered with advocating "minimal government" 
and not wanting to capture state power but "turning their backs on 
it". If, as Emmanuel Wallerstein would have it, there was after the 
16th century a "discontinuity between economic and political 
institutions", then constitutionalism or seeing the world as politics,
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78was truly, as Thompson has remarked, Mthe illusion of the epoch".
There is some truth in all this. Looked at from one angle, 
the 18th century did lack a properly constituted social theory; 
they lacked a social explanation of politics. Constitutionalism 
was certainly the major form of political rhetoric and consequently 
often used as black propaganda and sometimes as pure cant. Whether 
by conservatives or radicals, the appeal to the constitution also 
took the form of illusion in so far as it was meant to refer to a 
state of affairs either in the past or the present. All sides 
appropriated it and each gave the word their own particular meaning, 
attaching a degree of ambiguity to the idea of the constitution so 
as to make it almost meaningless. Lord Braxfield, the Scottish Trials 
judge, asserted "the British Constitution is the best that ever was 
since the creation of the world, and it is not possible to make it 
better". Many of the "Scottish Martyrs" whom he sentenced would have 
agreed, although their interpretation of what the constitution amounted 
to would have been diametrically opposed to his. Something close to 
what Braxfield meant came out at Bamford's trial when reference was 
made to "the law and the constitution as they were now administered". 
Each party accused the other of "advocating departures from the 
traditional and mixed constitution". Just as there was a false and 
genuine patriotism, so there was a true and false constitution.
As Joseph Gerrald, the Scottish Martyr declared, "the word 
constitution, constitutionL is rung in our ears ... is the talisman 
which the enemies of reform wield over the heads of the credulous 
and simple". Yet the manner of existence of "placemen and pensioners" 
is "one uniform violation of its principles", and to hear them 
"talking of a constitution" is "like a monk preaching population".
Even the old Anglo-Saxon constitution, usually seen as a Radical 
trope, could be given a conservative twist. In a play of 17th century
78 Sabine, History, 615-16; P.A. Brown, Revolution, 204ff; Immanuel 
Wallerstein, "Three Paths to National Development" in Studies in 
Comparative International Development, Vol.2, No.2, 1972, 95; 
Bailyn, Origins, 283; Wood, Republic, 22; Osborne, Cartwright, 
passim; I. Prothero, "William Benbow and the Concept of the 
'General Strike'" in Past and Present, 63, May, 1974, 132-71.
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origins, but performed in Newcastle in the 18th century, the Anglo-
Saxons are originators of "restricted rather than popular government"
and Alfred is depicted as the founder "of the civil power of a
79limited oligarchy".
The notion of the constitution is synonymous with ideas about
the commonwealth and polity. Originally, commonwealth referred to
"the public welfare or general good" and later came to mean "the
body politic or state, especially viewed as a body in which the whole
people had a voice or interest"; it also designated a republic. To
start off with, then, politics, and the idea of the state in particular,
subsumed the social. Like the idea of the commonwealth, the notion
or concept of the constitution also subsumed the economic and moral
and perhaps, in one sense, the religious order. According to Lord
Bryce, "the aggregate of laws and customs through and under which
the public life of a State goes on may be fitly called its
constitution". This, perhaps, was the 'truth' or reality in the
Saxon myth, that, as Wallerstein has written, "the roots of England's
state machinery are in part to be found in the legal homogeneity
deriving from the Norman Conquest". Yet the constitution was more
than law and custom. For Bolingbroke, the constitution was not only
an "assemblage of laws ... and customs" but included "institutions"
all of which accorded with "certain fixed principles" or natural law.
Bolingbroke's use of the term institutions gives out a hint that the
meaning of the constitution or polity could be extended to include all
social relationships including economic and, as Samuel Bamford makes
clear, 'personal' ones, too. The connection between moral or personal
health, political health and economic health has been mentioned a lot
during the course of the thesis. "An old Whig" attributed England's
"unexampled prosperity" to "the singular formation of its constitution".
According to Cartwright its "foundation is FREEDOM; its fruits the
80delicious fruits of liberty".
79 Gerrald cited in Thompson, Working Class, 140; Roger Howell, 
"King Alfred and the Proletariat: A Case of the Saxon Yoke" 
in Archaeologia Aeliana, 4th series, 1969, 97-100.
80 Antonia Fraser, Cromwell, (London, 1975), 301; Viscount 
Bolingbroke, Dissertation on Parties in Works,(1809 edn.) iii, 
157; Kramnick, Bolingbroke, 161; Cartwright, Aegis, 4.
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So t h a t  i f  t h e r e  i s  a weakness in  18th c e n t u ry  ideo logy  i t  would 
seem n o t  so much t h a t  i t  c o n t a i n s  no sense o f  t h e  s o c i a l ,  f o r  i t  does 
mere ly  in  a d i f f e r e n t  form, bu t  r a t h e r  because  o f  th e  manner in  which 
i t  d e s c r i b e s  s o c i a l  change.  In o t h e r  words,  i t  i s  seemingly 
' m e n t a l i s t i c '  o r  ' i d e a l i s t * .  I f  everybody b e l i e v e s  in  freedom, 
m i l l e n i a l - l i k e ,  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  w i l l  come a b o u t .  So, th e  importance  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  knowledge and e d u c a t io n  as a g e n t s  o f  s o c i a l  change.  
Under ly ing  t h i s  view t h e r e  i s  th e  m y th o lo g ic a l  concept  o f  g n o s i s  o r  
r e v e l a t i o n ,  y e t  t h e r e  were a l s o  ' m a t e r i a l '  e lements  invo lved  in 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t  e x p l a n a t i o n ;  namely th e  m i l i t i a ,  th e  p a t t e r n  o f  
l a n d h o ld in g ,  s o c i a l  c l a s s ,  t o  say n o th in g  o f  t r a d e ,  consumption and 
o t h e r  f a c t o r s .  The c o g n i t i v e  i d e a l i s m  may be r e l a t e d  t o  th e  
no rm at ive  i d e a l i s m  found in  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t  la nguage .  The 
c o n s t i t u t i o n  was something t h a t  d id  e x i s t ,  bu t  was h idde n ,  i t  was 
a l s o  something t h a t  had e x i s t e d  and ought  to  e x i s t  a g a i n .  W r i t ing  
in  1817, The Black Dwarf d i s t i n g u i s h e d  between th e  " c o n s t i t u t i o n  and 
government" .  The c o n s t i t u t i o n  i t  d e f in e d  as " th e  assemblage o f  laws,  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  and cus toms,  d e r iv e d  from c e r t a i n  f i x ' d  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
r e a s o n "  a d e f i n i t i o n  t h a t  seems to  have been ta k e n  word f o r  word from 
B o l ingbroke .  The c o n s t i t u t i o n  " i s  th e  r u l e  by which our  p r i n c e s  
ought t o  govern  a t  a l l  t im e s "  whereas government i s  how " th e y  a c t u a l l y  
do govern" .  The c o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  a l s o  an " i n h e r i t a n c e "  d e r iv e d  "from 
r i g h t  and t h e  law s" .  Under th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  " th e  peop le  a re  th e  
f o u n t a i n  o f  power" and "eve ry  B r i t o n "  has  "a nob le  and w e l l -b a l a n c e d  
C o n s t i t u t i o n "  t h e  g i f t  o f  " A l f r e d ' s  f r e e b o r n  r a c e "  and born o f  
" v i r t u o u s  L i b e r t y " .  E s s e n t i a l  to  l i b e r t y  was t h e  c o n c re te  f o r c e  o f  
th e  m i l i t i a ;  C a r t w r ig h t  c a l l e d  t h e  E n g l i s h  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a system o f  
" c i v i l  and m i l i t a r y  p o l i t y " .  The m i l i t i a  g u a ran t eed  l i b e r t y  and 
p r o s p e r i t y .  "When t h e  n a t i o n a l  m i l i t i a  was in  vogue" ,  Lord Hawkesbury 
s a i d ,  commerce has  always f l o u r i s h e d .  Trade i s  always buoyant  when 
t h e r e  i s  "a  c e r t a i n  degree  o f  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  in  a n a t i o n "  s in ce  
"commerce lo v e s  s e c u r i t y " .  Commerce and t r a d e  a r e  connec ted  with  
p o l i t i c s ,  w i th  t h e  p o l i t i c o - m o r a l  h e a l t h  o f  s o c i e t y  because  "no 
merchant  w i l l  w i th  ze a l  and p l e a s u r e  app ly  h i m s e l f  to  t r a d e ,  u n l e s s  
he has  a good o p in i o n  o f  t h e  wisdom and conduct  o f  t h e  s t a t e "  and 
u n l e s s  t h e  s t a t e  i s  s e t  upon s o l i d  fo u n d a t io n s  o r  p r i n c i p l e s  and u n le s s  
t h e r e  a r e  "good laws to  p r o t e c t  him from domest ic  o p p r e s s io n s "  and "a 
w e l l - c o n s t i t u t e d  f o r c e  t o  p r o t e c t  him from f o r e i g n  i n v a s i o n s " .  The 
more p l e b e i a n  Black Dwarf a l s o  a rgued  t h a t  " l i b e r t y " ,  a good c o n s t i t u t i o n
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t h a t  i s ,  " i s  th e  p a r e n t  o f  commerce". I t  i s  wor th n o t i c i n g  t h a t  two 
o f  the  more c o n c r e t e  concep ts  in  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t  paradigm 
d e r iv e  d i r e c t l y  from h i s t o r i c a l  developments  in  th e  E n g l i s h  s o c i a l  
s t r u c t u r e .  I f  no t  t h e  m i l i t i a ,  t h e n  t h e  s t a n d i n g  army was a p o s t -  
M a c h ia v e l l i a n  and p o s t - H a r r i n g t o n i a n  e n t i t y  and,  as  Pocock p u t s  i t ,  
something "known as  Trade e n t e r e d  t h e  language  o f  p o l i t i c s " .  Whatever 
c o n t i n u i t i e s  in  form, th e  E n g l i s h  c o n t e x t  added an im por tan t  dimension
4 - *  4 .  81to  c o n t e n t .
Also ,  o f  no t  l e a s t  impor tance  in  t h e  E n g l i s h  c o n t e x t  i s  th e  way 
in which ’M a c h i a v e l l i a n ’ o r  " L o c k e i a n ’ parad igms i n t e r r e l a t e d  with  
a r t i s a n  c o n s c io u s n e s s .  As a p r a c t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  Trade m a n i f e s t e d  
i t s e l f  t o  a r t i s a n s  as problems w i th  t h e  t r a d e  o f t e n  coupled  wi th  
th e  d e a rn e s s  o f  p r o v i s i o n s .  The more p l e b e i a n  R a d i c a l s ,  and th e  
founding  o f  t h e  London Corresponding  S o c i e t y  i s  a t y p i c a l  example,  
s t a r t e d  ou t  from a c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e i r  economic s i t u a t i o n . They sought 
i t s  cause which th e y  saw, a t  l e a s t  in  t h e  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e ,  as  p o l i t i c a l .
In t h e i r  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n  in  r e l a t i o n  to  p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  th e y  an a ly se d  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  in  t h e  economic s t r u c t u r e  
or  economy as  a whole.  They a n a l y s e d ,  and i t  i s  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  t h a t  
M a c h ia v e l l i a n ,  Lockeian o r  whatever  n o t i o n s  a r e  s t r o n g e s t ,  how t h e i r  
s i t u a t i o n  was de te rm ined  by t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  power.  E s p e c i a l l y ,  
they  saw how p o l i t i c a l  power was e x e r c i s e d  th rough  law. The law was 
enac ted  by landowners s i t t i n g  in  p a r l i a m e n t .  As Thomas Evans s a i d ,  
no t  only  " th e  expenses  o f  government" b o re  down h e a v i l y  on th e  poo r ,  
bu t  a l s o  " l a n d  monopoly" which was " c o n t r a r y  t o  . . .  C h r i s t i a n i t y  and 
d e s t r u c t i v e  o f  independence" .  C la s s  a n a l y s i s  was, t h e n ,  p r e s e n t e d  as 
an agent  o f  s o c i a l  cause bu t  was subsumed by t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s in c e  
ownership o f  land  gave p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  The 
weapon o f  c l a s s  a n a l y s i s  was a l s o  b l u n t e d  by t h e  b a s i c  mora li sm o f  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m ,  by a l i n g e r i n g  sense  o f  community,  a community which 
had been l o s t  bu t  t o  which t h e r e  must be a " r e t u r n " .  The a r i s t o c r a c y  
and g e n t ry  had t h e i r  p l a c e  in  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n ;  t h e y  were p a r t  o f  i t s
O 1
The Black Dwarf , No.35, S e p t . 24,  1817,  589; No.49,  Dec. 31,  1817, 
813; No.48,  Dec .24, 1817, 790-5;  C a r t w r i g h t ,  A e g i s , 4; C h a r l e s ,  
Lord Hawkesbury, C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Maxims E x t r a c t e d  from a D iscourse  
on th e  E s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  a N a t io n a l  and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  F o r c e , 
(London, 1757, r e p r i n t e d  by t h e  London Correspond ing  S o c i e ty ,  
1794),  6 -7 ;  Pocock,  Moment, 413,  425.
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e t e r n a l  b a la n c e .  Samuel Bamford r e c o u n t s  how in  th e  p a s t  "gentlem en 
were gentlem en indeed"  and " i f  th e y  l i v e d  sum ptuously , t h e i r  w aste 
was s c a t t e r e d  a t  home - on th e  spo t from whence i t  was d e r iv e d "  so 
t h a t  " th o s e  who t o i l e d  produced  much b e n e f i t  from i t " .  There was 
a s o r t  o f  p a t r i o t i s m  about t h e i r  consum ption s in c e  i t  d id  n o t  go ou t 
o f  th e  c o u n t ry ;  t h e r e  was a l s o  a s o r t  o f  community about t h e i r  p e r s o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s  w ith  th e  lower o rd e r s  s in c e  in  p a s t  t im e s  " th e  gentlem an 
t r a n s a c t e d  h i s  own b u s in e s s "  and "met h i s  fa rm er  o r  h i s  la b o u re r  
face  to  f a c e " . ^ 2
Of c o u rs e ,  as  th e  p re c e d in g  p a ra g ra p h s  have i n d i c a t e d ,  th e  key 
to  a r i s t o c r a t i c  power and th e  c e n t r a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  th e  p o l i t y  
o r  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  was th e  s t a t e .  Far from tu r n i n g  t h e i r  backs on 
th e  s t a t e ,  th e  R a d ic a ls  saw a re fo rm ed  s t a t e  as  v i t a l  t o  a more 
genera l r e fo rm a t io n  o f  manners and e v e ry th in g  e l s e .  I t  was an e v e r ­
p re s e n t  r e a l i t y  and th e  cause o f  a r t i s a n  d i s t r e s s .  A f te r  th e  1688 
R ev o lu tio n ,
There took  p la c e  a g r e a t  re fo rm  o f  government 
f in a n c e  which r e s u l t e d  in  th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  th e  
n a t i o n a l  d e b t .  The d e b t ,  p r i n c i p a l l y  s e rv ic e d  
by th e  revenues  from th e  Land Tax, t r a n s f e r r e d  
a growing p r o p o r t io n  o f  th e  s u rp lu s  p roduced  in  
a g r i c u l t u r e  out o f  th e  hands o f  th e  landow ners 
and p la c e d  i t  in  th e  p o c k e ts  o f  s to c k jo b b e r s  
and s p e c u la to r s ,  government f u n c t i o n a r i e s ,  
m i l i t a r y  men and placem en.
The sm all landow ners , as  m entioned b e f o r e ,  were h i t  h a r d e s t  w hile  
some o f  th e  la rg e  landowners b e n e f i t e d  from th e  new system , and " th e  
army and navy grew apace and th e  b u re a u c ra c y  expanded". In to  th e  
19th c e n tu ry  Southey com plained t h a t  th e  sum p a id  in t o  t a x a t i o n  " i s  
beyond what any o th e r  peop le  p a id  to  th e  s t a t e " .  S t a t e  e x p e n d i tu r e ,  
he went on, " i s  a lm ost i n c r e d i b l e  - f o r  th e  l a s t  y e a r s  o f  th e  war 
i t  exceeded a m i l l i o n  o f  E n g l ish  money p e r  week". Put a n o th e r  way, 
by 1722 th e  n a t i o n a l  debt has  been c a l c u l a t e d  a t  ^53 m i l l i o n ,  " r a t h e r  
more th a n  th e  g ro s s  n a t io n a l  p r o d u c t" ,  w h ile  "by 1750 i t  had r i s e n
Evans in  O live  Rudkin, Thomas Spence and His C o n n e c t io n s , (New 
York, 1927), 145; Bamford, E a r ly  Days, 19-20 .
O 7
N eale ,  W ea lth , 9 -10 .
Southey , L e t t e r s ,  376. See a l s o  th e  t a x a t i o n  f i g u r e s  in  Thomas P a in e ’s 
R ig h ts  o f  Man, (Everyman e d n .)  ( f o o tn o te  93, p309) f o r  some of 
P a in e 's  s t r o n g e s t  s ta te m e n ts  in  th e  G oth ic  mode o r  moment.
84 .
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to nearly £79 million". All this the Gothicist Radicals viewed, 
as they did personal and bodily corruption, through the lens or 
language of "excess", as an imbalance between nature and culture.
What they looked for was a restructuring of tax and consumption 
by the state. These two ideas are at the centre of their 'problematic', 
of their "moral economy", and they show what has been gathered for 
analysis is a mentality that can be specifically characterised as 
mercantilist. This chapter has aimed at specifying the deeper 
meaning of "moral economy", at showing the 'philosophic' assumptions 
behind the call for a "just price" and so on. Mercantilism is a 
structure in its own right.
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CONCLUSION
The thesis shows up the tension between an interest in method 
and science and an interest in historical particulars. I have tried 
to apply a method but at the same time I have maintained an interest 
in the individuality, the individual expression of an artisan or 
"honorary radical jack". At the same time I have looked for the 
common features in the beliefs of a number of persons. I have tried 
to explain the Norman Yoke or the myth of the Anglo-Saxon constitution 
in terms of the broad historical movement of rationalisation and 
through social science concepts of myth, ideology millenarianism and 
so forth and I have attempted to place it within its historical, 
intellectual and social context. The method can loosely be called 
'structuralist', the common features are summed up in the last 
chapter which describes the main aspects of the gothic or constitution­
alist paradigm, and the historical and social context is mercantilist. 
Power is also not left out since, with varying degrees of success I 
have pursued the question of hegemony as part of my analysis of 
individual artisan writers. But perhaps I ought to say again that 
the emphasis has been on knowledge rather than politics, and in this 
is the 'novelty' of my approach. Each representative figure or organic 
intellectual has been examined by looking at how they perceive the 
world and how that knowledge or perception is structured, including 
knowledge of the political world, rather than how they participated 
in a particular political event or situation or what political interest 
they represented. This approach is rooted in political philosophy or 
the history of political thought and social science generally, although 
I am by no means arguing for the exclusion of narrative type history.
In the light of the questions and aims raised in the 
introduction, this approach has, I hope, shown three things. First, 
it has offered an alternative understanding of particular i^riters 
or Radical figures. Second, the use of the paradigm method and 
certain social science concepts such as myth and general notion of 
a structure has revealed a 'surface' language involving the use of 
ideas or concepts such as natural law, virtue, custom, the militia, 
patriot king and so on. The methodology has also been used to 
point out that this political language rests on a Christian religious 
substructure in which deism, millenarianism, providence, are crucial 
concepts. Digging down further, there is another layer or 'deeper
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structure' or a sub-language of myth involving the concepts of 
culture and nature, purity and pollution, excess, origins and so on, 
which is common to all societies where agrarian rhythms of life 
remain in the ascendancy. And the third thing of note or conclusion 
is that the notion of a structure has shown how seemingly disparate 
ideas are interconnected or analogous through association. For 
example, that ideas such as virtue, natural law and custom, though 
usually seen as part of different political traditions can in fact 
be related through seeing them as part of a structured ideology.
Also, for example, that corruption in the state by analogy or 
association can be related to bodily corruption.
Keeping with the questions and aims raised in the introduction, 
the case studies have shown, I hope, that Anglo-Saxon gothic assumptions 
were more widespread and played a more significant part in Radical 
artisan mentality than was previously thought; that these ideas are 
not irrational. John Cartwright, whose ideas have often been 
interpreted as Enlightened (Rationalist) or irrational (Gothic) 
is, perhaps the most notable example of this. His 'representativeness' 
has been confirmed, and his ideas are best made sense of by seeing 
him not as a figure of the Enlightenment (natural law) or as a 
figure of reaction (virtue) but as someone who includes both these 
'positions' in his ideas and who is also not adverse to eating some 
slices from the cake of custom. This 'surface' trilogy is to some 
extent common to all the other representatives or organic intellectuals. 
The particular 'balance' varies from author to author. Thomas Bewick, 
who is now seen as much more than an engraver and less an ideological 
pupil of Marat, organises his statements mainly around custom and 
independence, but his ideas are only fully intelligible by taking 
into account what he has to say about virtue and natural laws as well. 
William Cobbett's History of the Protestant Reformation is no longer 
to be seen purely as a piece of gothic literature in the medieval sense, 
but as gothic in the Anglo-Saxon meaning. Yet regardless of whether 
the Catholic church or King Alfred's constitution is the dominant 
trope, Cobbett uses the vocabulary of custom and virtue to support 
the people's natural rights. In a similar manner, Sir William 
Jones ideas are neither subject to an exclusively "Lockeian influence" 
nor is he solely a follower of Burke.' His labour theory of value,
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such as it is, has also more to do with political rights than later 
socialist conceptions. It is concerned with rewarding labour on the 
grounds of labour's virtue conceived in terms of property and 'self' 
and a natural but lost right to land.
These concepts and views can be found to a greater or lesser 
extent in the more plebeian radicals. John Baxter, Thomas Evans, 
Thomas Spence and Gravenor Henson are all now seen as at best 
'constitutionalist' revolutionaries, all speaking a language of 
virtue, custom and natural law and all 'mercantilists' in terms of 
their political economy. The focus of that political economy is 
consumption, land, tax, trade and commerce; a 'pre-socialist' 
and perhaps pre-capitalist type of economy containing strong 
natural elements. At one level these political and economic ideas 
are the pieces of the paradigm common to all writers, a paradigm 
whose existence was given support by fairly copious illustrations 
of other writers in chapter four.
Nearly all the writers mentioned, including in an odd way 
Spence, used this political and economic language to grapple with 
a contemporary situation. They assumed that the 18th century 
constitution was descended from Anglo-Saxon origins, the latter 
being the genuine or natural constitution overlaid with centuries 
of corruption or culture. In order to describe this system of 
corruption or, "the political state and condition of England", the 
myth of the Anglo-Saxon constitution uses words like virtue, 
custom and natural law. But it has been argued that the paradigm 
has a wider scope or greater depth than this. Each of the 
representative figures has a religious background. All are 
Protestants, all are influenced to a greater or lesser degree 
by millenialist ideas, all seem to take over deist assumptions and 
all believe in providence. The Christian substructure, then, 
referred to above, seems to be another part of a shared paradigm.
Yet there still remains the question of why all these writers 
(and others) were influenced by the Anglo-Saxon myth. Why did they 
reach back so far? In what sense is the myth of the Anglo-Saxon 
constitution a myth? A close reading of the texts revealed, again 
to a greater or lesser extent, a sort of mythical sub-text, or 
again Foucault's "what was being said in what was said". More fully 
than above, this mythical sub-language is a series of concepts and
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oppositions including purity and impurity, origins, excess, darkness 
and light, types or heroes and villains, passion and reason and nature 
and culture and cyclical time. These are precisely the sort of notions 
that social anthropologists and historians of religion, such as 
Eliade, use when they analyse mythological thought among 'primitive' 
or pre-industrial peoples.
That, then, is the third 'level' of the paradigmatic elements 
common to the representative figures. And perhaps to some extent 
my analysis has been no more than a tidying up operation. But 
within the various levels of the 'gothic paradigm' I would claim a 
certain novelty. Myth is often said to reflect the division of 
labour within society. To some extent the dominance of the 
ideal of the amateur is also a reflection of a relatively simple 
division of labour. Consequently, from time to time in the case 
study chapters, and more extensively in the paradigm chapter, I have 
extended Barrington Moore's association of 'amateurism' with gentry 
and aristocratic mental culture to artisan politics and consciousness.
I also claim novelty in my treatment of the concept of simplicity, 
an idea usually overlooked in the analysis of the political ideology 
of the time. Again, the links between simplicity in politics, as 
simple reform, and simplicity as a key concept in Protestant 
religion and in English culture or character have been traced. My 
treatment of virtue and patriotism is, perhaps, less original.
But against Pocock, a writer who commands my greatest intellectual 
respect, I have emphasised the religious aspect of virtue and its 
connection in one direction with politics, and in another with 
private or social behaviour. Another, probably more controversial, 
piece of reassessment is the way I see the role of the state in 
Radical thought. The attacks on the cost and power of government 
are not so much liberal arguments about a smaller amount of 
government, but artisan arguments about decentralised government 
and about the distribution of taxation. Consequently, they are also 
mercantilist arguments about 'amateur' government and a paternalist 
social welfare state. But they are also moral assertions about 
virtuous and unpolluted government.
What the analysis of concepts such as simplicity and virtue 
has suggested, then, is that although there is a struggle going on 
over ways of perceiving a particular term or concept, that although
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hegemony is involved, there is also, to some extent, a shared culture 
or mentality. The more structuralist explanations of myth have 
stressed that oppositions in thought, such as purity and pollution 
or culture and nature, must be seen as part of a single mode of 
cognition or level of mentality. They are 'surface' contradictions 
or oppositions. Without too much difficulty, the 18th century 
opposition between natural law (nature) and custom (culture) 
can be seen in this light. But the analysis can also be extended. 
What I hope has been shown is that this sort of understanding can 
be fruitfully applied to more complex configurations of ideas.
From this angle, the oppositions between Country and Court strands 
of 18th century ideology are also surface or political oppositions. 
And, to bring in another structuralist device, they are not 
fundamental breaks in the 'epistemologies' of popular ideas; they 
do not belong to different types or modes of social perceptions 
or theories, or mentality. So, for example, Paine's ahistorical 
natural rights arguments are not necessarily more 'progressive' 
or radical in terms of knowledge and in the sense of belonging to a 
future tense of political perception than artisan statements about 
mythical customary rights. Similarly, in some ways the Radical 
artisan mind has at least as much, if not more, in common with Burke 
than Tom Paine.
Lastly, the structuralist-anthropological-paradigra mode of 
analysis has revealed, or characterised, the extent to which 18th 
century mercantilist society was a natural a 'pre-industrial' 
society since Country/Court, custom/natural law oppositions also rest 
on the mythological structures designated by culture/nature purity/ 
pollution and so on. The availability of 18th century version of 
the myth of the Anglo-Saxon constitution to this sort of analytical 
approach suggests that a large part of 18th century mentality and 
society can be seen in this 'primitive' or 'pre-industrial' or pre- 
Rationalist light. It is a society more mercantilist than modern 
capitalist, a society still in some sense a natural society, or a 
culture still relatively close to nature.
— ooOOoo—
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APPENDIX A
JOHN CARTWRIGHT’S TRIDENT
First, it is necessary to deal with the question of eccentricity 
again, to show The Trident was a rational product of Cartwright’s time and 
mentality, if not of ours. If it was ’’politically irrelevant”, it was not 
culturally irrelevant. The plan for "a monument of naval celebration” was 
not got up out of his own head but was a general proposal put forward by 
"men in high official situation, and other individual englishmen". It 
seems they took notice of his plans and did not regard him, as Cartwright 
himself feared, "as a vain projector who has lost his wits”. His niece 
reports the plans were considered by the government and by the president 
of the Royal Academy and blames political prejudice for the fact the 
Hieronauticon was not erected. The plans got him elected as an honorary 
member of the Marine Society, and Cartwright claims they met the approval 
of artists as well as Nelson and Southey. From the figures he gives, it is 
likely cost played a part in the government’s rejection although there was 
"a commercial part” to the plans. Even here, though, Cartwright points out 
that the initial cost and upkeep would be considerably less than Blenheim 
palace, another 18th century militaristic ’fantasy' built at public expense. 
He thought the approval of the Duke of Clarence and other personages 
would lead to the plans' execution.*
There are other examples which help to put Cartwright's architectural 
ideas into context. Besides Bentham's Panticon, the Hieronauticon seems 
neither grandiose nor fantastic. From one point of view, Nelson's column 
and the whole of Trafalgar Square is an extravaganza, yet Cartwright claimed 
his temple would not have "that unsupported tottering appearance". A model 
was "Indigo Jones's Tuscan Temple, on the plan of which he built Covent 
Garden". Or, think of the Rotunda, or 18th century follies and grottoes.
Even the incorporation of Anglo-Saxon imagery is not particularly irrational 
if we take for example the 'folly' of Alfred's tower at Stourhead or fellow
*’ Osborne, Cartwright, 70; John Cartwright, The Trident: or the National 
Policy of Naval Celebration ..., (London, 1802), 6, 208; Cartwright, 
Life, Vol.I, 287, 500, 305, 306; Vol.II, 190, 350.
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Radical Thomas Bewick's ideas which ran along parallel lines to Cartwright's. 
Not too far apart were the ideas of Thomas Wood who saw his buildings in 
Bath as a "vision of a Roman and Christian Utopia" promoting "God and Virtue". 
A source of inspiration for Cartwright may have been the classical republican 
ideas about militaristic ritual. Martial sports and ritual, to refer back to
John Brand, would offset "the general spread of luxury and dissipation".
2To Cartwright, this was exactly what the Hiemauticon represented.
This is suggestive, of course, of his classical frame of mind, his 
"Machiavellian Moment". Support for an interpretation along these lines is 
easily found in the text. The principles of the temple or Hieronauticon are 
founded on the "same laws of nature" as the Greeks, as indeed is the idea of 
a public games or Olympics. Britain lacks institutions of this sort "by 
means of which a wise legislature may effect a moral purpose". The Greeks 
possessed political wisdom whereby politics and religion were intermingled. 
"Taking advantage of popular superstition, they wisely engrafted it on their 
political institutions; the foundation of the Olympic games themselves was 
religion". Rousseau and others, the idea of the Noble Lie, immediately 
come to mind here. The common people, if not simple-minded professed 
simplicity of belief and taste. For this reason, cluttered Roman columns 
are rejected. Britons, though, as in the sub-title, are constantly compared 
in their deeds and thoughts to the glories of the Greeks and Romans. Yet 
somehow Britain or Albion transcends these glories. Even the harbour where 
the Hieronauticon is to be situated, Portland, is praised because it is a 
natural harbour "formed by the mighty hand of nature", whereas all Rome had 
was a wet dock or "a pool dug in the suburbs of the city". Although he 
based his ceremonies or rituals on "the practice of the antient Romans" 
Cartwright stated his object was opposite to theirs; he endeavoured to 
display virtue rather than riches.
Undoubtedly there is a classical moment or model in Cartwright's 
thinking but is continually being undermined. If Cartwright respects Greece
Elizabeth Burton, The Georgians at Home, (London, 1967), 368; R.S. Neale, 
The Wealth of Nations or Private Vices, Public Benefits, (The University 
of New England, NSW, 1976), 16; Thomas Bewick, A Memoir of Thomas 
Bewick Written by Himself, (London and Newcastle, 1862), 234-5, 245-7; 
Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 293; John Brand, Observations on Popular 
Antiquities, (London, 1810), iii; see also George Berkeley, An Essay 
Towards Preventing the Ruin of. Great Britain, (London, 1721),204, 206.
3. Cartwright, Trident, 9, 10, 13, 175-6, 197.
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and Rome, his feeling for Alfred the Great and England is that of adulation. 
This work, more than any other, sees the apotheosis of Alfred. The 
"Invocation and Dedication" brings this out clearly. It reads,
Alfred ... Thou, wisest, greatest best of human 
kind;/The king, the sire, the saviour and the 
sage,/Hero and bard of Albion’s grateful land!/
And thou who sittest on Alfred’s throne,/ And 
call'st him Ancestor/...Where Alfred’s sacred 
acorns were sown/...Him, in whose veins the
blood of Alfred flows..4
Among other things, what is noticeable is the association between 
Alfred and the oak and Alfred and political knowledge. The message to 
the reigning monarch is also clear. Descent from Alfred gives the right to 
rule but the legitimacy of that rule also depends on the monarch conducting 
himself as Alfred did and guarding the people's liberties. The model to 
venerate was "Saxon election, Saxon liberty, Saxon happiness, provided for 
and so eminently enjoyed under the institutions of the divine artificer 
Alfred". William the Conqueror had "utterly subverted the Saxon freedom" and 
it was not revived again until "the latter end of the reign of Henry III". 
Liberty and its opposite permeates the totality of culture. Even Norman (and 
Danish) armour gave the impression of "an entire man in an iron mask, 
imprisoned without election, in a shell riveted on him, till he be cramped 
and stiffened into deformity and misery".^
Alfred was a patriot and hero in other senses. Alfred is "the 
founder of that Navy, which now surrounds our country in a blaze of glory". 
This would seem to be part of the answer to Christopher Hill's question as 
to why Alfred replaced Edward the Confessor as the hero of the myth. The 
Hieronauticon was a monument in honour of the navy's founder, Alfred, and 
other naval heroes. But Alfred was the heroic founder of other institutions 
as well. "The Saxon militia" was the work of "god-like Alfred". And, "where 
but from this patriot lawgiver of England shall legislators learn the 
heavenly art of entwining liberty with law, property with power, willing 
obedience with firm authority". Knowledge of the arts and political 
knowledge also lead back to Alfred the Great. As scholar and patron of 
scholars he is found "sending learned persons to Hindoostan ... writing the
Cartwright, Trident, 2-3.4.
5. Cartwright, Trident, 5, 7, 52, 149.
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narration of discoveries”. First and foremost, although all his roles are con­
nected, Alfred is founder of the constitution. He is, then, a founding 
hero in the proper mythological sense and is literally worshipped as 
"immortal ALFRED".6
There are other important connections to notice. A picture 
celebrating military death has in the background "a church ... a small 
portion of the mansion-house of the family, seen through plantations in a 
style of natural beauty, where a grand oak in decay" and other trees are 
shown. Here Alfred and his Anglo-Saxons are associated with intermingled 
sentiments of nature, naval pride and prowess, familial and patriotic 
feeling and the idealisation of the gentry and mercantile classes. The 
association of Alfred with the rural idyll is made again in a line 
quoted from Pye's Alfred where the king's voice "shall teach the labourer 
of the field, the sickle and the sword by turns to wield". Alfred is an 
upholder of the agrarian value of amateurism, although not quite of the 
aristocratic variety.^
If the Anglo-Saxon myth undermines and modifies the classical 
and cosmopolitan sentiments and categories in Cartwright's writing, then 
so does his adulation of the Englsh navy. The Hieronauticon is a "naval 
temple" celebrating the "heroic spirit of the British navy". The work is 
dedicated to "Howe, Jervis, Duncan and Nelson". They are "fit companions 
for Alfred". Alfred figures so prominently because "the celebrated galleys 
of Alfred" were "the first ships ever built by the English, and consequently 
the germ of the English navy". He is the founder of a tradition. The 
present navy can do no more "in respect of defence" than was done by Alfred's 
navy. Like the militia, and perhaps even more so, the navy was seen by the 
Radicals as a defensive institution. Under threat from Napoleon it protected 
liberty in a very real sense. Had the navy's reputation "been less renowned", 
Cartwright writes, he would have planned the work on "less scale". Britain 
was a "naval nation" and in Cartwright's plans even the army or militia 
would carry flags with emblems which characterised "our troops as the 
soldiers of a naval nation". The "nautic character" has the virtues of 
"simplicity and strength" while nautical architecture should be "simple
b * Cartwright, Trident, 5, 67, 84, 103, 146, 147-8, 157, 168. 
’ Cartwright, Trident, 74, 157.
Vand strong". Britain's naval power was exhibited "by means of her naval
force, and the immensity of her shipping" through which "she visits all
seas, and every part of the terraqueous globe subject to her interest".
But the aim is or ought not to be conquest or occupation and colonisation
but commerce "by which she is enriched by the produce of every land".
On naval power depended "the protection of their colonies and commerce, and
the chastisement of those who insult their coasts". Doing this job, the
navy was the manifestation of political virtue. Cartwright was far from
alone among Radicals in associating the navy with virtue and liberty. A
design of Thomas Spence has an anchor over which there is an emblazoned cap
of liberty. This was a far cry from The Blessings of War, a pamphlet of the
-
1790s that described the navy as "a floating hell".
Patriotism, besides being connected with the figure of Alfred is
the dominating idea in The Trident in which the strong meaning of the word
is defence and unity and pride in the nation of the English people. Again,
then, the effect is to weaken and undermine any cosmopolitan or classical
meanings of patriotism. The words 'patriot' and 'Englishman' are constantly
equated. Patriotism also means that "the first paramount of national interest
is political freedom; the only legitimate cause of war, self-defence" in
order to preserve those freedoms. Once more there is reference to the
defence of the colonies and it is interesting to note Cartwright distinguishes
between the relatively unpeopled colonies which were "offsets" and "gardens"
springing from "the root of the mother country" and dependencies which are
"seed-beds" of war. There was to be no "absolute dominion at sea". The
shield, as in Britannia's shield, and the trident, signified "military,
political and moral defence". The reference to moral defence is crucial.
The Hieronauticon was "to celebrate more than nine centuries of moral virtue
in time past, and to perpetuate its continuance"; it was "the grand martial
temple of a naval nation". So that it is the object of the work, Cartwright
writes, "to call forth British genius in honour of British heroism, and to
—
perpetuate British fame".
Cartwright, Trident, 200, 58, 103, 110, 199; Cartwright, Life, Vol.I, 
334; Vol. II, 350; A.W. Waters, The Political Works of Thomas Spence, 
(Leamington Spa, 1917), plate facing pl2.
Cartwright, Trident, 18, 20, 94, 98, 102, 120.9 .
Other themes are present. Among the things to defend is property; 
there is "a scroll on which is written PROPERTY, FREEDOM, FAME and LIFE".
Yet any hint of luxury is to be avoided in the Hieronauticon or in the 
celebrations surrounding it. Cartwright looks for "the greatest simplicity 
and plainness consistent with good taste". The aim was to make the building 
and the rituals accessible to the common people. At the same time, the prin­
ciple of hierarchy was not ignored. In one ceremony, where the navy is 
preferred over the army or militia, the more meritorious swords are given 
to the higher ranks. The ceremony itself is conducted according to rank, 
the commanding admiral getting the highest honours, then the next in command 
and so on; although the lower ranks are represented. "The Arch" can be 
entered only by the king and members of parliament and "the great officers of 
government". Clearly the people's government would not do away with social 
dignity and distance. This is brought out vividly in "Sculpture no.8" called 
"Rural Happinesss". It includes a somewhat idyllic representation of agric­
ultural labourers, that is agrarian rather than urban workers, and depicts 
"in the farther distance, Windsor Castle, the residence of the shepherd of 
the people". In the Hieronauticon besides a "Hall of Alfred" there is an 
"Audience Chamber" and a "Royal Pavilion". Alfred himself is shown in 
aristocratic pursuits, for example hunting on horseback. Agrarian justice 
and redistribution obviously had its limits even though "in the presence of 
the god ... the works of every hand is equallly divine".^
These last words are a reminder that ideas about power, politics 
and hierarchy are organised through a non-secular mode of cognition. If 
religion gives the organisational content, myth determines the form.
The Trident is more than a metaphor; it is a mythical production in the full 
sense of the word. At one point, Cartwright seems to recognise the mythical 
content of the Greek legend of Neptune. "Superstition having bestowed him 
the sovereignty of the sea", he writes, "it was the business of poetry to 
invest him with all the attributes of that sovereignty; and of fable to 
embellish his history with exploits and amours". Yet, in truly mythical 
fashion he appears to take over and incorporate the basis of the legend into 
the present whereby "this metaphoric language when translated literally 
means no more than that ALBION is the most powerful, is king of the maritime 
states". Quoting from Milton, he also says "seeing that oft-times relations
vi
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hereforeto accounted fabulous have been often found to contain in them many 
footsteps and reliques of something true”. If there are elements of doubt 
and scepticism with regard to Neptume and classical myth in general, the 
credulousness is complete in the face of Alfred and his Anglo-Saxon 
democracy. The theme of the Hieronauticon is the restoration, "the right to 
restore" Alfredian principles and patriotism, in "copying antiquity" if not 
down to the last detail then certainly in its most important and essential 
parts. Besides the time question, there is glory as a sub-theme of 
The Trident . Glory is essential to the idea of the hero and consequently 
part and parcel of the structure of myth. Orgins as God, as "divine origins", 
are also present as legitimating features, as in the example of the art of 
shipbuilding which comes from "divine inspiration".^ Symptomatically, 
ritual and symbol are also important elements in Cartwright’s 'story'.
For Cartwright and others like him, the truth of myth is not its underlying 
logical structure or a formal representation of social relationships and 
structure but the extent to which this or that myth can be used to legitimate 
a current state of affairs or an ideal situation. Perhaps a better statement 
could not be found of what I mean by the term "lingering credulousness".
Monuments and altars are to be used for festivities to create a 
sort of Durkheimian "effervescence" or feeling of community solidarity and 
unity. In contrast to the pyramids which suffered from a "poverty of meaning", 
Cartwright's temple or Hieronauticon was intended to have a "political or 
moral effect". A high point in the main ceremony is where paganism in the 
form of speeches by Neptune and Albion is intermingled with Christian ritual.
On the altar is a closed book, "bearing on its cover the portrait of ALFRED". 
This perhaps symbolises political knowledge and its historical embodiment.
One of the most pervasive cultural symbols, often presented in association 
with Alfred, is the oak. "Our native storm-encountering oak" is "monarch 
of the forest, sacred to Neptune and composing the wooden walls of our state". 
In this presentation are sentiments of nature, naval pride, patriotism and 
constitutionalism. The oak was important in Cartwright's scheme of things 
for providing for the future "an assured supply of oak timber for the navy". 
Practicality and romanticism went side by side, with the heads of naval 
heroes "enriched ... with oaken wreaths". Figuring prominently in the 
victory ceremonies the oak also symbolises strength as well as nature's
11. Cartwright, Trident, 91, 93, §c.
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simplicity. Lastly, even science is presented in association with natural/
cultural symbol and myth. "Newton ... leaning against the upper horn of the
hill" has "in his left hand a rainbow ... the subject being of a historico-
allegorical kind". Not only are science and tangible nature often
represented together, but science is often represented visually, typically
for the 18th century as a sort of spectacle or entertainment in which the
12visual, aesthetic and even playful elements are mingled.
12. Cartwright, Trident, 188-9, 65, 180-83, 59ff, 62.
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APPENDIX B
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
John Baxter
A government spy described Baxter as, "a mean-looking man, sallow 
complexion, thin-faced, black hair queued, dark brown coat, black snuff 
waistcoat, about forty". If this is correct it means he was born about 
1750. In the 1790s, he was a journeyman silversmith working in Shoreditch. 
There is some mystery surrounding his early activities in the London 
Corresponding Society. The first mention of a Baxter given in the 
Society’s journal is for 14th March 1793 when Baxter is one of a special 
committee of delegates set up "to revise and consider the Constitution of 
this Society". Later, in May, it is announced that Baxter, "delegate of 
Division 16" and another delegate reported favourably on the re-admission 
of Robert Littlejohn. It is accepted that Littlejohn be re-admitted 
provided he makes an effort to "clear up his conduct" for no one doubts his 
"public spirit".
In June, Baxter brings charges of spying against another delegate,
George Lyneham. Despite Baxter's persistence, the charges are finally
rejected by the executive committee.'*' Also, Baxter is here referred to
as "Wm. Baxter, delegate of Division 16". Possibly, then, this is a
different Baxter from John Baxter. This is further suggested when both
the journal and Thomas Hardy in his historical sketch of the London
Corresponding Society - where he seems to rely on the L.C.S. journal -
refer to John Baxter presenting his credentials as delegate for Division
16 (in place of John Pierce who had emigrated to America), as if for the
first time. Although it seems unlikely that Hardy would make a mistake,
I am inclined to assume with P.A. Brown that the two Baxters are one and 
2the same person. It is possible that Pierce replaced Baxter for a 
while. And, more strongly, despite the fact that it was said of Baxter 
that "he leads a good deal as he can speak well", it seems unlikely that 
he would have risen to be chairman of the Society by November 1793, if 
he had so recently become a delegate.
Place Papers, B.M. Add. Mss., 27811
P.A. Brown, The French Revolution in English History, (London, 1918), 
72.
XIn September, he is nominated as member of the committee for 
drawing up an "Address to His Majesty". Later, along with Daniel Isaac 
Eaton he is complaining that the Address sent off was not the one drawn 
up by the committee. Baxter says it was unconstitutional and did not
3keep faith with the public. He also criticises it for its crudeness.
On 17th October 1793, he was elected as a member of the committee to 
provide instructions for delegates to the Edinburgh conference or 
convention which gave rise to the Scottish Trials. Some indication of 
Baxter's popularity, perhaps, is given by the voting figures. Margarot 
got the most, ten votes, and Baxter, along with the one other, got the 
least - six votes. The instructions the committee drew up contained the 
usual Radical demands: annual parliaments, feedom of speech and so on. 
Baxter was also put forward as delegate for Edinburgh, eligibility being 
three months membership, but - significantly perhaps - he declined the 
nomination. Margarot and Gerrald were elected.
After the Scottish Trials, Baxter succeeded Margarot as chairman. 
But other than his signature to an Address to the Friends of Peace and 
Parliamentary Reform, there is little indication of his activity during 
this period, save what comes out at Thomas Hardy's trial for treason in 
1794. in the autumn of 1794, Baxter appeared as co-defendant with 
Thomas Hardy, Horne Tooke, John Thelwall and eight others on the charge 
of high treason. After Hardy, Tooke and Thelwall were acquitted, the 
charges against Baxter were dropped. But a lot of evidence was given 
against Baxter by Gosling, the Government spy, during the course of 
Hardy's long and gruelling trial.
By 1795, Baxter and another member, Joseph Burks, had formed a 
breakaway group which split off from the L.C.S. and called itself the
4Society of the Friends of Liberty. Gwyn A Williams calls it "anarchist". 
Possibly this is based on John Baxter's remark when meeting a delegation 
from the London Corresponding Society to the Friends that, "there was not 
an individual in the Society of the Friends of Liberty but what despised 
the idea of leaders". On this occasion, there had been some misunder­
standing concerning remarks Baxter's group made about the London 
Corresponding Society's leadership. But the matter was settled amicably, 
and it is evident in this period that there is much coming and going 
between the two societies. It is also evident that the Friends of 
Liberty accepted the general leadership of the L.C.S. as still the largest 
reform society.
Place Papers, B.M.Add.Mss. 27812, 21714;3.
4. Gwyn A Williams, Aristans and Sans-Coulettes, (London, 1968), 98.
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Yet there were strains; and these often seem to centre around 
the questions of tactics and the personalities of Radical leaders, as 
much as around ideology. In August, Baxter, Burks and Bell, as a 
deputation from the Friends, waited upon the executive committee of the 
L.C.S. and were said to be "admitted to the honours of the sitting".
Their business concerned the publication of the trial of Henry "Redhead" 
Yorke. The matter had come to the Friends’ attention after one of their 
members who was passing through Sheffield - where Yorke had been tried - 
had chaired a large meeting there. The Friends also produced a letter 
from Sheffield. Francis Place, who was now an executive member of the 
L.C.S. said they should have nothing to do with it as the letter had been 
sent to the Friends and not to the L.C.S.; and he briefly crossed swords 
with Baxter over it. The L.C.S. committee ignored Place's advice but 
made some inquiries at Sheffield and Birmingham, where some money had 
been collected. In the event, they decided not to donate money to Yorke 
personally since the collections had been made for general publication of 
the state trials and Yorke was said to have personal wealth.
Other than the fact that in 1799 he is in prison suffering great 
hardship, along with many other Radicals, to my knowledge there is 
nothing much more to tell about Baxter's life. It is, though, important 
to consider his political reputation since it has a bearing on some 
broad questions to be discussed. Baxter's reputation is in fact
based on evidence given at Hardy's trial and on interpretations of a 
political pamphlet he wrote that was published in 1795.
At Thomas Hardy's trial, Gosling the government spy said Baxter 
was involved in the manufacture of pikes for revolutionary purposes. 
According to Gosling, Baxter also wanted to blow up the royal family, 
subvert the army and foment armed rebellion. Thomas Erskine, for the 
defence, accused Gosling of leading Baxter on, and he totally discredited 
Gosling as a witness. Remember this is the time of the so-called "Pop- 
Gun Plot" when there was supposedly a plot to assassinate King George 
III by means of blowing a poisoned arrow through an imitation walking- 
stick. Most of this stuff was got up by Upton, a government spy and 
agent-provocateur. Yet there was a seemingly more specific piece of 
evidence brought against Baxter at Hardy's trial. He was said to be the 
author of a handbill for a mock play entitled "A New and Entertaining 
Farce called LA GUILLOTINE or GEORGE'S HEAD IN A BASKET"... Erskine said 
that the handbill was "fabricated by spies". Edwards, also a silversmith 
and a member of the L.C.S, said the handbill Baxter had given him was of
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a different date from the one produced at the trial.^ The suggestion is 
also, I think, that its contents were milder. Whether they were or not is 
not all that important given the distinction that has been made between 
Jacobin revolutionary ideas and 'Lockeian' rebellion or 'resistance'.
P.A. Brown threw a lot of cold water on Gosling's evidence on the 
grounds that Baxter would have been arrested before he was if he had been 
involved in, among other things, the manufacture of pikes. Yet Brown says 
that he was a Jacobin and concludes that Baxter must be classed with Margarot 
and Hodgson "as leaders who seem to have dabbled in the doctrine of physical 
force".^ Brown refers to Baxter's pamphlet Resistance to Oppression, in 
support of his argument. G.S. Veitch reproduces quite an extensive quotation 
from Baxter's pamphlet and he is the only one who indicates that it might be 
something other than a revolutionary tract. He quotes a piece where Baxter 
argues that the reformers are not "reduced to the awful necessity of opposing 
Force to Force" since "the horrors of a Civil War" can be avoided through an 
"Association to obtain Redress of Grievances". This sentiment is all the 
more significant when it is remembered that the pamphlet was published in 
the famine years of 1795. Baxter appears to be advocating resistance only as 
a last resort; this point has not yet been reached. The government, if 
repressive, has not yet become a despotism. All historians have overlooked 
the way Baxter has taken over Lockean language and incorporated it into his 
own ideology, including the Lockean ambiguity towards political resistance 
and violence. Gwyn A. Williams refers to Baxter's "anarchism", his membership 
of the ultra-radical Society of the Friends of Liberty said to be "grand in 
style and French in temper", and the pamphlet as evidence of Baxter's
State Trials, (London, 1809-1826), Vol.24, 687. Edwards also said 
that pikes were made "not for a rebellion against the government; not 
against any legal power". Keeping in mind the Priestley riots 
and the activities of the anti-Jacobins and so on, many of the pikes 
would have been manufactured as a defence against these unofficial 
elements. A lot of Americans have guns in their houses but this 
does not make them revolutionaries. Private arms are often seen 
as a means of self-protection and preserving order.
6. P.A. Brown, The French Revolution in English History, (London, 1918), 
142, 143, 145~!
G.S. Veitch, The Genesis of Parliamentary Reform, (London, 1965, 
orig. pub. 1916), 323. See also Carl Cone, The English Jacobins 
(New York, 1968), 200-1, for an assessment of Baxter and an astute 
interpretation of how physical violence was related to any potential 
revolutionary situation.
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leanings. But he makes no attempt to interrogate Baxter’s ideology
in terms of paradigms, breaks and so forth. Williams also refers to
a handbill which asks for the execution of George III. This same piece
of evidence is said by John Cannon to indicate that Baxter was one of
the members of the L.C.S. whose behaviour was "unrestrained" and9"unconstitutional". Yet as mentioned before the authenticity of the 
handbill was disputed at the time.
Besides Baxter's activities in the Radical societies, there 
are two other pieces of documentary evidence: the pamphlet and his 
massive New and Impartial History of England. Williams interprets Baxter's
8 . 
9.
Gwyn A. Williams, Artisans and Sans-Culottes, (London, 1968), 98.
John Cannon, Parliamentary Reform, 1640-1832, (Cambridge, 1973), 136.
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History in a similar manner to his pamphlet. Its main object is "to 
derive the right of armed resistance from Saxon precedent".^ Earlier 
historians did not use the History and it seems that E.P. Thompson 
brought it to light. Thompson's analysis of the book is important since 
it is indicative of his analysis of Radical ideology as a whole. He 
also associates Resistance to Oppression with Baxter's taste for "more 
forceful measures" than were put forward by other reformers. Thompson 
reads the History such that Baxter emerges as a Jacobin and a Painite. 
Baxter's History shows that "Saxon precedent is almost indistinguishable 
from the state of nature, the noble savage, or the original social 
compact". From the time of the ancient Britons, Baxter reads English 
history as a history of progressive corruption. Using "industrious 
constitutional arguments" he arrives "at the right of the people to 
defy the Constitution". Alongside constitutionalist language, and in 
combat with it, ran Paine's political language of pure reason and natural 
law, unencumbered by historical precedent. But 'Gothic' ideology had 
a revival after 1793, "when Paine was driven into exile and his Rights of 
Man was banned as seditious libel". Yet, unlike the years between 1770 
and 1790 when "the theory of the Norman Yoke" or political Gothic was 
substantially authentic, it is now "in part, a matter of expediency". 
Political oppression demands that ideas be expressed in the milder 
constitutionalist language. It becomes a kind of "black propaganda". 
Baxter's "'Saxons' were Jacobin and sans-culottes to a man". But, 
shifting his ground a bit, Thompson recognises that "it was more than 
expendiency", that Gothic language still had some real currency although 
Baxter himself "felt it expedient to dissociate himself from Paine's 
total lack of reverence". Constitutionalist rhetoric "even when 
tricked out in Baxter's improbable Saxon terms ... implied absolute 
sanctions of certain conventions" including "the hereditary principle 
... the Established Church" and so on. Anyone who took up constitution­
alist political categories got "caught up in the trivia of piecemeal 
constitutional renovation"
Williams, Artisans, 73.
E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, (Pelican edn. 
1968), 94-96.
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In a detailed analysis of Baxter's book Thompson's 
interpretation is disputed. For now, only methodological implications 
are considered. Along with the other writers mentioned in relation to 
Baxter's pamphlet, the ideological question put by Williams and 
Thompson leads them to interpret the textual complexity of Baxter's 
History in a somewhat one-dimensional manner. The inherent empiricism 
of their question has led all writers into an "essentialist" reading 
of Baxter's mind; to a one-sided abstraction from a complex structured 
ideological formation.* Williams feels that Baxter's book has only an 
immediate political object. He fails to see the adoption of the 
stratagem of the Anglo-Saxon myth means that Baxter is bound to write 
English history as the history of liberty or non-liberty. He is bound 
to write it using certain conventions which have an 'epistemological' 
effect. Thompson adopts a position that is close to crude Namierism or 
vulgar Marxism which argues that ideas are never what they appear to 
be and need to be re-interpreted according to the subconscious or 'real' 
or 'essential' motives of the historical actors. Baxter's real political 
language is that of Tom Paine; the Gothic is only expediency. Thompson 
is aware of the "ambiguities of Locke" but does not see their proper 
significance in Baxter's thought. He also mentions Baxter's praise 
for a citizen militia but he is apparently not conscious of this as 
evidence of a neo-Machiavellian moment in Baxter's thought or of the 
implications it could have for his understanding of history and 
revolutions. Attachment to the ideological question precludes any 
probings along these lines. Baxter's book is not merely a functional 
thing; something that is produced by a particulur political situation 
and an attempt to legitimate a certain political position. It includes 
social descriptions that contain paradigms of an 'epistemic' nature.
More surprisingly, Thompson is at this point less aware than he ought 
to be of the question of hegemony. Since Thompson and Williams feel 
that Paineite language is the 'real' language of the more radical or
See for example Sonya Jowett "The Role of 
Language and the Development of English Political Ideas in the 
late 18th century from c. 1774 to 1785" (University of Manchester 
Ph.D. 1976) for an essentialist interpretation. Here 
constitutionalist language is used to express new ideas but the old 
vocabulary is used because it is safer.
plebeian reformers, the Gothic form can only be expedient or pragmatic. 
If Whig or constitutionalist categories are genuinely believed in they 
are a sign of domination or hegemony since they necessarily lead to 
moderate reform or "the trivia of piecemeal renovation". The question 
is never raised of whether these categories could undergo a degree of 
transformation and be adapted for purposes very different from what was 
originally intended.
Thomas Evans
On Evans' personality and political attitudes, the sources are 
conflicting and the picture has been made murkier through historians' 
selectivity. It is known for certain that he was at one time in 1798, 
a colourer of prints and later a patent brace-maker. For William Hone, 
who saw him at work in "his little shop" in Newcastle Street in the 
Strand, he appeared "as one of the plainest and most honest-minded 
men I ever saw ... had a round good, healthy fat-looking face, the very 
index of a manly mind". While "his speech was as bold and as English 
as his appearance". Sensitivity to 18th century 'language' suggests 
this is as much a political statement as it is the description of a 
person. Hone, who was later a friend of Evans wrote this in 1816. As 
early as 1797, Hone had co-operated with Evans and John Bone as represent­
atives of the London Corresponding Society in his first joint publishing 
venture. Other Radicals had different view of Evans. Samuel Bamford 
did not like him much. Bamford first seems to have come across Evans 
in the lodge in Coldbathfields prison. They did not speak and Bamford 
describes Evans as "a wordy and intemperate man". This, despite the 
fact that Bamford received financial aid from Evans' son and later 
stayed at Evans' house in Newcastle Street. Allan Davenport, his 
brother Spencean, expresses his debt "to the lectures and writings of 
Mr. Evans". But, for Francis Place, Evans' ideas and mind were mad 
and eccentric. "Evans was a strange creature", he says "with very 
contemptible reasoning power, a sort of absurd fanatic, continually 
operated upon by impulses". Evans had, Place adds, "the imagination 
of a man out of Bedlam". Evans "used to march from his house to the 
public house where ... the meetings of the society were held, with an 
old bible under his arm". The society to which Place refers was the 
Spenceans who Place disparages in terms of ideas and following. This
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point will be returned to later but for the present it is worth noticing
that Place did not always think so badly of Evans and yet it is Place
who has largely been relied on for establishing Evans' and the Spenceans'
eccentricity and wildness. Earlier, Place had listed Evans as one of
the "cleverest men I was intimately acquainted with", and at one time
had looked after Evans' wife and children. The cause of Place's change
12of view was probably a dispute over money in 1806.
If the tone of Evans' writings is shriller and more strained than,
say, those of John Cartwright it is because he suffered a lot at the hands
of the government. In 1798 or 9 he was arrested, his house was seized
and he was sent to prison for nearly three years. By his own account the
conditions were terrible. In his most well-known pamphlet he describes
how his wife and infant son were sent to prison, and how all persons
calling at his house "whatever their business" were also sent to gaol.
Evans himself was put into solitary confinement. In 1817 he was held
again, and this time not with John Baxter but with Gravenor Henson among
others. His son was arrested with him and the case caused "a great stir"
leading eventually to their unconditional discharge. Apart from the
mulatto, Robert Wedderbum, support was also forthcoming in Hone's
'Broadsheets', Cobbett's Register, the Black Dwarf, the Independent Whig
and other Radical journals where accounts of the Spenceans and their
13ideas were published.
Yet the impression got from Place and Thomas Hardy is that 
Evans' contribution to the Radical cause was marginal, while Christopher 
Hill calls him a "secondary figure". The view given is not only that 
Evans' ideas were derivative and not very important but that he was 
always involved in political groups that were in decline or did not get 
off the ground. It has been mentioned that in 1795 Evans was a member of 
the executive committee; in 1796 he is still listed as a deputy of the 
London Corresponding Society. In 1797, after the arrest of the main
* Place Papers, 27815, 27808; Henry Collins, "The London Corresponding 
Society" in Democracy and the Labour Movement, (London, 1954), ed.
John Saville, 129; Olive Rudkin, Thomas Spence § His Connections,
(New York, 1927), 96-7, 189; J. Ann Hone, "William Hone (1780-1842) 
Publisher and Bookseller: an approach to early 19th century London 
Radicalism" in Historical Studies, 16, 1974, 56; Samuel Bamford, 
Passages in the Life of a Radical, (2nd Edn. Heywood, 1839-41), Vol.I, 
109, 126; E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, 
(Pelican edn. 1968), 672; Biographical Dictionary of Modern British 
Radicals, (Sussex, 1979), (ed.) J.O. Baylen § N.J. Gossman, 165.
13. Thompson, Working Class, 191, 736; Thomas Evans, Christian Policy 
The Salvation of Empire, (London 1815, 2nd edn.) iv; Olive Rudkin, 
Spence, 159-60; Robert Wedderburn, The Folorn Hope or A Call to the 
Supine, (1st Issue n.d.).
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leadership, he became secretary. According to one historian "by this time 
it had shrank to a sect of some 200 passionate men". Yet E.P. Thompson 
has pointed to the probable existence of a large underground movement as a 
result of persecution and virtual illegality. ^
Since ideas about the Anglo-Saxon constitution were widespread 
among the London Corresponding Society membership, it is likely that 
Evans first came into contact with the myth there. They also had a certain 
currency among the Spenceans, something that is not usually given much 
notice. 'Dr' James Watson, another link between the London society and 
the Spenceans, addressing the crowd of distressed artisans and operatives 
before the Spa Fields riot told them how "ever since the Norman Conquest 
kings and lords have been deluding you”. He also made reference to 
Wat Tyler. As E.P. Thompson suggests, there was a certain ideological 
diversity among the Spenceans. Evans and Robert Wedderburn, for example, 
both gave Spence's land reform principles their own particular twist and 
emphasis. Thompson also argues that Evans was a Spencean while still 
a leader of the London Corresponding Society, whereas according to Olive 
Rudkin it was when he was released from gaol in 1801 "that he began to 
turn his attention from the United Englishmen to the Spensonians" even 
though the latter did not actually form themselves into a society until 
1807. Evans is said to have "played a leading part" in this formation.
Out of the Spensonian society, in October 1814, Evans "instituted the 
Society of Spencean Philanthropists". With historic spite, Place comments 
that "Evans ... like all fanatics thought ... he could produce a millenium" 
the Spenceans, he records, "were next to nobody and nothing ... their 
Society consisted of Evans, his son and their friends". If this is so, 
the Evanses must have had a lot of friends. It has been said the 
Spenceans were "very harmless as a body: and "never had any provincial 
branches" and "at no time numbered more than fifty persons". Thomas 
Evans' son has been quoted as "admitting" that the group or society never 
numbered above forty. Yet Evans himself says that when the Spenceans 
were founded they consisted of "4 sections and about forty members".
At a meeting of one of the sections at the Mulberry Tree in Moorfields a 
government spy reported that attendance was "to the number of 130 and 
upwards" another figure of 150 is also quoted. After 1812, writes Olive
Christopher Hill, "Norman Yoke" in Puritanism and Revolution, (London, 
1968), 113; Thompson, Working Class, 182; Gwyn A. Williams,
Artisans and Sans-Cu-lottes, 103, 107; Place Papers, 27815.
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Rudkin, the Spenceans "had become increasingly active". She adds that 
"probably their numbers grew after the outbreak of the Luddite riots". 
Also, around this time, "the principal meetings of the lower classes were 
those held by the Spenceans". Not only were they the organising force 
behind the Spa Fields Riot in 1816, they also set up the successful 
preparations for Henry Hunt's entry into London after Peterloo in 1819. 
Evans' Christian Policy went through two editions in the same year, while 
his second pamphlet which he had not "dared to publish" before is 
attributed to their increasing popularity and was published in 1818.
As Thompson points out, what Place's comment means is merely "that they 
had no wires to pull in Parliament nor in influential middle class 
circles". Place's statement is probably no more than an indication of 
the extent to which his own thinking and attitudes had become suffused 
with middle class ideas. He ought to have known, as one who had been 
active in a social movement of the working classes that a movement 
is more than the beliefs and actions of its leading enthusiasts or 
even of its 'card-carrying' members. Even today, the extent of a 
movement is obscured by concentrating on this element; in semi-legal 
and illegal conditions the visible element would have even more under­
stated the degree of support and the spread of ideas. ^
After the Society of Spencean Philanthropists folded in 1820 
as a result of the Cato Street conspiracy, Evans seems to have left 
for Manchester with his son who later became editor of the British 
Traveller and the Manchester Observer. There Evans published a life 
of Thomas Spence in 1821. He was in a good position to do so since as 
librarian of the Spenceans, he was the keeper of Spence's ideological 
heritage. As an activist and as a populariser of Spence's ideas Evans 
was, then, a "representative figure" - a primary rather than a secondary 
figure. Even more, the extent to which Evans merely transmitted 
Spence's ideas is problematical. He certainly had a few things to add 
of his own. It has been said that Evans "not only admired Spence" but 
"was personally attached to him"; that "he never criticises his leader or 
pushes forward his own ideas". At the end of his biography he compares
DRB, 165; DNB "James Watson", 921; Thompson, Working Class, 177, 
672-3, 763, 852; Olive Rudkin, Spence, 144 146, 160-1; Cole £
Postgate say that the Society of Spencean Philanthropists was formed 
in 1812. The Common People, (4th edn. London), 219.
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Spence to Jesus Christ. Yet, referring to Spence’s attention to commerce,
the same author is of the opinion that Evans "influence" on Spence "was
manifesting itself after 1798". Instead of trying to chart this 'influence'
it is probably more instructive to present two paradigms of each writers'
16*thinking.
^  * Olive Rudkin, Thomas Spence, 160-1, 189-90, 155.
:k
See text. For more biographical detail on Evans and the Spenceans 
generally see Iowerth Prothero, Artisans and Politics in Early 
Nineteenth Century London, (London, 1979), passim.
APPENDIX C
JOHN BAXTER’S SYMBOLS
The symbols in the History 'concretize' Baxter's thinking in 
that they are there not merely as ornaments or illustrations but form 
part of the argument. Even the unadorned portraits that appear in the 
book are symbols or types or figures. They are the heroes or villains 
in the age-old struggle for liberty. The frontespiece of Baxter's book 
shows in symbolic or concrete form the essence of the Radical outlook.
It shows the female figure of liberty with a shield and covered spear; 
that is the frontispiece depicts liberty as a defensive idea. She is 
defending the British constitution, in the shape of a pyramid, from the 
attacks of anarchy and despotism. Anarchy takes the form of an unclothed 
primitive and despotism is depicted as a king in full regalia. These 
figures can be taken as representing, on the one hand, uncontrolled or 
untamed nature, and, on the other hand, a surfeit of culture. Behind, 
waiting for the outcome of the struggle is a dark knightly figure gripping 
a yoke and a chain. The Englishness of the constitution is emphasised by 
the foundation stone at the base of the pyramid which has the words "Magna 
Carta" inscribed on it. One of the cornerstones has the inscription "Bill 
of Rights". The whole picture has oak leaves and acorns entwined around 
the frame. The goddess of liberty holds the spear in her right hand, 
suggesting purity combined with strength. Yet since the spear is covered 
with a cap of liberty, the suggestion is that force is subjected to 
principle. The cap, then, is associated with English rather than Gallic 
symbols. The symbol of the oak appears throughout Baxter's book. The 
Druids who derived their name from the oak, held the tree in "profound 
veneration". Two sprigs of oak are placed at the bottom of the patriotic 
Earl of Chatham. Even the engraving showing the storming of the 
Bastille is garlanded with oak. At the bottom of the frame are two 
oak branches, while just above the frame is a cap of liberty with two sprigs 
of oak underneath it. Overall, the symbols surrounding the frame are 
English rather than sans-culotte or Jacobin. Another common symbol in the 
book is the rolled parchment, suggestive of the people's age-old 
liberties and of their foundation in law. Often, the parchments have a 
pen attached to them suggesting the laws have actually been written 
down and indicating something of the fetishistic nature with which the 
Radicals regarded the written word. Sometimes the parchments are inscribed 
with the word "records", again suggesting their antiquity, and sometimes 
with the word "liberty". A gory scene showing Louis XVI's execution has
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the rolled parchment of liberty inserted into the frame. What is 
signified here is that Louis’ execution had taken place within the bounds 
of law. He had acted not as a patriot king but as an unconstitutional 
monarch. There is, therefore, despite appearances to the contrary, no 
inconsistency between the sentiments expressed in this plate and those 
symbolised in the frontispiece. As if to confirm this, Home Tooke 
appears on the next page as a patriot along with Paine, Thelwall and 
Thomas Hardy, where parchments are also in evidence. Additional evidence 
of Baxter’s ’archaic’ frame of mind comes from his discussion of Harold’s 
oath while in the hands of William of Normady. Harold’s oath was 
"exorted from him by fear" and Harold only "feigned a compliance" with 
William’s wishes to become king. The seriousness with which Baxter 
regarded oath-taking is highlighted not only by this incident but is suggested 
by Baxter's artisan background. On this, Baxter's respect for oaths gives 
support to W.H. Oliver rather than Hobsbawm. The oath represented a bond 
or contract with God and the religious basis of Baxter's mind is also 
suggested in an engraving showing George III and a wine cup with a serpent 
tangled around it. It is also reasonable to see this as symbolising 
luxury and corruption."*"
Baxter, History, Frontispiece, 798, 818, 827, 828; see also 775. 
W.H. Oliver, "Tolpuddle Martyrs and Trade Union Oaths", in Labour 
History, 10 May 1966; 7, 11, 12; E.J. Hobsbawm, "Ritual in Social 
Movements" in Primitive Rebels, (Manchester, 1971 edn. orig, pub. 
1959), 153, 163, 171.
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APPENDIX D 
EBENEZER SIBLY
It is worthwhile making an extended comment on Sibly's writings. 
For, from Cooper and from George Plant of Blackley, Samuel Bamford's 
friend, and from James Lackington, it seems that the influence of Sibly 
(and Culpepper) on the artisan mind was substantial. Sibly was himself 
the son of a mechanic and it is possible that his books are not much more 
than an attempt to present artisan lore about astrology and herbalism in 
a systematic form. Sibly's brother, Monoah, was a Swedenborgian. Sibly 
himself was a strong supporter of the Whig candidate in Ipswich; the 
significance of this can be best gauged by an examination of some of his 
writing. Nearly all of Sibly's works were published in the 1790s and 
early 1800s; a number of Nicholas Culpepper's works were also re-published 
around this time, as were William Lilly's, another 17th century astrologer 
and herbalist, and radical.'*" Sibly points out the association between 
reason and religion and astrology; these three modes of knowledge are to
Thomas Cooper, The Life of Thomas Cooper, (London, 1872), 46-7. On the 
importance of Sibly's work in the history of astrology, see Christopher 
Macintosh, The Astrologers and Their Creed, 118, where he describes 
Sibly's book as a "notable exception" in the face of the Enlightenment 
onslaught. Since I wrote this, mention has been made of Sibly in 
J.F.C. Harrison's The Second Coming: Popular Millanarianism 1780-1850, 
(London, 1979), 47-9. Harrison's treatment is brief, and he does not 
deal systematically with Sibly's ideas or mention the political or 
'analogical' aspects of his thinking; Bamford, Passages, Vol. 1, 130-1, 
135-143.
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be c o n t r a s t e d  w i th  ignorance  and s u p e r s t i t i o n .  This  knowledge i s  
d em o cra t i c  in  th e  way p o l i t i c a l  knowledge o r  edu ca t io n  i s  bu t  i t  i s  s t i l l  
co n c e iv e d  as a k in d  o f  g n o s i s .  "The i n t e l l e c t u a l  f a c u l t i e s  o f  a l l  
men", S i b l y  says ,
a r e  n o t  a l i k e  s t r o n g  and a p t  f o r  o c c u l t  s p e c u l ­
a t i o n s ;  y e t  i t  i s  m a n i fe s t  t h a t  a l l  pe rsons  a re  
capab le  o f  d e r i v i n g  g r e a t  improvements from 
r e a d i n g ;  and t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  so much the  want o f  
n a t u r a l  a b i l i t y ,  as  o f  i n d u s t r y  and a p p l i c a t i o n ,  
t h a t  so many men d i s g r a c e  the  image o f  t h e  Deity ,  
and degrade t h e  v e n e ra b le  p o s s e s s io n s  o f  D i v i n i t y ,
Phys ic  and Law . . . .
2
In keep ing  w i th  the  d e i s t i c  message ed u c a t io n  and knowledge i s  
n o t  m e re ly  s e l f - im provem e n t ,  i t  i s  a du ty  to  God. C o n t r a s t e d  w i th  
" e r r o r  o r  th e  d i s g r a c e  o f  ig n o ra n c e " ,  knowledge o r  g n os i s  i s  h o ly .  "The 
o c c u l t  p r o p e r t i e s  and q u a l i t i e s  o f  a l l  t h i n g s " ,  and t h i s  o b v io u s ly  
i n c l u d e s  p o l i t i c a l  knowledge,  " o c c u l t  causes  and e f f e c t s "  a re  " f i x e d  by 
the  hand o f  God". Also ,  " th o s e  o c c u l t  causes  and e f f e c t s ,  which a c t  
most  though th e y  a re  l e a s t  seen" lead  back to  God, " t h a t  FIRST and 
omnipo ten t  CAUSE t o  whose power a l l  second causes  a re  s u b s e r v i e n t " .
God i s  in  th e  world through r e a s o n ,  " t h e  p e c u l i a r  g i f t  o f  P rov idence" .
God i s  i n  the  wor ld d e m o c r a t i c a l l y  s in c e  the  o c c u l t  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  men 
can be u n d e r s to o d  by " a l l  men . . .  by more o r  l e s s  a l l  mankind".  What 
s t a r t e d  ou t  as  an e x e r c i s e  i n  ep is temology  becomes p o l i t i c s  s i n c e ,  " i t  i s  
t h e r e f o r e  e v i d e n t  t h a t  the  humble c o t t a g e ,  the  c l a s s i c a l  c u r a t e ,  the  
r e g u l a r  p h y s i c i a n ,  and th e  v i l l a g e  d o c t o r ,  s t a n d  on th e  same l e v e l  in  
t h i s  r e s p e c t " .3 S ib ly  a l s o  says  t h a t  God i s  known to  man through 
" s e n s e ,  p e r c e p t i o n  and r e a s o n " ,  t h a t  i s  e m p i r i c a l l y  and i n t u i t i v e l y .
This  i s  on ly  one i n d i c a t i o n  o f  h i s  deism. He b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
"an e t e r n a l ,  most powerful  and knowing being  which whether  anyone w i l l  
c a l l  i t  GOD m a t t e r s  n o t " .  But "we c e r t a i n l y  know t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
a God th a n  t h e r e  i s  any th ing  e l s e  w i thou t  u s " .  Although God i s  "an
Ebenezer  S i b l y ,  A Key to  the  Phys ic  and O ccult  S c ie n c e s ,  Opening 
to  a Mental  View the  System and Order  o f  the  I n t e r i o r  and E x t e r i o r  
Heavens; th e  Analogy Betwixt  Angels and th e  S p i r i t s  o f  Men and the  
Sympathy Between C e l e s t i a l  and T e r r e s t i a l  Bodies , (London, 1814, 
5 th  e d n . ) ,  1-2.
S i b l e y ,  A Key, 3.
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eternal mind", he is much more than this. His presence is in nature and 
in the cosmos" "the Deity is visible in all his works". He is active 
in the world on the moral and social level. "To the mercy of God", Sibly 
writes,
we owe all the blessings of this life, as the 
reward of good and virtuous actions. To his 
anger we justly attribute all violent concuss­
ions of the elements, famine, plague, pestilence 
§c brought on a wicked and abandoned people ...
The vengeance of the Deity cannot be more awfully 
described, than by David in his Psalms; which 
should act as a timely warning to those atheists 
and unbelievers, and to those wicked iolatrous, 
and polluted countries ... God is present in all 
places, nothing happens without his knowledge.
4
Astrology is compatible with religion, Sibly thought, because 
"it is expressly revealed in the scripture" that God is most perfectly 
apprehended through knowledge of heaven or the heavens. In heaven 
"he is pleased to afford a nearer and more immediate view of himself". 
Astrology therefore is the holy science for it is the science of the 
heavens. Facing one page of Sibly's book there is an astrological map of 
the heaven. Knowledge of heaven comes from "the Books of Revelation" 
and "occult philosophy" or astrology.  ^ Sibly also spells out the 
connections between belief in God, astrology and herbal remedies. He 
starts with a quotation from the Bible which states that "the Lord 
hath caused medicine to grow out of the earth". From this he reasons 
that vegetables, "the medium contrived by an all wise and omnipotent 
Creator" contain "occult virtues" for the "alleviation of human informat­
ics". Herbs and vegetables are related to astrology by analogy: "vegetables 
bear relation to the seven planets", he says. In turn, plants have 
"a signature or similitude with man". For example, "the walnut resembles 
the brain". They also act upon the disorders of the parts of the body to 
which they correspond:
truffles and potatoes ... which have a similitude 
with the testicles, wonderfully stir up and 
promote the semen; as do the parsnip ... and the 
mangel-wurzel, or root of scarcity, contribute 
much to stimulate the virile member. 6
Sibley, A Key, 5-7. 
Sibly, A Key, 7.
Sibly, A Key, 34, 35-6.
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Herbs could even be associated with patriotism in a way that 
left plenty of mental room for political analogy. Foreign herbs are no 
good. "CULPEPER recommends English herbs for an English constitution". 
Implicit here is the image of the constitution and the idea of impurity 
and the constitution and virtue. Foreign herbs lose their "virtues" in 
an English climate; the injection of virtue, of some form of Englishness, 
is necessary to restore health. This image of the constitution and the 
problem of its restoration to health or purity by means of virtue occurs 
frequently in Sibly's text. He also brings in the idea of "excess" 
and it can be imagined how Sibly would have related this to his political 
interests. "Nature is content with little", he says,
but luxury knows no bounds. Hence the epicure, 
the drunkard, and the debauchee seldom stop their 
career, till their money and their constitution 
fails .. .7
"Excess" of this kind leads to "fever" and a "poisoning" of 
the system. This is merely the moral language which underlies politics. 
The connection with politics is also made more explicit. On one page 
astrological charts supposedly explain the execution of Louis XVI and 
Marie Antoinette. "Whoever has perused by ILLUSTRATION of ASTROLOGY", 
he says,
will have seen, that in my predictions, published 
in the year 1786, I fortold the revolution in the 
French empire, and the dethronement and execution 
of the French king and queen, six years before it 
happened; with all the dreadfull (sic) consequences 
... exactly as they have since fallen out ... though 
wise the age we live in, yet few would brook the 
admonitions of a friend though they should lead 
to prosperity and riches - to glory and reknown ... 8
Astrology apprehends, "the secret operations of Nature" and 
nature affects civil society and politics. Natural or astrological 
causes have a "mundane influence". Once again England appears as the 
elect nation, the nation most favoured by divine or natural operations.
God shows "his unbounded favour to the British Isles" and "will overshadow 
and protect them". Sibly also predicts that "Germany shall be no more". 
The editor of Sibly's book adds that although Sibly did not live to see 
it, his prediction came true in 1806 with the "suppression" of the small
Sibly, A Key, 132.7.
8 . Sibly, A Key, 391.
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German states and the confederation. But astrology did not only offer an 
explanation of things through prediction, it also comprehended events 
through a vocabulary in use as political rhetoric. The French monarchy's 
downfall was written in the stars. The "Moon posited in Scorpio" gave 
Louis XVI "a taste for luxury". Luxury leads to death, to misfortune:
"he was but a man, subject to the severest reverse of fortune". Marie 
Antoinette's horoscope also shows a taste for excess. In the nativity, 
"the Moon is the lady of the ascendant, rising upon the sign of Libra, 
in the fifth house, the house of pleasure and sexual enjoyment". There 
is sufficient evidence that Marie Antoinette "was passionately fond" of 
sexual pleasure. "The sun was in his fall" and the "stars in their 
courses fought against this illustrious pair". The stars, "point out 
the testimonies of a violent and premature death". Politics is also part 
of language and knowledge. The simplicity of the English language helps 
to promote knowledge and knowledge eases communication; ease of communic­
ation smooths the workings of the economy. The English language "is the 
language of a great and powerful nation, whose fleets surround the 
globe, and whose merchants are in every port". The fact that the
English language is easy to use means it "has more perfect treatises on
9every art and science" than any other language.
Sibly, A Key, 392, 393-4; Ebenezer Sibly, A Universal System of 
Natural History Including the Natural History of Man, (London, 1794- 
1807), 449-50.
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